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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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THE
DEPARTMENT
I OF
STATE
BULLETIN
/
/
Volume LVII, Nos. 1462-U87
July S-December 25, 1967
BOSTON PUBLfCLlBRAR,
INDEX
Number
Date of Issue
Pages
Number
Dat
' of Issue
Pages
1462
July 3, 1967
1- 28
1475
Oct.
2, 1967
409-440
1463
July 10, 1967
29- 56
1476
Oct.
9, 1967
441Ht80
1464
July 17,1967
57- 84
1477
Oct.
16, 1967
481-516
1465
July 24, 1967
85-120
1478
Oct.
23, 1967
517-552
1466
July 31, 1967
121-156
1479
Oct.
30, 1967
553-592
1467
Aug. 7, 1967
157-192
1480
Nov.
6, 1967
593-628
1468
Aug. 14, 1967
193-224
1481
Nov.
13, 1967
629-664
1469
Aug. 21, 1967
225-248
1482
Nov.
20, 1967
665-700
1470
Aug. 28, 1967
249-272
1483
Nov.
27, 1967
701-732
1471
Sept. 4, 1967
273-312
1484
Dec.
4, 1967
733-772
1472
Sept. 11, 1967
313-340
1483
Dec.
11,1967
773-812
1473
Sept. 18, 1967
341-380
1486
Dec.
18, 1967
813-848
1474
Sept. 25, 1967
381^08
1487
Dec.
25. 1967
849-888
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 8360
Released April 1968
For sale by the Siiperintendenl of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 30 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $10 per year; $5 additional for foreign mailing.
INDEX
Volume LVII, Numbers 1462-1487, July 3-December 25, 1967
1667
oc
Abel, I. W., 489
Ackley, Gardner, 46, 392n, 455
Adams, Henry (quoted), 303
Adams, John Quincy (quoted), 605
Advisory Committee on Science and
Technology (Goldschmidt), 305
Afghanistan :
Agricultural commodities, agree-
ment with U.S. for sales of, 270
Technical cooperation program agree-
ment, with U.S., 270
Africa (see also individual countries):
Chinese technical assistance programs
(Bundy), 199
Contributions to U.S.: Johnson, 571 ;
Palmer, 656
Economic cooperation and develop-
ment and U.S. support for re-
gional efforts: Johnson, 32, 330,
632; W. W. Rostow, 67
Organization for African Unity:
W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88
Peace Corps activities (Palmer), 658
Preferential trade arrangements (Sol-
omon), 185
Southern, racial discrimination in
(Goldberg), 488
U.S. aid policy (Rusk), 212, 803
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach
(Johnson), 32
African Development Bank: W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 210, 212
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Sol-
idarity Organization: 495, 496;
Rusk, 491
Agency for International Development
(see also Foreign aid policy, U.S.):
Africa, policies for aid to (Rusk), 212,
803
Appropriations request fiscal year
1968 (Rusk), 208
Iran economic aid, termination:
Johnson, 827; Rusk, 825
Latin American programs. See Alli-
ance for Progress
Objectives and budget (Katzenbach),
531
Philippines (Blair), 204
Agency for the Safety of Air Naviga-
tion in Africa and Madagascar, 81
Aggression (see also China, Communist;
Communism; and Soviet Union):
OAS, final act and resolutions, 496
Prevention and suppression: Johnson,
779, 851; Katzenbach, 604, 818;
E. V. Rostow, 425; Rofere and
Schlesinger (quoted), 603; Rusk,
88,252, 348, 564, 821, 857
Aggression — Continued
U.N. Charter principles for suppres-
sion of (Lodge), 469
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Agricultural surpluses, U.S. use in over-
seas programs, agreements with
Afghanistan, 270; Brazil, 625, 698
Congo (Kinshasa), 190; Ghana
729; Iceland, 26; India, 117, 514
Indonesia, 590, 846; Israel, 309
Liberia, 698; Mexico, 770; Pakistan
154, 309; Sudan, 26; Tunisia, 770
Viet-Nam, 310, 590, 729
U.S. policy: Katzenbach, 531; Solo-
mon, 183
A.griculture (j« aha Agricultural sur-
pluses, Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization, and Food for Freedom):
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo
1968 (Freeman), 136
.\sia (Gaud), 582
Asian Development Bank Fund for
Agriculture (Gaud), 580
Europe: Schaetzel, 713; Trowbridge,
72
Farm-income problem: Freeman, 132;
Solomon, 183
India: Gaud, 583; Rusk, 211, 802
Iran: Johnson, 360; Rusk, 826
Ivory Coast (Johnson), 330
Kennedy Round concessions : 95,100;
Freeman, 132; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 577
Micronesia, land management (Salii),
377
Modernization, importance of (see
also Food and population crisis):
Fowler, 528; Gaud, 582; Gold-
schmidt, 305; Johnson, 762;
Rusk, 254; Sen (quoted), 766
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756
World Food Panel report, 76
Nepal, 709
Screwworm fly, elimination of, U.S.-
Mexico, 682
Trade problems: Freeman, 642 ; Nor-
wood, 369; Oliver, 756; Solomon,
181, 183
Viet-Nam (LUienthal), 865, 866
Water. See Water resources
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 654
AID. See Agency for International De-
velopment
Albania:
Communist China representation in
U.N., draft resolution: Fountain,
829, 830; text, 833
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Algeria:
Intergovernmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization, convention
(1965), amendment to article 28,
885
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Alianza paral el Progreso. See Alliance for
Progress
Alliance for Progress (see also Inter-
American Development Bank):
Accomplishments, goals, and U.S.
support: 717; Diaz Ordaz, 678;
Johnson, 31, 499, 717 (quoted);
Linowitz, 617; Oliver, 105, 754,
868; Rusk, 90, 210, 254, 490
Eliinination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of
(E. y. Rostow), 238
Multinational infrastructure projects:
Oliver, 104, 755, 757, 873; Rusk,
211; Solomon, 536
Sixth anniversary: Johnson, 287; Lin-
owitz, 321
Summit meeting, results and pros-
pects: 681; Johnson, 31, 498,
499; Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 103,
470, 755, 869; E. V. Rostow, 238;
W. W. Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211,
492, 493, 805; Solomon, 534
U.S. Ambassador Coerr, request by
Ecuador for recall of, 621
U.S. financial support: Oliver, 869;
Rusk, 208
Cutback in aid, probable adverse
eff'ects: Oliver, 471; Rusk, 805
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
American ideals: Blair, 207; Johnson,
303,631,653; E. V. Rostow, 609;
Rusk, 251, 255, 348, 741
Amistad Dam, 681
Amity and economic relations, treaty
of: Thailand, 438, 477, 662
Andean Common Market (Solomon),
537
Anderson, Eugenie, 365
Anderson, Robert B. (Oliver), 474
Angola, Congo mercenaries, use as
base for (Buffum), 807
Ankrah, Joseph A., 572
Antiballistic missiles. See under Missiles
Anton Bruun, RV, U.S. research vessel, 23
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.)
treaty, map, 460
Apartheid (Goldberg), 488
Apple, R. W., Jr., 416
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
891
Arab-Israeli conflict: Johnson, 325;
NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 425;
Rusk, 559
Cease-fire, importance of: 11, 12;
Goldberg, 3, 6, 9, 10, 50, 263,
690, 691; Johnson, 35, 37
Khartoum conference, prospects from
(Rusk), 388
NATO interests (Cleveland), 145
Refugees:
U.N. resolution, text, 112
U.S. aid: 400; Goldberg, 65
Johnson, 64, 65
U.S. position: U, 52; Goldberg, 8;
49, 108, 110, 111, 148, 218, 486
834, 839; Johnson, 33; E. V
Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 210, 388
416
Soviet draft resolutions: 12n, 112n
Goldberg, 5, 6, 51, 217, 842, 843
te-xt, 10, 12
Soviet position: Goldberg, 47, 109
110, 263, 834, 836; Johnson, 38
Rusk, 159
U.N. resolutions, U.S. position: Gold
berg, 108, 148, 691; Rusk, 149
U.N. role and U.S. support: 361
709; Goldberg, 3, 6, 10, 13, 47
49, 52, 110, 148, 216, 487, 690
691, 834, 840; Johnson, 33; Rusk
165, 387, 559, 561
U.N. special representative, need for
835«; Goldberg, 835, 840, 842
U.S. draft resolutions: 12«, 112n, 691.
Goldberg, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 51, 834,
836, 838; texts, 4, 7, 12, 51
Soviet position on (Goldberg), 9, 10
U.S. involvement, allegations of, and
U.S. replies: 112n; Goldberg, 3,
5, 9, 11, 48, 50, 150, 217, 262;
E. V. Rostow, 237
U.S. position: Goldberg, 3, 5, 9, 10,
47, 48, 108, 148, 216, 486, 690,
691, 834, 836, 841; Johnson, 33,
37, 39, 40; E. V. Rostow, 237,
425; Rusk, 88, 160, 210, 387, 561
U.S. press and public opinion (Gold-
berg), 8, 691
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41,
171,229,459,799
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict.
Near and Middle East, and indi-
vidual countries
Argentina:
Joint U.S.-Argentine Trade and Eco-
nomic Committee, 2nd meeting,
joint communique, 146
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 245,
378, 405, 728, 845, 846
U.S. consulate at Cordoba, closure,
246
Armaments {see also Military assistance.
Missiles, ani/ Nuclear weapons):
Arms race:
International arms traffic, problem
of: Katzenbach, 532, 795; Rusk,
733
Latin America, question of: Katzen-
bach, 797; Linowitz, 619, Oliver,
473, 757, 871
Middle East: 52; Goldberg, 7, 49,
110, 148, 486, 834, 837, 843;
Johnson, 33; Katzenbach, 532,
796; McCloskey, 652; E. V.
Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 160, 210,
215, 387, 561
Armaments — Continued
Arms race — Continued
U.S. -Soviet nuclear arms race:
Fisher, 543; McNamara, 445
Control {see also Disarmament):
Communist China, position on
(Fountain), 832
Deep ocean floor, need for arms
control measures (Goldberg),724
Cyprus, importation of (Pedersen), 53
East Europe and Soviet weapons,
threat to Western Europe: 14;
E. V. Rostow, 607; Rusk, 600
Middle East, U.S. arms shipments
policy : McCloskey, 652 ; Rusk, 387
Nigeria, Soviet supply to, U.S. posi-
tion, 320
Nuclear. See Nuclear headings
Outer space treaty, provisions: John-
son, 567; Rusk, 566
Soviet arms budget (Rusk), 558
Viet-Nam {see also Viet-Nam), Soviet
and Communist China supply of
arms (Rusk), 598
Armed forces:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position.
See Arab-Israeli conflict.
Congo (Kinshasa), foreign mercenar-
ies, U.N. resolution and U.S. sup-
port (Buflum), 151, 152, 807
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat-
ment of in time of war:
Congo (Brazzaville), 81; Kenya,
698; Kuwait, 514; Zambia, 698
NATO. ^fNATO
Philippines, settlement of claims for
pay and allowances of recognised
Philippine guerrillas, not previ-
ously paid in full, and for errone-
ous deductions of advanced salary
from the backpay of eligible Phil-
ippine veterans, agreement re,
117
U.K., proposed reduction of Asian
forces: Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259
U.S., tribute to (Johnson), 747
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Arnold, Thurman W., 475
ASA (Association of Southeast Asia):
Bundy, 198; Kaplan, 233
ASE.\N (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations): Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822
ASECNA (Agency for the Safety of Au-
Navigation in Africa and Madagas-
car), 81
Asgeirsson, Asgeir, 201
Ashmore, Harry, 462
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia
{see also Asian entries. Association of
Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, and individual
countries):
Communism, danger of: 64; Bundy,
278, 286; Johnson, 325; Katzen-
bach, 604; Marcos (quoted), 520;
Rusk, 253, 555, 560, 563, 597, 857
Economic and social development {see
also names oj countries and Regional
cooperation, infra): Gaud, 581;
Johnson, 32 61; Kaplan, 231;
Rusk, 822
Thailand, role of, 64
U.S. role: Bundy, 196; Rusk, 802
Food and population crisis. See Food
and popvuation crisis
Asia — Continued
Japan, role of: 452, 454, 745; Gaud,
581; Johnson, 32, 510, 742;
Kaplan, 233 ; Rusk, 452 ; Sato, 744
Philippines, interests and role (Blair),
205
Regional cooperation and develop-
ment: 452, 578, 615, 792; Bundy,
198, 285; Gaud, 579; Johnson,
453, 508, 612, 632, 743, 852;
Kaplan, 233; W. W. Rostow, 68;
Rusk, 214, 347, 563, 736, 804, 822
SEATO, importance to. See SEATO
U.S. commitments: Blair, 203; Bundy,
276; Johnson, 453, 852; Rusk
160, 458, 555, 563, 596, 599, 703,
821, 823, 857
Viet-Nam, importance to security
of: Blair, 206; Bundy, 195, 278,
285; Bunker, 781; Clifi"ord, 257,
258; Johnson, 520, 614, 777, 779,
851; Kaplan, 231, 234; Lee, 613;
E. V. Rostow, 426, 608; W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 90, 252, 344,
347, 740, 857 ; Souvanna Phouma,
654; Taylor, 259
U.S. relations and role: Bundy, 195;
Gaud, 580; Johnson, 614, 615;
Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach, 819
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
World peace, importance to (Gaud),
580
"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604;
Rusk, 596
Asian, Southeast, Ministerial Confer-
ence for Economic Development:
454; Rusk, 452
Asian, Southeast, Ministers of Educa-
tion Secretariat: Bundy, 198; Gaud,
580; Johnson, 509
Asian and Pacific Council: Bundy, 198;
Gaud, 597; Johnson, 509; Kaplan,
233; Rusk, 822
Asian Development Bank: Bundy, 198;
Kaplan, 233; Katzenbach, 335;
Rusk, 214, 559, 822
Japan, support of: 454; Johnson, 510,
742 ; W. W. Rostow, 68 ; Rusk, 452
Special funds for, U.S. support: 454,
578; Gaud, 580, 581; Johnson,
508; Rusk, 210, 456, 458
Asian Labor Ministe.s, Conference of:
Bundy, 198; Gaud, 579
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council
Association of Southeast Asia: Bimdy,
198; Kaplan, 233
Association of Southeast Asian Nations:
Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822
Astronauts, envoys of mankind (Dean),
566
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, 3rd annual re-
port: 302; Johnson, 302
Atlantic partnership: Harriman, 18;
Leddy, 762
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of:
Agreements re application of safe-
guards. See under Atomic Energy
Agency, International
Civil uses, bilateral agreements with:
Norway, 26; South Africa, 222,
309
892
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Atomic energy — Continued
Middle East programs, U.S. support
(Goldberg), 218
Nonproliferation treaty, draft, pro-
visions for peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions: 319; Foster, 316
PLOWSHARE nuclear craterin^ ex-
periments re interoceanic sea-level
canal feasibility study (Johnson)
302
Safeguards. See Atomic Energy
Agency, International
U.S. -Japan cooperation, 747
Atomic Energy Agency, International:
lltli general conference, U.S. delega-
tion, 476
Safeguards:
-Agreement with U.S. and Indonesia
for application of, 81
Agreements re application of safe-
guards to existing bilateral agree-
ments: Japan, 809; South Africa,
270
U.S. nuclear activities, proposal for
application of: 319; Johnson, 863
Statute (1956) as amended: Honduras,
153; Uganda, 378
Attlee, Lord, death of (Johnson), 568
Australia (ice also Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization):
Asian students in (Bundy), 199
Observers for Viet-Nam election
(Lodge), 350
Trade preference arrangements with
less developed counti-ies (Solo-
mon), 186
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 589,
625, 728
LT.S. exports, probable effect of U.S.
preferential trade legislation :
Fowler, 651; Rusk, 635
U.S. military alliance (Rusk), 563
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
Holt (quoted), 520; McNamara,
169; Rusk, 91, 92, 391, 599
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Austria:
Kennedy Round tariff reductions,
97, 100
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 625,
846
Automotive products, U.S. -Canada
Automotive Agreement, 1965: 45;
Reynolds, 140
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic
Aviation:
Air services technical talks vdth Soviet
Union completed, 820
Air transport, Micronesia, needs
(Norwood), 370
Aircraft:
G-130 transport aircraft, U.S. aid
to Congo (Kinshasa) : Buffum, 1 52
U.S. accidental overflights of Com-
munist China: Bundy, 355;
Bunker, 421
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air navigation equipment, agree-
ment with Germany re lease of, 8 1 0
Air navigation services, joint fi-
nancing services in:
Greenland and the Faroe Islands,
current actions: India, 769
Iceland, current actions: India,
769
Aviation — Continued
Treaties — Continued
Air transport agreements with:
Bolivia, 54; Mexico, 589, 625;
Panama, 54
Aircraft, international recognition
of rights in, convention (1948);
Thailand, 697
Aircraft, offenses and certain other
acts committed on board, con-
vention (1963): Netherlands, 117
Aircraft operated on or on behalf of
the U.S., agreement with ASE-
CNA re services and facilities for,
81
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
B
Babbidge, Homer Daniels, Jr., 332
Baggs, William, 462
Bahamas, industrial property conven-
tion (1883, as revised), application
to, 662
Bahamas Proving Ground, agreement
with U.K., re withdrawal of the
senior member of the British Armed
Forces posted there, 309
Balagucr, Joaquin, 620
Balance of payments:
Japan, 452, 746
Latin America (Solomon), 537, 533
U.K. pound devaluation, cooperative
adjustments to offset effect of:
Fowler, 793; OECD communique,
882; E. V. Rostow, 879
U.S.: 452, 746; Freeman, 132; John-
son, 266, 852; Reynolds, 137
Foreign aid programs, effect on:
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V.
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209
Foreign travel, effect on: 828; E. V.
Rostow, 879
U.S. exports, effect on: Fowler, 650;
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 688;
Udall, 638
Viet-Nam, effect of: 45; E. V.
Rostow, 879
World monetary system, adjustments
(Fowler), 524, 526
Ball, George, 462, 661, 759 (quoted)
Banda, H. Kamuzu, 43
Barbados:
GAS membership (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 190,
270, 309, 404, 438, 550, 590, 846.
U.S. Ambassador (Mann), confirma-
tion, 478
Harnett, Peter, 596
Harnett, Robert W., 586
Bator, Francis: 392n; Fowler, 393
Belgium:
Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc-
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge,
131
Observers for Viet-Nam elections
(Lodge), 350
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 378,
478, 625, 769, 770
Benjamin, Robert S., 489
Bennett, Ivan L., Jr., 76, 874
Berlin (see also Germany): Hrzezinski,
21; Cleveland, 142; Katzenbach,
335; NAG, 14; Rusk, 600
Bernardes, Carlos A. (Goldberg), 52
Bhumibol Adulyadej, 62, 63
Big-power responsibility: Brzezinski, 22;
Bundy, 285; Bunker, 781; Johnson,
35, 38, 59, 325, 853; Kaplan, 234;
Katzenbach, 334, 534, 604, 818;
Kiesinger, 329; Lee, 613; Oliver,
474; E. V. Rostow, 423, 428, 606,
609; Rusk, 251, 348, 564, 735, 807;
Sato, 744
BIRPI (International Bureaus for the
Protection of Industrial and Intel-
lectual Property), Trowbridge, 505
Bismarck, Kail Otto (quoted), 328
Black, Eugene (Johnson), 508
Blair, William McCormick, Jr., 203
Bogdan, Corneliu, 202
Boggs, Neil, 352, 464
Bolivar, Sim6n (quoted), 618
Bolivia:
Communism, danger of: Johnson,
683; Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach,
533; Rusk, 210, 490, 493
OAS final act and resolutions, texts,
493
Guevara, Ernesto "Che", report of
death (Rusk), 561
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 697
Bolton, Frances (Palmer), 658
Bonin Islands, question of return to
Japan: 745; Rusk, 457, 459
Botswana :
World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund membership (Fowler),
523
World Meteorological Organization
convention, 1947, accession, 624
Bowers, Raymond, 585
Bowie, Robert R., 16
Bowles, Chester (quoted), 583
Boyd, Alan S., 455
Braderman, Eugene M., 78
Brandeis, Louis D. (quoted), 107
Brazil:
Former President Castello Branco,
death of (Rusk), 159
International coffee agreement exten-
sion, U.S. -Brazil discussions: 799;
Oliver, 756
Nonproliferation treaty, reservations
to (Rusk), 388
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 625, 698
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 211
Brezhnev, Leonid I. (Cleveland), 143
Brodie, Henry, 725
Broomfield, Wilham S., 489, 844
Brosio, Manlio, 859, 860
Brown, Harold (McNamara), 448
Brown, L. Dean, 625
Hrown, Winthrop G. (quoted), 232
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 19
Buffum, William B., 46, 151, 152, 489.
807
Bulgaria:
Safety of life at sea, international
convention (1960), acceptance,
770
U.N. role in Viet-Nam negotiations,
position on (Goldberg), 670
Bull, Odd: 12n; Goldberg, 4
Bundy, William P., 195, 260, 275, 352,
462
Bunker, Ellsworth: 416, 584, 748, 781;
Johnson, 707; Rusk, 557
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
893
Burma:
Communism, danger of: Johnson,
520; Rusk, 164, 560, 563, 597, 822
U.N. Charter amendments to article
109, ratification, 81
Bushy, Horace, 476
Butler, Samuel, 794
Butterworth, W. Walton, 46
Callahan, James, 396, 793
Cambodia:
Communist use as base for Viet-Nam
infiltration (Rusk), 89, 412
Neutrality: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89,
412, 558, 597
Cameroon:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 514
U.S. visit of President Ahidjo: 654;
Palmer, 657
Canada:
Asian Development Bank, support for:
Gaud, 580; Johnson, 510
Champlain waterway, IJC feasibility
study, report, 107
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
Aflairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
Kennedy Round:
Antidumping legislation: 97, 99;
Roth, 126; Trowbridge, 131
Tariff reductions: 98, 99, 100;
Johnson, 884; Katzenbach, 688;
Roth, 178; Trowbridge, 128
U.S. replacement of interim staging
arrangements by Kennedy Round
staging, proclamation, 800
Oil exports to U.S. (Udall), 641
Pembina river bjisin, IJC report, 874
Trade restrictions on U.S. exports
reduction, 860, 861
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
190, 337, 378, 549, 589, 625, 698,
728, 770, 885
Canadian Bank Act, 45
Cantinflas (Johnson), 674
Carrillo Flores, Antonio, 684
Castello Branco, President, death of
(Rusk), 159
Castroism {see also Cuba) : Johnson, 498;
Linowitz, 322, 616; Oliver, 473, 757;
Rusk, 210, 490, 805
Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, 462
Central African Republic, U.S. Ambas-
sador (Lewis), confirmation, 478
Central American Common Market:
Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 1 05, 47 1 , 870;
Rusk, 211; Solomon, 534
Central American States, Organization
of, 697
Ceylon, treaties, agreements, etc., 54,
404, 661
Chad, U.S. Ambassador (Vance), con-
firmation, 310
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text),
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684
Chancellor, John, 390
Chandrasekhar, S. (Gaud), 583
Chile:
Inflation control (Solomon), 539
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 846
U.S. aid (Katzenbach), 531
Chile — Continued
U.S. Ambassador (Korry), confirma-
tion, 337
China, Communist {see also Aggression
and Communism) :
Asia, throat to: 744; Fountain, 831;
Katzenbach, 604, 796; Marcos,
520 (quoted); Rusk, 164, 347, 563,
564, 596, 821
Containment of: Katzenbach, 819;
Rusk, 598, 704
Leadership and policy, problems:
Bundy, 356; Bunker, 421; Kaplan,
230; Rusk, 347, 389, 415, 563
Military bases, use by North Viet-
Nam planes, question of (Rusk),
389, 416
Nuclear potential and U.S. strategy:
Fisher, 543; Katzenbach, 819;
McNamara, 449; E. V. Rostow,
610; Rusk, 164, 563
U.N. membership:
Communist conditions for (Foun-
tain), 831
U.N. resolutions, texts, 833
U.S. position: Fountain, 829; Rusk,
389, 390
U.S. accidental overflights: Bundy,
355; Bunker, 421
U.S. involvement as a result of Viet-
Nam, questions of: Bundy, 283,
357; Bunker, 420; Kaplan, 234;
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 564
U.S. relations: Johnson, 32; Kaplan,
234; Katzenbach, 820; E. V.
Rostow, 430; Rusk, 390, 415, 739
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Viet-Nam :
Military aid: Bundy, 3.56; Gold-
berg, 672; Lodge, 467; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 598, 600
Position on: Fountain, 832; Rusk,
164, 558
"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604;
Rusk, 596
China, Republic of:
Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581,
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 214, 822
Population control (Gaud), 583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309,
625
U.N. membership, question of ex-
pulsion from (Fountain), 829, 830
Draft resolution, text, 833
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement and text, 694
U.S. mutual defense treaty, map:
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. scientific team, report of: 585;
Johnson (quoted), 585
Christian, George, 349, 864
Churchill, Sir Winston (quoted), 251,
263, 530, 791
Civil emergency planning, agreement
with Canada re cooperation on, 378
Civil rights {see also Human rights and
Racial discrimination) :
U.S.: Goldberg, 488; Linowitz, 322,
618; E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk,
491, 856; Waters, 765
Women. See Women
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva
convention (1949) re: Congo
(Brazzaville), 81; Kenya, 698; Ku-
wait, 514; Zambia, 698
Claims:
Lake Ontario international arbitral
tribunal, immunities as inter-
national organization, Executive
order, 507
Micronesia, post World War II
damage claims: Anderson, 365;
Norwood, 373
Philippine veterans and recognized
guerrillas, agreement re, 117
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico),
settlement, 261
Clark, Robert E., 411
Cleveland, Harlan, 16, 141
aifford, Qark M., 256
Cocoa, international agreement, im-
portance: Oliver, 756; Solomon, 182
Coerr, Wymberley DeR., 621
Cofi'ee:
Diversification fund, U.S. support
(Solomon), 182
International coffee agreement
(1962), with annexes:
Current actions: Barbados, 117;
Bolivia, 697; Israel, 661
Extension, need for: Brazil-U.S. dis-
cussions, 799; Mexico-U.S. sup-
port, 682; Oliver, 756
Collective security {see also Mutual
defense) :
Asia-U.S.: Bundy, 278; Johnson, 852;
Rusk, 415, 458, 555, 563, 596,
598, 703, 823, 857; Souvanna
Phouma, 654
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, U.S.
bases, 745
U.N. principles and U.S. support
(Rusk), 87, 252
U.S. collective defense arrangements
(map), 460
U.S. commitments, importance:
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 16, 779,
853; Katzenbach, 336; E. V.
Rostow, 608; Rusk, 91, 252, 704,
857
U.S. national interests: Katzenbach,
334; E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 597
U.S. nuclear strategic policy: Gold-
berg, 488; McNamara, 443
Collisions at sea, international regula-
tions (1960) for prevention of:
Czechoslovakia, 270
Colombia:
Communism, threat of (Katzenbach)
533
Cotton textiles, arrangement re inter-
national trade, protocol, accept-
ance, 625
Inflation control (Solomon), 539
Interoceanic canal study commission,
3rd annual report: 302; Johnson,
302
Colombo Plan (Bundy), 199
Colonialism {see also Self-determina-
tion), Viet-Nam, French colonial
period, review (Bundy), 275
Commerce, Department of, 70n
Commodity trade problems: Norwood,
369; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 181
894
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Common markets. See name of market
Communications, {see also Radio and
Telecommunications):
Asia, role of Asian Development Bank
in development (Gaud), 581
Satellites:
Domestic svstems, importance (John-
son), 299
Global commercial communications
satellite system:
Interim arrangements: Kenya,
589; Panama, 624; Tanzania, 26
Special arrangements: East Airi-
can External Telecommunica-
tions Co., Ltd., 26, 589; Panama,
624
Importance of and U.S. policy
(Johnson), 296
Italv: Johnson, 500; Saragat, 501
N.VrO: Cleveland, 145; E. V.
Rostow, 428
U.S. policy task force, appointment:
301n; Johnson, 301
Communications Satellite Corporation
(Johnson), 297
Communism (see also Aggression ; China,
Communist; and Soviet Union):
Asia. See under Asia
Coexistence: Goldberg, 483, 791;
Rusk, 563, 564
Cold v/ar (see also East-West relations) :
Katzenbach, 817
Domino theory : Bundy, 281 ; Johnson,
851; Rusk, 347, 560
Economic and social conditions, effect
on: 496; Johnson, 851 ; Linowitz,
322; Katzenbach, 530
Increasing fragmentation of militant
ideological movements : Brzezinski,
19;Leddy, 761
Rejection and countermeasures;
Humphrey, 789; Linowitz, 617;
Ohver, 473; Rusk, 214, 490, 493,
563
O.AS final act and resolutions,
texts, 493
U.S. foreign policy: Brzezinski, 22;
Katzenbach, 817; E. V. Rostow,
606
U.S. role: Blair, 207; Johnson, 519,
522; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach,
530; Rusk, 344, 563, 704, 741, 806,
824
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Wars of national liberation: Bundy,
283; E. V. Rostow, 426, 608;
Rusk, 92, 252, 601, 703
World goals: Kaplan, 230; Katzen-
bach, 819; Rusk, 491, 600
Corapton, Arthur (quoted), 862
COMSAT. See Global communications
satellite system under Commuica-
tions: Satellites
Conferences, international (^see also
subject), calendar, 24, 435
Confucius (quoted), 614
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
(Kinshasa) :
Agricultural commodities sales agree-
ment with U.S., 190
Intervention in, U.N., resolutions and
U.S. support (Buffum, 151, 152,
807
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), Ge-
neva convention (1949) re pro-
tection of civilian persons in time
of war, current actions, 81
Congress, U.S.:
Africa, interest in (Palmer), 658
Documents relating to foreign policy,
lists, 79, 107, 147, 215, 239, 364,
511, 718, 807, 885
Foreign policy responsibilities (Kat-
zenbach), 333
Joint resolutions, Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, status of, text,
363
Legislation:
Alliance for Progress, U.S. financial
support: Linowitz, 619; Olivei',
755; Rusk, 805
Foreign aid, 1967, cutback in:
Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver, 471,
758; Rusk, 208
Inter-American Development Bank,
U.S. financial support (Johnson),
499
Micronesia, budget (Norwood), 366
Military aid poHcies (Oliver), 757
Poland, tariff legislation (Gro-
nouski), 434
Legislation, proposed:
American Selling Price system of
customs evaluation: Johnson, 885;
Roth, 173, 575; Trowbridge, 131
Asian Development Bank, Special
Fund: 454, 578; Gaud, 531;
Johnson, 503; Rusk, 210, 458
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, additional
funds and time extension re-
quests: 302; Johnson, 302
Import quotas on extra long staple
cotton, elimination of (E. V.
Rostow), 236
Kennedy Round implementation :
Johnson, 885; Katzenbach, 688;
Roth, 575
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504
Tax increase (Johnson), 266
Trade Expansion Act negotiating
authority, restoration of: Kat-
zenbach, 689; Roth, 576, 649;
Rusk, 636
Trade protectionist bills, adverse
effect on Kennedy Round re-
sults and U.S. trade: Diaz Ordaz,
677, 681; Freeman, 642; Fowler,
650; Johnson (quoted), 877;
Katzenbach, 686; E. V. Rostow,
877; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634;
Trowbridge, 645 ; Udall, 638
Legislative schedule, determination of
(Rusk), 458
Presidential messages, letters, and re-
ports. See under Johnson, Lyndon
B.
Public hearings, problems of (Rusk),
560
Senate advice and consent:
International grains arrangement
(Johnson), 716, 885
OAS Charter amendments (John-
son), 78
Senate concurrent resolution, U.N.
role in Viet-Nam solution (Gold-
berg), 667
Senate confirmations, 46, 246, 310,
337, 478, 489, 625, 729
Congress, U.S. — Continued
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 780;
Katzenbach, 603; Rusk, 560, 563
Conservation and development of nat-
ural resources, U.S. -Japan coop-
eration: 454; Rusk, 452
Consular relations:
Argentina, U.S. Cordoba consulate
closed, 246
France, U..S. consular convention rati-
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885
Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened,
698
U.K., Edinburgh and Liverpool ele-
vated to consulates general, 310
U.S. Embassy at Saigon, dedication
(Bunker), 584
Vienna convention (1963): Cam-
eroon, 26; Panama (and optional
protocol), 477
Entry into force, 81
Cooper, John Sherman, 562
Copyright convention, international
(1952), extension to St. Vincent, 661
Corner, Frank H., 13
Corona, Achille (Rusk), 855
Corwin, Edward S. (quoted), 333
Costa Mendez, Nicanor, 146
Costa Rica:
Sea-level canal study commission, 3rd
annua] report: 302 ; Johnson, 302
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 153,
405, 697
Costello, William A., 478
Cotton, extra long staple cotton exports
to U.S., proposed closure of (E. V.
Rostow), 236
Cotton textiles:
Argentine imports to U.S., 146
Bilateral agreements with: China,
625, 694; Hong Kong, 54; India,
378, 398; Israel, 154, 243
Jamaica, 590, 622; Malta, 23, 81
Mexico, 26; Pakistan, 114, 154
PhUippines, 511, 550; Portugal
548, 625; Spain, 625, 726
Turkey, 116, 117; U.A.R., 625
Yugoslavia, 506, 625
International trade arrangements
(1962), Poland, 770
E.xtension of: 95, 98; Johnson, 884;
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 127;
Solomon, 181; Trowbridge, 130,
647
Protocol, current actions: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, India,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, 624; Paki-
stan, 222; Poland, 770; Portugal,
624, 729; Spain, Sweden, 624;
Turkey, 222; U.A.R., U.K. (in-
cluding Hong Kong), 624
Less developed countries, trade con-
siderations (Solomon), 187
Council of Europe (Rusk), 856
Counterfeiting, international convention
(1929) and protocol for the suppres-
sion of counterfeiting currency,
Ceylon, 54
Couve de Murville, Maurice (W. W.
Rostow), 65
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
895
Crnobrnja, Bogdan, 362
Crockett, Kennedy M., 246
Cruz, J. V. (quoted), 832
CSDI (Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions), 462
Cuba:
Alliance for Progress, U.S. position on
participation (Linowitz), 617
Free-world and Communist trade:
OAS, 496; Rusk, 491, 493
GATT provisional accession agree-
ments, current actions, 405
International Sugar Agreement, lack
of support for (Solomon), 182
Subversion and insurgency: Johnson,
683; Katzcnbach, 532, 797; Lino-
witz, 322, 617; Oliver, 473; Rusk,
210, 252, 383, 490,493
OAS final act and resolutions, texts,
493
U.S. trade embargo: E. V. Rostow,
236; Rusk, 492
Cuban missile crisis: Brzezinski, 21;
Katzenbach, 818
Cultural relations and programs {set also
Educational exchange programs and
Foreign students in the U.S.):
African contributions to U.S.: John-
son, 571; Palmer, 659
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials:
Importation of, UNESCO agree-
ment (1950), and protocol, Kenya,
697
International circulation of visual
and auditory materials, agreement
(1949) for facilitating, Malawi,
245
International Education and Cultural
Exchange Program, annual report
(Johnson), 303
International fairs program. Execu-
tive order, 827
Mexico-U.S., 682
Philippines, cultural development
tiust fund, agreement re use of
Special Fund for Education for
establishment of, 337
Romania, 1968 exchanges program,
agreement, 875
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs, members confirmed, 332
Customs:
Garnets, TIR, customs convention on
the international transport of
goods under, Ireland, 270
Road vehicles, private, convention
(1954) on the temporary importa-
tion of, Ireland, 438
Touring, customs facilities, convention
(1954) on: Ireland, 438; Uruguay,
514
U.S. -Canada duty-free allowances,
proposals, 45
Cyprus (NAG), 15
Threat of war lifted, U.S. and U.N.
roles: Johnson, 859; Vance, 860
UNFIG\T, 6-month extension, 53n
U.S. pledge (Pedersen), 52
Czechoslovakia, treaties, agreements,
etc., 270, 309, 405
D
Daane, J. Dewey: 392n; Fowler, 393
Dagens Nyheler, transcript of Secretary
Rusk interview, 91
Dahomey, Peace Corps program, agree-
ment re establishment of, 154
Davis, Spencer, 385
De Oliveira, J. G., 881
De Tocqueville (quoted), 328
Dean, Sir Patrick, 565
Debrah, Ebenezer Moses, 578
Defense (see also Collective security and
Mutual defense):
National security, oil import control
program (Udall), 639
Nuclear strategy (McNamara), 443
Defense, Department of:
Defense expenditures review (John-
son), 267
Military assistance appropriations,
proposed transfer to budget of
(Rusk), 208
Deming, Frederick L.: 392n; Fowler,
393
Democracy and democratic processes
Humphrey, 791 ; Johnson, 522, 572
Linowitz, 618, 620; Norwood, 374
E. V. Rostow, 606
Nepal (King Mahendra), 708
Denmark:
Farm-income support practice (Free-
man), 134
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221,
589, 625, 809, 845, 845
Desalination (Rusk), 738
Iran: 361; Johnson, 360; Shah
Pahlavi, 360
Middle East: Goldberg, 487; John-
son, 34
U.S. -Mexico cooperative projects, 682
d'Estaing, Giscard (quoted), 710
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo: 674, 675, 677;
Johnson, 683
Diori Hamani, 541, 542
Diplomatic relations and recognition:
Ecuador, recall of U.S. Ambassador
requested, 621
Retaliatory trade legislation, proposed
(E. V. Rostow), 236
Southern Yemen, 861
Vienna convention (1961): Nigeria,
221 ; Norway, 769
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See
Foreign Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S.,
presentation of credentials: Ecua-
dor, 431 ; Ghana, 578; Greece, 507;
Italy, 13; Jamaica, 431; Japan, 69;
Jordan, 362; Malawi, 507; New
Zealand, 1 3 ; Poland, 43 1 ; Romania,
202; Togo, 202; Yugoslavia, 362
Dirksen, Everett M. (Johnson), 40
DiSaUe, Michael, 476
Disarmament {see also Armaments and
Nuclear weapons), U.S. position;
319, 744; Foster, 317; Goldberg,
488; Johnson, 295; Leddy, 761;
NAC, 14; Rusk, 90, 738
Disaster relief, Rio Grande floods: 680;
Diaz Ordaz, 674; Johnson, 673
Disputes, compulsory settlement of,
optional protocol on Vienna con-
vention, Norway, 769
Disputes, pacific settlement of {see also
Investment disputes, convention):
171; Dean, 566; Rusk, 87
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 565
Dominican Republic:
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto
Rican Economic Commission, an-
nouncement, 620
Political stability (Oliver), 871
U.S. role (Rusk), 211
Double taxation, income, agreements
and conventions for the avoidance
of: Canada, 698, 770; France, 268,
270; Malawi, 337; Trinidad and
Tobago, 698, 729
Drugs, narcotic:
Single convention (1961), on: Malay-
sia, 270; Philippines, 661; U.S.,
153
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in control of,
682
Drury, Charles M., 46
Duncan Reservoir, agreement with
Canada re special operating pro-
gram, 54
Dzu, Truong Dinh, 416
E
East-West Center for Technical Inter-
change, Hawaii (Norwood), 372
East-West relations: Brzezinski, 23;
Goldberg, 483; Katzenbach, 817;
NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 610;
Schaetzel, 711; Waters, 767
Detente: 14; Cleveland, 142; Kie-
singer, 326, 327; Leddy, 760;
Rusk, 90, 600
NATO role: E. V. Rostow, 427;
Rusk, 600
U.S. efforts to improve: 454; Gro-
nouski, 434; Harriman, 18; John-
son, 16, 32; Rusk, 600, 856
Viet-Nam, effect of (Kaplan), 234
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966
(Rusk), 600
Eastwind, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker,
362
EGA (Economic Commission for Africa) :
Goldschmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow,
68
ECAFE (Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East): Gaud, 579;
Goldschmidt, 304
EGLA (Economic Commission for
Latin America): Goldschmidt, 304
Economic and Social Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 308, 404, 438, 694
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials, importation of, agree-
ment ( 1 950), and protocol, Kenya,
697
Food aid for developing countries,
U.S. support for resolution on
(Goldschmidt), 304
Economic and social development {set
also Economic and technical aid.
Foreign aid programs. Organization
for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, and name of cvuntry):
Jolinson, 32, 330; W. W. Rostow, 67
Asia. See Asia
Bonin Islands, 459
Communism, as a countermeasure to:
496; Johnson, 851; Katzenbach,
530; Linowitz, 322, 618
Education, importance to (Bundy),
197
Europe: Brzezinski, 22; Schaetzel, 710;
Trowbridge, 72
896
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic and social development —
Continued
Hunger, disease, ignorance, key fac-
tors: Hiimpiirev, 792; Johnson,
59, 325, 570, 632, 655, 707, 753,
851 ; Linowitz, 617; E. V. Rostow,
424, 610; Rusk, 209, 255
Industrialized countries, role of: 329,
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32,
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876;
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon.
183, 185; Waters, 767
Internal stability, relation to, U.S.
military assistance role: Katzen-
bach, 533, 795; Oliver, 758, 871;
Rusk, 215, 806; Waters, 764
Latin America. See Alliance for Prog-
ress
Less developed countries. See Less
developed countries
Micronesia: Anderson, 365; Johnson,
363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376
Middle East, U.S. position and sup-
port: Goldberg, 9, 108, 148, 218;
Rusk, 210
Multilateral coordination, need for:
Johnson, 331, 763; Katzenbach,
334
Nepal: 709; Johnson, 706, 707
PhUippines (Blair), 205
Political stability, importance: John-
son, 632, 778, 851; Katzenbach,
334; Rusk, 210, 214, 806; Waters,
764
Principles for: Johnson, 42; Oliver
472,872; Rusk, 208
Private enterprise, role of: Gaud, 581 ;
Linowitz, 324; Oliver, 104; Rusk,
209
Self-help: 745; Fowler, 527; Gaud,
582 ; Johnson, 499 ; Linowitz, 618 ;
Oliver, 470
Singapore (Johnson), 612, 614
U.S.: Brzezinski, 21; Johnson, 267;
E. V. Rostow, 878; Rusk, 255
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; Johnson,
16, 632; Katzenbach, 335, 530;
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 801
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Economic and technical aid (see also
Agency for International Develop-
ment, Agricultural surpluses. Alli-
ance for Progress, Economic and
social development. Foreign aid pro-
grams, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, International Bank, and
Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development) :
Organization of Central American
States, agreement with U.S. for,
current actions: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, 697
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair),
204
Economic Commission for Africa: Gold-
schmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow, 68
Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East: Gaud, 579; Goldschmidt,
304
Economic Commission for Europe (E.
V. Rostow), 428
Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica (Goldschmidt), 304
Economic policy and relations, U.S.:
Domestic policy:
Farm programs geared to pressing
foreign needs (Johnson), 763
Farmers, benefits to, of Kennedy
Round concessions (Freeman),
133, 642
Great Society program, need for
(E. V. Rostow), 61 1
Income taxes, proposed 10-percent
surcharge: Johnson, 266; E. V.
Rostow, 878; Trowbridge, 504
State of the budget and the economy
(Johnson), 266
Foreign policy:
Agricultural trade policy objectives:
Freeman, 135, 642; Roth, 179;
Solomon, 183
Kennedy Round [see under Tai-iffs
and trade, general agreement on)
U.S. business, effect on: Reynolds,
137; Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 127
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social
Council, U.N.
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel
Community
Ecuador:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 337
U.S. Ambassador, recall requested,
621
Eden, Anthony, 276
Edisto, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, 362
Education, 303
Education {see also Cultural relations
and programs; Educational ex-
change programs, international;
Foreign students in the U.S.):
AID technical training programs
(Katzenbach), 532
Asia: Bundy, 197; Gaud, 579, 580
Benito Juarez-Abraham Lincoln schol-
arships, 681
"Brain drain": 585; Bundy, 197;
Oliver, 1 06 ; Schaetzel, 712; Trow-
bridge, 71, 74
Communications satellites, importance
to (Johnson), 296
Importance (Johnson), 303, 569
Iran (Johnson), 358
Labor adjustment assistance program,
training opportunities (Reynolds),
140
Latin America (Oliver), 105, 472, 757
Micronesia: Norwood, 371, 373;
Salii, 377
Nepal (Johnson), 707
OECD study (Trowbridge), 72
Philippines, Special Fund for Educa-
tion, agreements re uses of, 26,
117. 337
Science cooperation agreement with
Italy, 80
Southeast Asian Ministers of Educa-
tion Secretariat (Bundy), 198
Thailand, 64
TV and other new media: Johnson,
570, 614; Linowitz, 619; Norwood
370; Oliver, 757
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs, members confirmed,
332
U.S. intellectuals, foreign policy role
(Gronouski), 432
Education — Continued
Women, U.N. Commission on the
status of, report of 20th session
(Tillett), 219
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials:
Agreement (1949) for facilitating in-
ternational circulation of visual and
auditory materials: Malawi, 245
Importation of, UNESCO agreement
(1950), and protocol: Kenya, 697
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, U.N. :
Long-term program for advancement
of women, report (Tillett), 219
Oceanographv development (Gold-
berg), 723
Educational exchange programs, inter-
national (Rusk), 91
Agreements with: Italy, 80; Romania,
875; Turkey, 270
International Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange Program, annual
report (Johnson), 303
International fairs program. Executive
order, 827
Volunteers to America, 235
EEC (Economic Commission for Eu-
rope), E. V. Rostow, 428
Egypt. See United Arab Republic
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, draft treaty on nuclear
nonproliferation {see also Nuclear
proliferation): Foster, 291, 315;
Johnson, 315; text, 319
Einstein, Alfred (Rusk), 559
EI Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc.,
54, 697
Embassies, U.S.-Soviet proposed ex-
change of chancery sites, 540
Emerson, Ralph W. (quoted), 303, 327,
359
ENDC. See Eighteen-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee
Energy resources, U.S.-Canada trade
in, 45
ESRO (European Space Research
Organization), Frutkin, 401
Ethiopia:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 270, 478
U.S. Ambassador (Hall), confirma-
tion, 478
EURATOM, (European Atomic En-
ergy Community), Rusk, 856
Europe {see also Atlantic and European
headings, East-West relations. North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
individual countries):
Eastern :
Increasing independence: Leddy,
761; Rusk, 252
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for East-
ern Europe participation in
(Johnson), 300
U.S. economic relations. See East-
West relations
Unification: NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow,
428; Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 711,
715
U.N. European Office, U.S. repre-
sentative (Tubby), 625
Western :
Germany, policy of (Kiesinger), 326
Marshall Plan: Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 16
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
897
E urope — Continued
Western — Continued
Middle East war (E. V. Rostow),
425
Nonagricultural imports from U.S.,
restrictions reduced, 860
Technological gap with U.S.:
Brzczinski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V.
Rostow, 880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel,
712; Trowbridge, 70
Unification: 329; Cleveleuid, 144;
Harriman, 17; E. V. Rostow,
429; W. VV. Rostow, 66; Rusk, 857
U.S. commitments [see also NATO") :
Qeveland, 146; Leddy, 761
U.S. import quotas, probable ef-
fect: Fowler, 651; Rusk, 637
U.S. relations and interests: 503;
Brzezinski, 21; Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 16, 328; Leddy, 762;
E. V. Rostow, 422, 879; W. W.
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 855; Schaet-
zel, 710
U.S. role in Viet-Nam, position on:
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 857
European Atomic Energy Community
(Rusk), 856
European Coal and Steel Community:
Harriman, 18; Rusk, 856; Solomon,
538
Tariff reductions, 96
European Common Market. See Euro-
pean Economic Community
European Economic Community:
Johnson, 632; E. V. Rostow, 429;
Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 710; Solomon,
537
Africa, preferential trade arrange-
ments (Solomon), 185
Farm-income support practices (Free-
man), 134
Kennedy Round negotiations: 96,
97, 98, 100; Johnson, 884; Kat-
zenbach, 688; Reynolds, 137;
Roth, 124, 125, 178; Trowbridge,
128, 130
Membership increases, questions of:
Harriman, 18; Katzenbach, 687;
Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 715; Solo-
mon, 187
Surpluses, export program for (Free-
man), 643
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 809,
810,845,846
U.S. balance of payments imbalance,
problem of: OECD, 832; E. V.
Rostow, 879
U.S. protectionist tariflFs, probable
effects on (Katzenbach), 687
European Free Trade Association
(Rusk), 856
Kennedy Round tariff reductions:
97, '99; Katzenbach, 688; Reyn-
olds, 137; Roth, 576; Trow-
bridge, 128
U.K. relations (Solomon), 538
European Payments Union (Harriman),
18
European Space Research Organiza-
tion (Frutkin), 401
Evans, Rowland, 353
Executive orders:
Interest equalization tax rates modi-
fied (11368), 396
International fairs program {11380),
827
Executive orders — Continued
International Secretariat for Volun-
teer Service, designation as a
public international organization
(11363), 207
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, im-
munities as international organi-
zation (11372), 507
Expo 70, 454
Export-Import Bank (Katzenbach), 531
Exports (see also Export-Import Bank;
Imports; Tariffs and trade, general
agreement on; and Trade):
Asian countries, increases in (Gaud),
581
Less developed countries:
Importance to: OECD, 882; Oliver,
756; Solomon, 181; Woods
(quoted), 678
Promotion services and technical
assistance, GATT-UNGTAD pro-
posed merger, 725
U.S.: Katzenbach, 687; Roth, 179
Agricultural: Freeman, 132, 642;
Rusk, 636
,\rgentine-U.S., 146
Automobiles, Kennedy Round elim-
ination of certain road-use taxes
(Roth), 127
Chemicals (Roth), 176
Nontariff trade restrictions, reduc-
tions in, 860
Technological progress, relation to
(Trowbridge) , 506
Trade restrictions of other countries
in retaliation for proposed LT.S.
import quotas, discussions of:
Diaz Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler,
650; Freeman, 642; Katzenbach,
686; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 635;
Trowbridge, 645; Udall, 638
Extradition, Malawi, agreement re
continuance of force of existing
U.S.-U.K. agreement, 337
Family planning. See Population growth
Famine 1975 (Gaud), 582
FAO. S'e Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation.
Far East. See Asia and names of individual
countries
Faulkner, William (quoted), 631
Federal Communications Commission
(Johnson), 297
Federalist, The, 333
Fedorenko, Nikolai T., (quoted), 670
Feldman, George J., 625
Fermi, Enrico (Johnson), 502, 862
Finland, treaties, agreements, etc.,
153, 221, 625, 845, 846
Fish and fisheries:
Fish protein concentiate: Gold-
schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228
Great Lakes Fishery Commission,
U.S. commissioner (Pautzke), ap-
pointment, 172
International Whaling Commission,
U.S. commissioner (McHugh),
announcement, 586
Mexico-U.S. discussions on 12-mile
zone, 475
Micronesia (Norwood), 370
Soviet-U.S. fisheries agreements, re-
view, 873
Fish and fisheries — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atlantic tunas, conservation of,
international convention (1966):
Gabon, 885; Japan, 514; South
Africa, 885
Great Lakes fisheries convention
(1954) with Canada, amendment,
proclamation, U.S., 190
High seas in the western areas of
the middle Atlantic Ocean, agree-
ment with Soviet L'nion on certain
fishery problems, 846
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, convention, 1949:
Canada, 549; Ecuador, 337
North Adantic, conduct of fishing
operations in, convention (1967)
with annexes: U.S., 885
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, con-
vention (1965), international, pro-
tocols on measures of control and
entry into force: Soviet Union, 661
Traditional fisliing in the exclusive
fishery zones contiguous to the
territorial seas, agreement with
Mexico, 662,681, 685
Viet-Nam off-shore fishery develop-
ment project, agreement with
FAO re fund-in-trust grant, 222
Fisher, Adrian S., 489, 543
Fisk, James B., 585
Flood control:
Rio Grande floods: 680; Diaz Ordaz,
674; Johnson, 673
U.S. -Mexico agreement concluded
(Johnson), 147
Food aid convention (1967): 716;
Johnson, 716
Ciu'rent actions: Argentina, 846;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 770;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 810, 846;
EEC, Finland, France, 846; Ger-
many, 770; Italy (as EEC member
State), 810; Japan, 728; Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, 770; Norway,
846; Sweden, 810; Switzerland,
U.K., 846; U.S., 728
Food and Agriculture, The State of, 1967,
(cited), 766
Food and Agriculture Organization
(Goldschmidt), 305
Fishery conservation studies (Gold-
berg), 723
Offshore fishery development project
for Viet-Nam, agreement re fund-
in-trust grant, 222
Food and population crisis: Fowler, 528;
Johnson, 762; OECD, 882; Rusk,
90, 254, 737; Sen (quoted), 766;
Waters, 764
Asia (Gaud), 582
Famine 7975, William and Paul
Paddock (Gaud), 582
India: Gaud, 583; Johnson, 763;
Kaplan, 235; Rusk, 211, 802
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756
Marine resources, food potentijJ
(Humphrey), 228
U.N. agencies, role in (Goldschmidt),
304, 307
World Food Panel, report: 76;
Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533
World Food Problem, The, vol. Ill,
announcement and summary, 874
898
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Food for Freedom: Katzenbach, 531;
Rusk, 212; Waters, 767
Food resources {see also Agriculture):
Edible protein, U.S. support for in-
creased development, production,
and use (Goldschmidt), 307
Food synthesis, prospects, 77
Force, use of. See Aggression
Foreign Ajfairs, 285
Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also
Agency for International Develop-
ment, Alliance for Progress, Eco-
nomic and technical aid, Food for
Freedom, and Peace Corps):
Houphouet-Boigny, 331
Balance of payments considerations:
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V.
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209
Cutbacks, impact of: Johnson, 753,
777; Oliver, 758; Rusk, 389, 801
Education, U.S. aid for (Jolmson),
570
Food aid programs, 1966, report
(Johnson), 762
Foreign Advisory Programs, General
Advisory Committee, appointment
of new members, 294
Foreign policy aspects of: Johnson,
753, 778; Katzenbach, 530, 795;
Rusk, 253, 735, 801; Waters, 767
GATT multilateral food aid program:
101 ; Freeman, 133
GNP, percentage of: Katzenbach,
531; Oliver, 870
Matching-funds principle (Johnson),
430
Multilateral aid, coordination with:
Johnson, 508, 763; Rusk, 209,
212, 803; Waters, 767
Principles: 77; Blair, 204; Johnson,
78, 763, 767; Katzenbach, 531;
Rusk, 90, 389, 821
Regional efforts, support for (Rusk),
209, 212, 803
Self-help principle: Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 510, 763; Oliver, 499;
Rusk, 209, 212, 254, 803; Waters,
767
Foreign aid programs of other countries:
Asian development, need for increased
multilateral aid (Kaplan), 233
European (U.K. and France) aid to
Africa (Rusk), 212, 803
Germany (Kiesinger), 327
Japan: 745; Gaud, 581
Thailand (Gaud), 583
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, cut-
backsin: Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver,
471, 758; Rusk, 389, 801
Foreign Assistance Programs, General
Advisory Committee, new members,
294
Foreign policy, U.S. {see also Com-
munism, Viet-Nam, and World
peace):
Alliance for Progress as an instrument
of (Linowitz), 617
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
Briefing conferences, regional: Boston
586; Kansas, 397; Reading, 586i
St. Louis, 476
Congressional documents relating to
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147,
215, 239, 364, 511, 718, 807, 885
Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued
Consultations on, as opposed to public
hearings (Rusk), 560
Evolution of (Brzczinski), 19
Foreign aid as an instrument of:
Johnson, 753, 778; Katzenbach,
530, 795; Rusk, 253, 735, 801;
Waters, 767
1967 constructive developments:
Johnson, 32, 776, 852; Rusk, 558,
736, 856
Principles, objectives, and problems:
Brzezinski, 22; Johnson, 303, 852;
Katzenbach, 794; E. V. Rostow,
606; Rusk, 348, 736
Responsibilities:
President, primary role: Johnson,
780; Katzenbach, 333, 336; E. V.
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 348, 741
President and Congress compared:
Johnson (quoted), 336; Katzen-
bach, 333
Security of U.S., central purpose:
Johnson, 851; Katzenbach, 334;
E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 251
Tariff policies, U.S. national interest
considerations: Rusk, 634; Udall,
639
U.N. Charter, based on: Humphrey,
790; Rusk, 87
U.S. citizens, role in: Gronouski, 432;
Rusk, 824
Foreign Relations of the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I,
General: The United Nations, released,
729
Foreign Service {see also State Depart-
ment): Johnson, 780; Ambassadors,
confirmation, 246, 310, 337, 478,
625, 729
Foreign students in the U.S. {see also
Cultural relations, Education, and
Educational exchemge programs,
international):
Africa (Palmer), 657
Asian (Bundy), 197
Fosdick, Raymond (quoted), 740
Foster, John S. (McNamara), 448
Foster, William C, 291, 315
Fountain, L. H., 489, 829
Fowler, Henry H., 46, 132 (quoted),
455, 523, 650, 793
France:
Consular convention with U.S., rati-
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885
Germany, relations (Kiesinger), 326
Income tax convention, signature, 268
Kennedy Round road-use tax re-
ductions: 98; Roth, 127; Trow-
bridge, 131
NATO withdrawal, adjustments to:
Leddy, 760; Rusk, 856
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 222,
270, 378, 478, 514, 625, 729,
845, 846, 885
Viet-Nam colonial era, review
(Bundy), 275
Frederick, Pauline, 466
Freedom: Blair, 207 ; Johnson, 777
Four freedoms (Rusk), 855
Freedom of speech and press, U.S.:
Goldberg, 264, 691; Johnson, 59,
778; Rusk, 855
Arab-Israeli conflict (Goldberg), 8,
691
Freeman, Fulton, 475
Freeman, Orville L., 46, 132, 455, 642
Fried, Edward R., 146
Frutkin, Arnold W., 401
Fulbright, J. William: 559; Linowitz,
619
Fulbright-Hays Act, 235
Gabon:
Conservation of Atlantic tunas, inter-
national convention (1966), 885
President Mba, death of, U.S. con-
dolences (Johnson), 867
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 280
Gambia:
Treaties, agreements, etc, 477, 624,
810
U.S. Ambassador (Brown), confirma-
tion, 625
World Bank and International Mon-
etary Fund membership (Fowler),
523
Garcia, Hector P., 489
Gaston, Valente, Enrique, 146
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general
agreement on
Gaud, William S., 455, 579
General Advisory Committee on Foreign
Assistance Programs, appointment
of new members, 294
General and the President, The, cited, 603
General Assembly, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 113, 242, 404,
438, 694, 726
Emergency special session :
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 46
U.S. position (Goldberg), 12, 47,
216
Marine resources committee, pro-
posed (Goldberg), 723
Middle East crisis, resolutions on and
U.S. position {see also Emergency
special session, supra; and Arab-
Israeli conflict): Goldberg, 49,
51, 108, 112, 148, 216, 486; Rusk
387, 559
Resolutions:
Aid to refugees, 1 12
Jerusalem, status of, 113, 151
Korean unification, 845
Membership:
Communist China, Albanian draft
resolution, 833
Important-question, 833
Middle East situation, 218
22nd session:
Agenda, 239, 545
President Manescu, 483n
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 489
Geneva conference, Laos. See Laos
accords
Geneva conference, Viet-Nam. See
under Viet-Nam.
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment
of prisoners of war, wounded and
sick, armed forces, and civilians
in time of war:
Arab-Israeli conflict, application to:
11, 112; Goldberg, 8
Current actions : Congo (Brazzaville),
81; Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514;
Zambia, 698
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
899
Genocide, convention (1951) on the
prevention and punishment of:
Uruguay, 309
Geodetic survey, agreement with Upper
Volta, 478 ■
Germany reunification: Cleveland, 144;
Kiesinger, 326, 328; Leddy, 760;
Rusk, 600; Schaetzel, 711
Importance to peace of Europe:
329; Johnson, 325; NAG, 14;
E. V. Rostow, 428
Germany, Federal Republic of:
East Germany, relations: 14; Cleve-
land, 144; Rusk, 600
NATO forces, proposed reductions:
Johnson, 327; Rusk, 166
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, prob-
lem of (Foster), 292, 294
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 153,
337, 625, 769, 770, 810
U.S. copyright time limit on filings,
extended for German citizens,
171
U.S. pork exports restrictions reduced,
861
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, 325
Ghana:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 578
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 810
U.S. visit of General Ankrah, 571
Glassboro meeting of President Johnson
and Soviet Chairman Kosygin; 35,
36, 37, 38; Rusk, 159
Goethe, Johann (quoted), 328
Gold standard, U.S.: Fowler, 523;
Johnson, 793; E. V. Rostow, 877
Goldberg, Arthur J.:
Addresses, correspondence, and state-
ments:
ABM limited deployment, 487
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Jerusalem, status of, 149, 486
U.N. role and U.S. support, 3, 5,
10, 47, 49, 110, 216, 263, 690,
691, 834, 836, 841, 842
U.S. position, 9, 49, 108, 112, 148,
216, 486, 690, 691, 834
U.S. reply to allegations of U.S.
involvement, 11, 48, 150, 217
East-West relations, 483
Geneva agreements, 485
Korean DMZ violations, 692
Nuclear weapons draft treaty, im-
portance, 487
Ocean floor, cooperative explora-
tion and use, 723
Racial discrimination, 488
Self-determination, 488
Surveyor V lunar landing, trans-
mittal of report, 769
U.N. debate, value of, 262
U.N. General Assembly, convening
of emergency special session, U.S.
position, 12, 216
UNRVVA, U.S. pledge, 65
Viet-Nam:
Bombing pauses, 484, 669
Peaceful settlement, U.S. position
and U.N. role, 48, 483, 667, 671
World peace, 216, 264, 483
International Platform Association
awEu'd, 262
Outer space treaty, role in negotia-
tions (Johnson), 567
Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued
U.N. General Assembly, U.S. repre-
sentative, confirmation:
Special emergency session, 46
22nd session, 489
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 304
Goralski, Robert, 354
Grains. See International Grains Ar-
rangement, Rice, and Wheat
Grant, U.S. (quoted), 42
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway,
coordination of pilotage services,
agreement with Canada, 625
Great Lakes fisheries agreement (1954),
amendment: U.S., 190
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, U.S.
Commissioner (Pautzke), appoint-
ment, 172
Great Society: Johnson, 268; E. V.
Rostow, 61 1
Greece {see also Cyprus):
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 507
Estate-tax protocol, supplementary,
entry into force, 809
Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 698,
810, 845
Turkey, relations (NAC), 14
Greene, J. J., 46
Gronouski, John \., 432
Group of Ten: 454; Fowler, 526; Rusk,
456 _
Ministerial meeting, Washington;
392; text of communique, 396
U.S. delegation, 392, 392n
Guatemala:
Communism, threat to (Katzenbach),
533
Political stability (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 550,
697
Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (Rusk), 561
Guinea, agricultural sales agreement
with U.S., 729
Gulf of Aqaba (Goldberg), 5, 6, 7, 49
Gullion, Edmund, 276
Gut Dam, Lake Ontario claims tribunal,
507
Guy, William, 349
Guyana, Peace Corps program, agree-
ment re establishment, 54
H
Haines Road winter maintenance agree-
ment with Canada, 46
Haiti, International Wheat Agreement
(1962), 1967 protocol for further
extension of, 270
Hall, William O., 478
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 146, 265
Harmel, Pierre, 422
Harriman, W. Averell, 16, 17
Harris. Patricia Roberts, 16, 489
Harsch, Joseph C, 411
Hawk missiles, 729
Health and medical research:
Communications satellites, impor-
tance to (Johnson), 296
Edible protein, production and use
of, importance (Goldschmidt),
307
Micronesia: Norwood, 372; Salii, 377
Romania, 1968 exchange program,
agreement, 875
U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Committee, 3rd meeting,
172
Health and medical research — Con.
World Health Organization constitu-
tion (1946), as amended: Lesotho,
270
Amendment to article 7: Barbados,
270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica,
117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 27
Herter, Christian A.: Johnson, 885;
Roth, 124
Hesburgh, Theodore M., 294
He.'5s, Frederic O., 504
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 349
Hightower, John, 458
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 478
Hilsman, Roger, 279, 559
Hilton, James (quoted), 817
Historical summaries:
U.S. foreign policy (Katzenbach), 815
Viet-Nam, U.S. policy development
(Bundy), 275
Hollybush [see also Glassboro meeting),
35, 38
Holmes, Justice (quoted), 200
Holt, Harold (quoted), 520
Honduras, treaties, agreements, etc.,
153, 697
Hong Kong:
Communist China, threat of (Rusk),
164
Family planning programs (Gaud),
583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221, 625
Hornig, Donald F.: 585; McNamara,
448
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 331
Houssay, Bernardo, 717
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 586
Hughes, Richard: 349; Johnson, 36
Hull, Cordell (Rusk), 634
Human rights {see also Civil rights and
Great Society):
Human Rights Week and Human
Rights Year, proclamation, 660
OAS resolution, 496
Status of Women, U.N. Commission
on, report of 20th session (Tillett),
219
U.N. principles and U.S. support:
112; Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252
Human Rights International Confer-
ence (Tillett), 221
Humphrey, Hubert H.:
Addresses and remarks:
Oceanographic research and devel-
opment, international cooperation
for, 227
World order, 790
Visit to Europe, results (Cleveland),
141
Visit to Southeast Asia, 789
Humphrey, Ralph, 343n
Hungary:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 81
U.S. Ambassador (Hillenbrand), con-
firmation, 478
Hussey, William B., 698
Hydrographic Organization, Interna-
tional, Convention (1967) with
annexes: U.S., 477
IAEA. Set Atomic Energy Agency,
International
IBRD. See International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
900
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ICC. See International Control Com-
mission
Iceland.
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117,
222, 405, 846
U.S. visit of President Asgeirsson, 201
IDA. See International Development
Association
ILO (International Labor Organiza-
tion), 220
IMCO. See Maritime Consultative
Organization, International
IMF. See Monetary Fund, International
Imports {see also Customs; Exports; Tar-
iffs and trade, general agreement
on; and Trade):
Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, importation of,
UNESCO agreement (1950), and
protocol: Kenya, 697
Road vehicles, private, convention
(1954) on the temporary impor-
tation of: Ireland, 438
U.S.:
Argentine exports, U.S. restrictions,
14G
Cotton, foreign policy aspects of pro-
posed elimination of import quotas
(E. V. Rostow), 236
Dairy and meat imports, problem
of, and U.S. controls (Freeman),
135, 643
Escape clause tariffs on typewriter
ribbon cloth and stainless steel
flatware, termination (Johnson),
573
Import quota legislation, proposed,
probable adverse effects of: Diaz
Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler, 650;
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 686;
E. V. Rostow, 877; Roth, 574,
648; Rusk, 635; Trowbridge, 645;
Udall, 638
Oil imports (Udall), 641
Textile and apparel industries, Tar-
iff Commission study requested:
Johnson, 529; Trowbridge, 647
Income:
Conventions for relief of double taxa-
tion. See Double taxation
Income and property tax convention
with France, 268, 270
Income tax administration, agreement
with Viet-Nam, 54
India:
Agricultural modernization: Gaud,
583; Rusk, 211,802
Communist China, question of guar-
antees against: Foster, 293; Rusk,
164
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.
announcement and text, 398
Food and population problems: Gaud,
583; Johnson, 763; Kaplan, 235;
Rusk, 211,802
Sikkim border (Rusk), 563, 597
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 378,
514, 625, 662, 769, 770, 845
U.S. additional wheat shipments
authorized (Johnson), 430
U.S. aid: Johnson, 763; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 211, 802
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz-
enbach), 795
U.S. oceanographic research vessel,
announcement of transfer to, 23
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 431;
Rusk, 211, 802
India-Pakistan relations: Goldberg, 264;
Kaplan, 235; Katzenbach, 796;
Rusk, 212
Indonesia:
Communism, rejection of: Bundy,
287; Johnson, 520; E. V. Rostow,
608; Rusk, 560, 597, 822
Economic and political progress:
Gaud, 582; Humplu-ey, 791;
Johnson, 32; W. \V. Rostow, 68;
Rusk, 214,804
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 405,
590, 846
Visit of Vice President Humphrey,
789, 790
Joint communique, 792
World Bank role in economic stabiliza-
tion (Fowler), 523
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 75,
504
Convention (1883, as revised) for the
protection of, 1958: Bahamas,
662; Malta, 662; Togo, 337
U.S. copyright filings, time limit ex-
tended for German citizens, 171
Inflation: Katzenbach, 688; OECD,
882; E. V. Rostow, 879; Solomon,
539
Information activities and programs:
International fairs program. Executive
order, 827
U.N. specialized agencies, communi-
cation with developing countries
re aid in food and population
problems (Goldschmidt), 304
Institute for Technical Interchange at
East-West Center, Hawaii (Nor-
wood), 372
INTELSAT (International Telecom-
munications Satellite Consortium):
402; Johnson, 297
Inter-American Development Bank:
Linowitz, 321; Oliver, 105, 471;
Rusk, 211
Agreement (1959) establishing, with
annexes, acceptance: Trinidad
and Tobago, 190
U.S. support: Johnson, 499; Oliver,
755; Rusk, 210, 805
Interest equalization tax rates modified.
Executive order, 396
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development: 476; Harriman,
18; Johnson, 509; Katzenbach,
335; Oliver, 105; Solomon, 184
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 624
Indonesia, role in : Fowler, 523 ; Gaud,
582
International Boundary and Water
Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 681, 684,
770
International Control Commission: E.
V. Rostow, 608; Rusk, 93, 386, 412,
558, 597
International cooperation: Ahidjo, 655;
Linowitz, 616; Rusk, 87, 90, 738
East Asian-U.S. (Bundy), 197
Japan-U.S., 746
Law of treaties, importance to
(Kearney), 721
Nuclear energy development for
peaceful purposes: 319; Foster,
317
International cooperation — Continued
Oceanographic and marine resource
development: Goldberg, 723;
Humphrey, 227
Outer space treaty provisions: John-
son, 567; Rusk, 566
Patent systems (Trowbridge), 506
Satellite and space research programs:
Frutkin, 401 ; Johnson, 297
Technological development, NAC res-
olution, text, 15
Water for Peace, 245
International Development Association,
increase in and U.S. support: 45;
Fowler, 527, 528; Katzenbach, 335,
531 ; Rusk, 210; Solomon, 536
International Education Act of 1966
(Johnson), 303
International Educational and Cultural
Affairs, U.S. Advisory Commission,
members confirmed, 332
International Finance Corporation
(Fowler), 527
International grains arrangement
(1967): 146, 716; John.son, 716, 884
Current actions: Argentina, 845, 846;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 769, 770;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 809, 810,
846; EEC, Finland, France, 845,
846; Germany, 769, 770; Greece,
India, Ireland, Israel, 845; Italy
(as EEC member), 809, 810;
Japan, 728; Korea, Lebanon, 845;
Luxembourg, 770; Mexico, 845;
Netherlands, 770; Norway, 845,
846; Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Spain, 845;
Sweden, 810; Switzerland, 845,
846 ; Tunisia, 728 ; U.K., 845, 846 ;
U.S., 728
International Indian Ocean Expedition,
23
International Joint Commission, U.S.-
Canada, 107
Pembina river basin report, 874
International law:
Ocean floor, development (Goldberg),
724
Rule of law: Bundy, 200; Dean, 565;
Goldberg, 2G4; Johnson, 295;
Rusk, 252, 735
Treaties, ILC draft convention, U.S.
position (Kearney), 719
U.S. advisory panel members, an-
nouncement, 661
World Law Day, 1967, proclamation,
171
International monetary system, 45
Convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold
(Fowler), 523
Special drawing rights facility:
Fowler, 393, 523; Johnson, 392;
Rusk, 456
U.K. devaluation of pound sterling,
effect: Fowler, 793; Johnson, 793;
OECD communique, 882; E. V.
Rostow, 877
International organizations (see also
name of organization ) :
Calendar of international conferences,
24, 435
International Secretariat for Volun-
teer Service, designation as, 207
Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal, desig-
nation as, 507
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
901
International organizations — Con.
U.S. support: Katzenbach, 335; Rusk,
90, 209, 805
International Red Cross, 170
International Rice Institute: Gaud, 582;
Lilienthal, 866
International Secretariat for Volunteer
Service, Executive order, 207
International Telecommunications Sat-
ellite Consortium: 402; Johnson,
297
International waterways, free mari-
time passage, U.S. position: 51,
362; Goldberg, 5, 6, 7, 49, 108, 110,
148, 486, 834, 839; Johnson, 33;
E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk, 83, 164,
210
International Year on Human Rights
(TiUctt), 221
Investment disputes, international cen-
ter for the settlement of (Fowler),
527
U.S. panel members named, 475
Investment disputes between states and
nationals of other states, conven-
tion (1963) on: Ceylon, 404, 661;
Finland, 221; France, Japan, Nor-
way, Togo, 378; Switzerland, 549
Investment guaranties, agreements re:
Gambia, 810; Indonesia, 405; Mal-
awi, 309; Rwanda, 54; Swaziland,
590
Investment of private capital abroad
(Roth), 179
Asia (Gaud), 581
Europe: E. V. Rostow, 880; Schaetzel,
712
Indonesia (Gaud), 582
Iran (Rusk), 826
Japan, 453
Korea (Brown), 232 (quoted)
Latin America: Oliver, 470; Solomon,
537
Less developed countries, importance
to: Fowler, 525; Johnson, 763;
OECD, 882
Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677
Micronesia: Norwood, 369; Salii, 376
Trinidad and Tobago, agreement with
U.S., 698, 729
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865
Iran:
Desalination, U.S. study team: 361;
Johnson, 360; Shah Pahlavi, 360
Economic development: Johnson, 358,
359, 827; Rusk, 825
U.S. visit of the Shah of Iran, 358
Iraq, U.S. travel restrictions amended,
459
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 221,
270, 438, 550, 845, 846
Isolationism: Katzenbach, 815; Oliver,
471 ; E. V. Rostow, 605, 608; Rusk,
704, 807
Israel :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.,
announcement, 243
Existence of State of (Rusk), 160
Jerusalem, extension of Israeli juris-
diction {see also Jerusalem, status
of), 60n
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 154,
270, 309, 625, 661, 652, 810, 845,
845
Israel — Continued
U.S. economic and military aid:
Goldberg, 9; McQoskey, 652;
Rusk, 210
U.S. tiavel restrictions amended, 41
Italy:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13
Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc-
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge,
131
Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports
reduced, 861
San Marco satellite program (Frut-
kin), 401
Science cooperation agreement, an-
nouncement, 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
625, 809, 810
U.S. relations (Rusk), 855
U.S. visit of President Saragat, 500
Ivory Coast, U.S. visit of President
Houphouet-Boigny, 330
Jacoby, Neil H., 214
Jamaica:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 590, 625
U.S. Ambassador (Tobriner), confir-
mation, 729
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement and text, 622
James, Hatcher M., Jr., 288n
Japan:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 69
Asian regional development, role in:
452, 454, 745; Gaud, 580; John-
son, 32, 510, 742; Kaplan, 233;
Rusk, 452; Sato, 744
Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Bonin, Okinawa, and Ryukyu Islands,
question of return to Japan: 745;
Rusk, 457
Economic progress: Gaud, 581 ; Kap-
lan, 232; katzenbach, 688; Rusk,
822
Former Prime Minister Yoshida,
death of (Johnson), 660
Kennedy Round tariff reductions : 97,
93, 100; Johnson, 884; Katzen-
bach, 688; Roth, 178; Trow-
bridge, 128, 129
Population growth control (Gaud),
583
Trade (Bundy), 197
U.S. replacement of interim staging
arrangements by Kennedy Round
staging, proclamation, 800
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
309, 337, 378, 514, 549, 589, 625,
662, 728, 729, 809
U.S. interest equalization tax rate
modification, 396
U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical Sci-
ence Committee, 3rd meeting, 172
U.S. -Japan Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 6th meeting: communique,
452; Johnson, 453; Miki, 455;
Rusk, 451,455
U.S. mutual defense treaty: 745; map,
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. poultry exports, restrictions on
reduced, 861
Japan- — Continued
U.S. -Soviet-Japan discussions on Pa-
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield
proposal (Rusk), 455
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Sato, 742
World role (Brzezinski), 23
Jaworski, Leon, 475
Jay, John (quoted), 333
Jeff'erson, Thomas: quoted, 336, 692;
Johnson, 571
Jenks, Sir Wilfred (Rusk), 91
Jerusalem, status of: 60n; Goldberg,
103, 110, 112, 149, 486; Johnson,
33, 60; E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk,
88, 149
U.N. resolution, text, 113
Johnson, Lyndon B.:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Alliance for Progress, 31, 499
Science and technology multilat-
eral program, 717
Sixth anniversary, remarks, 287
American ideals, 303, 631, 653
Arab-Israeli conflict, 33, 35, 37, 40
Jerusalem, status of, 33, 60
Asia:
Regional cooperation, 453, 508,
612, 632, 743, 852
U.S. role and relations, 453, 614,
851
Atomic energy, 25th anniversary, 862
Big-power responsibilities, 35, 38,
59, 325, 853
Chamizal settlement, 683
China, report of U.S. scientific
team, 585
Collective security, importance of
U.S. commitments, 16, 779, 851
Communism, 519, 522, 851
OAS role, 498
East- West relations, 16, 32
Economic and social development,
principles for and importance of,
16, 32, 42, 59, 325, 330, 499, 570,
631, 655, 707, 753, 763, 778, 851
Education, importance, 303, 569
Food and population crisis, 78, 762
Foreign assistance act of 1967, cut-
backs, effects of, 753, 777
Foreign policy:
1967 accomplishments, 32, 776,
852
Principles and objectives, 303,
325, 753, 778, 851
Responsibilities for, 336 (quoted),
780
Freedom of speech and press, 59, 778
Hollybush, meeting with Soviet
Chairman Kosygin, 35, 36, 37,
38, 59
India, additional wheat shipments
authorized, 430
Inter-American Development Bank,
U.S. pledge, 499
International Grains Agreement,
signature, 716
International Monetary Fund, new
reserve facility, 392
Italy-U.S. relations, 500, 501
Japan:
Former Prime Minister Yoshida,
death of, 660
U.S. relations, 453, 742, 743
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto
Rican economic commission, an-
nouncement, 620
902
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Kennedy Round, 32, 717, 852, 884
Laos, 653, 752
Lee Kuan Yew, tribute to, 614
Lord Attlee, regret at death of, 568
Marine resources cooperative de-
velopment, 723 (quoted)
Meetings with heads of state, im-
portance and results of, 31, 35,
36, 38, 39, 59, 329
Mexico:
Mexico-U.S. flood control project
agreement concluded, 147
U.S. relations, 673, 675
Middle East emergency relief pro-
grams, U.S. support, 64
NATO, 327
Nuclear weapons proliferation draft
treaty, 315, 863
Outer space treaty, provisions and
importance, 567
Regional cooperation, 34, 632, 655
Self-determination, 59, 295, 519
Soviet Chairman Kosygin, meetings
with, 35, 36, 37, 39
Tciriff Commission study on eco-
nomic condition of U.S. textile
and apparel industries, request for,
529
Trade, 573, 633, 716, 717, 877
(quoted), 883
U.K. devaluation of pound sterling,
793
Viet-Nam (Jor details, see Viet-Nam):
Civilian service awards, 288
Enterprise proposal, 747, 775
Political progress, 289, 290, 421,
521, 776, 779
Situation reports, 32, 775
U.N. role, 780
U.S. commitment, 59, 519, 614,
776, 777, 779, 851
U.S. position, 37, 59, 209, 498,
509, 519, 775
U.S. public opinion, 519, 776,
777, 778
U.S. willingness to negotiate for
peace, 32, 39, 521, 632, 775
War on hunger, 762
World order, 631, 633, 655
World peace, 16, 31, 35, 38, 328,
522, 571, 631, 747, 851
Correspondence and messages:
Gabon, death of President Mba,
U.S. condolences, 867
Iran, U.S. economic aid terminated,
827
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary, 16
Soviet Union, 50th anniversary, 705
Viet-Nam Chief of State, congratu-
lations, 421
World Food Problem, foreword, 78
Leadership (Oliver), 474
Meetings with Heads of State and
officials of, remarks and joint
communiques: Cameroon, 654;
Denmark, 40; Germany, 325;
Ghana, 571; Iceland, 201; Iran,
358; Italy, 40, 500; Ivory Coast,
330; Japan, 742; Laos, 653, 752;
Lesotho, 568; Malawi, 42; Malay-
sia, 578; Mexico, 673; Nepal, 706;
Niger, 541; Rwanda, 290; Singa-
pore, 612; Soviet Union, 35;
ThaUand, 61; U.K., 40
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Messages, letters, and reports to
Congress :
Asian Development Bank, U.S.
financial support, 508
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, 3rd annual
report, transmittal, 302
Communications policy, 296
Food aid programs, 1966, report,
transmittal, 762
Internationa) Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange Program, Annual
Report, transmittal, 303
Kennedy Round trade agreement,
transmittal, 883
OAS Charter amendments, ratifi-
cation recommended, 78
State of the budget and the econ-
omy, 266
Trade agreements progi-am, 11th
annual report, transmittal, 717
Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, commission for study of
status, recommendation, 363
News conference, transcript, 775
Outer space tieaty, negotiations for:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 565
Policies of: Oliver, 474; W. W. Ros-
tow, 67; Rusk, 736
Support, desirability of (Gronouski),
434
Viet-Nam: Bundy, 275; Lodge, 464
Responsibilities: Johnson, 40; Rusk,
343
Johnson, U. Alexis, 455
Joint Canada-US. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
Affairs, 1 1th meeting, communique,
44
Joint U.S. -Japan Committee on Trade
and Economic Aff'airs, 746
Jonathan, Leabua, 568
Jordan:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 362
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
U.S. aid: McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 163,
210, 400
U.S. Ambassador (Symmes), creden-
tials, 625
U.S. travel restrictions, 41n, 459
Juarez, Benito (quoted), 321, 498, 680,
683
Judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters, ser\'ice
abroad, convention (1965); U.S.,
378
K
Kalb, Bernard, 416
Kaplan, Harold, 230
Karlovy Vary Conference (Cleveland),
143
Kashmir. See India-Pakistan relations
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 333, 462,
530, 602, 686, 794, 815; Johnson, 32
Kavibanda, Gregoire, 290
Kearney, Richard D., 719
Kellogg, Arthur Remington, 586
Kennan, George (quoted), 265
Kennedy, John F.: quoted, 254, 279;
Bundy, 280
Kennedy, Robert F., 350
Kenya:
AID programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662,
698
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 326, 327, 328
Killian, James R., Jr. : 717; McNamara,
448; Oliver, 757
Kim, Eva Soonhe, 288n
King Mahendra, 707, 708
Kistiakowsky, George B. (McNamara),
448
Kleiman, Robert, 465
Knappstein, Heinrich (Johnson), 328
Komer, Robert: Bunker, 750; Mc-
Namara, 169
Korea:
Military demarcation line (Kaplan),
232
Unification, U.N. resolution and U.S.
support (Broomfield), 844
Korea, North:
DMZ violations (Goldberg), 692
U.N. Command report, text, 692
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Korea, Republic of:
Economic progress and role of U.S.
aid: Gaud, 581, 582; Kaplan, 232;
Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 214, 804,
822
Population growth control (Gaud),
583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222,
405, 589, 625, 845
U.S. mutual defense commitments:
Brown, 232 (quoted); map, 460;
Rusk, 563
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
Bunker, 782; McNamara, 169;
Park (quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92,
391, 555; Taylor, 259; Westmore-
land, 788
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Korean conflict: Bundy, 277; Kaplan,
232; E. V. Rostow, 607
Korean Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (Bundy), 197
Korry, Edward M., 337
Kosygin, Aleksei N.: 36, 37, 38;
Goldberg, 47, 109, 110; Rusk, 159,
562
Krag, Otto, 41
Kristol, Irving, 285
Kuchel, Thomas H., 147
Kuwait:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 477, 514,
770
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Ky, Nguyen Cao: 260 (quoted), 789;
Bundy, 260, 354; Bunker, 421;
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556
Labor :
Adjustment assistance, Trade Ex-
pansion Act: Johnson, 885; Kat-
zenbach, 689; Reynolds, 139;
Roth, 174, 179, 576; Solomon,
183, 537
African-U.S. relations, role of or-
ganized labor (Palmer), 658
Asian Labor Ministers, Conference
(Bundy), 198
Kennedy Round, importance to
(Reynolds), 137
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
903
Labor — Continued
Labor standards below U.S. levels,
legislation (Dent bill) proposed to
restrict imports of products pro-
duced under (Roth), 574
Micronesia, employee benefits (Nor-
wood), 375
Labor Organization, International, sta-
tus of women report (Tillctt), 220
Lacouture, Jean, 279
Laise, Carol (Johnson), 707
Lake Champlain, 107
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, 507
Lamb, Charles, 35
Landlocked states, transit trade, con-
vention (1965): Mali, 697; Yugo-
slavia, 26
Laos:
Communism, threat of: 654; Johnson,
520, 653; Rusk, 164, 214, 347,
560, 563, 597, 822
Geneva accords: Bundy, 280; Rusk,
386, 387
Communist violations (Rusk), 92,
386, 601,740
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 198
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 855
U.S. aid, importance (Rusk), 214, 804
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968
appropriations request (Rusk), 208
U.S. visit of Crown Prince Vong
Savang, 752
U.S. visit of Prince Souvanna Phouma
653
Viet-Nam, military and other aid
(Rusk), 561, 563
Larsen, Stanley, 346, 557
LASO. See Latin American Solidarity
Organization
Latin America {see also Alliance for
Progress, Organization of American
States, and indivudial countries):
Communism, danger of: Katzenbach,
797; Linowitz, 322, 617; Oliver,
473, 757, 871; Rusk, 252, 490,
493, 805
OAS resolution and text of final
act, 491
Defense expenditures: Katzenbach,
797; Linowitz, 619; Oliver, 473,
757,871
Economic and social development.
See Alliance for Progress
Inter-American Export Promotion
Center (Oliver), 756
Political stability (Oliver), 870
Science and technology multilateral
program: 717; Oliver, 757
Trade:
Economic integration: 681; John-
son, 31, 632; Linowitz, 518;
Oliver, 104, 471, 755; W. W.
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211, 559;
Solomon, 184, 534
U.S. generalized trade preferences:
Oliver, 756, 870; Solomon, 196
U.S. protectionist trade legislation,
probable effects of: 681 ; Diaz
Ordaz, 677; Oliver, 758
Latin American Common Market.
See Latin America: Economic inte-
gration
Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion: Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 105,
471, 755, 870; Solomon, 534
Latin American Solidarity Organiza-
tion: 497: Linowitz, 322, 617;
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 491
Laurel Langley Trade Agreement, 78,
332
Law, international. Set International
law
Law of the sea. See Safety of life at sea
Le Defi Amirkain, 712
Lebanon:
Treaiies, agreements, etc., 153, 845
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 171
Leddy,John M., 759
Lee Kuan Yew: quoted, 68, 287, 614;
Johnson, 614
Lesotho:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 477,
478, 770
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Jonathan,
568
Less developed countries:
Agriculture, importance of moderni-
zation. See Agriculture
Communications satel.itcs, impor-
tance to (Johnson), 298
Communism, threat of (Brzezinski),
20
Economic and social development:
Germany, aid (Kiesinger), 327
Importance of: 45; Fowler, 527;
Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson, 59;
E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk, 208
Industrialized nations, role of: 329,
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32,
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876;
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon,
183, 185; Waters, 767
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; John-
son, 16, 763; Katzenbach, 530;
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 90, 209,
254, 389, 801
Food and population crisis. See Food
and population crisis
International patent system, impor-
tance to (Trowbridge), 506
Ocean resource development, U.S.
cooperation (Humphrey), 228
Science and technology, importance
to (NAC), 15
Space research, value to (Frutkin),
403
Trade:
Kennedy Round, importance to:
45, 95, 101, 503; Freeman, 134,
135; Johnson, 135 (quoted), 633,
884; Roth, 126, 577; Solomon, 189
Preferential trade arrangements:
OECD, 882; Oliver, 472, 756;
Rusk, 856; Solomon, 185
Trade problems: 45, 454, 497, 725;
OECD, 882; Roth, 178; Solomon,
180; Woods (quoted), 678
Lewis, Geoffrey W., 478
Lewis, Verne B., 476
V Express, 713
Liberia:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 337,
698
Libya:
Treaties, agreements, etc. 153, 337,
405
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Lilienthal, David, 360, 864
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), 9, 679, 743
Lindsey, Edward M. (Rusk), 87
Linowitz, Sol M., 321, 586, 616
Lisagor, Peter, 465
Load lines, convention (1966), inter-
national: Denmark, 221; Israel,
270; Liberia, 221; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands .Antilles), 270; Sweden, 661;
U.K., 270; U.S., 404
Loc, Nguyen Van (Bunker), 784
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 349, 464; John-
son, 290
London Times, cited, 393
Lopez, Fernando, 582
Lord Attlee, death of (Johnson), 568
Lost Revolution, The, 275
Luce, Charles F., 46
Luxembourg:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 770
U.S. Ambassador (Feldman), cre-
dentials, 625
M
Macao, 729
Macauley, Thomas B., 580 (quoted)
Macedo Soares, Edmundo, 799
Malagasy Republic:
Foreign Minister Sylla, death of
(Rusk), 159
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337,
662
Malawi:
Ambassador to U.S. credentials, 507 '
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309,
337
U.S. visit of President Banda, 42
Malaya. See Malaysia
Malaysia (see also Association of South-
east Asia) :
Economic and political progress:
Gaud, 581; Kaplan, 232
Narcotic drugs, single convention
(1961), accession, 270
Science and mathematics regional
education center, proposed (Gaud),
580
U.K. proposed withdrawal from area
(Taylor), 259
U.S. visit of Minister of Finance Tun,
578
Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role, 520
Visit of Vice President Humphrey,
789
Maldive Islands, treaties, agreements,
etc., 54, 404
Mali, transit trade of land-locked
states, convention (1965), accession,
697
Malta:
Cotton textile agreement, announce-
ment, 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 270, 662
U.S. Ambassador (Smythe), con-
firmation, 625
Manescu, Corneliu, 483n
Mann, Fredric R., 478
Mansfield, Mike: 357; Goldberg, 667;
Rusk, 456, 739
Mantilla Ortega, Carlos, 431
Margolies, Daniel F., 585
Marine resources {see also Fish and
fisheries), 23
Cooperative exploration and use of
ocean floor, U.N. role in develop-
ment of principles for: Goldberg,
723; Johnson (quoted), 723
904
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
.Marine resources — Continued
Fish protein concentrate: Gold-
schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228
International cooperation for: 747;
Humphrey, 227
Marine Sciences Council (Humphrey),
229
Maritime Consultative Organization,
Intergovernmental (Goldberg), 723
Convention (1948): Hong Kong, 221;
Maldive Islands, 54
Convention (1965), amendment to
Article 28: Algeria, Mexico, 885
Maritime matters {see also Safety of life
at sea and Ships and shipping):
Exploration of the Sea, International
Council for. Convention (1964);
Belgium, 378
Maritime traffic, international, con-
vention (1965) on facilitation of,
with annexes: Canada, Germany,
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles), 624; Romania,
Singapore, Sweden, 337
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights
in, international convention, 1962;
Liberia, 337
Marriage and family, status of women,
U.N. Commission, report of 20th
session (TiUett), 219
Marshall, George (quoted), 251, 534
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary: Har-
riman, 17; Johnson, 16
Martin, Edwin M., 808
Martin, William McChesney, Jr., 392«
Martola, Ilmarai (Goldberg), 52
Matsui, Akira, 670
Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened, 698
Mba, President of Gabon, U.S. con-
dolences on death of (Johnson), 857
Mbekeani, Nyemba VVjiles, 507
McCall, Thomas, 349
McCarthy, Eugene (Palmer), 659
McCloskey, Robert, 16, 652
McConnell, John P., 355
McHugh, J. Laurence, 586
McKernan, Donald L., 172, 475, 685,
873
McKinney, Robert M., 476, 828
McLuhan, Marshall (W. W. Rostow),
69
McNamara, Robert S.: 167, 443, 544
(quoted); Lodge, 465; Rusk, 208,
416
Viet-Nam DMZ barrier (Rusk), 385,
414
Mekong Valley development: Bundy,
198; Gaud, 580; Johnson, 509, 510,
752; Kaplan, 233; Lilienthal, 867;
W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 214
MentschikoflT, Sola, 475
Meteorological research: Frutkin, 402;
Goldberg, 723; Humphrey, 227;
Rusk, 739
North Atlantic ocean weather stations
agreement (1955), with annexes:
India. 770
Polar cap ionosphere, NASA-CNRC
cooperative study, agreement with
Canada, 337
World Meteorological Organization
convention (1947): Barbados, 438;
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438
Mexico:
Air transport agreement, announce-
ment, 589
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text),
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684
Economic development: Diaz Ordaz,
677; Rusk, 211
Fishery zones and fishery rights, dis-
cussions and agreement, 475, 681,
685
Flood control agreement concluded
(Johnson), 147
Pious Fund claim, settlement of, 261
Presidents' action program, text, 681
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 625,
662, 698, 728, 770, 845, 855
U.S. relations: 680; Diaz Ordaz,
677; Johnson, 673, 675; Linowitz,
321
U.S. visit of President Diaz Ordaz, 673
Michalowski, Jerzy, 431
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands
Middlcton, Drew, 68, 231, 287
Mikhail Frunze, Soviet vessel, 170
Miki, Takeo; 455; Gaud, 580
Military aircraft. See under Aviation
Military assistance [see also ."Armaments),
Soviet arms budget increases (Rusk),
558
Militai-y assistance, U.S.:
Appropriations request FY 1968
(Rusk), 208, 214
Europe, effect on balance of payments
(E. V. Rostow), 881
India, Pakistan, U.S. aid policy
(Katzenbach), 795
Jordan, review of: McCloskey, 652;
Rusk, 163, 210
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair),
204
Principles for, and policy objectives:
Katzenbach, 530; McCloskey,
652; Oliver, 757; Rusk, 208, 215,
387, 806
Military bases:
Outer space treaty prohibition of:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566
Philippines, exploitation of natural
resources of U.S. bases, agree-
ment, 405
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, 745
U.S. use of Thai bases (Rusk), 92
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Mills, Wilbur D., 529, 647
Miner, Robert G., 729
Missiles (see also Armaments and Nu-
clear weapons):
Antiballistic missiles:
Agreement, proposed : Cleveland,
143; Goldberg, 487; Johnson,
32; Rusk, 385
Soviet and U.S. deployment: Fisher,
543 ; McNamara, 44 7 ; Rusk 1 66
U.S., Chinese-oriented: Fisher, 543;
Goldberg, 488 ; McNamara, 449
Hawk and Nike Hercules missiles
system, agreement with Japan re-
production of in Japan, 729
Modesti, Girolamo, 596
Monetary Fund, International: Katzen-
bach, 335; Rusk, 214; Solomon,
184, 539
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 477
Ministerial meeting, Washington,
communique, 369
Monetary Fund, International — Con,
Ministerial meeting — Continued
U.S. delegation, 392, 392n
Special drawing rights facility, im-
portance and U.S. position: 329,
392, 393, 454, 503; Fowler, 394.
523; Johnson, 392; E. V. Rostow,
877; Rusk, 558, 856
22nd annual meeting, Rio de Janeiro:
Fowler, 523 ; text of resolution, 529
Mora, Jose A., 494
Moreno, Mario (Diaz Ordaz), 675
Morgenthau, Hans (quoted), 279
Morocco:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 550, 770
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Morrison, Alice A., 218n
Morse, Wayne, 667
Moseman, Albert H., 585
Murphy, George, 349
Muskie, Edmund S., 349
Mutual defense:
Bilateral agreements with: Japan, 54;
Norway, 846
Map, 460
U.S. commitments: Johnson, 853;
Rusk, 89, 704, 823
N
NAC. See North Atlantic Council
Nam Ngum Dam: Bundy, 198; Gaud,
58! ; Johnson, 509
Narcotics. See Drugs
NASA. See National Aeronautics and
Space ."Administration
Nasser, Gamal (Goldberg), 5, 6
National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration:
Cooperative satellite programs
(Frutkin), 401
Polar cap ionosphere study, agree-
ment with Canada re cooperation
with Canadian National Research
Council, 337
National Science Foundation, 23, 80
Nationalism (Brzezinski), 20, 22
Asia (Hilsman), 280
Indonesia (Bundy), 287
Philippines, dangers of economic na-
tionalism (Blair), 206
Nationality, acquisition of, Vienna con-
vention, optional protocol re: Nor-
way, 769
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Near and Middle East {see also Arab-
Israeli conflict):
Arms shipments. See Armaments
Economic development: Goldberg,
148, 487; Johnson, 359, 632; W.
W. Rostow, 69; Rusk, 210
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy implications (E. V. Ros-
tow), 236
Emergency relief programs, U.S.
pledge: Johnson, 64; Rusk, 210
Military assistance, U.S. position {see
also Armaments): Goldberg, 9;
McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 160, 210,
387, 803
Oil exports (Udall), 641
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41,
171, 229, 459, 799
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
905
Nepal:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 810
U.S. visit of King Mahendra, 706
Netherlands:
Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports
reduced, 861
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 270,
478, 550, 624, 625, 770
Neutrality and nonalinement:
Cambodia: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89,
412, 558, 597
King Mahendra, 709
Laos (Souvanna Phouma), 654
Malawi (Banda), 43
New York Times, 68, 231, 287, 603
New Zealand:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13
Observers for Viet-Nam elections
(Lodge), 350
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 1 1 7,
309
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
520; McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91,
92, 391
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Newly independent nations (see also
name of country):
Africa: Johnson, 32; W. W. Rostow,
68; Rusk, 212, 803
Anticolonialism (Kaplan), 231
Asia (Bundy), 278
Economic problems and U.S. aid:
Katzenbach, 530; Rusk, 212, 801
International law, importance to
(Bundy), 200
U.N., importance to (Goldberg), 265
Man Dan, 672
Nicaragua:
Sea-level canal feasibility study, com-
mission, 3rd aimual report: 302;
Johnson, 302
Treaties, agreements, etc., 662, 697
U.S. Ambassador (Crockett), con-
firmation, 246
Nieuwenhuis, Willebrond, 595
Niger:
International telecommunications con-
vention (1965), with annexes,
ratification, 309
U.S. visit of President Diori, 541
Nigeria:
AID program under review (Rusk),
212
EEC trade agreement (Solomon), 185
Soviet arms supply, U.S. position,
320
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 221,
728, 730
Nike Hercules missiles, 729
Nonintervention, U.S. position: Brze-
zinski, 22; Buff'um, 152; Rusk, 821
Norstad, Lauris, 465
North Atlantic Council, ministerial
meetings, Washington (1957): text
of communique, 14; U.S. dele-
gation, 16
Resolution on international techno-
logical cooperation, text, 15
North Atlantic Treaty: Leddy, 422;
map, 460
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Johnson), 32
Armed forces, strength and deploy-
ment: Johnson, 327; Kiesinger,
327; Rusk, 166
North Atlantic Treaty Organization —
Continued
Deterrent role: 329, 503; Cleveland,
141; Johnson, 325; Kiesinger,
326; Leddy, 759; E. V. Rostow,
427; Waters, 767
Global interests (Cleveland), 145
Italy, support of (.Saragat), 502
Nonproliferation treaty, position on
(Cleveland), 144
Technological cooperation, NAC res-
olution, 15
U.S. commitments and support:
Cleveland, 145; Kaplan, 234;
Katzenbach, 335, 532; E. V.
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 91, 598, 599,
856, 857; Schaetzel, 715
U.S. 1968 appropriations request
(Rusk), 208
Viet-Nam, position on (Rusk), 599, 601
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc., 26,
81, 378, 625, 769,845, 846
Norwood, William R., 366
NS Savannah, operation by a private
company, bilateral agreements re
U.S. liability: China, 245; Yugo-
slavia, 270
NSF (National Science Foundation), 23,
80
Nuclear blackmail: 744; Fisher, 544;
Foster, 293; Goldberg, 487; Mc-
Namara, 449
Nuclear nonproliferation :
Nonnuclear states, Foster, 316; Rusk,
388
Treaty, draft: 319; Foster, 315, 317;
Goldberg, 487, 488 ; Johnson, 315;
Rusk, 559; text, 319
Safeguards, U.S. position on : Foster,
292, 293, 317; Johnson, 863
Treaty, need for: 503, 744; Cleveland,
144; Fisher, 291, 545; Goldberg,
488; Johnson, 36, 291, 315;
Kosygin, 38; McNamara, 449;
NAC, 14; Rusk, 388
Nuclear test ban:
Comprehensive treaty, need for
(Foster), 293
Outer space treaty, provision of, 567
Treaty (1963), ratification: Costa
Rica, 153
Nuclear war, dangers of and U.S. efforts
to prevent: 319; Brzezinski, 19;
Fisher, 544; Johnson, 520, 863;
Rusk, 87, 251, 253, 704, 737, 824.
857, 859
Nuclear weapons:
Communist China, threat of and ques-
tion of guarantees against: Mc-
Namara, 449; Rusk, 164
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Outer space, prohibition of: Johnson,
567; Rusk, 566
Tests. See Nuclear test ban
25th anniversary (Johnson), 863
U.S. capabilities and policv: Brzezin-
ski, 2 1 ; McNamara, 443
World peace, stabilizing effect (Brze-
zinski), 20
Nugent, Patrick L., (Johnson), 40, 41
o
O'Brien, John R., 337
Oceanography. See Marine resources
O'Conor, Herbert R., Jr., 489
ODECA (Organization of Central
American States), 697
OECD. See Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., 245
O'Hara, Barratt (Palmer), 659
Ohin, Alexandre, 202
OU:
Arab-Egyptian economic sanctions
(E. V. Rostow), 237
Iran, production (Rusk), 825
Micronesia, production and develop-
ment (Norwood), 370
Prevention of pollution of the sea by,
international convention (1954),
with annexes: Japan, 549; Leb-
anon, 153
U.S. oil import control program
(Udall), 639
Okinawa, question of return to Japan
(Rusk), 458
Okun, Arthur M. (Fowler), 393
Old, Bruce S., 585
OUvcr, Covey T., 102, 470, 698, 754,
868
O'Neill, Joseph P., 288n
Organization for African Unity: W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development: 861; Harriman,
17; NAC, 15; Oliver, 756; E. V.
Rostow, 428; Roth, 178; Rusk, 856;
Solomon, 181 ; Trowbridge, 72
Development Assistance Committee
chairman (Martin), 808
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary
(Johnson), 16
Ministerial council meeting, Paris,
1967: E. V. Rostow, 876; text of
communique, 881
Temporary tariff advantages for less
developed countries: OECD, 882;
Rusk, 856
Organization of American States: Lino-
witz, 321, 616; OUver, 871 ; Rusk, 88
Charter (1948):
Current actions : Barbados, Trinidad
and Tobago, 846
Protocol of amendment (1967): 190;
Argentina, 245
U.S. ratification urged (Johnson),
78
Foreign Ministers meeting, Washing-
ton: Johnson, 498; Katzenbach,
533; Linowitz, 617
U.S. representative (Oliver) on Inter-
American Economic and Social
Council, designation, 698
Venezuelan complaint against Cuba:
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 383, 490, 493
OAS Final Act, text, 491
OAS resolutions, 495
Organization of Central American
States, agreement with U.S. for
economic and technical assistance,
current actions: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, 597
Ortana, Egidio, 13
Osorio-Tafall, B. F., 52
Outer space (Rusk), 253
International law, application to
(Dean), 555
Surveyor V lunar landing, report,
transmittal (Goldberg), 769
906
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Outer Space — Continued
Treaty on principles of exploration
and use of ( 1 967) : Goldberg, 263 ;
Johnson, 295; Rusk, 558, 738
Current actions: Australia, Canada,
Denmark, 589; Finland, 153;
France, 514; Hungary, Jamaica,
81; Japan, Korea, 589; Nepal,
810; Pakistan, 438; Peru, 81;
Sierra Leone, 190; Soviet Union,
Sweden, 589; Trinidad and To-
bago, 514; U.A.R., 624; U.K.,
U.S., 589
Entry-into-force: 589, 747; Dean,
565; Dobrvnin, 565; Johnson,
567; Rusk, 566
Johnson, role in negotiation of:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566
Pacific communitv, U.S.-So\iet-Japan
d!scu.':sions, Mansfield proposal
(Rusk), 456
Pacific Islands Trust Territory, fe Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands and
individual islands
Paddock, Paul: 583 (quoted); Gaud,
532
Paddock, WiUiara: 583 (quoted); Gaud,
582
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 359,
360
Pakistan:
Cotton textile agreement, announce-
ment, 114
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583;
Rusk, 802
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154. 222,
309, 438, 845, 846
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk,
211, 802
U.S. .Embassador (Oehlert), con-
firmation, 246
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz-
enbach), 795
Pakistan Aid Consortium (Rusk), 212,
802
Palmer, Joseph, 2d, 656
Panama:
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Studv Commission, 3rd annual
report: 302; Johnson, 302
Canal treaties, agreement on: Oliver,
474; Rusk, 165; texts, 65
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 438,
477, 624
Paraguay:
Political progress (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 662
Park, Chung Hee (quoted), 520
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504
Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, 253
Paulos, Kirsten C, 218n
Pautzke, Qarence F., 172
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman (Goldberg),
483
Peace Corps:
Africa: Pahner, 658; Rusk, 212
Agreements establishing: Dahomey,
154; Guyana, 54; Lesotho, 478
"Exchange peace corps". Volunteers
to America, 235
Micronesia: Norwood, 358, 369;
SaUi, 376
Pearson, Drew, 262
Peck, William (Norwood), 372
Pedersen, Richard F., 46, 52
Pembina river basin project, IJC
report, 874
Pepin, Jean-Luc, 46
Perkins, James A., 294; Jolmson, 569
Peru (Solomon), 536, 540
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of
(E. V. Rostow), 237
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 221,
309, 590, 723
Peterson, Rudolph A., 294
Petroleum. See Oil
Pham Van Dong (quoted), 671
Philippines {see also Association of
Southeast Asia):
Agriculture graduate study and re-
search institute, proposed (Gaud),
580
.Esia, role in (Blair), 205
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117,
337, 405, 550, 625, 661
U.S. cotton textile arrangements,
exchange of notes, 51 1
U.S. mutual defense treaty: map,
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. Presidential advisers Clifford and
Taylor, reason for not visiting
(Qifford), 259
U.S. relations (Blair), 203
U.S. trade agreement, discussions, 78,
332
Viet-Nam, military and other support:
Blair, 206; Marcos (quoted), 520;
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91, 391
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico), settle-
ment, 261
Poland :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 550,
730, 846
U.S. policy, attitude of Congress
(Gronouski), 434
Pollack, Herman, 246, 476
Pollution, water pollution, problem of
(Humphrey), 227
Pollution of the sea by oil, prevention
of, convention, international (1954),
with annexes: Japan, 549; Lebanon,
153
Population growth:
Family planning programs: Gaud,
583; Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson,
763; Rusk, 212; Tillett, 220
Food supply, relation to. See Food and
population crisis
India (Paddock, quoted), 583
Latin America (Oliver), 472
Less developed countries (Rusk), 736
Portugal:
Angola, use as base for Congo mer-
cenaries (Buffum), 808
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 625,
729, 845, 846
Postal matters:
Parcel post agreement with Ethiopia,
54, 270
Postal Union of the Americas and
Spain, convention, money order
agreement, parcel post agreement,
and final protocols: Argentina,
Mexico, Peru, U.S., 728
Postal Union, Universal, constitution
with final protocols: Hungaiy, 26;
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho,
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo,
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404
President, The: Office and Powers, 333n
Prisoners:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.N. resolution
on treatment of, 11, 112
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat-
ment of: Congo (Brazzaville), 81;
Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514; Zam-
bia, 698
U.S. application to Viet-Nam war
prisoners, 170
Proclamations by the President:
Human Rights Week and Human
Rights Year (3814), 660
National UNICEF Day {3817), 718
Trade agreements, interim, with Can-
ada, U.K., and Japan, termina-
tion of further staging of certain
concessions {3818), 800
United Nations Day, (1967) {3797),
295
World Law Day, 1967 {3791), 171
Propaganda (Goldberg), 262
Public Law 480 (Johnson), 763
Publications:
Commerce Department, Technological
Innovation: Its Environment and
Management, 70n
Congressional documents relating to
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147,
215, 239, 364, 511,718, 807, 885
International exchange of, conven-
tion (1958): Finland, U.S. 221
Official publications and government
documents, exchange of between
states, convention (1958): Fin-
land, U.S., 221
State Department:
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
Foreign Relations oj the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I,
General: The United Nations, re-
leased, 729
Lists of recent releases, 81, 117, 154,
222, 246, 310, 338, 364, 405, 590,
626, 662, 730, 886
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
released, 366»
United Nations:
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242,
308, 404, 438, 694, 726
Programme jor the Liberalisation and
Expansion of Trade in Manufactures
and Semi-Mamtfactures of Interest to
Developing Countries, 189n
Question of the Granting and Extension
of Preferences in Favour of Developing
Countries, 188n
World Food Problem, The, released, 76n;
Johnson, 78
Puerto Rico, Joint Dominican Repub-
lic-Puerto Rican Economic Com-
mission, announcement, 620
Q
Quint, Bert, 417
Quintanilla, Luis, 462
Rabasa, Oscar, 475, 685
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
907
Rabb, Maxwell, 476
Racial discrimination (sec also Civil
right?):
Africa: Goldberg, 488; Palmer, 659
Convention, international (1965), on
the elimination of all forms of:
Argentina, 378; Guatemala, Mo-
rocco, 550; Nigeria, 728; Panama,
438; Philippines, 550; Sierra
Leone, 378; Trinidad and Tobago,
117; Venezuela, 662; Yugoslavia,
589
U.N. role in solution (Goldberg), 264
Radio:
Amateur radio stations, agreement
with Austria re operation of, 846
Licensed amateur radio operators,
agreements re reciprocal granting
of authorizations to operate in
either country: Chile, 846; New
Zealand, 117; Norway, 81; Vene-
zuela, 550
Loran-A stations, agreement with
Canada re loan of additional
equipment, 885
Partial revision of radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959) to put into effect
revised frequency allotment plan
for aeronautical mobile (R) serv-
ice and related information: Bel-
gium, 478; China, 309; Iceland,
222; India, 662; Japan, 309;
Kenya, 662; Netherlands, 478;
New Zealand, 309; Singapore,
222; Tanzania, Uganda, 662;
U.K., 309; U.S., 270, 404;
Yugoslavia, 222
Partial revision of radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959) with annexes and
additional protocol: Korea, 222
Standard (AM) radio broadcasting
stations, agreement with El Sal-
vador re pre-sunrise operation, 54
Rajaratnam, S.J. (quoted), 231
Ramev, James T., 476
Rasminsky, Louis, 46
Reciprocal assistance, Inter-American
treaty, 1947, acceptance: Trinidad
and Tobago, 54
Red Cross, International: 170, 401;
Johnson, 65
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights
in, international convention, 1962:
Liberia, 337
Refugees, Arab-Israeli conflict. See
Arab-Israeli conflict
Regional cooperation and development:
Brzezinski, 20; Rajaratnam, 231
(quoted); Solomon, 184
Asia. See under Asia
Europe (Trowbridge), 75
Inter-American system (see also Alli-
ance for Progress) : Linowitz, 321 ;
Solomon, 537
Middle East, U.S. proposals: Gold-
berg, 218; Johnson, 34, 632;
W. VV. Rostow, 69
U.S. support: Johnson, 32, 632, 655;
Katzenbach, 335; VV. VV. Rostow,
67; Rusk, 91, 209, 212, 803
Reporter, 68
Research. See subject
Reston, James, 280
Rey, Jean: Roth, 125; Schaetzel, 715
Reynolds, James J., 137
Rice, research in: Gaud, 582; Lilien-
thal, 866
Richardson, Egerton Rudolf, 431
Rio Treaty (map), 460
Ritchie, A. E., 46
Road vehicles:
Private, customs convention on the
temporary importation of, ac-
cession: Ireland, 438
Road-use ta.\es, Kennedy Round re-
ductions: 98, 100; Roth, 127.
576; Trowbridge, 131
Robert R. Nathan and Associates, study
on Micronesia (Norwood), 368
Roberts, Edmund, 63
Robinson, H. F., 76, 874
Robinson, Thomas E. (Johnson), 36
Rockefeller, John D., Ill (Rusk), 737
Rockefeller Foundation: Diaz Ordaz,
676; Gaud, 582; Lilienthal, 866
Rockne, Knute (quoted), 752
Rogers, Will (quoted), 675
Rolz-Bennett, Jose, 859, 860
Romania:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202
Exchanges and visits, 1968 program,
agreement, 875
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337
Romney, George: Lodge, 467; Rusk,
383,414
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 151, 660
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (quoted), 522,
817
Roosevelt, Theodore (quoted), 736
Roshchin, Alexei (Foster), 293
Rostow, E. v., 236, 301n, 397, 422,
476, 605. 876
Rostow, W. W., 66
Roth, William M.: 95, 123, 173, 455.
574, 648, 725; Solomon, 189
Rovere, Richard, 603
Ruge, Gerd, 595
Rusk, Dean:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Africa, U.S. aid policy, 212, 803
Alliance for Progress, 90, 210, 254,
410 492 493 805
American ideals,' 251, 255, 348, 741
Antiballistic missiles, 166, 385
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Jerusalem, status of, 88, 149
Refugees, U.S. position, 388, 416
Soviet arms shipments, 561
U.N. role, 165, 387, 559
U.S. position, 88, 159, 165, 210,
387, 388, 561
Armaments:
Arms race, economic burden of,
738
Middle East, supply to, 88, 160,
210, 215, 561
U.S. policy under review, 387
Asia:
British proposed reduction of forces
in, 160
Communism, threat of, 253, 555,
560, 563, 596, 597, 821, 857
Regional cooperation, 214, 347,
452, 563, 736, 804, 822
U.S. aid programs, 214
U.S. commitments, 160, 458, 555,
563, 596, 599, 703, 821, 823, 857
Asian Development Bank, 452, 456,
458
Australia, military aid to Vict-Nam,
599
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Bonin Islands, 457, 459
Brazil, former President Castello
Branco, death of, 159
Chamizal setdement, 684
Collective security, 252, 347, 598,
704, 857
Communism:
Countermeasures, 214, 490, 493,
563
U.S. role against, 344, 704, 741,
806, 824
Wodd goals, 92, 252, 491, 600
Communist China:
Containment, question of, 598,
704
Internal situation, 389, 415
Threat of, 164, 347, 563, 564, 596,
822
U.N. membership, U.S. position,
389, 390
U.S. relations and efforts to im-
prove, 390, 739
Congress, public hearings, advisa-
bility of, 560
Cuba, subversion and intervention
by, 490, 493
Disarmament, 90, 215, 738
East-West relations, 90, 600
Europe, U.S. interests and relations,
855
Food and population crisis, 254, 736
Foreign aid, principles for, 90, 209,
253, 389, 735, 801
Foreign policy, 90, 251, 348, 736,
821
Four freedoms, 855
Glassboro talks, 159
Guevara, "Che", 561
India, U.S. aid, 211, 802
International cooperation, need for,
738
Iran, U.S. direct economic aid
terminated, 825
Japan-U.S. joint Economic Com-
mittee, 6th meeting, 451, 455
Jordan, U.S. economic and militziry
aid under review, 163
Kennedy Round, 456, 457
Laos accords, 386, 387, 601
NATO:
German and U.K. armed forces,
proposed cutbacks in, 166
U.S. commitments, 91, 598, 599,
856
1967, constructive developments,
558, 736, 856
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 388
Nuclear war, danger of, 704, 737,
824, 859
Okinawa, 457
Outer space treaty, provisions of
ancf importance, 565
Pacific Ocean problems, U.S.-
Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans-
field proposal, 456
Pakistan, U.S. aid, 212, 802
Panama Canal treaties, 165
President, responsibilities of, 348,
741
Ryukyu Islands, 458
SEATO, 13th anniversary, 391
Secretary McNamara, 416
908
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Soviet Union:
U.S. relations, 159, 252, 564, 600
Viet-Nam, position on, 558, 596,
598
Suez Canal, 164
Trade:
Japan-U.S., 451,457
U.S. protectionist trade legisla-
tion, 634
Turkey, U.S. aid, 212
U.N. Charter, principles and U.S.
support, 87, 252, 344, 564, 704,
737
U.S. economy, 255
Viet-Nam {for details, see Viet-Nam) :
AID program, goals, 213
Armaments, Communist Chinese
and Soviet supplies, 558, 598
Bombing pauses, prospects from:
89, 161, 163, 253, 347, 384, 412,
556, 560, 562, 595, 597, 599
"Brainwashing", question of, 383,
414
Communist use of Chinese air-
bases, 389, 416
Congress, position on, 560, 563
DMZ barrier, question of, 385,
414
Geneva conference, prospects for,
383.413,558,597,598
"Intellectuals", views on, 559
National Liberation Front, 91,
93, 94, 386, 390, 558
N.\TO position, 601
Negotiations for peaceful settle-
ment:
Chinese Communist and Soviet
inauence, 596, 597, 598, 601
U.S. willingness, 93, 161, 163,
253, 346, 384, 411, 452, 458,
555, 557, 560, 597, 599, 705,
740
Viet-Nam role, 384, 386, 411,
556, 558
Peace, prospects for, 162, 555,
558,562,601,740,823
Political developments, 94, 161,
163, 166,345,385,412,557,822
President- and Vice-President-
elect, difficulties between, 385
Situation reports, 91, 161, 164,
555, 557, 595, 600
"Stalemate", question of, 161,
346, 557
Summit conference, prospects for,
165, 561
UJJ. role, 383, 559
U.S. bombing, effect of, 413
U.S. commitments, importance,
90, 91, 163, 253, 344, 347, 388,
415, 555, 564, 596, 597, 599,
601-602, 703, 740, 821, 823,
857
U.S. forces, morale, 348, 704
U.S. national interest, 555, 599,
703, 821
U.S. position, 89, 252, 344, 412,
416, 452, 601, 740, 821
U.S. public opinion, 345, 387, 559,
600
World order, U.S. role, 735, 807
World peace, importance, 87, 215,
252, 564, 704, 739, 821, 824,
857
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
"Yellow peril", 596
Foreign policy briefing conference,
speaker, 586
Four freedoms award, 855n
Meetings with Soviet Minister
Gromyko (Johnson), 36, 37
NAC meeting, chairman, U.S. delega-
tion, 16
News conferences, transcripts of, 91,
159, 383, 455, 555
OAS meeting of consultation, U.S.
delegate, 494
Readers' Digest interview, transcript,
821
TV-radio interviews, transcripts, 411,
595
Rwanda:
Investment guaranties agreement with
U.S., 54
U.S. visit of President Kayibanda, 290
Ryukyu Islands:
Advisory Committee to the High
Commissioner, establishment, 746
Japanese administration, 745
Residual sovereignty of Japan (Rusk),
458
Sachar, Abram L., 332
Safety of life at sea :
Convention (1960), international, on:
Bulgaria, 770; Czechoslovakia,
309; Nicaragua, 662; U.K., 550
Amendments to chapter II : France,
117; Ghana, 810; Iceland,
117; Israel, 810; Malagasy,
337; Pakistan, 309; Sweden, 438
International regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea:
Czechoslovakia, 270
St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes,
coordination of pilotage services,
agreement with Canada, 625
St. Vincent, universal copyright con-
vention (1952), extension to, 661
Salii, LawTence, 376
San Marco satellite program (Frutkin),
401
San Marino, supplementary convention
(1956) on the abolition of slavery
and similar practices, ratification,
438
Sanchez-Vilella, Roberto, 620
Sanders, William, 494
Sanz de SantamarSa, Carlos (Oliver),
756
Saragat, Guiseppe, 501, 502
Satellites (see also Communications:
Satellites, Meteorological research,
and Outer space):
Geodetic satellite observation station
on Isla Socorro, agreement with
Mexico, 698
Navigational aids for civilian use
(Humphrey), 228
U.S. cooperative programs (Frutkin),
401
Sato, Eisaku, 742, 743
Saudi Arabia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 54, 153,
845
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Savage, Francis S. : 288n ; Johnson, 288
Scalapino, Robert A., 332
Schaetzel, J. Robert, 710
Schliesingcr, Arthur, 599, 603
Schoenbrun, David, 411, 412
Science and technology:
Agricultural research and develop-
ment, 77
China, U.S. study team, report, 585
Cooperation in, U.S. (Rusk), 91
Cooperative program, agreement with
Italy, 54, 80
Europe, technological gap: Brzezin-
ski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V. Rostow,
880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 712;
Trowbridge, 70
Korean Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (Bundy), 197
Latin American multilateral program,
717
Marine science research (Humphrey),
227
Patent reform, importance to (Trow-
bridge), 505
Technological Innovation: Its Environ-
ment and Management, 70n
U.S., effects of (Brzezinski), 21
Science and Technology, Advisory
Committee on (Goldschmidt), 305
Scotton, Frank W., 288n
Sea-level canal, Atlantic-Pacific Inter-
oceanic Canal Study Commission,
3rd annual report; 302; Johnson,
302
Seaborg, Glenn T., 476
SEAMES. See Asian, Southeast, Ministers
of Education Secretariat
Security Council, U.N. :
Congo mercenaries, use of Angola as
base (Buffum), 807
Documents, lists of, 1 13, 153, 404, 726
Korean DMZ violations (Goldberg),
692
U.N. Command report, text 692
Middle East, role in. See Arab-
Israeli conflict
Peacekeeping operations, primary re-
sponsibiUty (Goldberg), 13
Resolutions :
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Cease-fire, call for, 1 1
Civilian population, treatment of,
11
Congo, foreign interference in, 153
Congo mercenaries, condemnation
of use of Angola as base, 808
Cyprus peacekeeping force, 6-month
extension, 53n
Middle East:
Cease-fire, 692
U.N. special representative, 843
Veto, Soviet use of: Goldberg, 6;
Lodge, 469 ; Rusk, 559
Viet-Nam:
Role in (see also under United Na-
tions): Goldberg, 667; Rusk, 559
U.S. draft resolutions, texts (Gold-
berg), 669, 671
Segonzac, .Adalbert de, 597
Self-defense. See Defense
Self-determination :
Micronesia: Johnson, 363; Norwood,
375; SaUi, 378
Middle East (Johnson), 33
U.N. principles and U.S. support:
Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252
U.S. position and support: 171;
Goldberg, 488; Johnson, 59, 519
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
909
Self-determination — Continued
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Sen, B. R. (quoted), 766
Senegal, international telecommunica-
tions convention (1965), with an-
nexes, ratification, 222
Servan-Schreiber, 712
Seydoux, Roger (quoted), 670
Shaplen, Robert, 275
Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 362
Sharp, Mitchell, 46
Shepley, Steven C, 288n
Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 478
Shimoda, Takeso, 69
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime
Consultative Organization, Inter-
governmental) :
Sea-level canal feasibility study; 302;
Johnson, 302
Soviet ships, allegations of U.S.
attacks and U.S. replies, 44, 170
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Seaway pilotage services, agree-
ment with Canada re coordina-
tion of, 625
Maritime traffic, international, con-
vention (1965) on facilitation of,
with annex: Canada, Germany,
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles), 624; Romania,
Singapore, Sweden, 337
NS Savannah, U.S. liability during
operation by private company,
agreements with: China, 245;
Yugoslavia, 270
LT.S. vessels, loan of, agreements
with: Brazil, 81 ; Japan, 309
USS Tellowstone, agreement with
Malta re deployment of, 270
U.S. Navy Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem, use by civilian ships (Hum-
phrey), 228
U.S. oceanographic research vessel
Anton Bruun, loan to India, 23
U.S. research vessels denied passage
through Soviet waters, 362
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involve-
ment in Middle East crisis, and
U.S. replies (Goldberg), 3
USS Liberty, Israeli attack (Goldberg),
8
Sierra Leone:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 378,
477
U.S. Ambassador (Miner), confirma-
tion, 729
Singapore :
English language center, proposed
(Gaud), 580
Family planning programs (Gaud),
583
Political progress (Kaplan), 232
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 337
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Lee, 612
Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role in,
520
Sino-Soviet relations: Bundy, 280;
Rusk, 252
Sipila, HelviL., 218
Sisco, J. J., 46
Slaves and slavery, abolition of slavery,
the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery, supple-
mentary convention (1956): San
Slaves and Slavery — Continued
Marino, 438; Spain, 885; U.S., 697,
846, 885
Small, David H., 218™
Smith, Robert S., 586
Smyth, Henry DeWolf, 476
Smythe, Hugh H., 625
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea
Solomon, Anthony M.: 46, 180, 534,
586; Fowler, 393
Somali Republic, treaties, agreements,
etc., 190, 405
Sorensen, Theodore (quoted), 280
South Afirica, Republic of:
Racial problems, U.N. role in solution
of (Goldberg), 264
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 270,
309, 845, 885
Southeast .^sia Treaty Organization:
Background and U.S. commitments
under: Bundy, 276; Jolinson, 852;
Rusk, 344, 414, 415, 703
Map, 460
13th anniversary (Rusk), 391
U.S.-Thai support, 64
Viet-Nam, U.S. commitments under.
See Viet-Nam
Southern Yemen, U.S. diplomatic rec-
ognition, 861
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 653
Souza Costa (quoted), 529
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Com-
munism, and Sino-Soviet relations):
Air services technical talks with U.S.
completed, 820
Antiballistic missiles:
Deployment: Fisher, 543; McNa-
mara, 447; Rusk, 166
Discussions with U.S., proposed
(Rusk), 385
Arab-Israeli conflict: Goldberg, 5;
Rusk, 159
Draft resolutions : 12; Goldberg, 5, 6
Soviet arins shipments, problem of:
Katzenbach, 532, 796; McClos-
key, 652; Rusk, 159, 561
Arm.s supply to Nigeria, U.S. position,
320
Chancery sites, U.S.-Soviet exchange
of, 540
50th anniversary : Johnson, 705; Katz-
enbach, 815
Fisheries agreements, with U.S., re-
view, 873
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for Soviet
participation in (Johnson), 300
Nuclear weapons strength and policy
compared with U.S. (McNa-
mara), 444
Soviet vessels, U.S. replies to allega-
tions of attacks on, 44, 1 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662,
846
U.N.:
Propaganda, utilization for: Gold-
berg, 6, 9, 263, 691
Veto, use in: Goldberg, 6; Lodge,
469; Rusk, 559
U.S. -Japan-Soviet discussions on Pa-
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield
proposal (Rusk), 456
U.S. relations and efforts to improve
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 32, 36
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 818
Kosygin, 37, 38; E. V. Rostow,
430; Rusk, 90, 159, 558, 564
Soviet Union — Continued
U.S. relations and eflorts to im-
prove— Continued
Arms budget, increase, effect on
(Rusk), 558
Glassboro meeting, eflfect of. See
Glassboro meeting
Viet-Nam, effect of (Rusk), 90
U.S. research vessels denied passage
through Soviet waters, 362
Viet-Nam, position on and aid to:
Brzezinski, 20; Goldberg, 668;
Kosygin, 38; Lodge, 469; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 558, 562,
596, 598
World relations and goals: Cleveland,
143; E. V. Rostow, 428; Rusk,
159, 252
Space. See Outer space and Satellites
Spain:
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.,
announcement, 726
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 309,
625, 845, 846, 885
Spivak, Lawrence, 352, 464
Sputnik: Dobrynin, 565; Johnson, 567;
Katzenbach, 818; Rusk, 566
Stainless steel flatware, termination of
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573
Stanton, Frank, 294
State Department (see also Foreign
Service) :
Appointments and designations, 246,
337, 661, 698
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (Kaplan), 231
Publications. See under Publications
Viet-Nam, preoccupation with, ques-
tion of (Bundy), 356
Work of (Rusk), 91
Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), 151, 262
Straits of Tiran (see also International
waterways): Goldberg, 49, 50;
Johnson, 33
Sudan:
Agricultural sales agreement with U.S.
26
AID program, suspended (Rusk), 212
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow),
236
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Suez Canal (see also International water-
ways): Goldberg, 5; Rusk, 164
Suffridge, James (Johnson), 631
Sugar, international sugar agreement
(1958):
Nonoperation (Solomon), 182
Protocol for further prolongation:
Barbados, Ireland, Netherlands,
Tunisia, 550
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 873
Sunday Telegraph, London, 231
Surveyor V lunar landing (Goldberg),
769
Swaziland, investment guaranties agree-
ment with U.S., 590
Sweden :
Kennedy Round tariff reductions, 97,
98
Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter,
transcript of Secretary Rusk inter-
view, 91
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 438,
589, 625, 661, 809, 810
910
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Switzerland:
Kennedy Round tariff reductions; 97,
98; Trowbridge, 131
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 405,
549, 845, 846
U.S. poultry exports, restrictions re-
duced, 861
Sylla, Albert, death of (Rusk), 159
Symmes, Harrison M., 625
Syria :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
Taiwan {see also China, Republic of):
Asian students in : Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581,
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 214, 822
Tanzania:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 662,
729, 885
Tape, Gerald F., 476
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic
policy and relations: Tariffs and
trade, general agreement on; and
Trade):
American Selling Price, modifica-
tions: 95, 97, 98; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 173, 175, 575; Trow-
bridge, 131
Escape-clause provisions, value of:
Rusk, 637; Trowbridge, 649
Import quota bills, probable adverse
effect on U.S. trade and Kennedy
Round prospects: Fowler, 650
Freeman, 642 ; Katzenbach, 686
Oliver, 758; Roth, 574, 648
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645
Udall, 638
Japan, interests in (Miki), 457
Kennedy Round. See Tariffs and
bade, general agreement on
Most-favored-nation basis (Solomon),
187
Presidential authority for protective
action (Roth), 173, 576
Tariff Commission study of impact of
imports on textile and apparel
industries requested: Johnson,
529; Roth, 577
Trade barriers, elimination of (John-
son), 573
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on :
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and
protocols :
Accessions to, current actions on:
Argentina:
Protocol: Austria, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, 846
Provisional, 3rd proces-verbal :
Austria, Czechoslovakia, 405
Iceland:
Protocol: Austria, Iceland, Paki-
stan, Spain, Turkey, 846
Provisional, proces-verbal:
Cuba, 405
Ireland, protocol: Austria, Ire-
land, Spain, Turkey, 846
Tariffs and trade, general agreement
on — Continued
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and
protocols — Continued
Accessions to, current actions on —
Continued
Korea, protocol: Austria, U.K ,
405
Poland, protocol: Austria, 846;
Poland, 550; Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, 846
Spain, protocol: Pakistan, 846
Switzerland, protocol: Cuba, In-
donesia, 405; Pakistan, 846
Tunisia, provisional, 3rd proces-
verbal: Cuba, 405
U.A.R. provisional, 2nd proces-
verbal: Czechoslovakia, 405
Yugoslavia, protocol: Cuba, 405;
Pakistan, 846
French text, protocol of rectifica-
tion to: Barbados, 590
Part IV on trade and development,
introduction of, and amendment
of annex I, protocol amending:
Argentina, 846
Schedule XX, renegotiation of,
bilateral agreements with: Can-
ada, Japan, U.K., 337
Contracting parties, 24th session, 725
Kennedy Round: 147, 861; Rusk, 558
Histoi-y (Roth), 123
Importance and results: 45, 454,
725; Freeman, 132; Harriman, 18;
Johnson, 32, 633, 716, 717, 852,
883; Katzenbach, 688; Miki, 457;
OECD, 882; Reynolds, 135; E.
V. Rostow, 876; Roth, 123, 173,
577; Rusk, 451, 456, 457, 637,
856; Solomon, 189; Trowbridge,
127
Signature, announcement, 95
U.S. protectionist trade bills, ad-
verse effect of: Fowler, 650
Freeman, 642; Johnson, 633
Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634
Trowbridge, 645; UdaU, 638
U.S. replacement of interim staging
in agreements with Canada, U.K.
and Japan, proclamation, 800
U.S. tariff reductions: 96; Freeman,
133; Trowbridge, 130
U.S. proposed elimination of import
duties on extra-long-staple cotton,
effect of (E. V. Rostow), 238
Taxation:
Double taxation, conventions for
avoidance of. See Double taxation
Estate-tax protocol with Greece, sup-
plementary, 698, 809, 810
Income and property tax convention
with France, 268, 270
Income tax administration, agree-
ment with Viet-Nam, 54
Interest equalization tax rates modi-
fied. Executive order, 396
Latin America, development of ef-
fective systems (Oliver), 104
Personal and corporate income taxes,
proposed 10-percent surcharge:
Johnson, 266; E. V. Rostow, 879:
Trowbridge, 504
Taylor, Geoffrey (quoted), 794
Taylor, Maxwell D., 256
Technical assistance:
Afiica :
Chinese programs (Bundy), 199
U.S. programs (Rusk), 213
Less developed countries, need for, 78
Technical cooperation:
Bilateral agreements with: Afghanis-
tan, 270; Somalia, 190, 405
Eastern Asia (Bundy), 198
Technology. See Science and technology
Telecommunications {See also Radio)
Convention (1965), international,
with annexes: Argentina, 221
Bcirbados, 404; Ethiopia, 476
France, 222; Iceland, 221; Japan
662; Laos, 729; Malagasy, 662
Nepal 309; New Zealand (in-
cluding Cook, Niue, and Tokelau
Islands), 26; Niger, 309; Pakistan,
222; Paraguay, 662; Senegal,
Spain (including Spanish prov-
inces in Africa), 222; Tanzania,
729; Togo, 478; U.S., 54
TV system establishment, agreement
with Saudi Arabia, 54
Thailand {see also Association of South-
east Asia) :
Airbases, use by U.S. (Rusk), 92
Amity and economic relations treaty,
Senate approval, 477
Asian institute of technologv, pro-
posed (Gaud), 580
Asian students in (Bundy), 199
Communism, threat of: Johnson, 520;
Rusk, 92, 164, 347, 560, 597, 822;
Taylor, 258
LT.S.aid asacountermeasure:Bundy,
285; Rusk, 214,804
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583;
Kaplan, 232
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 662,
697
U.S. Ambassador (Unger), confirma-
tion, 310
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968
appropriations request (Rusk),
214
U.S. relations: Bhumibol Adulyadej,
63; Johnson, 61
U.S. visit of King Bhumibol Adulyadej
and Queen Sirikit, 61
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
64, 520, 792; Johnson, 61; Rusk,
91,92,391,561,563
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Thanat Khoman (quoted), 477
Thieu, Nguyen Van: 414 (quoted), 789;
Bundy, 260; Bunker, 416, 418;
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556
Thompson, Llewellyn E. (Johnson), 36
Thoreau, Henry David (quoted), 680
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 864
TiUett, Gladys A., 218
To Move A Nation, 219n
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago
Tobriner, Walter N., 729
Togo:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 378
478, 730
U.S. Ambassador (Sherer), confirma-
tion, 478
Tonkin Gulf incident (Goldberg), 668
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
911
Touring and tourism:
Canada, 45
Customs facilities for, convention
(1954): Ireland, 438; Uruguay,
514
East Europe (Rusk), 6(X)
Italy (Johnson), 500
Japan, 454
Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677
Micronesia (Salii), 377
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses;
Economic policy; Exports; Imports;
and Tariff policy, U.S.):
Antidumping regulations: 95, 97, 99;
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 575; Trowbridge, 131,
649
Cotton textiles. See Cotton textiles
European Economic Community
(Schaetzel), 713
Expansion, need for: 746; Fowler,
524; Johnson, 633, 883; Roth, 577
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
-MTairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
Landlocked states, convention (1965)
on transit trade: Mali, 697;
Yugoslavia, 26
Latin America. See Latin America and
Latin American Free Trade Asso-
ciation
Less developed countries. See Less
developed countries
Micronesia (Salii), 376
NontarifT trade barriers: 860; Roth,
179, 577
Oil, importance of, and import-export
patterns (Udall), 640
Technological progress, relation
(Troubridge), 506
Trade and Development, U.N. Con-
ference, 2nd: 45, 454; OECD,
882; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 188
U.S.:
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo,
1968 (Freeman), 136
.•\rgentine-U.S., joint Trade and
Economic Committee, 2nd meet-
ing, joint communique, 146
Canada-U.S. joint ministerial com-
mitttee on trade and economic
affairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
East Asian countries (Bundy), 197
Eastern Europe, trade policy, 454
Elimination of import quotas for
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236
Japan-U.S. Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 746
6th meeting: 452; Miki, 455;
Rusk, 451, 457
Kennedy Round. See under Tariffs
and trade, general agreement on
Mexico: 681, 682; Diaz Ordaz,
677
Philippines trade agreement, dis-
cussions, 78
Policy (Johnson), 883
Comprehensive study request:
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 573;
Roth, 127, 173, 178, 577;
Solomon, 189
Preferential imports: Oliver, 472;
Solomon, 186
Trade — Continued
U.S. — -Continued
Protectionist trade bills, probable
adverse effect on: Diaz Ordaz
678, 631; Fowler, 650: Freeman
642; Johnson, 877 (quoted)
Katzenbach, 686; Roth, 574, 648
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645
Udall, 638
Trade agreements program, 11th
annual report, transmittal to
Congress (Johnson), 717
Trinidad and Tobago, trade agi'ee-
ment, 698, 729
Trade Expansion Act of 1962:
Adjustment assistance program: John-
son, 885; Katzenbach, 689;
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 174, 179,
576; Solomon, 183, 537
Continuation, need for: Katzenbach,
689; Roth, 173, 576, 649; Rusk,
636
Transportation:
.Asia, Asian Development Bank role
in development (Gaud), 581
Micronesia, needs (Norwood), 371
U.S. -Japan study, proposed, 453
Viet-Nam (McNamara), 168
Travel (see also Touring and tourism):
Cuba, to, O.-^S resolution, 496
East Asia-U.S., increases in (Bundy),
197
Middle East travel restrictions amend-
ed, 41, 171, 229, 459, 799
Special travel task force, appointment,
828
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Current actions, 26, 54, 80, 117, 153,
190, 221, 245, 270, 309, 337, 378,
404, 438, 477, 514, 549, 589, 624,
661, 697, 728, 769, 809, 845, 885
U.N. draft convention on law of
treaties, U.S. position (Kearney),
719
Trimble, James W., 476
Trinidad and Tobago:
OAS membership (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agieements, etc., 54, 117,
190, 514, 698, 729, 846
U.S. Ambassador (Costello), confir-
mation, 478
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 46, 70, 70n,
127, 455, 504, 645
Truman policies (E. V. Rostow), 607
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands:
Economic, social, and political devel-
opment: Anderson, 365; Johnson,
363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376
U.S. Commission on status of: 363;
Johnson, 363
Congress of Micronesia: Johnson,
363; Norwood, 375; Salii, 377
Trusteeship Council, U.N., documents,
list of, 309
Tubby, Roger W., 625
Tun Tan Sieiv Sin, 578
Tunisia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 405,
550, 728, 770
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Turkestan, Soviet ship, 44
Turkey (see also Cyprus) :
Cotton textile agreement, armounce-
ment, 1 1 6
Turkey — Continued
Economic development and U.S. aid
program: Katzenbach, 532; Rusk,
211, 212, 803
Greece, relations (NAC), 14
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222,
270, 846
Typewriter ribbon cloth, termination of
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573
Typhoon damage, Micronesia (Nor-
wood), 367
U
U Thant, Viet-Nam negotiations, pro-
posals for (Rusk), 162
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
Udall, Stewart L., 455, 638
Uganda:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 378, 652
UNCTAD. See United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development
UNEF (United Nations Emergency
Force): Goldberg, 6, 50, 110
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, U.N.):
Goldberg, 723;Tillett, 219
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force
in Cyprus
Unger, Leonard, 310
UNICEF. See United Nations ChUdren's
Fund
United Arab Republic:
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
Treaties, agreements, etc., 404, 405,
624, 625
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 799
United Kingdom:
Asian forces, proposed reduction in:
Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259
Edinburgh and Liverpool posts ele-
vated to consulates general, 310
European Economic Community,
membership, questions of: Harri-
man, 18; Katzenbach, 688; Rusk,
858; Schaetzel, 715; Solomon, 187
Farm-income support system (Free-
man), 134
Kennedy Round tariff reductions: 97,
98, 99, 100; Johnson, 884; Roth,
178, 576; Trowbridge, 128, 130
NATO forces, commitment (Rusk),
166
Pound sterling devaluation: Fowler,
793; Johnson, 793; OECD com-
munique, 882; E. V. Rostow, 876;
Rusk, 856
Trade, U.S. replacement of interim
staging arrangements by Kennedy
Round staging, proclamation, 800
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 309,
337, 405, 550, 589, 625, 845, 846
United Nations:
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Communist Chinese conditions for
membership (Fountain), 831
Cyprus threat of war lifted, U.N. role:
Johnson, 859; Vance, 860
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242,
308, 404, 438, 694, 726
912
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United Nations — Continued
European Office of, U.S. representa-
tive (Tubby), confirmation, 625
Foreign Relations of the United States:
Dif>lomatic Pafiers, 1945, Volume /,
General: The United Mations, re-
leased 729
Forum, as': Goldberg, 151, 262; E. V.
Rostow, 606
International education year, pro-
posed (Johnson), 571
International Human Rights Year,
1968, 660
Korean unification, resolution, and
U.S. support (Broomfield), 844
Marine resources development, role
in (Goldberg), 723
Membership :
Communist China, U.S. position:
Fountain, 829; Rusk, 389, 390
Important-question resolution, U.S.
position (Fountain), 829
Responsibilities and significance
(Goldberg), 4, 265, 483
Middle East emergency relief pro-
grams, U.S. support (Johnson), 65
Peacekeeping operations (see also
Arab-Israeli conflict. General As-
sembly, and Security Council):
303, 615, 744; Goldberg, 216;
Rusk, 383, 559; Saragat, 502
Importance and U.S. support:
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 34, 295
Specialized agencies, work of (Gold-
berg), 263
Viet-Nam, role in. See Viet-Nam
United Nations Charter:
Article 109, amendment; Burma, 81;
Denmark, 54; France, 729; Ku-
wait, 770; Libya, 405; Nigeria,
117; Paraguay, 405; Philippines,
625; Poland, 54; U.S., 54
Obligations, binding nature of: Gold-
berg, 667; E. V. Rostow, 426, 607
Principles and U.S. support: Gold-
berg, 216, 264; Humphrey, 790;
Lodge, 468; Rusk, 87, 252, 344,
560, 564, 704, 737, 824
Viet-Nam, application of principles
to (Goldberg), 667
United Nations Children's Fund: 113;
Rusk, 805
National UNICEF Day, proclama-
tion, 713
United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Humphrey), 229
United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 2nd: 45, 454;
OEGD, 882; Oliver, 756; Solomon,
188
United Nations Day, 1967, proclama-
tion, 295
United Nations Development Program,
U.S. financial support (Rusk), 805
LTnited Nations Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East (Bundy),
198
United Nations Emergency Force, Mid-
dle East, effect of withdrawal
(Goldberg), 6, 50, 110
United Nations Force in Cyprus
(N.\C), 15
Extension of, and U.S. pledge: 53n;
Pederson, 52
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees, 1 1 3
U.S. financial support: 400; Gold-
berg, 9, 65, 111; Rusk, 210
United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (Goldberg), 1 10
United States citizens and nationals:
Claims. See Qaims
Foreign policy, role of intellectuals
(Gronouski), 432
Israel, private support for (Goldberg),
9
U.S. public image, role in: Hum-
phrey, 791; Oliver, 753
United States Information Agency, 827
United States-Japan Joint Economic
Committee, 6th meeting: commu-
nique, 452; Johnson, 453; Miki,
455; Rusk, 451, 455
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friend-
ship, 682
Universal copyTight convention, St.
Vincent, 661
Universal Postal Union, constitution
with final protocols: Hungary, 26;
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho,
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo,
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404
UNRWA. See United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization), 1 10
Upp>er Volta, geodetic survey agreement
with U.S., 478
Urban development: 453; Johnson, 453
Uruguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 309,
514
USS Irwin, 81
USS Lewis Hancock, 8 1
USS Liberty, Israeli attack on (Gold-
berg), 8
USS Tellowstone, agreement with Malta
re deployment of, 270
Van Deerlin, Lionel, 1 47
Vance, Cyrus, 859, 860
Vance, Sheldon B., 310
Vandenberg, Arthur (Oliver), 102
Vatican City State, wheat trade con-
vention, 770
Venezuela:
Communism, danger of Cuban threat :
Johnson, 683; Kaplan, 230; Kat-
zenbach, 533; Oliver, 473; Rusk,
210, 383, 490, 493
OAS Final Act and resolutions,
tests, 493
Economic progress (Rusk), 211
OU exports to U.S. (Udall), 641
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 550,
662
Viet-Nam, North:
Haiphong harbor: Lodge, 468;
Taylor, 259
Soviet vesseb, allegations of U.S.
attacks on, and U.S. replies, 44,
170
U.S. position: Bundy, 284; Goldberg,
484, 485; Katzenbach, 602; E. V.
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 89, 92, 253,
415, 823
Viet-Nam, North — Continued
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Viet-Nam, Republic of:
Amnesty program. See Chieu Hoi
Background: Bundy, 275; Westmore-
land, 785
Bombing, U.S. See U.S. air actions
Bombing pauses:
Communist activity during U.S.
ceasefires: Bundy, 355; Johnson,
521; Lodge, 464; Rusk, 162, 335,
412, 557, 562, 595
Communist position: 462; Gold-
berg, 484; Johnson, 521; Rusk,
411, 556, 557, 560, 562, 595, 600
1965-1967 (Goldberg), 669, 671
Prospects from: Clifford, 258; Gold-
berg, 484; Lodge, 464, 468;
Rusk, 89, 161, 163, 384, 411, 413,
556, 562, 595, 597, 593
Reciprocal, U.S. willingness: 671;
Bunker, 751; Goldberg, 484;
Johnson, 521 ; Rusk, 90, 162, 347,
385, 412, 560, 562, 595, 599
Viet-Nam government negotiations,
prospects and U.S. position:
Bundy, 353, 354; Bunker, 416,
417; Rusk, 411, 556
"Brainwashing", question of: Lodge,
467; Rusk, 383, 414
Chieu Hoi program: Bunker, 782;
Lodge, 466; Rusk, 93, 386, 557;
Westmoreland, 785
Civilian service awards (Johnson), 288
Coalition government, Vietnamese re-
jection of (Bundy), 354
Communism, rejection of: Lilienthal,
866; Rusk, 557, 823
Communist aggression and subver-
sion:
Casualties: Bundy, 353; Johnson,
289, 521; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 164,
346, 414
Chinese air bases, question of use of
(Rusk), 389, 416
Civil war, distinguished from: Katz-
enbach, 602; Rusk, 89, 252, 345,
740
Communist China:
Military aid: Bundy, 356; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 603; Rusk, 598,
601
Position on: Bundy, 283; Gold-
berg, 672; Marcos (quoted),
520; Rusk, 164, 558
Communist defections. See Chieu
Hoi program
Communist forces, problems of
maintenance and recruitment:
Bunker, 751, 782; Lodge, 468;
Westmoreland, 786
Communist position: 462; Katzen-
bach, 602; Lodge, 465; E. V.
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 163, 556
Communist responsibility for situa-
tion: Blair, 203; Bundy, 279, 290,
356; Johnson, 519, 632; Katzen-
bach, 602, 818; E. V. Rostow,
425, 607; Rusk, 89, 91, 161, 252,
344, 412, 556, 558, 559, 601-602,
740,821,823
Deescalation, mutual, U.S. willing-
ness: Johnson, 32; Rusk, 92, 253,
346, 412, 740
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
913
V'iet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Communist aggression and subver-
sion— Continued
Escalation:
Danger of: Bundy, 283, 357;
Bunker, 420; Johnson, 37;
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 603;
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 555, 564, 823
One-sided concept of (Rusk), 89,
93, 253, 346
Guerrilla warfare: Bunker, 419;
Johnson, 289; Lodge, 465, 466,
468 ; Rusk, 345 ; Westmoreland, 785
International law aspects (E. V.
Rostow), 607
Prisoners, U.S. position, 170
Propaganda, failure of (Lodge), 465
Refugees (Rusk), 213
Test case for: Bundy, 283; Johnson,
632; Katzenbach, 819; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 90, 387,
703, 823
Communist reliance on U.S. dissent:
Johnson, 522; Katzenbach, 602;
Rusk, 555, 556, 600, 705, 824;
Westmoreland, 785
Demilitarized zone: 671; Goldberg,
485; Rusk, 412, 558
Barrier, proposed (Rusk), 385, 414
Extension of. Communist rejection
(Rusk), 89, 597
Economic and social development:
Industrialization (Lilienthal), 866,
867
Off-shore fisheries development
project, 222
Prospects: Johnson, 519; McNa-
mara, 167; Rusk, 93
Social and land reforms, obligations
of new government: Bunker, 783;
Rusk, 413
U.S. aid: Bundy, 277, 284; Bunker,
781, 784; Rusk, 213, 804
Communist participation: Gold-
berg, 485; Johnson, 33; Rusk,
601, 823
Vietnamese role: Bunker, 584, 783;
Lilienthal, 864; Rusk, 413
Geneva conference: 361, 671, 709;
Bundy, 276, 280; Goldberg, 383
(quoted), 484, 485, 671 ; Rusk, 93,
383, 413, 558, 559, 598
Inflation: Bunker, 784; Lodge, 466;
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 161, 213;
Taylor, 258
Japan, position of, 745
Korea, compared to: Katzenbach,
603; Westmoreland, 788
Military and other aid from foreign
countries: 64, 520, 792; Bundy,
285; Bunker, 782; Johnson, 61,
520, 632; NcNamara, 169; Park
(quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92, 391,
555, 561, 599, 822; Taylor, 258,
259; Westmoreland, 788
National Liberation Front: Bunker,
782 ; Department, 854 ; Fedorenko
(quoted), 670; Goldberg, 672;
Rusk, 91, 93, 94, 386, 390, 558;
Westmoreland, 786
National reconciliation (pacification)
program: 854; Bundy, 284, 353;
Bunker, 418, 419, 748, 750, 783;
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 386,
557; Taylor, 257
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Negotiations for peaceful settlement:
Ashmore-Baggs contacts (Depart-
ment), 462
Channels: 462; Goldberg, 484;
Johnson, 775; Rusk, 162
Communist China and Soviet
Union, influence on: E. V. Ros-
tow, 608; Rusk, 596, 597, 598,
601
Communist rejection: 462; Bundy,
284, 357; Bunker, 784; Goldberg,
671; Johnson, 521, 632, 775;
Rusk, 89, 94, 163, 253, 346, 383,
384, 391, 411, 556, 558, 705, 740,
823
Enterprise proposal (Johnson), 747,
775
Geneva conference. See Geneva
conference
International conference, U.S. sup-
port for, 671
National Liberation Front par-
ticipation: 854; Bundy, 353,
417; Department, 854; Rusk, 93,
94, 390, 558
Norstad proposal (Lodge), 465
Peace efforts of other countries :
Goldberg, 669; Lee, 615; Rusk,
94
Prior to U.S. presidential elections,
question of (Bunker), 419
U Thant proposals (Rusk), 162
U.S. willingness: 745, 854; Bundy,
284; Bunker, 417, 418, 781, 784;
Goldberg, 48, 484; Gronouski,
432; Johnson, 32, 39, 521;
Lodge, 464; Rusk, 89, 162, 163,
346, 384, 555, 556, 595, 600, 705,
740
Vict Cong participation, LT.S. posi-
tion: 854; Johnson, 775
Vietnamese role: 854; Bundy, 352,
353; Bunker, 416; Rusk, 384,
411, 412, 556, 558
Wilson-Kosygin talks, London:
463 ; Rusk, 562
Without conditions, U.S. willing-
ness: Katzenbach, 602; Rusk, 9(5,
93, 162, 253, 346, 384, 557, 705
Peace :
Geneva accords as a basis for:
361, 671, 709; Goldberg, 484;
Rusk, 93, 383
Prospects for: Bunker, 416, 781;
Clifford, 258; Johnson, 32; Rusk,
93, 162, 164, 411, 412, 458, 556,
558, 599, 601, 823
U.S. goal: Bundy, 357; Bunker, 584,
784; Goldberg, 483; Johnson, 37,
39, 632, 775, 777, 851; Lodge,
465; Rusk, 384, 452, 555, 560,
562, 564, 740, 823
Vietnamese position: Goldberg,
485 ; Lilienthal, 866
Political development: Bundy, 284,
354; Bunker, 417, 748, 781;
Goldberg, 485; Johnson, 289, 521,
776, 779; Lodge, 350, 466, 467;
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 94, 161,
412, 557, 705; Taylor, 257
Communist participation: Gold-
berg, 485; Rusk, 386, 601
Corruption, prevention of (Bunker),
751
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Political development— Continued
Military leadership (Bundy), 260
President- and Vice-President-elect,
relations, question of: Bunker,
421; Rusk, 385
Presidential elections:
Campaign, problems and inci-
dents: Bundy, 260, 352, 354;
Bunker, 749; Johnson, 290;
Lodge, 350
Communist interference: Bunker,
749 ; Johnson, 52 1 ; Rusk, 345,
414, 557, 740; Westmoreland,
786
Conduct of, and percent of
Vietnamese voters: 391 ; Bunker,
417, 420, 749, 783; Johnson,
421, 776; Rusk, 557, 822;
Westmoreland, 786
Inauguration ceremonies (Hum-
phrey), 789
Prospects from: Bundy, 353, 357;
Bunker, 416, 417, 419, 420, 751,
783; Johnson, 421, 521 ; Katzen-
bach, 603; Lodge, 465; Rusk,
94, 163, 166, 385
U.S. observers: 349, 671 ; Johnson,
421 ; Lodge, 349; Rusk, 345
Port and harbor facilities (Mc-
Namara), 167
Reunification: 671; Bundy, 277, 279;
Goldberg, 485
Security {see also National reconcili-
ation): Bundy, 353; Johnson, 521,
776; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 557
Following U.S. withdrawal, ques-
tions of: Bundy, 355 ; Rusk, 93
Self-determination: 361, 854; Bundy,
195; Bunker, 781; Chfford, 257;
Goldberg, 485; Humphrey, 789;
Johnson, 33, 59, 498, 519, 779;
Rusk, 90, 94, 345, 452, 703, 823
Soviet position and aid: Brzezinski,
20; Goldberg, 668; Kosygin, 38;
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 426,
608; Rusk, 558, 562, 596, 598
Summit conference, prospects for:
Bunker, 750; Clifford, 258; Rusk,
165, 561
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 310,
404, 590, 729
U.N. action:
Communist rejection: 671; Gold-
berg, 669; Rusk, 383,413
Soviet position (Goldberg), 668
NLF participation, 854
U.S. support: Bundy, 357; Gold-
berg, 483, 667; Johnson, 521, 780;
Lodge, 468, (U.N. role), 469;
Rusk, 383, 559
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 264,
670; Rusk, 559
U.S. air actions:
Military targets only : 44, 171;
Lodge, 468; Rusk, 414
Results {see also U.S. military
actions): Bundy, 355; Lodge, 464,
465; McNamara, 168; Rusk, 413
U.S. commitment: 745; Bunker, 420,
584, 784; Goldberg, 484; John-
son, 33, 59, 508, 519, 614, 776;
Lodge, 465; Rusk, 163, 388, 555,
596, 600, 823
Asia, importance to. See under Asia
914
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
U.S. commitment — Continued
Congressional support: E. V. Ros-
tow, 605 ; Rusk, 555, 560, 563, 599,
821
"Credibility gap" (Rusk), 414, 555,
740, 824
Importance of dependability:
Bunker, 781; Johnson, 519, 777,
779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V.
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 90, 91, 253,
599, 703, 704, 740, 821, 857
SEATO: Bundy, 277, 285; John-
son, 779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 414, 555,
563, 703, 821
U.S. Embassy, dedication (Bunker),
584
U.S. information, sources and supply
of (Bunker), 781
U.S. military forces:
Leadership (Johnson), 776
Manpower levels and deployment:
Bundy, 353; Johnson, 267, 522,
775; McNamara, 169; Rusk,
344, 821; Taylor, 258, West-
moreland, 786
Morale and public support:
Bunker, 585; Johnson, 267, 522;
Rusk, 348, 704
Withdrawal, conditions for: Bundy,
356; Rusk, 89, 92, 345, 563,
597, 823
U.S. military operations:
Consultations and reviews: Bunker,
749, 750; Clifford, 256; E. V.
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 414, 561
Costs: Johnson, 266; Trowbridge,
504
Logistics (MACONOMY): West-
moreland, 787
Phases of, survey (Westmoreland),
786
Responsibility for decisions : Bunker,
750; Rusk, 414, 741
Results: Bundy, 355; Bunker, 748,
781; Clifford, 257; Johnson, 521,
776; Lodge, 465; McNamara,
168; Rusk, 92, 346, 413, 821
Stalemate, question of: Bimker,
418, 783; McNamara, 168; Rusk,
161, 346, 557
Strategy: Bundy, 284, 355; Clif-
ford, 257; Lodge, 466; Mc-
Namara, 168; Taylor, 257, 259
U.S. national interests: Bundy, 278,
285; Johnson, 519, 779, 851;
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 607;
Rusk, 555, 563, 599, 703, 821
U.S. objectives: Blair, 206; Brzezinski,
22; Bundy, 283; Bunker, 584, 781 ;
Goldberg, 483; Humphrey, 789,
790; Johnson, 290, 498, 519,
779; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach,
602; Lodge, 469; Rusk, 92, 345,
416, 452, 555, 601, 823; Taylor,
257
Allies, support for: ClifTord, 256;
Johnson, 522; Taylor, 257
Congressional support: Johnson,
519, 790; Katzenbach, 603; Rusk,
91, 560, 563
U.S. officials, preoccupation with,
question of (Bundy), 356
U.S. politics, bipartisan issue under:
Lodge, 467; Rusk, 415
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
U.S. presidential elections, effect on
Communist position : Johnson,
777; Lodge, 468
U.S. public opinion: Bunker, 750;
Gronouski, 432; Johnson, 519,
776, 777, 778; Lodge, 464;
E. V. Rostow, 605, 607; Rusk,
345, 387, 555, 559, 600
U.S.-Vietnamese relations: Lilienthal,
867; Rusk, 557-558; Westmore-
land, 787
Vietnamese Army: Bundy, 284, 353;
Bunker, 750, 782; Johnson, 777;
Katzenbach, 603; Lodge, 466,
468; Rusk, 346; Westmoreland,
787
Vietnamese character and goals: John-
son, 521 ; Lilienthal, 865, 866
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
jmd Taylor, 256
Visit of Vice-President Humphrey, 789
World opinion: 745; Johnson, 520;
Rusk, 347, 705
World peace, importance to: Gold-
berg, 671; Johnson, 520, 852;
Rusk, 564
Viklund, Daniel, 91
Visas:
Romania, agreement re issuance of
visas to diplomatic and non-
diplomatic personnel, 81
U.S. travel restrictions to Middle
East amended, 41
Volunteer Service, International Secre-
tariat for. Executive order, 207
Volunteers to America: 235; Palmer,
658
w
War on Hunger (set also Food and pop-
ulation crisis): Johnson, 762; Rusk,
209, 254, 801; Waters, 765
War on Poverty: Linowitz, 323, 618;
Rusk, 857; Trowbridge, 504
Warsaw Pact: Cleveland, 143; Leddy,
761
Washington, George (quoted), 333
Watanabe, Takeshi (Rusk), 458
Water resources:
Management of, need for coopera-
tion (Rusk), 738
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in develop-
ment of water resources, 682
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865
Water for Peace Office, interim
director (Woodward), 245
Waters, Herbert J., 764
West Point (Johnson), 780
Western European Union (Rusk), 856
Western Samoa, International Wheat
Agreement, 1967 protocol for the
extension of, ratification, 270
Westmoreland, William C: 785; Bunk-
er, 750, 751; Lodge, 466; Mc-
Namara, 168
Whaling:
International convention (1946),
amendments to schedule, en-
trance into force, 590
Whaling Commission, International,
U.S. commissioner, announce-
ment, 586
Wheat:
Research, Mexico: Diaz Ordaz, 675;
Gaud, 582; Johnson, 674, 683
Wheat — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
EEC, agreement re suspension of
agreements concerning quality
wheat and other grains, 245
International Grains Agreement: 45,
95; Freeman, 133; Johnson, 716;
Roth, 124
International Wheat Agreement
(1962):
Protocol for further extension of:
Germany (including Berlin), 26
1967 protocol for further exten-
sion of: Australia, 153; Bar-
bados, 190, 309; Belgium (for
Belgium-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union), 117; Canada,
153; Ecuador, 190; Germany,
Guatemala, 153; Haiti, 270;
Israel, 153, 662; Italy, Japan,
153; Korea, 117; Libya, 153,
337; Mexico, 26; Nigeria, 770;
Peru, 590; Portugal, 190; Spain,
309; Tunisia, 190; Venezuela,
405; Western Samoa, 270
Wheat trade convention (1967):
Johnson, 716
Current actions: Argentina, 845;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 769;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 809,
845; EEC, Finland, France,
845; Germany, 769; Greece,
India, Ireland, Israel, 845,
Italy (as EEC member State),
809; Japan, 728; Korea, Leb-
anon, 845; Luxembourg, 770;
Mexico, 845; Netherlands, 770;
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Spain, 845; Sweden, 809; Switz-
erland, 845; Tunisia, 728; U.K.,
845; U.S., 728
U.S. additional shipments to India
authorized (Johnson), 430
U.S. stocks, decrease in (Gold-
schmidt), 305
White, William Allen (E. V. Rostow),
606
Whitman, Walt (quoted), 571
WHO. See World Health Organization
Wiesner, Jerome B. (McNamara), 448
WUlis, David K., 353
Winters, Robert, 46
Wirtz, W. Willard, 455
WMO. See World Meteorological Or-
ganization
Women:
Political rights, convention (1953):
Chile, 729; Costa Rica, 405
Status of women:
Iran (Shah Pahlavi), 361
U.N. commission, 20th session,
report (TUlett), 218
Woods, George D. (quoted), 678
Woodward, Robert R., 245
World Bank. See International Bank
of Reconstruction and Develop-
ment
World Food Problem, The: 76n, 307n, 874n;
Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533
World Food Program (Goldschmidt),
306
World grains arrangement. See Inter-
national grains arrangement
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402
OFFICIAI. BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
World Health Organization:
Constitution, 1946, as amended:
Lesotho, 270
Amendment to article 7: Barbados,
270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica,
117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 26
World Law Day, 1967, proclsimation,
171
World Meteorological Organization :
Goldberg, 723; Rusk, 739
Convention (1947): Barbados, 438;
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438
World order: 615, 709; Brzezinski, 19;
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 631, 633,
655; Linowitz, 616; E. V. Rostow,
609; W. W. Rostow, 66; Rusk,
91,600
Interdependence of modern world:
Hammarskjold (quoted), 265;
Johnson, 325; Katzenbach, 334;
E. V. Rostow, 423, 605; Rusk,
252, 452, 735, 807
U.S. influence: Brzezinski, 21;
Humphrey, 790; Johnson, 303;
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 735
World peace: 745; Goldberg, 483; E.
V. Rostow, 425; Rusk, 87, 91, 704,
735; Sato, 744
Arab-Israeli conflict, threat to: Gold-
berg, 4, 13, 108, 216; Johnson,
33; E. V. Rostow, 237
World peace — Continued
Economic considerations: Humphrey,
792; Katzenbach, 334; Linowitz,
323; Rusk, 254, 737; Waters, 765
Inter-American system, importance to
(Linowitz), 321
Law of treaties, importance to (Kear-
ney), 721
NATO, importance to, 329
U.N. Charter principles and U.S.
support: Goldberg, 216, 264;
Rusk, 252, 560, 564, 737, 824
U.S. commitments, importance to:
Johnson, 519; Kaplan, 234; Katz-
enbach, 604; E. V. Rostow, 608;
Rusk, 255, 347, 703, 704, 857
U.S.-Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans-
field proposal (Rusk), 456
U.S.-Soviet responsibilities: Johnson,
35, 38, 59; Katzenbach, 819; E.
V. Rostow, 428; Rusk, 160
U.S. support: Johnson, 16, 31, 328,
522, 571, 747, 851, 853; Katzen-
bach, 820; E. V. Rostow, 237,
605; Rusk, 215, 452, 564, 739, 821
Viet-Nam, importance of U.S. com-
mitments (Johnson), 520
World Law Day, 1967, proclamation,
171
World War II, lessons of (Rusk), 251,
253, 343, 704, 737, 824, 857
World Weather Watch (Rusk), 739
Worsthorne, Peregrine (quoted), 231
Wyndham White, Eric (Roth), 125
Xauthopoulos-Palamas, Christian, 507
Yemen, U.S. travel restrictions
amended, 459
Yemen, Southern, U.S. diplomatic
recognition, 861
Yingling, Raymond T., 475
York, Herbert F. (McNamara), 448
Yoshida, Shigeru (Johnson), 660
Young, Stephen M. (Johnson), 42
Yugoslavia :
Ambassador to U.S., 362
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 222,
270, 405, 589, 625, 846
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement, 586
Zambia, Geneva convention (1949) re
protection of civilian persons in
time of war, adherence, 698
a U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1968 O — 289-936
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. U62
July S, 1967
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES DEBATE ON NEAR EAST;
SOVIET PROPOSAL CONDEMNING ISRAEL REJECTED
Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Texts of Resolutions 3
THE MARSHALL PLAN: FROM THE RECONSTRUCTION
TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harrhnan 17
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
by Zbigniew Brzezinshi 19
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1462 Publication 8255
July 3, 1967
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and the Foreign Service,
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U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near East; Soviet
Proposal Condemning Israel Rejected
Following are statements made on June 10,
IS, and 14. in the U.N. Security Council hy U.S.
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg'^ and the
text of a letter he sent to the Secretary-General
on June 9, together with texts of resolutions
adopted hy the Council on June 12 and H, a
revised U.8. draft resolution subnvitted on
June 14 which remain^s before the Council, and a
revised Soviet draft resolution submitted on
June 13 which failed to obtain the required votes
for adoption.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 10
U.S./U.N. press release 98
Mr. President, it has been the consistent view
of my Government from the very beginning of
this conflict that this Security Council should
have a single goal : to quench the flames of war
in the Near East and to begin to move toward
peace in the area. And throughout our delib-
eration of this subject, we have attempted by all
the means at our disposal to expedite the action
of this Council and the action of the United Na-
tions in this direction. This is our task. This is
what we should be devoting ourselves to with
all of the resources at our command.
Instead of that, Mr. President, much of the
time of this Council is devoted to diatribes
against my country about alleged involvement
in this conflict. I have stated many times, and
I again wish to state, that the United States is
in no way involved in this conflict but on the
contrary has used its influence here and diplo-
matically in the interests of first avoiding the
conflict and then bringing it to an end.
' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg In
the Security Council on June 6, 8, and 9, see BtrLLETiN
of June 26, 1967, p. 934.
We have done more than make statements to
the Council in this regard. We have offered to
have unpartial observers of the United Nations
make a determination with respect to the charges
that have been made. I have not heard from
those who make the charges any willingness on
their part to subscribe to this point of view. And
yet, what better proof can there be of lack of
involvement than a willingness to have charges
of this type, which are false and which are mali-
cious, put to the test of impartial observation?
In fact, I pointed out what was quite clear —
that, with respect to the canard that the 6th
Fleet was involved in this exercise, there was
another country with naval craft in the vicinity
which could enlighten the Council about this
situation. It is perfectly obvious what I was
referring to in that connection.
Here again tonight we have another illustra-
tion of this, and all I can say again, and I wiU
continue to say it, is that there is no involve-
ment on the part of the United States, that we
are quite willing to have the charges that were
made investigated impartially, and that it does
not serve the cause of peace to repeat these base-
less charges.
Now, Mr. President, we were the ones who
proposed last night that we should receive re-
ports and we welcome very much the reports
that we are receiving. We very much appreciate
the straightforward way in which our distin-
guished Secretary-General has rendered these
reports, in which he has pointed out the facts
and pointed out their limitations and has urged
for further facts so this Council can act
appropriately.
We do, however, have some facts before us,
and we have indicated throughout a willingness
to act upon such facts and to act in an even-
handed and impartial way. Indeed, we have
tried to make it very clear that it is the obliga-
JULT 3, 1967
tion of both Israel and Syria to strictly comply
with the cease-fire order. This is the first fact.
It is not the final task of this Council, but it is
the essential first task.
We have a very grave situation in the Middle
East. To rebuild the fabric of peace in the area
is going to be very difficult. We all know that.
To quench the flames of war is very difiicult. We
ought first of all to have a stopping of all mili-
tary activity, an end to the conflict. This is the
first and primary task and not the last task.
We will have to go on to other matters which
were mentioned in the resolution ^ we tabled
before the Security Council.
Now, it does not help to have invective in this
situation. Invective does not take the place of
progress. And I should like to make it very
clear that it has not been my practice at any
time in the United Nations to impugn the ve-
racity or integrity of any representative of the
U.N. representing his country. But when
charges are made against the United States
that have no foundation, it is the plain obliga-
tion of the representative of the United States
to rebut those charges and to place before the
Council the facts — or the means of verifying
the facts.
There is another thing which I mentioned
earlier which I think is very clear, and that is
that I respect the right of every member of this
Council to represent his coimtry. I do not im-
ply that any member of tlie Council in appear-
ing here represents anybody else other than his
country. Wlien remarks are made that tlie rep-
resentative of the United States speaks for
some country other than his own, it is that type
of remark to which I take strong exception —
and I think justifiably so. Such a remark is
not one which should be countenanced by an
international organization. We speak for our
countries. We state their policies, and we at-
tempt to the best of our abilities to present the
point of view of our countries to this Coimcil.
That is the responsibility of every member, and
I respect any member wlio does that with all
the energy and vigor at his command.
Now, that is all I meant when I made the
statement that I made this morning. I will not
accept from anybody a concept that in speak-
' U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 2 ; for backgrounfl, see Bul-
letin of June 26, 1967, pp. 941 and 943 ; for text of a
third revision, see p. 12.
ing here I speak from any other basis than the
interests of the United States of America,
whom I proudly represent before this Council,
and any indication to the contrary I will not
t-olerate; nor do I think any diplomatic body
should tolerate it, because it is inconsistent with
the attitude that we owe each other as col-
leagues at the United Nations.
Now, we are dealing with the cease-fire order
immediately. That is the problem we have at
hand. That is why we have been called into
session twice today. And our concern must be
that that cease-fire must be recognized. Both
Syria and Israel have given General Bull [Lt.
Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization]
solemn assurances that they accept the cease-
fire and will fully implement it.
It is a source of encouragement to me that,
from the Secretary-General's reports, inci-
dents of violation — except those that occurred
possibly within a few minutes after this agree-
ment was made witli General Bull — are not
being repeated. I sincerely hope that this is so,
and I await more detailed reports of the Secre-
tary-General so that we can determine that
hopefully now at least — and it should have
been earlier — ^the cease-fire is in effect.
Now, this morning I was prepared to table a
resolution, even on the basis of the fragmen-
tary information we had, condemning any
violation of the cease-fire by any source. It is
interesting to me that while we are accused of
being involved — which we are not — those who
make that accusation never make reference to
their condemnation of a violation of the cease-
fire if it comes from any source other than those
whose cause they advocate. We are advocating
the cause of peace in this Security Council, and I
we are advocating the cause of respect for the
cease-fire orders of this Council. And my Gov- J
ernment takes the position that the cease-fire I
orders must be complied with — I repeat, must f
be complied with. To that end, Mr. President, '
I table the following resolution : '
The Security Council,
Having heard the reports of the Secretary-General
on the current situation,
Gravely concerned at reports and complaints it has '
received of air attaclts, shelling, ground activities and i
other violations of the cease-fire between Israel and '
Syria,
' U.N. doc. S/7971.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIII
1. Condemns any and all violations of tbe cease-fire ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to order a full in-
Testigation of all reports of violations and to report to
the Security Council as soon as possible;
3. Demands that the parties scrupulously respect its
cease-fire appeals contained in resolutions 233, 234 and
235;'
4. Calls on the Governments concerned to issue cate-
goric instructions to all military forces to cease all
firing and military activities as required by these
resolutions.
FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 13
U.S./D-N. press release 102, Corr. 1
The United States has introduced a draft
resolution (S/7952) which we believe holds the
hope of the lasting peace in the Near East. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has sub-
mitted a revised draft resolution (S/7951)
which its distinguished representative has
talked about today.
I propose, in the interests of furthering the
debate and consideration by the Council today,
to discuss both resolutions — not in the spirit of
invective which regrettably has characterized
our debates of the past several days but on the
merits, because of the grave seriousness of the
problem and because of the necessity for this
Council to arrive at a sober and considered
judgment of what its responsibilities are in the
area.
Throughout the 19 years since the admission
of Israel to the United Nations, the United
States has supported many attempts to resolve
the underlying causes of tension and instability
between the Arab states and Israel. We have
sought to assure acceptance of the political in-
dependence and territorial integrity of all states
in the area — Arab states and Israel alike — all
members entitled to the protection of the char-
ter. And we have also sought for an end to acts
of force of whatever kind, acts which also are
hostile to the spirit and intent of the charter.
We have sought an equitable and humani-
tarian solution of the problem of the Palestin-
ian refugees; we have supported plans for the
development of the resources of the Jordan
Eiver in a way which will help all states and
do harm to none. We have pressed for recogni-
tion of the rights of all nations, including
Israel, to free and innocent passage of the Suez
Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. And, above all,
we have sought the conversion of the armistice
of 1949 into a permanent peace, as contemplated
in the General Armistice Agreements them-
selves.
And we have not changed our views or poli-
cies about the entire situation because of the un-
fortunate events which have occurred recently.
Virtually all our efforts, as we know, have not
succeeded. The Near East has lived for 19 years
in a state of tension which now, for the third
time, has erupted into war. The evenhanded ef-
forts of the United States to prevent and end
the present violence and the past violence are
spread on the record of the United Nations and
of international diplomacy for all to read.
The depth of our commitment was made man-
ifest in 1956 at the time of the Suez crisis. And
more recently it was made evident again in the
evenhanded approach of the United States to-
ward border incidents in 1966. We supported
a call in the Security Council, also supported
by the great majority of the members, on the
Syrian Government to restrain terrorist raids
laimched from its territory.^ Then in November
1966 we joined in the unanimous censure of
Israel for its retaliatory raid against Es-Samu
in Jordan.^ I need scarcely recall to this Coun-
cil that it was the Soviet veto which prevented
the milder action of the Council directed against
Syria from being adopted.
It may also be instructive to recall one as-
pect of the course of events in the past month
leading directly to the outbreak of the fighting,
an aspect which has not been fully or adequately
discussed in the Council but which I am im-
pelled to do by virtue of some of the remarks
by the distinguished representative of the So-
viet Union today.
In early May of this year reports were cir-
culated in Syria and the United Arab Republic
of a supposed Israeli buildup on the borders of
Syria, allegedly backed by the United States
and aimed at the overthrow of the Syrian
Government.
President Nasser recently revealed one source
from which his Government heard this inflam-
matory rumor; namely, Moscow. Yet, Secre-
tary-General U Thant on May 19 ' stated that
* For texts, see Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 947.
' For background, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969.
' Ibid., p. 974.
' U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.
JULY 3, 1967
United Nations observers had found no evidence
to support the charges of an alleged Israeli mili-
tary buildup in the area. And indeed, he could
not have reported any complicity on the part of
the United States, for such complicity was non-
existent.
And let me remind this Council that wliile
these inflammatory charges, inspired by Mos-
cow, were inciting the situation in the Near
East, the Soviet representative's only answer to
my country's call for urgent action by this
Council was a complaint that we were "drama-
tizing" the situation. He should know better
than anybody what "dramatizing" means.
This totally false accusation of a U.S.-Israeli
plot helped substantially to inflame the crisis
in which Israel and Egypt confronted each
other for the first time in 10 years across bor-
ders no longer patrolled by the United Nations.
On May 17, as the world well remembers,
President Nasser, citing the supposed danger
of an Israeli invasion of Syria, requested the
withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency
Force. And when UNEF vacated Sharm el-
Sheik, the United Arab Republic immediately
reimposed its blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba,
after 10 years of free and peaceful navigation.
Now, these are the facts, Mr. President. The
whole world community knows this. We in
the Council, above all others, are fully conver-
sant with them.
Throughout this entire period, the United
States of America in the Security Council, as
its reports disclose, and in all its diplomatic
activity urged the utmost restraint on all par-
ties. We exerted every effort to prevent an out-
break of hostilities and to assure that vital
international maritime rights in the Gulf of
Aqaba would be respected.
Unfortunately, our urgent efforts to convene
the Security Council and to get the Security
Council to act before an outbreak of hostilities
were stalled by other powei-s who chose to ridi-
cule the seriousness of the situation, who failed
to support our urgent efforts to find a peaceful
solution. And as a result, largely through Soviet
obstruction, the Security Council — ^between its
first meeting on May 24 and the outbreak of
fighting on June 5 — was unable to pass a single
resolution or take any effective action to j^revent
an outbreak.
And throughout this time, the whole area re-
mained a tmderbox ; armies were mobilized and
poised for war, and inexorably war came. And
from the outset of the fighting, the United
States immediately sought a cease-fire, and sup-
ported efforts made by our distinguished Presi-
dent and others in the same direction. The
record of the meetings of the Security Council
shows clearly who obstructed the cease-fire — the
first indispensable step to bringing the conflict
to an end — and why it took 2 days to adopt a
simple cease-fire resolution, wliich should have
been adopted immediately and without debate.
The record also shows that, regardless of the,
sponsor, the United States speedily supported
the second cease-fire resolution, which was pro-
posed by the Soviet Union. After that, however,
again precious time was wasted in protracted
debate and in negotiations before a tliird cease-
fire resolution applying to the situation in Syria i
could be adopted. This was true even though
here also the United States was ready to acti
inmiediatfily and had in fact sought to antici-
pate the situation the previous day by support-
ing a resolution condemning violations of thei
cease-fire and, indeed, proposing to sponsor such i
a resolution.
Now, fortimately — and belatedly — a cease-fira
is in effect. But we cannot rest there. The cease-i
fire, as we have repeatedly said, is no more than
the first essential step in this Council's duty.
Our charter responsibility is the maintenance
of international peace and security. The guns
are mercifully silent in the Near East today. Bui
that region is still a long, long way from the
true peace or from true security.
The question now facing the Security Coun-
cil, therefore, is simply this : Wliat is the next
step we must take toward peace and security
for the nations of the Near East ? Wliere do we
go from here ? Not where do we further debate,
or exchange recriminations or invective — but
where do we go from here? |
There are two answers to this question pro- I
posed before the Council. That is, that of the '
Soviet Union in its resolution and that of the |
United States.
Before stating the case for my Government's
proposal, I would like to comment briefly on
that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet's proposal j
could be stated in simple terms as follows : Con- I
demn Israel for its aggression ; Israel, with-
draw your troops and let everything go back to /
exactly where it was before the fighting began j
on Jime 5. In other words, the film is to be rim j
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
backward through the camera to that point in
the early morning on June 5 when hostilities
had not yet broken out.
But what would the situation be?
Once again, opposing forces are to stand m
direct confrontation poised for combat. Once
again, there is to be no international machinery
to keep them apart. Once again, Aqaba is to be
blockaded for the free and innocent passage of
all maritime nations. And once again, nothing
is to be done to resolve the deep-lying griev-
ances on both sides that have fed the fires of
conflict in the Near East for 20 years. And
significantly, once again, there is no bar to an
arms race in the area which has so substantially
contributed to tension in that region.
If there was ever a prescription for renewed
hostilities, the Soviet resolution is that prescrip-
tion. I do hope that the U.S.S.R. does not con-
template with equanimity the prospect of a
fourth round in the Arab-Israel struggle. This
is precisely what this Council should concert its
eiforts to avoid.
Let us recall that the General Armistice
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that
their purpose is, and I quote : ". . . to facilitate
the transition from the present truce to penna-
nent peace" — I repeat, "permanent peace" — "in
Palestine."
We all know that there has been no transition
and there is no permanent peace in that area at
all. On the contrary, there is war. A bandage
was applied to the wound 18 years ago, but the
wound has never been allowed to heal. It is still
an open and festering wound today. All of the
18 years of the armistice regime have witnessed
virtually no progress on any of the basic issues
from which the conflict arose. As long as these
issues are unresolved, they will continue to en-
venom the political life of the Near East.
The Soviet proposal does not encompass a
genuine approach to their solution; it cannot
lead toward peace. Mr. President, it is rather a
big step backward toward another war.
What the Near East needs today are new steps
toward real peace, not just a cease-fire, which
is what we have today ; not just a fragile and
perilous armistice, which is what we have had
for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which is nec-
essary but insufficient.
Real peace must be our aim. And in that con-
viction my delegation submitted last Thurs-
day— even before the cease-fire became fully
effective — a draft resolution [S/7952/Rev. 2]
from which I shall now read the most important
provision :
The Security Council, . . .
Calls for discussions promptly thereafter (that is,
after the cease-fire) among the parties concerned, using
such third party or United Nations assistance as they
may wish, looliing toward the establishment of viable
arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and dis-
engagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of
force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital
international rights and the establishment of a stable
and durable peace in the Middle East.
Our objective in making this proposal is to
encourage a decision by the warring parties to
live together in peace and to secure interna-
tional assistance to this end. It is necessary to
begin to move — not some day but now,
promptly, while the memory of these tragic
events is still vivid in our minds — toward a full
settlement of all outstanding questions. And I
again repeat "all outstanding questions" be-
tween the parties, such as the resolutions the
United Nations has contemplated for nearly
20 years.
There are legitimate grievances on all sides of
this bitter conflict, and a full settlement should
deal equitably with all legitimate grievances and
all outstanding questions, from whichever side
they are raised. In short, Mr. President, a new
foundation for peace must be built in the Middle
East.
Doubtless, agreements between the parties on
these profoundly contentious matters will take
a long time, but the United Nations, speaking
through this Council, has an urgent obligation
to facilitate them and to rebuild an atmosphere
in which fruitful discussions will be possible.
That is the purpose of the resolution we have
submitted.
Mr. President, the Security Council is now
faced with a clear-cut issue : We can either at-
tack the causes of the disease which has
plagued the Near East with war three times in
a generation or we can go back to the treatment
of symptoms, which has proved such a dismal
failure in the past. And, in this, we should
adopt a simple pragmatic rule from what the
medical advisers of all of us tell us, "You can't
cure cancer with a band-aid."
Now, Mr. President, in this grave situation,
fraught with so many differences of opinions
and attitudes, the tendency is to say that it de-
fies solution. But we cannot accept this type of
JtJLT 3, 1967
counsel. Let us rather say that no one can say
that sohitions are impossible. The sad fact is
that for many years they have not been really
fearlessly tried. And now, at the end of this
tragic week of war, let us remember the death
and suffering of all the parties of war, and let
us open the way for solutions that will be suf-
ficiently enduring and sufficiently just to be an
acceptable monument to their sacrifice and to
the pledge that is contained in the Charter of
the United Nations.
Now, Mr. President, in dealing with this sub-
ject, since we are here in New York, we are
constantly reminded by various spokesmen, in-
cluding my good friend the distinguished
representative of Jordan, Ambassador [Mu-
hammad H.] El-Farra, of American public
opinion. And, again, I should like to make
something very explicitly clear. I do not apolo-
gize in any sense for the expression by any
American group of their point of ^aew about
this problem, whether it is the Action Commit-
tee on American- Arab Kelations headed by Dr.
[M. T.] Mehdi, who met with me, or by the
head of any Zionist organization.
Our Constitution- — and we are very proud of
it — permits free expression of opinion by our
citizens. The other day we witnessed a vivid
demonstration of the character of the American
Constitution. The Arab-American Society had
its demonstration, peaceful demonstration, in
front of the White House, and so did various
Zionist and Jewish groups. Both were per-
mitted, both took place peaceably under our
Constitution; and both are permissible under
our system of government. We are proud of this.
We do not in any way apologize for this, and
we do not in any way apologize for what any
person says in our country about any matter
of public opinion.
I should say, for Ambassador El-Farra's in-
formation, that very often public opinion ex-
pressed in America is not public opinion which
is exactly complimentary of our Government;
and yet whether it is complimentary or not, it is
the entire basis of our society that our citizens
should have a right to express themselves freely
on all issues. "The right of comment, the right
of dissent," our Supreme Court said, "is a right
of American citizens both in times of peace and
in times of war, and is our most precious
heritage."
I should also like to say again in this Council
that I do not think it appropriate — and I shall
say it again and again — or that it serves the
causes of debate to refer to comments made by
various citizens or individuals or public officials.
It is legitimate, I have said, and I repeat, to
comment upon the foreign policy of our Gov-
ernment, the declarations made by the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, myself, and others
who have responsibility for enunciating the for-
eign policy of our Government.
When other officials in the American Govern-
ment, in the legislative branch — and I will be
very precise, Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy,
Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller, or anybody
else — express themselves, they are also exercis-
ing their rights as public officials and American
citizens. And I don't think the time of the Coim-
cil ought to be spent in debating the views of
our officials or entering into our domestic affairs.
What is more relevant, if I may say so, with due
respect to them, is the decision that is stated in
this Council on behalf of the American
Government.
Now, reference has been made to the attack on
our ship Liberty. I stated in this Council, in the
strongest terms, the protest of our Government
against that attack, and we have renewed that
protest in the strongest terms to the Israeli au-
thorities. We regard that attack to be an un-
justified attack. And I have welcomed expres-
sions made by some, but not by all, of the
members of the Council expressing regret about
the lives we have lost in this conflict, just as I
have expressed regret about the lives of all other
personnel lost in this conflict, including the lives
of the combatants themselves. Because, surely,
we must express regret about all bloodshed and
loss of life in this conflict.
And now I should like also to address myself
to some other comments that have been made.
We do have, in the aftermath of the fighting,
an urgent responsibility to see that the Council
takes all action within its jiower to protect those
already victimized by this war. There are solemn
obligations which we must recall concerning the
treatment of victims of war under the 1949
Geneva convention; in particular, the obliga-
tions concerned with civilian populations, as the
distinguished representative of Argentina, Dr.
[Jose Maria] Ruda, pointed out on June 11.
These are particularly relevant in light of the
reports we have heard of the movement from
their homes of civilian populations, many of
them refugees from earlier conflicts.
I have already expressed in this Council my
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Government's concern for the welfare and
safety of the populations of the west bank of the
Jordan. Our concern includes all who might find
themselves in areas of the Near East disrupted
by this conflict and, particularly, those who now
find themselves in areas under Israeli control.
The United Nations, through its resolutions
establishing the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency, assumed particular responsi-
bility for the refugees of the 1947-48 fighting.
We supported this resolution and the subsequent
resolutions renewing its mandate. We have been
the principal contributor to the work of
UNRWA and, therefore, have a legitimate con-
cern that the refugees of the 1947—48 conflict be
treated with the humanitarian concern to which
they are entitled. And we also have the equal
concern that other civilians displaced during the
recent conflict from their homes, and particu-
larly those on the west bank of the Jordan, will
be allowed and encouraged to return to their
homes and that all civilians will be provided
with adequate assurance of their safety in the
same locations in which they resided before hos-
tilities began. We urge all concerned, and par-
ticularly the Government of Israel, to exert
every possible effort to this end.
Mr. President, we have taken the first step
in the cease-fire, and, commendably, the cease-
fire is holding. We have many tasks to perform
in bringing about a just and equitable solution,
which the Secretary-General has so strongly
stressed to us in his report, so needed in this
troubled area of the world. Let us pursue these
tasks in a spirit of perhaps the greatest Ajner-
ican President, Abraham Lincoln : "With mal-
ice toward none, with charity for all." And let
us bind up the wounds of this conflict and bring
peace, the most precious gift of all, to all the
people in the area.
SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 13
U.S. /U.N. press release 103
I shall try to be very brief. The representa-
tive of the United Arab Republic, our esteemed
friend and colleague Ambassador El Kony, this
evening repeated unwarranted allegations that
the United States supported and encouraged the
recent hostilities in the Middle East and was
guilty of collusion. That is simply not true. No
member of this Council has made greater efforts
than the United States, both in the Coimcil and
outside the Council, to prevent this conflict. The
United States simply has not intervened in any
way in this conflict. That, perhaps, is also my
reply to what our friend and colleague Ambas-
sador El-Farra has said. I had not assumed that
any intervention of any sort by the United
States would have been regarded as appropriate
or proper in the circumstances of the present
conflict.
As for the remarks of the representative of
Syria, Ambassador [George J.] Tomeh, who has
asserted the idea that the Israeli military estab-
lishment has been sustained by United States
military and economic aid, the fact is that
United States military aid to the Arab states in
the last 20 years has been more than 10 times
the amount of United States military aid to
Israel. I repeat, more than 10 times the amount.
As for economic aid afforded by the United
States Government, the amount given to Arab
states in the past 20 years has been almost three
times that given to Israel ; and this aid has been
made available as part of our desire to main-
tain friendly and cooperative relations with all
countries in the area.
It is true that many United States citizens
have made generous gifts to Israel. That is their
right as individuals. And it is also true, if we
want to keep the record completely straight,
that the Arab states have received substantial
aid, both economic and military, from the Soviet
Union, which Israel has not. This is also a joart
of the record of the past 20 years.
But really, all of these things have no bearing
immediately on the basic point : that tlie United
States Goverimient, as a matter of public pol-
icy, has helped both the Arab states and Israel
over the past 20 years and that the amount
accorded to the Arab states has been substan-
tially greater than that accorded to Israel.
It is our desire — and I said this earlier in the
debate — to have the economic conditions of the
whole area improved and to play a constructive
role in the improvement of those economic con-
ditions in the entire area.
With respect to the statements made by our
colleague Ambassador Fedorenko [Nikolai T.
Fedorenko, of the Soviet Union], he has given
a most distorted interpretation to our draft
resolution. If I heard him correctly, he said that
unless the territorial demands of Israel on the
United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan are
met, there will be an explosive situation and
war — that this is the effect of our draft resolu-
JtTLT 3, 1967
tion. This is, to say the least, a gross and flagrant
distortion of our draft resolution and the state-
ment I made to the Council, which speaks for
itself, and our desire to bring about the condi-
tions that can create the basis for a just, equi-
table, and peaceful solution to the conflict.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 14
D.S./U.N. press release 104
Mr. President, I shall be very glad to respond
to your request. There are, in fact, three United
States proposals before the Council.
One is in document S/7916/Eev. 1,* to which
you, Mr. President, have referred, which was our
initial proposal designed to prevent the out-
break of hostilities by endorsing the appeal of
the Secretary-General. A number of members
at that time were unwilling to support the Sec-
retary-General's appeal and the subsequent out-
break of hostilities has put this resolution out
of date. "We vtdll not press it to the vote.
The second is in document S/7971. We intro-
duced it last Saturday to demand scrupulous re-
spect for the cease-fire and to call for categoric
instructions to military commanders. It was de-
nounced by the Soviet Union for reasons I
foimd inexplicable at the time — and still find
inexplicable. A resolution with identical ob-
jectives was adopted the next day " at the recom-
mendation of you, Mr. President. The United
States will therefore not press this resolution
(S/7971) to the vote, either.
The third United States resolution is our
substantive proposal contained in document
S/7952/Kev. 2. We have just submitted a tliird
revision to this draft, which has just been cir-
culated and has just been referred to by our
distinguished colleague Ambassador Ignatieff
[George Ignatieff, of Canada] .
This United States proposal, whose purpose
I explained in detail yesterday, is still before
the Security Council. My delegation will not
ask for a vote on this resolution today, because
several delegations have indicated to us that
they desire more time for all members to con-
sider carefully enough all of tlie complicated
ingredients which must go into a truly mean-
■ For text, see Bulletin of .Tune 26, 1967, p. 948.
'U.N. doc. S/RES/236 (1967) ; for text, see p. 11.
ingful next step toward peace in the Middle
East. And some members have indicated that
they will wish to suggest certain changes in our
text. The distinguislied representative of Ethi-
opia [Lij Endalkachew Makonnen] has made a
particularly eloquent plea earlier today that we
not press this resolution to a vote.
Mr. President, I want the Council to know
that although we have proposed a resolution
which expresses our sincere convictions in the
matter, we are open minded and will be glad
to consider constructive suggestions for im- ■
provement in the United States text. Indeed,
many constructive contributions liave been made
in the course of our debate as to how best we
may deal with this subject, and we have been
carefully weighing and considering these pro-
posals which have been made.
Our objective is what we have achieved so
far, and that is not to force votes but to achieve
unanimity on the best course of action that the
Council can follow to bring about peace in the
Middle East, just as we have been able to achieve
unanimity under difficult conditions on the
cease-fire resolutions we have adopted.
We must remember that a cease-fire is in
effect, and admittedly the process of consulta-
tion, conciliation, and accommodation of view-
points as to the next important steps takes time,
and we are ready to agree that the appropriate
time should be granted for this purpose.
We recognize the urgency of the matter, and
I think we have demonstrated for 3 weeks our
willingness to deal urgently with this situation.
But we think it perfectly apparent to all con-
cerned that the Council has far from exhausted
its possibility of contributing to the construction
of a stable peace in the Middle East. The fact
is that we are not at the end of our work. We
are only at the beginning.
Now, despite this, we are not going to stand
in the way of a request by a permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council for consideration
of a resolution that a permanent member puts
before the Security Council. This is quite con-
sistent with the views that the United States
delegation has always taken — that if a member,
permanent or nonpermanent, desires an urgent
meeting, an urgent meeting should take place;
if a member, permanent or nonpermanent, de-
sires to put to a vote a proposition, that is its
privilege. We are prepared to vote on the resolu-
tion put to us by the distinguished representa-
tive of the Soviet Union [S/7951/Rev. 2].
10
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUI-LETIlf
i
LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL
U.S./U.N. press release 90 dated June 9
June 9, 1967
Dear Mk. Secretary General : My Govern-
ment wishes to make it umnistakably clear to all
members of the United Nations that the United
States has not engaged in any form of military
operations on behalf of the Government of
Israel during the present crisis in the Middle
East. On Jmie 6, 1967 I stated in the Security
Coimcil : "
"During the past twenty-four hours, fantastic allega-
tions have been made about United States aircraft be-
ing involved in the hostilities in the Near East. These
allegations are totally v^ithout foundation in fact. They
are made up out of w^hole cloth.
"I take this opportunity in the Security Coimcil on
the complete authority of the United States Govern-
ment to deny them categorically without any ifs, ands
or huts. Indeed, yesterday morning June 5, within
hours after first hearing such charges my Government
denied them in a formal statement issued by the De-
partment of Defense which I now quote :
'There have been reports that U.S. aircraft from
aircraft carriers assigned to the Sixth Fleet have flown
to Israeli airfields. Other reports have stated that Sixth
Fleet aircraft have participated in air activities else-
where in the area of conflict. All such reports are
erroneous. All Sixth Fleet aircraft are and have been
several hundred miles from the area of conflict.' "
To establish the good faith of my Govern-
ment, I stated :
"In these circumstances, my Government considers it
necessary to take prompt steps to prevent the further
spread of these dangerous falsehoods. With this in
mind, I am authorized to announce in this Council and
propose two concrete measures :
"The United States is prepared, first, to cooperate in
an immediate impartial investigation of these charges
by the United Nations, and to offer all facilities to the
United Nations in this investigation. And second, as a
part of, or in addition to such an investigation, the
United States is prepared to invite United Nations
personnel aboard our aircraft carriers in the Mediter-
ranean today, tomorrow, or at the convenience of the
United Nations to serve as impartial observers of the
activities of our planes in the area and to verify the
past activities of our planes from our official records
and from the log that each ship carries. These ob-
servers in addition will be free to interview air crews
on these carriers without inhibition so as to determine
their activities during the days in question. Their
presence as observers on these carriers will be wel-
comed throughout the period of this crisis and so long
as these ships are in the Eastern waters of the
Mediterranean."
I should like to request that you circulate this
letter to all members of the United Nations as a
Security Council docmnent.
With the highest consideration.
Kespectfully yours,
Abthur J. Goldberg
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Resolution of June 12^^
The Security Council,
Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-
General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made
at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and
the supplemental information supplied in documents
S/7930 and Add. 1^,
1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his
investigations and to report to the Council as soon as
possible ;
3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and dis-
continuance of all military activities includes a pro-
hibition of any forward military movements subse-
quent to the cease-fire ;
4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire posi-
tions of any troops which may have moved forward
subsequent to 1630 GMT on 10 June 1967 ;
5. Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
in Palestine and the observers in implementing the
cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate
communications facilities.
Resolution of June 14^
The Security Council,
Considering the urgent need to spare the civil popu-
lations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict
in the Middle East from additional sufferings,
Considering that essential and inalienable human
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes
of war.
Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the
parties Involved in the conflict,
1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the
safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the
areas where military operations have taken place and
to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ;
2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the
" S/RES/236 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June
12.
" Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 934.
"S/RES/237 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June
14.
JULY 3, 1967
B65-73S— 67-
11
scrupulous resi)eet of the humanitarian principles gov-
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro-
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the ef-
fective implementation of this resolution and to report
to the Security Council.
REVISED U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION, JUNE 14''
The Security Council,
Recalling its resoluUons 233, 234, 235 and 236, and
the understanding formulated by the President of the
Council at its 1353rd meeting,"
Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United
Arab Republic have accepted and implemented the
Council's demand for a cease-fire, and that military
operations and any forward military movements have
been discontinued.
Desirous of taking steps toward the achievement of
a stable peace in the Near East,
1. Insists on the continued scrupulous implementa-
tion by all the parties concerned of the Council's
repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all
military activity as a first urgent step toward the
establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to
report to the Council on compliance with the cease-
fire;
3. Calls for discussions promptly among the parties
concerned, using such third party or United Nations
assistance as they may wish, looking toward the
establishment of viable arrangements encompassing
the withdrawal and disengagement of armed person-
nel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature,
the maintenance of vital international rights and the
establishment of a stable and durable peace in the
Middle East ;
4. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide
such assistance as may be required in facilitating the
discussions called for in paragraph 3.
tion of the United Nations Charter and generally recog-
nized principles of international law ;
2. Demands that Israel should immediately and un-
conditionally remove all its troops from the territory
of those States and withdraw them behind the armi-
stice lines and should respect the status of the demili-
tarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice
Agreements.
U.S. Does Not Concur in Request
for U.N. General Assembly Session
I
Following is the text of a letter from Arthur
J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.
U.S./tJ.N. press release 108 dated June 15
June 15, 1967
Deae Mr. Secretary General: I have the
honor to refer to your telegram of June 14, 1967
which inquires whether the United States Gov-
ernment concurs in the request, set forth in
Document A/6717, for the convening of an
Emergency Special Session of the General
Assembly.
Your telegram refers to Kule 9b of the Rules
of Procedure of the Assembly as setting forth
the responsibilities of the Secretary General in
dealing with a request by a Member for an
Emergency Special Session. This Eule and Rule
8b, which provides for the convening of an
Emergency Special Session within 24 hours of
the receipt by the Secretary General of a request
REVISED SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, JUNE 13 ""
The Security Council,
Noting that Israel, in defiance of the Security Coun-
cil's resolutions on the cessation of military activities
and a cease-fire (S/RES/233 of 6 June 1967,
S/RES/234 of 7 June 1967 and S/RES/235 of 9 June
1967), has seized additional territory of the United
Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria,
Noting that although military activities have now
ceased, Israel is still occupying the territory of those
countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defy-
ing the United Nations and all peace-loving States,
Considering unacceptable and unlawful Israel's ter-
ritorial claims on Arab States,
1. Vigorously condemns Israel's aggressive activities
and continued occupation of part of the territory of
the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regard-
ing this as an act of aggression and the grossest viola-
" U.N. doc. S/7952/Eev. 3. The U.S. draft resolution
still remains before the CounciL
" At the conclusion of the meeting on June 9, the
President of the Security Council (Hans R. Tabor, of
Denmark) stated: ". . . it appears that we all agree
that we should request the parties concerned to extend
all possible cooperation to United Nations Observers in
the discharge of their responsibilities, that we should
request the Government of Israel to restore the use of
Government House to General Odd Bull, and should
ask the parties to reestablish freedom of movement."
" U.N. doc. S/7951/Rev. 2. On June 14 at the request
of the representative of Nigeria, the U.S.S.R. draft
resolution was voted upon by parts : 4 votes were cast
in favor of operative paragraph 1 and none against,
with 11 abstentious (U.S.) ; 6 votes were cast in favor
of operative paragraph 2 and none against, with 9
abstentious (U.S.). Accordingly, the draft resolution
was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required
majority.
12
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
for such a session from a majority of the mem-
bers of the United Nations, refer to General
Assembly Kesolution 377 A (V) entitled "Unit-
ing for Peaco".^ The Uniting for Peace resolu-
tion and Rules 8b and 9b of the General Assem-
bly's Rules of Procedure constitute the only
source of authority and the basis for the holding
of an Emergency Special Session.
General Assembly Resolution 377A (V) pro-
vides that an Emergency Special Session may
be called "If the Security Council, because of
lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression."
As you know, the Security Council is seized
of the question of the Middle East situation.^
The Council has already adopted four resolu-
tions calling for a cease-fire by the parties to the
recent hostilities in the area, and a fifth resolu-
tion of a humanitarian character dealing with
the aftermath of the hostilities. All jBve of these
resolutions were adopted unanimously. A sixth
resolution was voted on at the Council meeting
on June 14 and failed of adoption because it did
not receive sufficient votes. Several other resolu-
tions are pending before the Council as well as
other suggestions to deal with this complex
problem.
With respect to the draft resolution proposed
by the United States in Document S/7952 Rev.
3, 1 indicated on June 14 that the United States
would be prepared to consider constructive sug-
gestions and revisions. With respect to the draft
resolution submitted by Canada, its distin-
guished representative indicated that revisions
were being considered.
The present situation is therefore that mem-
bers of the Security Council are still engaged
in consultation looking toward further action
by the Council on this matter.
The processes of consultation, negotiation and
search for measures to harmonize the actions of
nations enjoined by the Charter therefore have
not been exhausted. For these reasons, the
" For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.
" See p. 3.
United States Government does not believe that
a situation has arisen in which the Security
Council, in the words of the General Assembly
Resolution 377 A (V), "fails to exercise its pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Accordingly,
the United States is not able to concur in the
request for the holding of an Emergency Special
Session at this time.
If, nevertheless, a majority of the Members
decides to convene such an Assembly, the United
States hopes that any discussion will have a
helpful influence in encouraging and enabling
all states concerned to deal effectively with the
underlying causes of tension and conflict in the
Middle East. The establishment of a firm and
just peace would be a boon to all peoples of the
area and would have a most favorable effect on
general peace and security througliout the
world. There is imperative need not for invec-
tive and inflammatory statements, but for con-
structive proposals and deliberative diplomacy.
I request that this letter be circulated as a
document of the Security Council and of the
General Assembly.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances
of my highest consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldbeeg
Letters of Credence
Italy
The newly appointed Ambassador of Italy,
Egidio Ortona, presented his credentials to
President Jolinson on June 14. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated Jime 14.
New Zealand
The newly appointed Ambassador of New
Zealand, Frank H. Corner, presented his creden-
tials to President Johnson on June 14. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press re-
lease dated June 14.
13
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
The North Atlantic Council held its spring
ministerial meeting at Luxenibourg June 13-
llf.. Follmoing is the text of a communique is-
sued at the close of the meeting on June H, to-
gether with a list of the members of the U.S.
delegation.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
Press release 143 dated June 15
The spring ilinisterial Meeting of the NATO
Council was held in Luxembourg on 13th and
14th June, 1967.
Reviewing the international situation in the
light of recent developments, Ministers took
note of the high degree of instability and uncer-
tainty still existing in the world. The Council
once again aiRrmed that the cohesion of its mem-
bers remains essential for their own security and
for the maintenance of peace.
In accordance with their practice of consult-
ing together. Ministers held an exchange of
views on the Middle East situation following
the hostilities which have once again occurred
in this region. They noted with satisfaction that
a cease-fire had now taken place and stressed the
urgency of humanitarian efforts to alle^date the
sufferings caused by the war. Member govern-
ments expressed their determination to support
all efforts to establish a lasting peace in this area
and resolve the outstanding problems in a spirit
of equity and in accordance with the legitimate
interests of all concerned.
The Council discussed the questions of East-
West relations. With a view to improving rela-
tions and lowering tensions in Europe, govern-
ments have continued in every way jiossible
their declared policy of seeking to develop con-
tacts and mutually advantageous exchanges
with the countries of Eastern Europe. These ef-
forts have not always met with success. The
Council, therefore, recorded its view that the de-
tente should be extended for the benefit of all
members of the Alliance. Ministers agreed to
continue close consultation on the ways in which
the policies of member countries can contribute
to improved East-West relations in a framework
of peace, security and stability. The special
group on future tasks of the Alliance was asked
to make a thorough study of these and related
questions.
Ministers again emphasized that the peaceful
settlement of the German question on the basis
of the free expression of political will by the
German people was an essential factor for a just
and lasting i^eaceful order in Europe. Ministers
were informed by their German colleague of the
state of relations between the two parts of Ger-
many. They welcomed the efforts by the Federal
Government to increase human, economic and
cultural contacts between both parts of Ger-
many, and were agreed that this internal Ger-
man process was to be considered an important
contribution to the search for a detente in Eu-
rope. On Berlin, Ministers agreed that the ques-
tion of ensuring the viability of that city re-
quires special attention. They confirmed the
declaration of the Council of 16th December,
1958.1
Ministers expressed their concern to see prog-
ress made in the field of disarmament and arms
control, including steps directed towards pre-
venting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of
forces by the East and West could be a signifi-
cant step toward security in Europe. A contri-
bution on the part of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries towards a reduc-
tion of forces would be welcomed as a gesture
of peaceful intent.
Regarding Greek-Turkish relations. Minis-
ters noted the Secretary General's report on his
"Watching Brief" and invited him to continue
" For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 52.
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtrLUETnf
his activities in this sphere. They expressed the
hope that Greece and Turkey would resume
their discussions on the Cyprus question and on
Greek-Turkish relations and that these would
rapidly produce positive results. They re-
affirmed the importance which they attach to
preserving peace and improving the situation
on the Island, as well as to the continued pres-
ence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus
while an agreed solution is being sought.
Ministers took note of an interim report of
the Permanent Council on the studies being
undertaken on the future tasks of the Alliance
pursuant to the Ministerial Kesolution ^ of 22nd
December, 1966. They noted with satisfaction
that the keen interest displayed in this study
was further evidence of the vitality with which
the Alliance is determined to face its tasks in the
years ahead. Ministers look forward to receiving
the substantive results of this study.
Ministers examined the report which, at their
request, the Permanent Representatives have
prepared on the ways and means of implement-
ing the proposals of the Italian Government for
reducing disparities in the technological devel-
opment of different countries. They adopted the
attached resolution recommending the intensi-
fication both of member countries' own efforts
and of international cooperation at the Euro-
pean and Atlantic levels and in a wider frame-
work. The Permanent Representatives have
been invited to keep under review the specific
role which the Alliance can play in the field of
teclmology and to report their findings to the
next Ministerial Meeting.
The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council
will be held in Brussels in December 1967.
Resolution on Intebnational Technological
Co-Opebation
Ministers, having considered the report submitted
to them by the Council in permanent session on the
procedure which might be followed for further exami-
nation and implementation of the Italian proposals for
closer international co-operation in technology :
(1) Noted that: (a) The discrepancies in the rate
of technological progress vary considerably between
the different countries and also between one sector and
another; they are apparent not only between North
America and Europe, but also within Europe, and, on
a world scale between the more Industrialized countries
and those which are still developing ;
(b) While some disparities are inevitable in dynamic
societies, in order to avoid that they become a source
'Ibid.
of tension, every effort should be made in scientific,
technical and industrial areas simultaneously on both
national and international levels and special consider-
ation should be given to the problems of the less
developed countries of the Alliance ;
(c) On the international level, some tasks are par-
ticularly suitable for co-operation between a small
number of countries while others may necessitate wider
co-operation, either on a European scale, an Atlantic
scale or in a wider framework.
(2) Recommended as far as efforts on a national
level were concerned that the governments of member
countries should:
(a) Ensure that sufficient resources be devoted to
education, to scientific and technical training, and to
research and development;
(b) Seek to determine and put into practice in a
co-ordinated manner the various courses of action
liable to contribute to the success of a long-term tech-
nological policy which would define both the areas
suitable for national realization, and the role which
the country concerned could play in international co-
operation, it being understood that the less developed
members of the Alliance will be helped to the extent
possible in the fulfilment of this recommendation.
(3) As far as co-operation at the European level
was concerned :
(a) Agreed that closer co-operation between the
European countries was an essential way of reducing
the disparities in technology between Europe and North
America ;
(b) Noted that various existing organizations were
already pursuing studies and implementing certain
forms of co-operation between their member countries ;
(c) Recognized that research and development po-
tential, and homogeneity and size of market are essen-
tial factors relevant to technical progress;
(d) Noted that interested governments would benefit
from considering together all possible ways and means
of facilitating technological co-operation between them.
(4) As far as general co-operation at the Atlantic
level or in a wider framework was concerned :
(a) Recognized that the studies and consultations
undertaken in the OECD constituted a most useful
starting point and should be continued and intensified
without prejudice to the possibility of setting up new
procedures if they should prove necessary ;
(b) Noted that member governments should be
ready to examine in a constructive spirit, new pro-
posals which may be put forward with a view to arriv-
ing at measures for mutual collaboration including,
where appropriate, specific agreements, in particular
between countries which are in advance in certain
fields of technology and other countries;
(c) Recommended that, in the light of studies un-
derway in OECD, further exchanges of views, and
negotiations as appropriate, should be undertaken to
examine :
(i) Schemes for reducing obstacles which hinder
technological exchange ;
(ii) Acceptable ways for facilitating access for
15
firms to patents and technological data, Including
those owned by governments ;
(ill) Whether international co-operation on govern-
ment research and development contracts can be
expanded ;
(iv) These and other ways for reducing the phe-
nomenon of the "Brain-Drain".
(5) As far as the role of the Alliance itself was
concerned :
(a) Noted with satisfaction that the various scien-
tific and technological activities already undertaken
by NATO had contributed, in the spirit of Article II of
the North Atlantic Treaty, to the speeding-up of the
spread of scientific and technical progress in member
countries, while reinforcing the cohesion and military
power of the Alliance ;
(b) Invited the Council in permanent session to pur-
sue its studies, and to report at the next Ministerial
Meeting in December on the role which the Alliance
could play in the field of technology, Including pos-
sibly the application of defense technology to civil
needs, to encourage co-operation between its members,
and to contribute towards narrowing the technological
disparities which may exist between them.
U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 140 dated June 10
Representative
Dean Rusk (chairman) , Secretary of State
United States Representative on the North Atlantic
Council
Harlan Cleveland
Advisers
Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State
C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
Philip J. Farley, Deputy United States Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
Patricia R. Harris, American Ambassador to Luxem-
bourg
Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic Politi-
cal-Military Affairs
George S. Springsteen, Jr. (coordinator). Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
George S. Vest (deputy coordinator) , Deputy Director,
Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military
Affairs
Brig. Gen. John G. Wheelock, III, USA, Director, Eu-
ropean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Secretary o/ Delegation
William G. Jones, Director, Office of International Con-
ferences, Department of State
The Peaceful Revolution
of the 20th Century
Following is a message from President John-
son to the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and DevelopTnent on the 20th anniversary
of the Marshall Plan, which was read iy Am-
bassador at Large W. Averell Harriman at a
commemoratvve dinner at Paris on Jv/ne 5.
Twenty years ago a great American Secretary
of State, George Marshall, stated the peaceful
revolution of the 20th century. His proposal
that the United States join with Europe in the
enormous task of rebuilding that war-ravaged
continent marked the beginning of a bold new
experiment in international cooperation. "Our
policy," he said, "is directed not against any
coimtry or doctrine but against poverty, hunger,
desperation, and chaos." ^
Working together, Europe and America de-
feated these ancient enemies and laid the foun-
dation for an era of prosperity and growth
unmatched in history. Success was not inevi-
table. It took energy, imagination, and courage
on both sides of the Atlantic.
These qualities still abound, both in Europe
and America. Our task now is to mobilize them
in the battle against the "poverty, hunger, des-
peration, and chaos" that still afflict most of
mankind. Today's challenge is more stubborn,
more complex, and fully as urgent as that of
1947.
We must continue to improve the interna-
tional economic and financial arrangements
which have served us so well and are so impor-
tant to our continued prosperity.
We must maintain the vitality of the institu-
tions we have created for the maintenance of
peace and security throughout the world and the
commitments in which they are rooted.
We must continue to work to bridge the gap
that still divides East from West.
We must join hands to promote the growth, in
peace and freedom, of the developing countries.
It is here that the challenge is most urgent and
the penalties of failure most painful.
Together we built a new Europe from the
ruins of war. Let us now resolve to work to-
gether for a world at peace, free of poverty,
hunger, and disease.
' BinxETiN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUXLETrN
The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction to the Construction of Europe
hy Ainbassador at Large W. Averell Harriman ^
I wish to express my gratitude to '■'■Opinion en
S4 heures" for having brought us together and
for inviting me to join this most interesting dis-
cussion of the Marshall Plan and your theme,
"From the Reconstruction to the Construction
of Europe." Then, too, it is always a delight for
me to have an excuse to come to Paris.
It is hard for me to draw a line dividing re-
construction and construction. From the very
inception of the Marshall Plan, those of us who
were involved in carrying it out — Europeans
and Americans alike — thought in terms of con-
struction as well as reconstruction, not simply
recovery but the building of a foundation on
which Europe would grow and prosper.
There was a distinct change in our emotions
as the program was conceived and got under
way. At the time of General Marshall's speech,^
there was the gravest concern over the plight
of Europe, due to the destruction and disloca-
tions of the war and aggravated by the dis-
astrous crop failures and the desperately cold
winter of 1947. These conditions inspired Gen-
eral Marshall's words to describe our policy as
"against himger, poverty, desperation, and
chaos." His proposal and the quick response of
the Western European governments, followed
by prompt action by the American Congress,
brought a feeling of hope by the spring of 1948.
Hope was converted increasingly into confi-
dence with the extraordinary progress made
through the combined efforts of those partici-
pating in this great cooperative enterprise.
Now, after 20 years, with Europe more
dynamic and prosperous than ever before in its
'Address made at a luncheon sponsored by "L' opi-
nion en 24 heurea" at Paris on June 6 (press release
lo5).
' For text, see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
history, we miglit say there is a sense of fulfill-
ment. But we camiot afford complacency, as
there is more to be done.
For my part, I feel that the spirit of the
Marshall Plan is still very much alive. Many
of the goals of today were conceived and prog-
ress toward them gained momentum during the
early years of the plan. May I recall a few of
them to you ?
First of all, the basic concepts, not only of
self-help but, equally emphasized, of mutual
aid, led rapidly to a call for the integration of
Europe. The initiative came from both sides
of the Atlantic. The Congress strengthened the
language in the enabling legislation in the sec-
ond year (1949) by including in the preamble
this statement : "It is declared to be the policy
of the people of the United States to encourage
the unification of Europe." This policy guided
the American actions throughout.
In Europe, initiatives of fundamental impor-
tance were taken by the OEEC [Organization
for European Economic Cooperation]. At our
request, the organization undertook the respon-
sibility of dividing the available American aid
among the participants. This led to the system
of annual country reviews, in which for the fii'st
time in history the policies and programs of
each participating goverimient were analyzed
and criticized by their peers because all recog-
nized the effects of national policies on com-
mon objectives. Revolutionary programs for
increased productivity and capital mvestment
for an expanding economy were accepted as
essential goals. Procedures for concerted action
continue today in the successor organization—
the OECD [Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development] .
A drive to break down trade barriers, partic-
ularly quantitative restrictions, was imple-
mented through the intra-European payments
JUIiT 3, 1967
17
system and later given impetus by the European
Payments Union.
These actions made possible the development
of the Coal and Steel Community and other
bodies, followed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome
and the European Economic Conmiunity, which
added new dimensions to the structure of Euro-
pean integration. Now Great Britain as well as
Deimiark, Ireland, and possibly other countries
are taking steps toward membership.
American support for European unity has
been consistently recorded from the begimiing
of tlie Marshall Plan to this day. President
Jolinson last October reaffirmed our position,
saying: "We look forward to the expansion and
further strengthening of the European com-
mimity." ^
The view that we Americans have of the need
for unity in Western Europe is not based on
abstractions. It is based on our experience that
our own achievements could not have been re-
alized except on a continent of freedom of move-
ment of people, trade, and ideas. We see Western
European unity as an indispensable step in the
attaimnent of the overriding objectives that
Europeans and Americans share together.
Speaking of a unified Europe, President Ken-
nedy once said : *
The United States looks on tliis vast new enterprise
with hope and admiration. . . . We see in such a
Europe a partner ... in all the great and burdensome
tasks of building and defending a community of free
nations.
President Johnson last October spoke of a
imified Europe as "an equal partner in helping
to build a peaceful and just world order."
I feel that it is important for Europeans to
understand that the United States has consist-
ently applauded European initiatives for inte-
gration. We firmly believe that it strengthens
the Atlantic partnership.
Of the other tasks ahead, I would underline
the responsibilities we share toward the develop-
ing areas of the world — those nations whose
people are aspiring to be freed from man's
ancient enemies, ignorance and poverty.
" Ihid.. Oct. 24, 19G6, p. 622.
* Ihid., July 23, 1962, p. 131.
These tasks also found their origin in the co-
ojoerative work begun during the Marshall Plan,
The OECD and its subcommittees are making
progress m coordinating assistance, but much
more needs to be done. The World Bank esti-
mates that the developing nations badly need
and can effectively absorb twice the amount of
capital that is now being made available. This
gap must be filled. Our own continuing prosper-
ity and security are closely linked with the
achievement of the aspirations of the peoples of
the developing areas.
The agreement achieved in the Kennedy
Round is a milestone in encoui'aging world trade
particularly for the industrialized nations. Our
endeavors now should be directed toward in-
creasing the trade of the developing nations.
Furthermore, let us not forget General Mar-
shall's offer was to the whole of Europe, in-
cluding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
It was Molotov who walked out of the Paris
meeting of ministers called to consider the pro-
posal, forcmg Czechoslovakia and Poland to
withdraw as well. It was Stalin who organized
the Cominform and declared war on the Mar-
shall Plan, branding it an American device "to
subjugate Europe."
Today, the people of Eastern Europe see a
prosperous Western Europe, strong and inde-
pendent, with a high degree of integration. The
unnatural division continues to partition Eu-
rope. As President Johnson has pointed out,
"We must turn to one of the great unfinished
tasks of our generation : making Europe whole."
Progress toward this goal, along the lines he
outlined, certainly will add to the prosperity
and security of both Eastern and Western
Europe and, in fact, of the world as a whole.
And so, in closing, let me suggest that we are
not gathered here to commemorate the Marshall
Plan as a thing of the past but to celebrate its
conception. Its concepts are as alive today and
as valuable today as ever. There is much ahead
to be done to continue the construction of Eu-
rope. At the same time, our overriding task lies
in using our combined material and spiritual
resources to seize the opportunities and respon-
sibilities to help build a world of expanding
opportunity for all.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
^'■What is really changing in international politics?" In his
remarks before the Department of State''s national foreign pol-
icy conference for editors and broadcasters on May 22, Mr.
Brzezinski, a member of the Departments Policy Planning
Council, analyzed five major changes in international politics
and their implications for U.S. foreign policy. His remarks were
made on a ''''background'''' basis, and he has edited them for
publication in the Bulletin.
The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy
by Zbigniew Brzezinski
International politics is dominated by crises.
The result is that we often mistake these crises
for the reality of international politics. Gomg
from crisis to crisis, we simply lose sight of the
more basic and often more important changes
that imperceptibly reshape the world in which
we live.
It is useful, therefore, sometimes to pause
and ask in a detached way : Wliat is the nature
of our era? What is really changing in inter-
national politics? By posing these questions we
become better equipped to discuss the implica-
tions of historical trends for U.S. foreign
policy. Definition of a broad framework of that
kind in turn enables us to see in sharper relief
our true interests and goals in specific regions
of the world, such as Europe or Asia. Accord-
ingly, in these remarks I would like to first turn
to the problem of change in international
politics and then discuss the implications of
these changes for the U.S. posture in world
affairs.
As I look at international politics, I see five
major changes taking place, together funda-
mentally altering the nature of international
relations in our day. The changes are not ob-
vious, because they are slow ; but their cumula-
tive impact is most important.
Waning of Ideological Conflicts
1. The first involves the loaning of ideological
conflicts among the more developed nations of
the world.
Since the time of the French Revolution,
conflicts between states have been profoundly
emotionalized by mass struggles induced by a
mixture of ideology and nationalism. "Where
that mixture was particularly intense, as in the
case of nazism, the conflicts which resulted were
particularly bloody and destructive. By and
large, during the last 150 years or so relations
among the more advanced states, particularly
in Europe, have been poisoned by the emotional-
izing impact of absolute doctrinal answers
concerning most of the basic issues of humanity.
Tliis condition is waning due to a variety of
factors.
First of all, nuclear weapons have necessi-
tated greater and greater restraint in relations
among states. The realization of the enormous
destructiveness of nuclear conflict has had a
most sobering effect on statesmen. Hitherto one
could calculate the cost and the potential ad-
vantages of war ; today, this simply is no longer
possible, and thus even the most bitter ideologi-
cal hatreds have to be restrained by common
sense.
Secondly, just as important, we are realizing
more fully that social change is such an enor-
mously complex and interrelated process, with
so many variables, that it cannot be reduced to
a few simple ideological formidas, as was the
case in the early stages of industrialization.
Ideological attitudes are thus giving way to a
problem-solving, engineering approach to social
change.
Thirdly, communism, the principal, and until
recently the most militant, revolutionary ideol-
JULT 3, 1967
19
ogy of our day, is dead — communism is dead as
an ideology in the sense that it is no longer
capable of mobilizing unified global support.
On the contrary, it is increasingly fragmented
by conflicts among constituent vmits and par-
ties. This has contributed to ideological disil-
lusionment among its members. Commimist
states. Communist movements, and Commimist
subversion are still very important on the in-
ternational scene, but Commmiist ideology as a
vital force is no longer with us.
Kevolutionary movements in different parts
of the world instead relate themselves more
specifically to local radical traditions and try to
exploit local opportunities. Thus, the common
doctrine and its alleged universal validity are
being diluted by specific adaptations. The proc-
ess is destroying the universal appeal and glo-
bal effectiveness of ideology.
All of that, cumulatively, prompts the waning
of the ideological age in relations, particularly
among the developed nations. The role of ideol-
ogy is still quite important in relations among
the less developed states, where problems are
simpler, where issues can be translated into
black-and-white propositions, and where abso-
lute doctrinal categories still appear superfi-
cially relevant.
Shift in Focus of Violence
2. Closely connected with the loaning ideolog-
ical conflicts ainong the more developed nations
of the world is the decline of violence among
these states. During approximately the last 150
years, the international scene has been domi-
nated by conflicts fought principally among the
more advanced and largely European nations of
the world. The focus of violence today is shift-
ing to the third world. Increasingly, conflicts
are either between some of the developed nations
and the less developed nations ; or increasingly,
instability in the imderdeveloped world is itself
the source of global tensions. It is thus a basic
reversal of the dominant pattern of the recent
past.
The new restraint on violence displayed by
the more advanced states in relations among one
another is also largely due to the nuclear age.
It should be acknowledged that without the
presence of nuclear weapons a major war prob-
ably would have erupted in the course of the
last 20 years. Given the range of conflicts, the
frequent tensions, and the occasional clashes
between the United States and the Soviet Union,
in almost any other era in history a war between
them probably would have ensued. The pres-
ence of nuclear weapons has introduced an over-
riding factor of restraint into relations among
the more advanced states and has helped to
preserve world peace.
This restraint is still largely absent insofar
as relations among the less developed states are
concerned. Moreover, the ideological passions
and the nationalist tensions have not yet run
their full course ; and consequently the propen-
sity toward total reactions, total commitment,
and total violence is still quite high.
Without discussing the pros and cons of the
Vietnamese war, it offers a good example of the
generalization made above. It reflects the shift
of focus in global affairs from conflicts between
the developed states to a conflict that involves
a wealthy and higlily advanced country in an
effort to create regional stability. The unwill-
ingness of the Soviet Union to become totally
involved in the conflict stems from the greater
realization of its own interest in preserving
peace in the nuclear age and also from the grad-
ual waning of its ideology, which weakens its
sense of total identification with every revo-
lutionary movement in the world.
Trend Toward Postnationalism
3. The third generalization is the proposition
that we are witnessing the end of the supremacy
of the nation-state on the international scene.
This process is far from consummated, but
nonetheless the trend seems to me to be irre-
versible. It is not only a matter of security
interdependence among allied states. It is also
a matter of psychological change. People
through history have expanded their sense of
identification. At first, men identified them-
selves with their families, then with their vil-
lages, then with their towns, then with their
regions and provinces, then with their nations.
Now increasingly people are beginning to
identify with their continents and regions.
This change has been induced by the necessities
of economic development and of the technologi-
cal revolution, by changes in the means of
conmiunication — all of which cause people to
identify themselves more and more with wider,
more global human interests.
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BX7LLETIN
Global Power of the United States
4. The fourth rnajor change which has tahen
place in our times is the emergence of the United
States as the preponderant world poioer. The
conventional view is that since 1945 we have
seen three basic stages of international develop-
ment: First of all, U.S. nuclear monopoly;
secondly, bipolarity, based on two homogeneous
alliances rigidly confronting each other; and
now increasingly polycentrism, with many
states playing tlie international game.
I submit that this is a wrong perspective;
in fact, the sequence has been the opposite. The
first postwar era — 1945-50 — was essentially a
polycentric era. The United States was largely
disarmed. It had a nuclear monopoly, to be sure,
but its nuclear power was essentially apocalyp-
tic; it was not applicable— it was only usable
in circumstances which everyone wished to
avoid — hence it was not politically relevant.
The United States was disarmed, it was only
beginning to be involved in Europe, hardly in-
volved in Asia — and there were still two major
empires on the scene, the French and the Brit-
ish. The Russians were asserting their regional
control over Central Europe, but they were not
yet involved in Asia. Asia itself was in turmoil.
This truly was the polycentric era.
It gave way to the era of bipolarity, of di-
chotomic confrontation, if you will, between
two alliances — one led by the Soviet Union, one
led by the United States. The Soviet Union
during this time acquired nuclear capacity, and
under Khrushchev it misjudged its nuclear
power and attempted to pursue between 1958
and 1962 a policy designed to assert Soviet
global su)5remacy. These years were dominated
by the Soviet effort to throw the West out of
Berlin, to put missiles in Cuba and to force a
showdown. However, Khrushchev discovered in
1962 that the Soviet Union still had only apoca-
lyptic power. Its nuclear power was not relevant
when faced with U.S. power, which by then had
become much more complex and much more
usable in a far greater diversity of situations.
Thus in the last few years the United States
successfully stared Khrushchev down in Cuba,
it protected its interests in the Dominican Re-
public and in the Congo— and today it is doing
it in Viet-Nam. Yet the Soviet Union did not
dare to react even in the area of its regional
domination: Berlin. Today, the Soviet Union
is in effect a regional power, concentrating pri-
marily on Europe and on the growing danger
from China. Our power during this ensuing
period has become applicable power, with a
long-range delivery system, with the means of
asserting itself on the basis of a global reach.
Moreover, recent years — and this is much
more important — have witnessed continued eco-
nomic growth in this country; they have seen
the expansion and appearance on the world
scene of U.S. technological know-how. Increas-
ingly, the U.S. way of life, our styles, our pat-
terns of living, are setting the example. Today,
if there is a creative society in the world, it is
the United States — in the sense that everyone,
very frequently without knowing it, is imitating
it. However, paradoxically because the United
States is the only global power, it finds it in-
creasingly difiicult to concentrate its resources
or its policy on any specific region of the world.
This often creates sharp dilemmas and difficul-
ties, difficulties with which we will have to live
because our involvement is also a major factor
of stability in the world.
The Growing Fragmentation of the World
5. The fifth major change involves the grow-
ing fragmentation of the loorld, not only
between the developed states and the under-
developed— lohich is, of course, miich talked
about — hut the increasing fragmentation of the
developed loorld. I have particularly in mind
the growing difference between the United
States and the rest of the advanced world. The
United States is becoming a new society, a soci-
ety no longer shaped by the impact of the
industrial process on social, economic, and polit-
ical life. That impact still shapes European
life ; if you look at the changes in the nature of
the European political elite, if you look at prob-
lems of employment or unemployment or wel-
fare, if you look at efforts to create greater
access to education in Europe — all of these are
manifestations of the imjjact of the industrial
process on a formerly rural and traditional
society.
The United States is no longer in this kind
of historical era. Increasingly, our social di-
lemmas are of leisure, well-being, automation,
psychic well-being, alienation of the youth
(usually from well-to-do middle-class families).
All of that is connected with a standard of liv-
ing which has become relatively stable and lugh,
connected with a society which is well-to-do but
JULT 3, 1967
21
in many respects has new dilemmas of purpose
and meaning. We are becoming, in effect, a post-
industrial society, in which computers and com-
munications are shaping more and more our
way of life. Our education and our image of
the world are shaped more by television and
less and less by sequential, logical media such
as books and newspapers. If the Europeans are
today experiencing the automobile revolution —
which extends physical mobility — Americans
are undergoing an electronic revolution, which
extends our senses and nervous systems.
All of this induces new perspectives and new
attitudes and sharpens the difference between
us and the rest of the developed world. It also
creates underlying tension, in addition to the
ob^aous problems of foreign policy, such as the
Kennedy Eound, the problem of NATO, the
problem of East- West relations, and so forth.
U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Change
If there is any merit in this highly general-
ized analysis of the nature of change in our
time, what are its implications for U.S. foreign
policy ?
First of all, we should not become ideological
latecomers. We have traditionally been the prag-
matic society, free of ideological shackles. It
would be unfortunate if now we succumbed to
internal and external ideologization, either be-
cause of belated anti-Communist rigidity at a
time when the Commimist world is becoming
fragmented or because of radical reactions to
internal dilemmas, the new dilemmas of our
society that I spoke about. It would be unfor-
tunate if these new dilemmas, inherent in the
United States' becoming a new type of society,
were responded to on the basis of essentially ir-
relevant, outmoded, 19th-century ideological
formulations. Yes, this is the great danger, par-
ticularly with the New Left, which is looking
for ideological guidance and only too often
turns to outmoded anarchistic, Trotskyite, or
nihilistic doctrines, doctrines completely irrele-
vant to the new dilemmas of our society.
Secondly, in our foreign policy we ought to
avoid the prescriptions of the extreme right or
the extreme left. The right only too often says,
erroneously, that to protect a better America
we ought to stay out of the world. The New Left
says that to build a better America we have to
stay out of the world. Both are wrong, because
today our global involvement and our prepon-
derance of power is such that our disinvolve-
ment would create international chaos of enor-
mous proportions. Our involvement is an his-
torical fact — there is no way of ending it. One
can debate about the forms it ought to take,
about its scope and the way it is applied, but
one cannot any longer debate in absolutist terms
should we or should we not be involved.
Thirdly, we should not imderestimate, be-
cause of our own historical formation, the role
of revolutionary nationalism in the world.
While we have to pursue the task of building a
world of cooperative communities, we have to
realize that revolutionary nationalism is a stage
of development which in many cases cannot be
avoided. We should therefore be very careful
not to get overinvolved in conflicts, with the re-
sult that we are pitched against revolutionary
nationalisms, making us appear as impediments
to social change.
This raises the extremely complicated issue of
intervention. Under what conditions should we
or should we not intervene ? It is extraordinarily
difficult to define clear-cut criteria; but as a
broad generalization, it might be said that in-
tervention is justified whenever its absence will
create regional instability of expanding propor-
tions. It has to be judged largely on its inter-
national merits and not in terms of specific
domestic consequences within individual states.
It is that distinction which justifies interven-
tion— it is that distinction which warrants our
involvement today in the effort to create re-
gional stability in Southeast Asia.
Fourthly, in seeking ties with the developed
nations of the world, particularly with Western
Europe, we have to emphasize in addition to
specific political and security arrangements, in-
creasingly efforts addressed to the fundamental
social dilemmas which are inherent in the
widening gap between the United States and
Western Europe. We ought to try to share and
distribute our new knowledge and teclmological
skills, because this is the unique asset of the
postindustrial society. At the same time we
should try to make the industrial societies more
aware of the novel character of our problems.
By learning from us they can perhaps avoid
some of our difficulties. We have to forge new
social bonds, especially between our yoimger
generation and the younger Europeans — and
urgently so, for we are at a time in histoiy when
the two continents find themselves in different
historical eras.
22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN I
Finally, to apply these remarks cumulatively
and briefly to Europe : Since the ideological age
is waning, since the developed world is increas-
ingly becoming the zone of tranquillity, since
the United States is playing a predominant role
in the world, and since we are in a new historical
era which gives us special assets, it is our task
to develop a broader approach for Europe, the
purpose of which, as the President said on Octo-
ber 7th,^ is to end gradually through reconcilia-
tion the cold war, a remnant of the civil war
that has divided the most advanced parts of the
world for the last 150 years.
Thus we need to adapt the Atlantic concept
to the post-cold-war era. We should strive in-
creasingly to shape a community of the de-
veloped nations which will contain four basic
components: The United States; a more homo-
geneous and integrated Western Europe in close
ties with the United States but also in increas-
ingly close linkage with Eastern Europe; an
Eastern Europe which will gradually begin to
stand on its own feet and engage in subregional
integration more independently of the Soviet
Union while in turn retaining its ties with the
Soviet Union; a Soviet Union which would
also be drawn into constructive relationships
with Western Europe and the United States.
Only by developing such a community of the
developed nations, of which Japan should natu-
rallj' be a member, can we try to assure a meas-
ure of order to a world which otherwise will be
increasingly dominated by chaos.
If we look 20 years ahead, we can see clearly
a challenge to the survival of organized society
in several parts of the world. "When we look 20
years ahead in the developed parts of the world
and particularly in the United States, where the
scientific, tecluiological, medical, and chemical
revolutions are progressing most rapidly, we
can increasingly see a challenge to the individ-
ual as a mysterious, autonomous human being.
We cannot effectively respond to these twin
challenges if we are at the same time pre-
occupied with ideological and doctrinal con-
flicts which no longer have much relevance to
the fundamental concerns of our day. Given
the traditional American quest for human free-
dom and today's U.S. global power, we have the
opportunity and the responsibility to take the
lead in responding to these twin challenges.
U.S. Offers Indian Government
Oceanographic Research Vessel
Presa release 138 dated June 8
The Department of State and the National
Science Foundation on June 8 announced that
the President has approved a proposal to trans-
fer the RV Anton Bruiin, an oceanographic
research vessel owned and operated by the Na-
tional Science Foundation, to the Government
of India. The arrival of Indian representatives
to survey the ship and conduct technical discus-
sions with NSF relating to the proposed trans-
fer is expected in the near future. The transfer
itself would take place later this year.
The Bnmn, formerly the Presidential yacht
Williamsburg, was built in 1930 and has in re-
cent years been operated as a biological oceano-
graphic research ship. During 1963-1964 she
participated in the International Indian Ocean
Expedition, in which 13 nations including the
United States and India cooperated in the first
comprehensive study of the Indian Ocean. The
Anton Bruun will be used by the Indian Gov-
ernment for scientific research in oceanography.
The Bruun carries the name of Dr. Anton
Bruun, a Danish oceanographer who, until his
death in 1961, was one of the world's most dis-
tinguished marine biologists and proponents of
international cooperation in science. Dr. Bioiun
was the first chaii-man of the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission, which sponsored
the International Indian Ocean Expedition.
United States and Malta Conclude
Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
June 15 (press release 142) that notes had been
exchanged at Valletta, Malta, on June 14 be-
tween the Government of Malta and the Amer-
ican Embassy, on behalf of the Government of
the United States, which provide for controls
over the exports of cotton textiles from Malta to
the United States.
As reflected in the notes,^ the comprehensive
understanding shall remain in force for a period
' For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y.,
on Oct. 7, 1966. see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
^ For text of the U.S. note, see Department of State
press release 142 dated June 15.
23
of 4 years, retroactively from January 1, 1967,
through December 31, 1970.
The understanding establishes an overall
limit for the first agreement year of 12.7 million
square yards equivalent. Within this aggregate
limit, three group limits are provided : the first
covers all yarn categories, at 9 million square
yards equivalent; the second covers fabrics,
made-up goods, and miscellaneous, at 200 thou-
sand square yards equivalent; and the third
covers all apparel categories, at 3.5 million
square yards equivalent. Specific ceilings are
provided within the apparel group ceiling for
three categories.
Provisions on growth, swing, carryover, con-
sultation, spacing, system of categories and con-
version factors, and administrative arrange-
ments are also included.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences ^
Scheduled July Through September
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on World Trade in Steel
IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes
FAO Study Group on Rice: 11th Session
IBE Council: 32d Session
UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session
ICAO Panel of Experts To Consider Limits of Liability for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session
Fifth International Film Festival
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Legal Status of Gas Pipelines
OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees
OECD Energy Committee
UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 30th
Session.
OECD Tourism Committee
lATC Technical Committee on Research and Organization: 5th
Meeting.
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation
CENTO Ministerial Council: 15th Session
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 4
Geneva July 3-5
London July 3-7
Rome July 3-7
Geneva July 4-5
Geneva July 4-14
Montreal July 4-17
Geneva July 4-21
Moscow July 5-20
Geneva July 6-7
Paris July 6-7
Paris July 6-7
Geneva July 6-15
Paris July 7 (1 day)
Mexico July 10-13
Geneva July 10-14
London July 10-14
London July 11-12
Paris July 11-12
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, 1967, lists inter-
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-September
1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and
Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lATC, Inter-American Travel Congresses;
IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International
Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele-
communication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAIGH, Pan American
Institute of Geography and History; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
24
DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
International Seed Testing Association: Executive Committee Cambridge, July 11-20
England.
WMO Worldwide Conference on Meteorological Training Leningrad .... July 11-22
Economic and Social Council: 43d Session Geneva July 11-Aug. 4
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 3 Paris July 17-18
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel Paris July 17-19
U.N. Committee of 24 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial New York .... July 17-Aug. 25
Countries and Peoples.
International Wheat Council London July 18-21
lATC Technical Committee on Removal of Travel Barriers: 5th Managua July 18-21
Meeting.
OECD Development Assistance Committee: High-Level Meeting . . . Paris July 19-20
lATC Technical Committee on Travel Plant: 5th Meeting Quito July 24-27
lATC Teclmical Committee on Tourist Travel Promotion: 5th Lima July 31-Aug. 3
Meeting.
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Construction of Vehicles Geneva July 31-Aug. 4
FAO Technical Conference on Fisheries of West African Countries. . . Dakar July 31-Aug. 4
FAO Fertilizer Industry Advisory Panel: 13th Session Rome July
ECOSOC Regional Semin.ar on Political and Civic Education for Women. Helsinki Aug. 1-14
Inter-American Statistical Institute: 5th General Assembly Caracas Aug. 7-18
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 5th Session Geneva Aug. 15-Sept. 8
ECAFE Seminar on Financial Aspects of Trade Expansion Bangkok Aug. 21-28
ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec- New York .... Aug. 21-Sept. 1
tion of Minorities.
International Coffee Council London Aug. 21-Sept. 8
ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 1
United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee on the Effects of Atomic Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 8
Radiation.
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Paris August
Group on Marine Pollution.
21st Edinburgh International Film Festival Edinburgh .... August
ECAFE Asian Industrial Development Council: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 1-8
PAIGH Directing Council: 10th Meeting Washington .... Sept. 1-10
ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 11th Session . . . Sydney Sept. 4-9
U.N. Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. . . . Geneva Sept. 4-22
ICAO Legal Subcommittee Paris Sept. 5-26
ILO Joint Maritime Commission: 20th Session Geneva Sept. 10-20
FAO Animal Production and Health: 6th Inter-American Meeting . . Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 10-20
IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution London Sept. 11-15
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting on the Wood Working Industries . . Geneva Sept. 11-22
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 8th Session Bangkok Sept. 11-22
3d ICAO South American/South Atlantic Regional Meeting Buenos Aires . . . Sept. 12-Oct. 6
ECE Group of Rapporteiu-s on Intercontinental Transport by Containers Geneva Sept. 18-20
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working The Hague .... Sept. 18-20
Group on an International Aspect for the Implementation of the U.N.
Resolution on Resources of the Sea.
IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection London Sept. 18-22
ECE Codex Alimentarius Group of E.xperts on Standardization of Quick- Rome Sept. 18-23
Frozen Foods.
ECAFE Working Party on Shipping and Ocean Freight Rates .... Bangkok Sept. 18-25
ITU World Administrative Maritime Mobile Conference Geneva Sept. 18-Nov. 4
U.N. General Assembly: 22d Session New York .... Sept. 19-Dec. 15
FAO Expert Panel on Animal Breeding and Climatology Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 21-26
ECE Committee on Coal Geneva Sept. 25-27
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs Geneva Sept. 25-29
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 5th Session Amman Sept. 25-30
International Rubber Study Group: 19th Assembly Sao Paulo .... Sept. 25-30
ILO Technical Experts on Organization and Planning of Vocational Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6
Training.
ILO Meeting of Experts on Minimum Wage Fixing Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6
ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 26-Oct. 3
IAEA General Conference: 11th Session Vienna Sept. 26-Oct. 6
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Sept. 27 (1 day)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL): 36th General Kyoto Sept. 27-0 ct. 4
Assembly.
ECAFE Seminar on the Development of Building Materials Bangkok Sept. 28-Oct. 4
U.N. Conference on Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . Vienna September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 18th Meeting . . . Taipei September
BIRPI Working Group on International Cooperation Geneva September
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna September
BIRPI Paris Union: Executive Committee Geneva September
JULY 3, 1967 25
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.*
Ratification deposited: Cameroon, May 22, 1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World
Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965."
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 26, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal TJnion with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and
convention with final protocol and regulations of ex-
ecution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratification deposited: Hungary, May 2, 1967.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite system.
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into
force Augu.st 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Tanzania, June 16, 1967.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Signature: East African External Telecommunica-
tions Company Limited, June 16, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered
into force January 1, 1967.*
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, including Cook
Lslands, Niue and Tokelau Islands, April 13, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
Trade, Transit
Convention on transit trade of landlocked states. Done
at New York July 8, 1965.*
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, May 10, 1967.
Entry into force: June 9, 1967.
Wheat
1967 protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive."
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Mexico, June 13, 1967.
Protocol for the further extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.
Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I and parts
III to VII ; August 1, 1966, for part II. TIAS 6057.
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany
(including Berlin) , June 1, 1967.
BILATERAL
Iceland
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as
amended; 7 U.S.O. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed
at Reykjavik June 5, 1967. Entered into force June 5,
1967.
Mexico
Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington June 2, 1967.
Entered into force June 2, 1967.
Norway
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 4, 1967.
Entered into force: June 8, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement concerning the use of the Special Fund for
Education for the School Building Construction Proj-
ect, 1967-1968. Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila May 18, 1967. Entered into force May 18,
1967.
Sudan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1 736D), with annex. Signed
at Khartoum June 3, 1967. Entered into force June 3,
1967.
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 3, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U62
Communism. The Implications of Change for
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19
Diplomacy. The Implications of Change for
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19
Economic Affairs
The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction
to the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . 17
United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 23
Europe
The Implications of Change for United States
Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19
The Marshall Plan : From the Reconstruction to
the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . . 17
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
(communique) 14
The Peaceful Revolution of the 20th Century
(Johnson) 16
Foreign Aid. The Peaceful Revolution of the
20th Century (Johnson) 16
India. U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceano-
graphic Research Vessel 23
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences ... 24
Italy. Letters of Credence (Ortona) .... 13
Malta. United States and Malta Conclude Cotton
Textile Agreement 23
Near East. U.N. Security Council Continues De-
bate on Near East ; Soviet Proposal Condemn-
ing Israel Rejected (Goldberg, texts of
resolutions) 3
New Zealand. Letters of Credence (Corner) . . 13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North At-
lantic Council Meets at Luxembourg (com-
munique) 14
Presidential Documents. The Peaceful Revolu-
tion of the 20th Century 16
Science
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
(communique) 14
U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceanographic
Research Vessel 23
Treaty Information
Current Actions 26
United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 23
U.S.S.R.
The Implications of Change for United States
Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19
U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3
United Nations
U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3
U.S. Does Not Concur in Request for U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Session (Goldberg) .... 12
Name Index
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 19
Corner, Frank H 13
Goldberg, Arthur J 3, 12
Harriman, W. Averell 17
Johnson, President 16
Ortona, Egidio 13
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 1 2-1 8
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to June 12 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 135 of June
6, 138 of June 8, and 140 of June 10.
No.
*141
Date
6/14
142 6/15
143
*144
6/15
6/17
Subject
Corry sworn in as Ambassador to
Ceylon and the Maldive Islands
(biographic details).
U.S.-Malta cotton textile agree-
ment (rewrite).
NATO communique.
National foreign policy confer-
ence for educators, Washington,
June 19-20.
■ Not printed.
2.1120
Superintendent of Docume
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POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
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BULLETIN
Voi.Lv/i^i^S.%W"'
JUL 21 1957
DEPOSiTORY
July 10, 1967
PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Address hy President Johiison 31
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOLDS FIFTH EMERGENCY SESSION;
UNITED STATES OFFERS PROPOSALS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Statements hy Ambttssador Arthur J. Goldherg Ji.7
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PREMIER KOSYGIN
DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
Statements After the Meetings at Glassiwo, N.J. 35
THE SPIRIT OF HOLLYBUSH
Excerpt From an Address hy President Johnson 38
For index see inside hack cover
i|
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1463 Publication 8256
July 10, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is Indexed in
the Readers' Quide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a vceekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
tlie field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy , issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other offieers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to tvhich tlie United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter'
national relations are listed currently.
Five principles for peace in the Middle East were outlined hy
President Johnson in his address before the Department of
State foreign policy conference for educators on June 19. These
principles are: recognized rights of national life, progress in
solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime
passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political
independence and territorial integrity. '■'■Taken together," the
President said, '■'■they point the way from uncertain armistice
to durable peace?''
Principles for Peace in the Middle East
Address by President Johnson
White House press release dated June 19
Secretary Rusk, ladies and gentlemen : I wel-
come the chance to share with you this morning
a few reflections of American foreign policy, as
I have shared my thoughts in recent weeks with
representatives of labor and business and with
other leaders of our society.
During the past weekend at Camp David,
where I met and talked with America's good
friend, Prime Minister [Harold E.] Holt of
Australia, I thought of the General Assembly
debate on the Middle East that opens today in
New York.i
But I thought also of the events of the past
year in other continents in the world. I thought
of the future, both in the Middle East and in
other areas of American interest in the world
and in places that concern all of us.
So this morning I want to give you my esti-
mate of the prospects for peace and the hopes
for progress in these various regions of the
world.
I shall speak first of our own hemisphere, then
of Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia,
and lastly of the two areas that concern us most
at this hour — Viet-Nam and the Middle East.
Let me begin with the Americas.
Last April I met with my fellow American
Presidents in Pimta del Este.'' It was an en-
' See p. 47.
"For background, see BuiiETiN of May 8, 1967, p.
706.
couraging experience for me, as I believe it was
for the other leaders of Latin America. For they
made, there at Punta del Este, the historic deci-
sion to move toward the economic integration
of Latin America.
In my judgment, their decision is as im-
portant as any that they have taken since they
became independent more than a century and a
half ago.
The men I met with know that the needs of
their 220 million people require them to mod-
ernize their economies and expand their trade.
I promised that I would ask our people to co-
operate in those efforts and in giving new force
to our great conmion enterprise which we take
great pride in — the Alliance for Progress.
One meeting of chiefs of state, of course, can-
not transform a continent. But where leaders
are willing to face their problems candidly and
where they are ready to join in meeting them
responsibly, there can be only hope for the
future.
The nations of the developed world — and I
am speaking now principally of the Atlantic
alliance and Japan — have in this past year, I
think, made good progress in meeting their com-
mon problems and their common responsibili-
ties.
I have met with a number of statesmen —
Prime Minister Lester Pearson in Canada just
a few days ago,' and the leaders of Europe in
• Ihid., June 19, 1967, p. 908.
JULY 10, 1967
81
Bonn shortly before that.* We discussed many
of the issues that we face together.
We are consulting to good effect on how to
limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
We have completed the Kennedy Kound of
tariff negotiations ' in a healthy spirit of part-
nership, and we are examining together the vital
question of monetary reform.
We have reorganized the integrated NATO
defense, with its new headquarters in Belgium.
We have reached agreement on the crucial
question of maintaining Allied military
strength in Germany.
Finally, we have worked together — although
not yet with sufficient resources — to help the
less developed countries deal with their prob-
lems of hunger and overpopulation.
We have not by any means settled all the
issues that face us, either among ourselves or
with other nations. But there is less cause to
lament what has not been done than to take
heart from what has been done.
Relations With Eastern Europe
You know of my personal interest in improv-
ing relations between the Western World and
the nations of Eastern Europe. I believe the
patient course we are pursuing toward those
nations is vital to the security of our nation.
Through cultural exchanges and civil air
agreements; through consular and outer space
treaties ; through what we hope will soon become
a treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons, and also, if they will join us, an agree-
ment on antiballistic missiles — we have tried to
enlarge, and have made great progress in enlarg-
ing, the arena of common action with the Soviet
Union.
Our purpose is to narrow our differences
where they can be narrowed and thus to help
secure peace in the world for the future genera-
tions. It will be a long, slow task, we realize.
There will be setbacks and discouragements.
But it is, we think, the only rational policy for
them and for us.
In Africa, as in Asia, we have encouraged the
nations of the region in their efforts to join in
cooperative attacks on the problems that each
of them faces: economic stagnation, poverty,
hunger, disease, and ignorance. Under Secretary
Nicholas Katzenbach just reported to me last
' IMd., May 15, 1967, p. 751.
" For background, see ibid., June 12, 1967, p. 879.
week on liis recent extended trip throughout
Africa. He described to me the many problems
and the many opportunities that exist in that
continent.
Africa is moving rapidly from the colonial
past toward freedom and dignity. She is in the
long and difficidt travail of building nations.
Her pioud people are determined to make a new
Africa, according to their own lights.
They are now creating institutions for politi-
cal and economic cooperation. They have set
great tasks for themselves — whose accomplish-
ments will require years of struggle and
sacrifice.
We very much want that struggle to succeed,
and we want to be responsive to the efforts that
they are making on their own behalf.
I can give personal testimony to the new
spirit that is abroad in Africa from Under Sec-
retary Katzenbach's report — and in Asia from
my own travels and experience there.
In Asia my experience demonstrated to me a
new spirit of confidence in that area of the
world. Everywhere I traveled last autumn, from
the conference in Manila to other countries of
the region, I found the conviction that Asians
can work with Asians to create better conditions
of life in every country. Fear has now given way
to hope in millions of hearts.
Asia's immense human problems remain, of
course. Not all countries have moved ahead as
rapidly as Thailand, Korea, and the Republic of
China. But most of them are now on a promising
track, and Japan is taking a welcome role in
helping her fellow Asians toward much more
rapid development.
A free Indonesia — the world's fifth largest
nation, a land of more than 100 million people —
is now struggling to rebuild, to reconstruct and
reform its national life. This will require the
understanding and the support of the entire in-
ternational community.
We maintain our dialog with the authorities
in Peking, in preparation for the day when they
will be ready to live at peace with the rest of the
world.
The Situation in Viet-Nam
I regret that this morning I cannot report any
major progress toward peace in Viet-Nam.
I can promise you that we have tried every
possible way to bring about either discussions
between the opposing sides or a practical de-
escalation of the violence itself.
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
Thus far there has been no serious response
from the other side.
We are ready— and we have long been ready —
to engage in a mutual deescalation of the fight-
ing. But we cannot stop only half the war, nor
can we abandon our commitment to the people
of South Viet-Nam as long as the enemy attacks
and fights on. And so long as North Viet-Nam
attempts to seize South Viet-Nam by force, we
must, and we will, block its efforts so that the
people of South Viet-Nam can determine their
own future in peace.
We would very much like to see the day
come — and come soon — when we can cooperate
with all the nations of the region, including
North Viet-Nam, in healing the wounds of a
war that has continued, we think, for far too
long. When the aggression ends, then that day
will follow.
Crisis in the Middle East
Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East —
and to the tumultuous events of the past months.
Those events have proved the wisdom of five
great principles of peace in the region.
The first and greatest principle is that every
nation in the area has a fundamental right to
live and to have this right respected by its
neighbors.
For the people of the Middle East the path
to hope does not lie in threats to end the life
of any nation. Such threats have become a bur-
den to the peace, not only of that region but a
burden to the peace of the entire world.
In the same way, no nation would be true to
the United Nations Charter or to its own true
interests if it should permit military success to
blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights
and its neighbors have interests of their own.
Each nation, therefore, must accept the right
of others to live.
This last month, I think, shows us another
basic requirement for settlement. It is a human
requirement: justice for the refugees.
A new conflict has brought new homelessness.
The nations of the Middle East must at last ad-
dress themselves to the plight of those who have
been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides
have resisted the best efforts of outside media-
tors to restore the victims of conflict to their
homes or to find them other proper places to
live and work. There will be no peace for any
party in the Middle East unless this problem is
attacked with new energy by all and, certainly,
primarily by those who are immediately con-
cerned.
A third lesson from this last month is that
maritime rights must be respected. Our nation
has long been committed to free maritime pas-
sage through international waterways ; and we,
along with other nations, were taking the neces-
sary steps to implement this principle when
hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was
more responsible for this explosion than any
other, I think it was the arbitrary and danger-
ous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran
would be closed. The right of innocent maritime
passage must be preserved for all nations.
Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated
the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of
the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must
rest not only on those in the area but upon the
larger states outside the area. We believe that
scarce resources could be used much better for
teclmical and economic development. We have
always opposed this arms race, and our own
military shipments to the area have conse-
quently been severely limited.
Now the waste and futility of the arms race
must be apparent to all the peoples of the world.
And now there is another moment of choice.
The United States of America, for its part, will
use every resource of diplomacy and every
coimsel of reason and prudence to try to find a
better course.
As a beginning, I should like to propose that
the United Nations immediately call upon all of
its members to report all shipments of all mili-
tary arms into this area and to keep those ship-
ments on file for all the peoples of the world to
observe.
Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of
respect for political independence and terri-
torial integrity of all the states of the area. We
reaffirmed that principle at the height of this
crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of
all. This principle can be effective in the Middle
East only on the basis of peace between the
parties. The nations of the region have had only
fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years.
What they now need are recognized boundaries
and other arrangements that will give them
security against terror, destruction, and war.
Further, there just must be adequate recogni-
tion of the special interest of three great
religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.
These five principles are not new, but we do
think they are fundamental. Taken together,
they point the way from uncertain armistice to
JXTLT 10, 1967
33
durable peace. We believe there must be prog-
ress toward all of them if there is to be progress
toward any.
Seftlement Depends on Nations of the Area
There are some who have urged, as a smgle,
simple solution, an immediate return to the sit-
uation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished
and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has
already said, this is not a prescription for peace
but for renewed hostilities.^
Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but
there must also be recognized rights of national
life, progress in solving the refugee problem,
freedom of innocent maritime passage, limita-
tion of the arms race, and respect for political
independence and territorial integrity.
But who will make this peace where all others
have failed for 20 years or more ?
Clearly the parties to the conflict must be
the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is
they who must make a settlement in the area.
It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to
live together in peace if they cannot learn to
reason together.
But we must still ask. Who can help them?
Some say it should be the United Nations ; some
call for the use of other parties. We have been
first in our support of effective peacekeeping in
the United Nations, and we also recognize the
great values to come from mediation.
We are ready this morning to see any method
tried, and we believe that none should be ex-
cluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be
useful and all will be needed.
I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view
on these matters. I offer assurance to all that
this Government of ours, the Government of
the United States, will do its part for peace in
every forum, at every level, at every hour.
Yet there is no escape from this fact: The
main responsibility for the peace of the region
depends upon its own peoples and its own lead-
ers of that region. What will be truly decisive in
the Middle East will be what is said and what
is done by those who live in the Middle East.
They can seek another arms race — if they
have not profited from the experience of this
one — if they want to. But they will seek it at a
terrible cost to their own people — and to their
* For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
In the U.N. Secnrity Council on June 13, see ibid., July 3,
1967, p. 5.
very long neglected human needs. They can live
on a diet of hate, though only at the cost of
hatred in return. Or they can move toward peace
with one another.
The world this morning is watching, watch-
ing for the peace of the world, because that is
really what is at stake. It will look for patience
and justice, it will look for humility and moral
courage. It will look for signs of movement
from prejudice and the emotional chaos of con-
flict to the gradual, slow shaping steps that lead
to learning to live together and learning to help
mold and shape peace in the area and in the
world.
The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its
people and in its resources. It has no need to live
in permanent civil war. It has the power to
build its own life as one of the prosperous re-
gions of the world in which we live.
U.S. Will Help in Works of Peace
If the nations of the Middle East will turn
toward the works of peace, they can count with
confidence upon the friendship and the help of
all the people of the United States of America.
In a climate of peace we here will do our full
share to help with a solution for the refugees.
We here will do our full share in support of
regional cooperation. We here will do our
share — and do more — to see that the peaceful
promise of nuclear energy is applied to the criti-
cal problem of desalting water and helping to
make the deserts bloom.
Our country is committed — and we here re-
iterate that commitment today — to a peace that
is based on five principles.
— first, the recognized right of national life ;
— second, justice for the refugees;
— third, innocent maritime passage ;
— fourth, limits on the wasteful and destruc-
tive arms race; and
— fifth, political independence and territorial
integrity for all.
This is not a time for malice, but for magna-
nimity; not for propaganda, but for patience;
not for vituperation, but for vision.
On the basis of peace we offer our help to the
people of the Middle East. That land, known to
every one of us since childhood as the birthplace
of great religions and learning, can flourish
once again in our time. We here in the United
States shall do all in our power to help make
it so.
34
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems
President Johnson and Aleksei N. Kosygin,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the So-
viet Union, conferred at Glasshoro, N.J., on
June 23 and again on Jtine 25. The two meetings
were held at '"''Hollyhush^'' the residence of the
president of Glassboro State College. Premier
Kosygin traveled to Glassboro from, New York
City, where he ivas heading the Soviet delega-
tion to the fifth emergency special session of the
U.N. General Assembly.
Following are texts of a toast made hy Presi-
dent Johnson at a luncheon for Premier Kosy-
gin at ^'■Hollyiusli''' on June 23, statements made
iy the Pi^esident and the Premier on June 23
and June 25 at the conclusion of each of their
meetings, and a hrief report to the Nation made
hy President Johnson upon his return to the
White House from Glassboro on June 25, to-
gether with a statement made hy Premier Kosy-
gin regarding his meeting with President John-
son which was delivered as part of his opening
remarks at a neios conference he held at United
Nations Headguarters on the evening of Ju/ne 25.
TOAST BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 23
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. For-
eign Minister [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromylco], Mr. Ambassador [Soviet Ambas-
sador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin] : We are de-
lighted that you have had a chance to even
briefly visit our country, and we are especially
pleased that you have come here today for a
meeting with us.
We both have special responsibilities for the
security of our families, and over and beyond all
our families is the security of the entire human
family inhabiting this earth. We must never
forget that there are many peoples in this world,
many different nations, each with its own his-
tory and ambitions. There is a special place,
however, in tliis world and a special responsibil-
ity placed upon our two countries because of our
strength and our resources.
This demands that the relations between our
two countries be as reasonable and as construc-
tive as we know how to make them. It is also our
obligation that we make it possible for other
countries to live in peace with each other if this
can be done. And that is why today we have
here discussed with you some questions affecting
the peace of the entire human family of 3 bil-
lion people.
I want to inform Secretary Rusk, Minister
Gromyko, and Secretary [of Defense Robert
S.] McNamara and the other distinguished
guests present here that you and I have dis-
cussed various aspects and possibilities for
strengthening peace in the world, such as the
nonproliferation agreement, and certain ques-
tions arising out of the Middle East situation.
We also agreed that both of us, as well as our
two nations, made some small contribution to
bringing about a cease-fire in the Middle East.
We only regret that this contribution between us
had not made it possible to prevent the out-
break of hostilities — although we tried.
I want to emphasize that the results of today's
meeting will be judged by what we can achieve
in the future in order to achieve peace.
I quoted to the Chairman the story about the
author, Charles Lamb, who threw down in dis-
gust a book he had been reading. To his sister's
question of whether he knew the author, he said,
"No, because if I did, I would like him."
And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope
that today's meeting has contributed to getting
us to know each other better, and therefore to
like each other better, just as our Ambassadors
in Moscow and Washington have become more
acquainted and liked by the people they deal
with. And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to
thank you for coming here. We thank you for
coming. We want very much to resolve some of
these questions.
We would like to have the opportunity to sit
down further and discuss some aspects of the
antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation,
perhaps some questions arising out of the Mid-
dle East situation, and at least explore the situ-
35
ation in Southeast Asia, as well as questions of
mutual interest in Europe and the Western
Hemisphere.
And now I would like to ask each of you to
stand and raise your glass to the health of the
Chairman, the Soviet Union, and to peace in
the world.
STATEMENTS AT CONCLUSION
OF FIRST MEETING, JUNE 23
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23
President Johnson
The Chairman and I have met since we ar-
rived here a little after 11 :00 today.
Our meeting gave us an opj^ortunity to get
acquainted with each other. We have exchanged
views on a number of international questions.
Among these problems were the Middle East,
Viet- Nam, and the question of nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons.
We agreed that it is now very important to
reach international agreement on a nonpro-
liferation treaty.
We also exchanged views on the questions of
direct bilateral relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States of America.
Finally, we agreed that discussions on these
questions should be continued in New York be-
tween Secretary Kusk and Mr. Gromyko during
next week.
This meeting today was a very good and very
useful meeting. We are in the debt of the great
Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality.
We are in^dting ourselves to return here again
at 1 :30 on Sunday afternoon. We will continue
our discussions here then. Those of you who
have Sunday afternoon off, we will be glad to
have you come, too.
Premier Kosygin ^
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I wish first
of all to thank the President for arranging this
meeting, and all the more so that he has ar-
ranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful
a locality and town.
I also want to thank the hosts, the masters
of the house who have given us these facilities,
have given us a roof over our heads under which
we could meet.
I suppose you can get the impression from
' Premier Kosygin spoke in Russian.
what the President has said that we have
amassed such a great number of questions that
we weren't able to go through them all today,
which is why we have decided to meet again this
Sunday.
As regards the statement which the President
just made to you, I have nothing whatsoever to
add. I think it was very correctly drawn up.
I hope you won't be offended with us if we
have kept you here for all this time and have
not told you very much. Please excuse us.
STATEMENTS AT CONCLUSION
OF SECOND MEETING, JUNE 25
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 25
President Johnson
The Chairman and I met again today and
talked somewhat more than 4 hours, beginning
at lunch and working through until just now.
We have gone more deeply than before into a
great number of the many questions before our
two countries in the world. We have also
agreed to keep in good communication in the
future, through Secretary Rusk and Foreign
Mmister Gromyko, through our very able Am-
bassadors Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Thompson
[American Ambassador to the U.S.S.E. Llewel-
lyn E. Thompson], and also directly. We have
made further progress in an effort to improve
our understanding of each other's thinking on a
number of questions. I believe more strongly
than ever that these have been very good and I
very useful talks. The Chairman and I join in ■
extending our thanks to Governor [of New
Jersey Richard J.] and Mrs. Hughes, to Presi-
dent [of Glassboro State College Thomas E.]
and Mrs. Robinson, and to the good people of
Glassboro for the contribution that they have
made in making these good meetings possible.
Now I should like to ask the Chairman to say a
word or two.
Premier Kosygin
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I would like
first of all to thank all the citizens of Glassboro
and the Governor and the president of the col-
lege for having created a very good atmosphere
for the talks that we were able to have here with
your President.
I think altogether we have spent and worked
here for about 8 or 9 hours, and we have come to
become accustomed to this place. We like the
36
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
town and we think the people of Glassboro are
very good people. We have come to like them.
We have been very favorably impressed by the
time we have spent here.
As during the first meeting which took place
on June 23, the exchange of views between the
President and myself touched upon several in-
ternational issues. Also in the course of these
conversations we had a general review of the
state of bilateral Soviet- American relations. On
the whole, these meetings provided the Govern-
ments of the Soviet Union and the United
States with an opportunity to compare their
positions on the questions under discussion, and
this both sides believe is useful.
And once again, on my own behalf and on
behalf of all those who have come here with me,
I wish to extend my profound gratitude to you
all. Goodby.
Premier Kosygin
I want to thank you all very sincerely for this
very warm welcome. May I salute friendship
between the Soviet and American peoples, and
to all of you I want to wish every success and
happiness and express the hope that we shall go
forward together for peace.
President Johnson
You good people of Glassboro have done your
part in helping us make this a significant and a
historic meeting.
We think that this meeting has been useful,
and we think it will be helpful in achieving
what we all want more than anything else in
the world — peace for all humankind.
Thank you very much.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REPORT
TO THE NATION, JUNE 25
White House press release dated June 25
On my return tonight to the White House
after 2 days of talks at Hollybush, I want to
make this brief report to the American people.
We continued our discussions today in the
same spirit in which we began them on Friday —
a spirit of direct face-to-face exchanges between
leaders with very heavy responsibilities.
We wanted to meet again because the issues
before us are so large and so difBcult that one
meeting together was not nearly enough. The
two meetings have been better than one, and at
least we learned — I know I did — from each hour
of our talks.
You will not be surprised to know that these
two meetings have not solved all of our prob-
lems. On some, we have made progress — great
progress in reducing misunderstanding, I think,
and in reaffirming our common commitment to
seek agreement.
I think we made that kind of progress, for
example, on the question of arms limitation. We
have agreed this afternoon that Secretary of
State Rusk and Mr. Gromyko will pursue this
subject further in New York in the days ahead.
I must report that no agreement is readily in
sight on the Middle Eastern crisis and that our
well-known differences over Viet-Nam con-
tinue. Yet even on these issues, I was very glad
to hear the Chairman's views face to face and to
have a chance to tell him directly and in detail
just what our purposes and our policies are —
and are not — in these particular areas.
The Chairman, I believe, made a similar
effort with me.
Wlien nations have deeply different positions,
as we do on these issues, they do not come to
agreement merely by improving their under-
standing of each other's views. But such im-
provement helps. Sometimes in such discussions
you can find elements — beginnings — hopeful
fractions — of common ground, even within a
general disagreement.
It was so in the Middle East 2 weeks
ago when we agreed on the need for a prompt
cease-fire. And it is so today in respect to such
simple propositions as that every state has a
right to live, that there should be an end to the
war in the Middle East, and that in the right
circumstances there should be withdrawal of
troops. This is a long way from agreement, but
it is a long way also from total difference.
On Viet-Nam, the area of agreement is
smaller. It is defined by the fact that the dan-
gers and the difficulties of any one area must
never be allowed to become a cause of wider con-
flict. Yet even in Viet-Nam, I was able to make it
very clear, with no third party between us, that
we will match and we will outmatch every step
to peace that others may be ready to take.
As I warned on Friday - — and as I just must
' See p. 38.
JULY 10, 1967
37
■warn again on this Sunday afternoon — meet-
ings like these do not themselves make peace in
the world. We must all remember that there have
been many meetings before and they have not
ended all of our troubles or all of our dangers.
But I can also report on this Simday after-
noon another thing that I said on last Friday :
That it does help a lot to sit down and look at a
man right in the eye and try to reason with him,
particularly if he is trying to reason with you.
We may have differences and difficulties
ahead, but I think they will be lessened, and not
increased, by our new knowledge of each other.
Chairman Kosygin and I have agreed that
the leaders of our two countries will keep in
touch in the future, through our able secre-
taries and ambassadors, and also keep in touch
directly.
I said on Friday that the world is very small
and very dangerous. Tonight I believe that it is
fair to say that these days at HoUybush have
made it a little smaller still — but also a little less
dangerous.
STATEMENT BY PREMIER KOSYGIN
AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 25
TTnofflclal translation
On June 25 a second meeting between the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.E., Mr. Kosygin, and President Jolmson
of the United States, was held in the town of
Glassboro, not far from New York. At the sec-
ond meeting, as at the first, which took place on
June 23, the exchange of views touched upon
several international problems.
In connection with the situation in the Middle
East, the two sides set forth their respective
positions. It was stated on the Soviet side that
the main thing now is to achieve the prompt
withdrawal behind the armistice lines of the
forces of Israel, which has committed aggression
against the Arab states. Tliis question is of
signal importance for the restoration of peace
in the Middle East, and it is in the center of the
attention of the emergency special session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and
it must be positively resolved without delay.
The exchange of views on the Viet-Nam
problem once again revealed profound dif-
ferences in the positions of the Soviet Union
and the Unit«d States. It was emphasized on
the Soviet side that settlement of the Viet-Nam
problem is possible only on the condition of an
end to the bombing of the territory of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the with-
drawal of American forces from South
Viet-Nam.
Both sides reaffirmed that they believe it im-
portant to promptly achieve understanding on
the conclusion of an international treaty on the
nonprolif eration of nuclear weapons.
In the course of the talks, a general review
was made of the state of bilateral Soviet and
American relations. On the whole, the meetings
offered the Governments of the Soviet Union
and the United States an opportunity to com-
pare their positions on the matters discussed, an
opportimity both sides believe to have been
useful.
The Spirit of Hollybush
FoUotoing is an excerpt from remarks made
hy President Johnson at a Presidenfs Club
Dinner at Los Angeles, Oalif., on June 23 in
xohich lie discusses his meeting at Glassboro,
N.J., that morning with Aleksei N. Kosygin,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Soviet Union.^
White House press release dated June 23
This morning I found myself in a house that
had been visited before by Presidents — Theo-
dore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. So
it was in no partisan party spirit that we went
to Hollybush, We went to serve what we be-
lieved to be a great national purpose, the pur-
pose of peace for human beings.
I said to the Chairman that we have 200 mil-
lion people. ... I said that we not only had
a responsibility to our 200 million and their
more than 200 million — the 400 million to-
gether^— but we had a responsibility to 3 billion
people in the world because of our strength and
obligations as great powers ; that responsibility
was peace and trying not only to secure it for
ourselves but to secure it for all human beings.
The world's peace now hangs heavily tonight
upon the wisdom, judgment, and understanding
' See p. 35.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of these two very great states — the United States
of America and tlie Soviet Union.
Tliere are deep and very serious differences
in our two societies, but one tiling we do liave
in common, as Chairman Kosygin himself said
when he addressed the United Nations, is a
grave responsibility for world peace in a nu-
clear age. Every crisis in the last 20 years has
necessarily invoked that common responsibility,
and repeatedly we have seen the dangerous con-
sequences of incomplete understanding.
We have also repeatedly seen that when others
are irresponsible in word or in deed, a very s^De-
cial burden for care seems to always fall upon
America. So I was glad to meet with Chairman
Kosygin this morning. We talked throughout
the day quietly and straightforwardly.
I am glad to say to you that I found he came
to our meeting in the same spirit. He had some
seniority on me. He had been a grandfather for
over 18 years, and I had been a gi-andfather for
only 18 hours, but he and I agreed that we both
very nmch wanted a world of peace for our
grandchildren.
We talked about the problems of the Middle
East in detail. We shall continue to talk about
them. We talked about the problems of South-
eastern Asia. We talked about the arms race
and about the need for new agreements there.
We talked about the need for common action on
constructive initiatives for peace. We reached
no new agreements — almost, but not quite. New
agreements are not always reached in a single
conversation. So we are going to eat lunch
and spend Smiday together again at Hollybush.
I don't want to overstate the case. I don't
want to get your hopes too high. I do think,
though, that we understand each other better.
I do think that I was able to make it vei-y clear
indeed that the strength and the determination
of our coimtiy and the Government are fully
matched by our persistent eagerness to talk and
to work, to fight for peace and friendship with
all who will work and talk with us.
But all of you must remember that one meet-
ing does not make a peace. I don't think there
is anyone in the world who ever wanted peace
more than the leaders in the world of countries
who are not at peace. You must all remember
that there have been many meetings before and
they have not ended our troubles nor have they
ended our danger. There is not a nation in the
world we would trade places with tonight.
These meetings just have not ended our trou-
bles and our dangers, and I cannot promise you
that that will not happen again. The world re-
mains a very small and very dangerous one. All
nations, even the greatest of them, have hard
and painful choices ahead of them. What I can
tell you tonight — and I have no doubt about it
at all — is that it does help a lot to sit down and
look at a man in the eye all day long and try to
reason with him, particularly if he is trymg to
reason with you. That is why we went to Holly-
bush this morning, and reasoning together there
today was the "spirit of Hollybush."
I think you know me well enough to recognize
that that is my way of doing things — "Come
now," as Isaiah said, "and let us reason to-
gether." What I think is even more important —
that is the way I think we must finally achieve
peace.
Those who do not smell the powder or hear
the blast of cannon, who enjoy the luxury and
freedom of free speech and the right to exercise
it most freely, at times really do not understand
the burdens that our marines are carrying there
tonight, who are dying for their country, or the
burdens that their commanders are carrying,
who wish they were all home asleep in bed or
even carrying a placard of some kind.
But they can't be and still retain our national
honor. They can't be and still preserve our free-
dom. They can't be and still protect our system.
Wlien they can be — with honor — they will be —
at the earliest possible moment.
Sometimes I think of my friends who don't
understand all of the cables I read from all of
the 122 countries. They don't hear all the voices
of despair and of all the chaotic conditions that
come to us through the day. Sometimes I think
of that Biblical injunction, when I see them ad-
vising their fellow citizens to negotiate and say-
ing we want peace and all those things.
I try to look with understanding and charity
upon them, and in the words of that Biblical
admonition, God forgive them, for they know
not really what they do.
I can just say this to you : There is no human
being in this world who wants to avoid war
more than I do. There is no human being in this
world who wants peace in Viet-Nam or in the
Middle East more than I do.
When they tell me to negotiate, I say, "Amen."
I have been ready to negotiate and sit down
at a conference table every hour of every day
JTTLY 10, 1967
267-786 — 67-
89
that I have been President of this country, but
I just cannot negotiate with myself.
And these protestors haven't been able to de-
liver Ho Chi Minh anyplace yet.
I was not elected your President to liquidate
our agreements in Southeast Asia. I was not
elected your President to run out on our com-
mitments in the Middle East. If that is what you
want, you will have to get another President.
But I am going — as I have said so many
times — any time, any place, anywhere, if in my
judgment it can possibly, conceivably, serve the
cause of peace. That is why I went to that little
farmhouse way up on the New Jersey Pike to-
day to spend the day, and that is why I am
going to get over to see my grandson by day-
light in the morning.
European Leaders Meet
With President Johnson
On June 22 President Johnson held separate
meetings at the White House with Prime Min-
ister Jens Otto Krag of Denmark, with Prime
Minister Aide Moro and Foreign Minister
Amintore Fanfani of Italy, and with Foreign
Secretary George Brown of Great Britain. Fol-
lowing is an exchange of toasts between the
President and Prime Minister Krag at a White
House luncheon on that day honoring the Euro-
pean leaders.
White House press release dated June 22
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Senator [Mike] Mansfield has asked me to
request the Senators to leave in time to be at the
Senate Chamber at 3 o'clock. So in order to
avoid any misunderstanding, I don't want to
create the impression that the reason that Sena-
tor [Everett M.] Dirksen leaves my table rather
abruptly is because he doesn't like what I am
saying or he doesn't like what I feed him. But
I am going to depend on Senator Dirksen, as
the coleader of the Senate, at the appropriate
time to give the signal. I am sure, as you usually
do, all of you will follow him. We are very
grateful, though, that the Members of the Sen-
ate would join us on such short notice. I did not
know until yesterday that we could have this
group here together today. It has been hur-
riedly arranged.
I apologize for not giving you more time,
but I know you can understand the problems
of a grandfather.
But the pace of change in our time is almost
too swift for men to comprehend or to really
adjust to it. Two days ago, I was a parent — only
a parent. Yesterday, my role changed drasti-
cally— I became a grandfather. I did not seek
that high office, but now that I have been chosen,
the path of duty is clear — and I shall serve.
And at this moment of great and critical
change, I am blessed with the presence of good
friends and strong partners in this house. My
own happiness is the greater because you have
come here today to share your strength and
your friendship with us.
I recognize that other events, Mr. Prime Min-
isters, Mr. Foreign Ministers, have brought you
here — events that threaten the peace and chal-
lenge the intelligence and forbearance of all
nations.
This is not the first time we have faced a cri-
sis together, and it will not be the last. We have
weathered past storms because we have con-
sulted and because we have acted together, and
we shall weather this storm for this very same
reason.
Each of us must play his part in helping to
build a permanent peace in the Middle East. I
said on Monday that the main responsibility for
the peace of the region depends upon its people
and its own leaders.^
What will be truly decisive in the Middle East
will be what is said and what is done by those
who live in the Middle East. There may well be
helpful roles for others — the United Nations or
outside mediators — but I said that we are ready
to see any method tried. We believe none should
be excluded altogether.
I have appealed to all to adopt no rigid view.
For our own part, we have promised that the
Government of the United States would do its
part for peace in every forum at every level at
every hour. I know that you share our eager-
ness to help find the path to peace in the Middle
East. We value this chance to hear your views
on how it may be found.
Our responsibilities are very great and so, of
course, are our opportunities. We think and we
work and we act not only for the millions whom
' See p. 31.
40
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
we serve at this moment but for their children
and those who will come after them.
I can tell all of you that I am more acutely
aware of this now than ever before, now that I
have achieved grand fatherhood. I would like to
help make a world for young Patrick Nugent
and his contemporaries in every land that will
be safer, more prosperous, more hopeful, and
certainly more peaceful by far than the world
that I have inhabited.
So working together and reasoning together
and planning together — being patient and un-
derstanding together — I believe that we can
achieve such a world.
So just as I am grateful to you statesmen who
have come from across the waters, I am grateful
to the leaders in the field of foreign affairs and
relations in our Congress, in our courts, in our
press, and others who have come here today to
help me honor these leading spokesmen of great
nations.
So now I should like to ask you to join me in
toasting the King of Denmark, the Queen of
England, and the President of Italy. The King,
the Queen, the President.
PRIME MINISTER KRAG
Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express
my gratitude, sir, for giving this luncheon
today.
All our guests around these tables know how
hospitable you are. Once again, we enjoy the
honor and pleasure of being with you in the
White House. It has been a period of some very
hectic weeks in international politics for all of
us, but inevitably the burdens fall most heavily
on the shoulders of the great powers.
We all marvel at the way in which you carry
your great responsibilities, Mr. President.
I should like to say that it is a great comfort
for all of us to know that the United States, un-
der your leadership, is steering a course of mod-
eration and reconciliation in the present situa-
tion in the Middle East.
No doubt the coming months will present us
with a multitude of international problems. It
is our hope that the climate of good will and
common sense will prevail eventually.
I can assure you, Mr. President, that the three
European Governments represented here will
do whatever is in our power to bring this about.
We all know that yesterday was a very im-
portant and happy day in your life and for
Mrs. Johnson, because your daughter Luci gave
birth to your first grandson. I am sure he will
have the same high qualities as his grandfather.
On behalf of the three European nations be-
ing guests here, I would like to propose, ladies
and gentlemen, that we all toast the President
of the United States.
U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions
Resulting From Near East Conflict
Press release 148 dated June 21
The Department of State announced on June
21 that U.S. passports are now valid, without
special endorsement, for travel of U.S. citizens
to the following countries : Israel, Kuwait, Mo-
rocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.^
The Department also announced that because
of conditions resulting from the recent hos-
tilities in the Near East it was continuing in
effect for the present a restriction upon travel
to the remaining countries listed in the Depart-
ment's announcement of June 5.^ U.S. citizens
desiring to go to the following countries are,
therefore, until further notice still required to
obtain passports specifically endorsed by the
Department of State for such travel : Algeria,
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Sudan, the
Syrian Arab Eepublic, the United Arab Ee-
public, and Yemen. However, in accordance with
existing regulations, validations for travel to
these countries will be granted, as the situation
permits, to persons whose travel may be re-
garded as being in the interest of the United
States. These restrictions will be lifted as soon
as conditions warrant.
^ The Department spokesman announced later on
June 21 that the action of lifting travel restrictions
applies precisely to the same geographical areas on
which these restrictions were originally imposed : U.S.
citizens wishing to travel to the west bank of the Jor-
dan River must secure specially validated passports
to do so; U.S. citizens wishing to travel to the holy
places in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, however, need not
make special application for validation and are given
permission to do so.
* BXJ1.LETIN of June 26, 1967, p. 952. For texts of Pub-
lic Notices 269 and 270 of June 22, 1967, see 32 Fed.
Reg. 9175.
JTJLY 10, 1967
41
President of Malawi Visits the United States
H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic
of Malawi^ made a private visit to the United
States June S-11. He met with President John-
son and other officials at Washington June 8-10.
Following is an exchange of toasts between
President Johnson and President Banda at a
luncheon at the White House on June 8.
White House press release dated June 8
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
We are honored today to visit once again with
the distinguished President of the Kepublic of
Malawi.
We hope that for President Banda — as for
us — this visit is like a homecoming. Dt. Banda
was educated in the United States of America.
He has spent a great deal of time here in our
country. We are delightfully encouraged that
he keeps returning despite the fact that he
knows us reasonably well.
Since Dr. Banda's arrival, he and I have
been engaged in a very fruitful discussion of the
problems of Africa and the problems of the
world. The doctor has provided me with his
insights on a very wide range of concerns. I
must say to my colleagues here today and citi-
zens of my country that I am very pleased to
find such broad agreement between us on the
international questions of the day.
But while Malawi's attention is rightly fo-
cused on the future, on the problems of inter-
national development, President Banda leads
a new nation — a nation which is worlring very
hard to offer its people, the citizens of its land,
a better future tomorrow.
Gibbon called independence "the first of
earthly blessings." Malawi's independence is
well established. But President Banda and his
countrymen realize, recognize, and know that
nationhood is much more.
They know, as we learned a long time ago,
that ringing speeches count very little unless
they are accompanied by economic advance.
They know that development is just another
word for work, for planning, and for long, hard
application.
They know that the future of Malawi is
largely a product of a people's faith in them-
selves. The real test is the amount of effort that
they put behind that faith.
Americans, Mr. President, as you know, im-
derstand these truths. We, too, are a very young
nation. We, too, faced an uphill economic fight
in the early years of our independence.
I am reminded of an observation of one of
my predecessors in the Presidency, President
Grant. The Pilgrims, he said, found they had
to make a living in a climate "where there were
nine months of winter and three months of cold
weather."
Of course, I realize that this does not pre-
cisely describe your problem.
But our challenge, Mr. President, in many
ways is very similar to the challenge that you
face. It is this experience which has taught us a
lesson that you know well. That lesson is that
the ingredients of economic growth are not just
physical resources, not just a good climate, not
just fertile soil.
The critical elements are people — human be-
ings— their dreams, their application, their ded-
ication, their persistence.
I know that the people of Malawi — and their
distinguished President — have these qualities
in abundance. How do I know it? We broke
ground for a pulpmill in the last hour and we
built 300 miles of highways already.
So my good friends from throughout the Na-
tion, particularly from the State of Indiana
where the distinguished President went to
school, the State of Ohio — represented here by
Senator [Stephen M.] Young today — where the
distinguished President took his education, I
ask all of you to rise and join me in a toast to
our most honored guest. Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda
of the Republic of Malawi.
42
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
PRESIDENT BANDA
I am tricked ! "VVlien I came here, as a matter
of fact, I did not know that the lunclieon was
going to be like this. I was told in Zomba by the
American Ambassador that the President
wanted to have just a quiet lunch with me, you
see.
So when I came here this morning, all I ex-
pected was that it would be just probably the
three of us — the President himself and the Sec-
retary of State, somewhere, not in a gathering
of this kind.
However, I would like to thank you very
much, Mr. President, for your kindness in ar-
ranging a fimction of this kind to give me an
opportimity to meet you and your colleagues
and those that work with you.
As you have rightly said, when I come here I
feel the homecoming spirit, because I was edu-
cated in this country.
I had my high school in this country at Wil-
berforce Academy just outside of Xenia — about
9 or 10 miles from Xenia. Then from there I
went to the University of Indiana in Blooming-
ton, Indiana; from there to the University of
Chicago, where I got my first degree ; and then
Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennes-
see, after which I went to Edinburgh.
So, you see, I feel at home here. That is prob-
ably why I behave as I do, I speak as I do, I act
as I do — many, many times when others don't
exactly see my point.
You see, I came here at the most impression-
able age. If I went back home after I was a
doctor, gave up my medical practice in London
and began to fight for my people's political
freedom, it was because you, your country,
taught me.
"I know not what course others may take ; as
for me, give me liberty or give me death." That
saying, which my high school teacher taught
me, rang in my mind when I went back home.
Anyway, I don't come here to talk politics.
But what I would like you to know is that what
you have said is exactly what I am telling my
people. From the very day I went back home,
I told my people : "Independence does not mean
money and wealth will rain on our heads like
manna from heaven. No. It means hard work."
It so happens that we have no gold or copper
or diamonds or oil there. So I say to my people,
"Here we have no mines, no factories. Our mines
and factories is the ground — the soil. From the
soil every penny we have in this country comes,
in the form of maize, groimdnuts, tobacco, cot-
ton, and other products of the soil."
My people know my policy. Hard work. And
I am happy to tell you, Mr. President, that my
people listened to me.
I said to my people, "We have won our in-
dependence now, but we have to build this coun-
try. And to build this country we have to have
money. If I am to be listened to by the President
of the United States, by the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, by the President of the
Eepublics of France or Germany, you, my peo-
ple, must work hard so that when I go to Wash-
ington, to London, go to Paris, go to Bonn, I
will say to them, 'Look, ]Mr. President, my peo-
ple have cleared the road. All the bush are
cleared, all the trees. But there is the river, the
Shire Eiver. They cannot bridge it with their
f emiir — with their legbone. It requires steel and
steel requires money.' If I tell my friends in the
West that you, my people, are working hard but
there are things we cannot do with our hands, we
need money, they will listen to me."
As a result, these boys, women, everywhere
work very, very hard. I come here now to say
I want a road. My people have cleared the grass
and the trees. We need good bridges. Therefore,
the kind of road that my people can build can-
not do it. You have to persuade your banks, or
your international development association and
other organizations like that, to help us. That
is why I am asking for that.
At the same time, we have trees. We are plant-
ing trees. We can't turn them into anything
else unless you help us. That is why I am asking
you to ask "Mr. Chase Manhattan" and other
bankers.
You have mentioned that since I have been
here this morning we have broken ground on
a number of points. I am not going to go into
detail about that, but I would like you to know,
Mr. President, that whatever it may cost me,
I always do what I think is the right thing
according to my own conscience.
In 1960-61 I was asked to lecture at Yale.
I told the students there— when they asked me
what was going to be Malawi's foreign policy
when we became independent — that Malawi's
policy when we became independent would be
this : "Discretional alinement and nonalinement.
No automatic alinement, because," I said, "no
nation or a group of nations is always right
and no nation or a group of nations is always
wrong. Therefore, Malawi's policy, foreign pol-
icy, will be to associate with any power that is,
on a particular given international problem, ac-
cording to my view, in the right."
And it so happens that most of the time, ac-
cording to my understanding anyway, the West
is right.
Therefore, Mr. President, Mr. Vice President,
Mr. Secretary of State, if you read in the papers
or hear that I am unpopular, or the unpopular
man number one in Africa, you will understand
now why.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
The President and I had just concluded our
conversation before lunch, but in the light of
what he said about his people listening to him,
I am pleased to observe that he has a formula
that I would like to inquire more definitely into.
So as you go your own way, I will be talking
with President Banda.
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts
on Air Actions at Cam Pha
Following is the text of a U.S. note which iva^s
delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington
on June 20.
Press release 147 dated June 20
Juste 20, 1967.
The Government of the United States of
America refers to its note dated June 3, 1967,'
to the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics concerning the incident in-
volving the Soviet ship "Turkestan" off Cam
Pha on June 2.
Further information concerning this incident
was received on June 18 from the United States
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force. This
information was conveyed orally to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington shortly after its
receipt. The new facts indicate that in addition
to the two flights of United States F-105 air-
craft which conducted strikes against military
targets in the vicinity of Cam Pha on June 2, as
described in the United States note of June 3,
a third flight of F-105 aircraft passed through
^ BuiiETiN of June 26, 1967, p. 953.
the area of Cam Pha at the general time of the
incident. It now appears that aircraft from this
third flight directed 20 mm cannon suppressive
fire against a North Vietnamese anti-aircraft
site at Cam Pha and that some of this fire may
have struck the "Turkestan."
As indicated in the United States note of
Jime 3, the United States regrets the damage
to the "Turkestan" that any such action may
have caused, particularly the death of one mem-
ber of the crew and injuries to others. Through-
out the course of the tragic struggle in Vietnam,
United States military pilots have operated un-
der strict instructions to avoid engagement with
any vessels which are not identified as hostile.
The Soviet Government may be assured that
United States authorities will make every effort
to insure that such incidents do not occur.
U.S.-Canada Economic Committee
Concludes Eleventh Meeting
Text of Communique, June 22
The Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Canada-
United States Ministerial Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs was held in Montreal
June 20-22.
The Committee exchanged views on current
economic developments. They reviewed the suc-
cess achieved in both countries in moderating
excessive demand pressures during the past year
and noted that a more djTiamic pace of expan-
sion of real output was expected in coming
months. Recovery of the residential construc-
tion industry, an end to the inventory correc-
tion, modest expansion of private investment
expenditures, higher Federal, State and local
government purchases, and renewed vigor in
consumer spending were cited as the major an-
ticipated sources of strength in the U.S. outlook
for the coming year. Similar forces were also
expected to lead to stronger growth in Canada.
The Committee emphasized the need for flex-
ible and responsive fiscal policy in both coun-
tries during the coming months. They recog-
nized the need for dealing with the problem of
achieving greater stability in costs and prices,
especially as the two economies resume rates of
advance more in line with their potentials.
In a world of growing trade and develop-
ment assistance Committee members affirmed
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the intention of their Governments to press for
general agreement at the 1967 annual meeting of
the Governors of the International Monetary
Fund on the structure and major provisions of
a contingency plan for the creation of a new in-
ternational reserve asset. They stressed the need
for an asset which monetary authorities could
include in their reserves.
The Committee also reviewed the balance of
payments prospects of the two countries. United
States members reiterated the continued deter-
mination of the United States to make as much
progress toward equilibrium in its world-wide
balance of payments as the costs of Vietnam per-
mit. The Committee discussed capital move-
ments between the two countries and took note
of the benefits to both countries of existing ar-
rangements relating to access by Canadian bor-
rowers to the United States capital market.
The Committee welcomed the successful con-
clusion of the Kennedy Round of trade negoti-
ations which will provide an important stimu-
lus to world trade as well as to trade between the
United States and Canada. They discussed
prospects for future trade liberalization, noted
that both countries are conducting studies
on this matter and agreed to continue close
consultations.
The Committee devoted special attention to
the trade problems of the developing countries,
recognizing the importance of positive and con-
structive measures in support of efforts by the
developing countries to accelerate their own
economic development. This will be the main
theme of the second United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development early next year.
The Committee was concerned about the fail-
ure of development aid to expand in line with
the growing requirements of the developing
countries. In this context early and substantial-
ly enlarged replenishment of International De-
velopment Association resources must have a
high priority. The Committee welcomed the new
multilateral food aid programme agreed upon
in the Kennedy Round which will help expand
food aid and will result in a more equitable shar-
ing of the cost. The amount and character of
food assistance must be improved as well as the
degree of self-help by the recipient nations.
The Committee recognized the importance of
close and effective cooperation between the two
countries in respect of wheat marketing poli-
cies, including wheat flour, particularly in the
context of the new Cereals Agreement con-
cluded in the Kennedy Round. They agreed to
strengthen consultative arrangements concern-
ing wheat marketing and food aid.
United States members reiterated their con-
cern over those aspects of the Canadian Bank
Act which in their view have the effect of dis-
criminating retroactively against a bank in Can-
ada owned in the United States. Canadian Min-
isters took a different view of the effect of the
Bank Act, and stressed the importance of effec-
tive Canadian ownership of major financial in-
stitutions. They reiterated Canada's intention
to encourage increased participation by Ca-
nadians in the ownership and control of Cana-
dian industry while continuing to maintain a
hospitable climate for foreign investment.
Canadian members also drew attention to the
problem arising from the effect which certain
United States laws and regulations may have
upon Canadian companies, especially as regards
securities regulation and foreign assets control
but noted that good progress had been made in
dealing with particular aspects of the problem.
The Committee agreed on the desirability of an
exchange of information in the securities field
that would benefit investors in both countries.
The Committee examined results achieved
under the Automotive Agreement of 1965.^ De-
spite fluctuations in demand and the continuing
process of adjustment the industry is making
progress in rationalization and efficiency, and
trade in automotive products between the two
countries has expanded substantially to the
benefit of both producers and consumers. They
noted that a comprehensive review of the Agree-
ment was to begin later this year.
The Committee discussed energy relations
between the two countries. They recognized the
common interest in the orderly expansion of
trade in energy resources and discussed the
kinds of facilities which might be needed to
serve efficiently the development of this trade.
The Committee noted the recent decision of the
Federal Power Commission which, in approv-
ing the transmission of natural gas to Eastern
Canadian and border state customers, referred
to the community of interest in this project and
to its security advantages.
The Committee discussed a number of bilat-
eral questions of current interest to the two
countries. United States members urged that
Canadian tourists returning to Canada from the
United States be given duty-free allowances
equivalent to those given Canadian tourists re-
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193.
JULY 10, 196T
45
turning from overseas areas. They also re-
quested that Canada accord official recognition
to Bourbon whisky as a distinctive product of
the United States.
Canadian Ministers referred to the desirabil-
ity of expanding the area of free trade in agri-
cultural machinery, tractors and equipmentand
it was agreed that this matter should be ex-
amined jointly with a view to working out
mutually satisfactoi-y arrangements. They also
urged the elimination of the manufacturing
clause in United States copyright legislation
and the relaxation of restrictions on United
States imports of aged Canadian cheddar
cheese. Canadian members drew attention to the
problem created from time to time because of
the cross-border movement of relatively small
quantities of agricultural products at depressed
prices usually at or near the end of the market-
ing season. The Committee agreed that con-
tinued efforts would be made to work out ac-
ceptable solutions to these jiroblems. Other
topics discussed included trade in lead and zinc,
and the Saint John River development.
The Committee expressed pleasure that agree-
ment had been reached regarding winter main-
tenance for the Haines Cutoff portion of the
Alaska Highway and discussed possible im-
provements in the Alaska Highway system.
The Committee took note of the studies at
present being undertaken by the International
Joint Commission which, at the request of the
two Governments, is investigating a number of
questions of economic and general public in-
terest relating to boundary waters and pollution
of air and water.
Meetmgs of the Joint Ministerial Committee
have in the past been held alternately in Ottawa
and "Washington. On the occasion of the Cen-
tennial of Canada's Confederation, this meeting
was held in Montreal which provided an ojipor-
tunity for members of the Committee to visit
EXPO '67.
The United States Secretary of State, the
Honorable Dean Rusk and the Canadian Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs, the Honour-
able Paul IMartin were unable to participate in
the meeting as planned because of the Emer-
gency Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.
The United States was represented by Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the Honorable Henry H.
Fowler (Chairman of the Delegation) ; United
States Ambassador to Canada, the Honorable
W. Walton Butterworth ; Secretary of Agricul-
ture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman ; Secre-
tary of Commerce, the Honorable Alexander B.
Trowbridge; Under Secretary of the Interior,
the Honorable Charles F. Luce; Chairman of
the President's Council of Economic Advisers,
the Honorable Gardner Ackley ; Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs, the Hon-
orable Anthony M. Solomon.
The Canadian Delegation was headed by the
Honourable Robert Winters, Minister of Trade
and Commerce, and included the Honourable
Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance ; the Hon-
ourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of In-
dustry; the Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin, Min-
ister of Energy, Mines and Resources; the
Honourable J. J. Greene, Minister of Agricul-
ture; Mr. Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the
Bank of Canada; and Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Ca-
nadian Ambassador to the United States.
U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed
The Senate on June 19 confirmed the nomina-
tions of the following to be representatives to
the fifth emergency special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations:
Arthur J. Goldberg
Joseph John Siseo
WiUiam B. Buffum
Richard F. Pedersen
46
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency Session; United States
Offers Proposals for Peace in the Middle East
Following are statements made hy U.S. Rep-
resentative Arthur J. Goldberg in the fifth
emergency special session of the U.N. General
Assembly, which convened at Neio York on
June 17.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 17
U.S. delegation press release 109. Corr. 1
Mr. President, distinguished delegates, the
United States has already stated in its letter of
June 15 ^ to the Secretary-General reservations
as to the propriety, in light of the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution ^ of the General Assembly, of
convening an emergency special session under
the prevailmg circumstances. A majority of the
members have nonetheless indicated their con-
sent that such a session should be convened. In
view of this fact, the United States, without
further belaboring the points and without yield-
ing the principle, will do all within its power
to the end that this session may yield construc-
tive results.
Yesterday the distinguished Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr.
[Aleksei N.] Kosygin — whom we welcome in
this Assembly today, along with other distin-
guished leaders of government — according to
the French press said : "I am going to New York
with the sole aim of finding a peaceful solution."
If that is indeed his sole aim, and it is shared
by others, he will find the United States pre-
pared, as I explicitly stated in the Security
Council, to consider all proposals with an open
mind and a fervent desire for peace in this
troubled area and for a just and equitable solu-
* For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12.
* For text, see iUd., Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.
tion to the grave problems which confront us.
Mr. President, on behalf of my Government,
I wish to make it clear that the United States
is participating in this session on the explicit
understanding that everything, every problem
and every proposal, that was before the Secu-
rity Council in its proceedings on the crisis in
the Near East is now before the General Assem-
bly. The only legitimate conceivable purpose
for this session is to search for reasonable, just,
and peaceful solutions to the situation in the
Near East. The United States will devote its
own participation solely to that purpose.
It is worth noting in this connection that
the Soviet Union, which based its request for
this session on the theory that the Security
Council was unable to deal with any of the pro-
posals before it, went to the extreme of trying
to prove its theory true by threatening in ad-
vance to veto draft resolutions of the Council
which were not yet even in final form and thus
could not even be evaluated. The plain import
of this assertion was that all questions before
the Council were to be transferred to this
Assembly.
To the end of seeking a reasonable, just, and
peaceful solution to the situation in the Near
East, I, on behalf of my Government, appeal to
all delegations to spare the General Assembly
from the hot words, destractive propaganda
diatribes, and disrespect for facts which unfor-
tunately characterized so many of the recent
sessions of the Security Council.
Peace is at stake in the Middle East. So, as
our distinguished President of the General As-
sembly, His Excellency Ambassador [Abdul
Eahman] Pazhwak, has just reminded us, is the
good name and reputation of the United Nations
itself, sorely put to question during the past sev-
eral days. My delegation and I earnestly hope
all members who jointly share with us the power
JTJLT 10, 1967
47
and responsibility for peace under the charter
will seek to use this session only for the pursuit
of what the Secretary-General in his recent re-
port has called reasonable, peaceful, and just
solutions for the problems of the Near East.
This is the proper business — the only proper
business — of the present session of the General
Assembly.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 19
U.S. delegation press release 110
Mr. President, distinguished delegates, today
we have listened with great interest and close
attention to the statements made by the dis-
tinguished Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters of the Soviet Union. Mr. Kosygin, and
the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. [Abba]
Eban.
I do not wish to take the time of this Assem-
bly today for a detailed answer to the remarks
made by Mr. Kosygin about my country. The
basic position of the United States has been
stated this morning by the President of our
country," and I am content to leave it to all here
to compare the temper and content of what
these two leaders have said.
Tomorrow I shall elaborate our position in
detail, but today, briefly, I shall respond to
statements of the Chairman that cannot be rec-
onciled with the facts and must be dealt with
immediately. I shall do so both today and to-
morrow in the spirit of President Johnson's
statement of this morning : that our purpose is
to narrow our differences with the Soviet Union
where they can be narrowed and to try to en-
large the arena of common action with the
Soviet Union, all in the interests of helping
secure peace in the world for ourselves and our
posterity.
I deeply regret, however, that the leader of
a great nation should repeat the entirely false
charge that my Government incited, encour-
aged, and prompted Israel to conflict. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Every resource
of the United States, inside and outside the
United Nations, was devoted to an effort to
prevent the recent war. Mr. Kosygin, perhaps
better than any world statesman, should know
what these efforts have been, and he must also
know of our efforts to stop the fighting as soon
as it started.
It is particularly incomprehensible that he
should allege that we sought to gain time in the
Security Council to permit Israel to consoli-
date its military operations; it is just the con-
trary, as the records of the Security Council
show.* As soon as the war broke out, we joined
with others in the Security Council in seeking
an immediate end to the military conflict. It
was not the United States but others that de-
layed action for more than 36 hours on that
simple demand.
The charge that United States participation
in international efforts to assure freedom of
innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba
was an encouragement of Israeli aggression is
a particularly topsy-turvy version of history.
Since closing the Gulf clearly increased tension
and ran the risk of starting the conflict, our
efforts to de-fuse the situation were obviously
designed to forestall war. not to promote it.
More generally, the description of the origins
of the conflict, the denigration of U.S. efforts
to avert it, the misstatement about the efforts
of the Security Council to prevent it and then
stop it, were plainly partisan presentations.
Let me say only that I must categorically
reject the unfounded and unworthy insinuation
that the United States had any part whatever
in the recent conflict in the Middle East, except
to try to stop it by every means at every stage.
And tomorrow I shall set the record straight
in all respects to corroborate this statement.
As for Viet-Nam, I have only a very simple
statement to make. I would innate the distin-
guished Chairman of the Council of Ministers
to cooperate with the Security Council of the
United Nations or with the Geneva machinery
to bring peace to Viet-Nam. The United States
is ready to join with him in such an effort —
and to join with him today. But I do not believe
that our debate is furthered by discussing in
this Special Assembly irrelevant subjects —
Viet-Nam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and
Germany. Tomorrow I shall deal with the real
question on our agenda, which is the need for
a just and stable peace in the IVIiddle East, so
ardently desired by all people of the world.
' See p. 31.
* For statements made b.v Ambassador Goldberg dur-
ing the Security Council debates on the Near East
crisis, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 871 ; June 19,
1967, p. 920 ; June 26, 1967, p. 934 ; and July 3, 1967,
p. 3.
48
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
STATEMENT OF JUNE 20
U.S. delegation press release 112
The General Assembly has been convened
under the resolution known as "Uniting for
Peace." The choice before the Assembly is clear :
We can unite for peace, or we can divide in
discord.
The text of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
includes a direct quotation from the United
Nations Charter, setting forth the fundamental
purposes of the United Nations : first, "To main-
tain international peace and security" ; and sec-
ond, "to develop friendly relations among
nations." These purposes must guide our pro-
ceedings here. The United States of America
pledges its devoted efforts to this end. Yester-
day President Johnson spoke for the American
people when he said : "I offer assurance to all
that this Government of ours, the Government
of the United States, will do its part for peace
in every forum, at every level, at every hour."
As the troubles of the Middle East are great,
so also must our purposes be great. It is not
enough to de-fuse the bomb of hostility; we
must remove the explosive itself. Our ultimate
aim must be nothing less than a stable and du-
rable peace in the Middle East.
Our task is far from easy. We may all "unite
for peace" in the abstract ; but our real task is,
for the sake of peace, to unite upon a course of
action. This course must be rooted both in
fidelity to the princiijles and purposes of the
charter and in a clear grasp of the historical
events which have led to the present situation.
There have been more meetings of the Secu-
rity Council on the recurrent crises in the Middle
East than on any other issue in the history of
the United Nations. The record of two decades
reveals clearly that trouble and ci-isis have been
constant because of the failure of the parties
concerned to come to grips with the underlying
causes of tension in the area and to seek per-
manent solutions.
Five Essentials of Peace
Yesterday the President of the United States
stated what are, in the view of my Grovernment,
five essentials of peace in the area.
First, and greatest among them, is that every
nation in the area has a fundamental right to
live and to have that right respected by all, in-
cluding its immediate neighbors.
The second essential for peace is the simple
human requirement that there be justice for the
refugees — that the nations of the area must at
last address themselves, with new energy and
new determination to succeed, to the plight of
those who have been rendered homeless or dis-
placed by the wars and conflicts of the past, both
distant and recent.
The third requirement for peace, as clearly
demonstrated by events of the past weeks, is
that there be respect for international maritime
rights — the right of innocent maritime passage
for all nations.
Fourth, peace in the Middle East requires
steps to avert the dangers inherent in a renewed
arms race, such as has occurred during the past
12 years. The responsibility for such steps rests
not only on those in the area but also upon the
larger states outside the area.
Fifth and finally, peace in the Middle East
requires respect for the political independence
and territorial integrity of all the states of the
area. It is a principle which can be effective only
on the basis of peace between the parties — only
if the fragile and violated truce lines of 20 years
are replaced by recognized boundaries and other
arrangements that will provide the nations of
the area security against terror, destruction,
war, and violence of all kinds.
These principles, if implemented, offer a solid
basis for a durable peace in the future. If they
had been accepted and adhered to in the past,
there could have been peace. But they were not
adhered to. Instead, the world has witnessed
tlxree tragic wars. And today the Assembly is
faced with the aftermath of the latest of these
outbreaks.
Tensions Rise; Efforts To Avert Clash Fail
The essential facts are clear. In the spring of
this year the tension of many years became even
greater ; acts of violence became more frequent ;
threats and declarations became more ominous
and bellicose. Then on May 17, President Nasser
demanded the withdrawal of the United Na-
tions Emergency Force and immediately moved
large U.A.R. forces into the Gaza Strip, the
Sinai Peninsula, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Within
a few days thereafter, the U.A.R. declared a
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait
of Tiran, which had been open to free and in-
nocent passage by the ships of all nations under
accepted principles of international law.
JITLT 10, 1967
The major insulator, the United Nations
Emergency Force, by -which the United Nations
had for so many years protected the Middle
East against full-scale war, was stripped away.
Hostile forces stood in direct confrontation
within plain sight of each other. Threats of war
filled the air. Peace hung suspended by a thread.
At this point the Secretary-General made a
journey to Cairo in the interest of maintaining
peace. He reported to the Security Council on
May 26 " that he had "called to the attention of
the Government of the United Arab Kepublic
the dangerous consequences which could ensue
from restricting innocent passage of ships in the
Strait of Tiran," and that he had expressed his
"hope that no precipitate action would be
taken." In the same report the Secretary-Gen-
eral made his plea to all the parties for a
"breathing spell" which would allow tension to
subside from its explosive level. He urged all
concerned "to exercise special restraint, to
forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions
wliich could increase tension, to allow the Coun-
cil to deal with the underlying causes of the
present crisis and to seek solutions."
In the spirit of this wise plea, my Govern-
ment and some others made strenuous efforts
both inside and outside the United Nations to
find ways to avert a clash. In the Security Coun-
cil on May 31, the United States delegation pro-
posed a resolution' to provide the "breathing
spell" which the Secretary-General had so
urgently requested. It is a matter of profound
regret that this proposal, aimed at preventing
bloodshed and suffering, was not agreed to by
others.
Security Council Obtains a Cease-Fire
Early on Jime 5 the thread of peace was
broken. From that moment, the first and most
urgent necessity was to stop the fighting be-
fore its dimensions were enlarged.
Within hours of the outbreak of fighting —
even before we had confirmation of any major
movement of troops across truce lines — my Gov-
ernment joined with some others in the Security
Council in seelring to obtain, without debate, a
call for an immediate cease-fire. If a cease-fire
and a standstill had actually occurred at that
point, the problems we now face would be far
• U.N. doc. S/7906.
• For background, see BuxLETrN of June 19, 1967,
p. 927.
less formidable. But again, others resisted this
effort, and it was not imtil 36 hours later — on
the evening of June 6, after prolonged discus-
sion— that the Security Council finally reached
a unanimous decision on a simple cease-fire.^
And when, in the following days, we sought
to secure a cease-fire on the Syrian front, we en-
countered the same kind of obstruction. Here,
too, the United States was prepared, without de-
bate and without delay, to bring the hostilities
to a halt. But others did not see the matter the
same way. For hours they engaged in imseemly
bickering which, to say the least, did no credit
to this organization.
Charges of U.S. Intervention Rejected
Now, Mr. President, a good deal of this time
was consumed in the elaboration of totally false
accusations against my country. The United
States was accused of having plotted, incited,
encouraged, and prompted Israel to conflict;
and it was even charged that our armed forces
had intervened in the hostilities on the side of
Israel.
Thiring the debates in the Security Council,
and once again yesterday in the General Assem-
bly, it was my duty to reject categorically all
these charges, in whichever of their many and
changing forms they appeared. Today I re-
affirm, on the full authority of the United
States Government, that no United States sol-
dier, sailor, airman, ship, airplane, or military
instrument of any kind — including radar jam-
ming— pertaining to the armed forces or to any
agency of the United States intervened in this
conflict. Furthermore, whatever they may say,
all the governments concerned are well aware of
the true facts. We had nothing whatever to do
with the fighting except to try to prevent it and,
once it occurred, to use every effort at our com-
mand to bring it to a speedy end.
Wlien these false and inflammatory charges
were first made, I offered on behalf of the
United States our full cooperation with any
United Nations or other impartial investiga-
tion of them — including the proposal to open
the logs of our aircraft carriers in the 6th Fleet
to United Nations investigators.' This offer of
ours has not been answered or even referred to
by the accusers.
' For background and text of Security Council Reso-
lution 233, see md., June 26, 1967, p. 934.
* For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on June 7,
see Hid.
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
It is perfectly clear why these charges have
been spread. They were spread in an attempt
to find a scapegoat for what occurred — and
perhaps for an even more sinister purpose: to
engage the great powers with each other. The
United States will not lend itself to such
purposes.
Despite all this diversionary propaganda, the
Security Council was able to achieve a cease-
fire ; and the cease-fire is holding. Aiid now the
problem of peace in the Middle East has come
before the General Assembly.
Analysis of Soviet Proposal
Yesterday the Soviet Union introduced a
resolution," essentially the same as that which
it also proposed in the Security Council, and
which tlie overwhelming majority of the Council
refused to accept.^"
Under this Soviet proposal, Israel alone is
to be condemned as an aggressor ; though surely,
in the light of all the events, both recent and
long past, that led up to the fighting, it would
be neither equitable nor constructive for this
organization to issue a one-sided condemnation.
Tlaen, second — and this is the heart of their
proposal — ^the Soviet Union asks this Assembly
to recommend, in effect, as follows: "Israel,
withdraw your troops, and let everything go
back to exactly where it was before the fighting
began on June 5." In other words, the fihn is
to be rim backward through the projector to
that point in the early morning of June 5 when
hostilities had not yet broken out.
But what would the situation then be ?
Once again, opposing forces would stand in
direct confrontation, poised for combat. Once
again, no international machinery would be
present to keep them apart. Once again, in-
nocent maritime passage would be denied. Once
again, there would be no bar to belligerent acts
and acts of force. Once again, there would be
no acceptance of Israel by her neighbors as a
sovereign state, no action to solve the tragic
refugee problem, no effective security against
terrorism and violence.
Once again, in short, notliing would be done
to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both
sides that have fed the fires of war in the
Middle East for 20 years. And once again, there
would be no bar to an arms race in the area.
Surely, no one in this hall can contemplate
with equanimity the prospect of a fourth round
in the Arab-Israel struggle. Yet if ever there
was a prescription for renewed hostilities, the
Soviet resolution is that prescription. Surely, it
is not an acceptable approach for the United
Nations.
U.S. Offers Plan for Permanent Peace
Wliat approach, then, ought to be taken? It
may be well to recall that the General Armistice
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that
their purpose is, and I quote, ". . . to facili-
tate the transition from the present truce to
permanent peace." I repeat, '■^permanent feaceP
We all know that there has been no transition
and there is no permanent peace in that area.
All of the 18 years of the armistice regime have
witnessed virtually no progress on any of the
basic issues from which the conflict arose. As
long as these issues are unresolved, they wiU
continue to poison the political life of the
Middle East.
Wliat the Middle East needs today are new
steps toward real peace; not just a cease-fire,
which is what we have today; not just a fragile
and perilous armistice, which is what we have
had for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which
is necessary but insufficient.
Real peace must be our aim. In that convic-
tion I now propose, on behalf of the United
States, a resolution ^^ which I now read :
The General AssemMy,
Bearing in mind the achievement of a cease-fire in
the Middle East, as called for by the Security Council
in its Resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 (1967),"
Having regard to the purpose of the United Nations
to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,
1. Endorses the cease-fire achieved pursuant to the
resolutions of the Security Council and calls for its
scrupulous respect by the parties concerned ;
2. Decides that its objective must be a stable and
durable peace In the Middle East ;
3. Considers that this objective should be achieved
through negotiated arrangements with appropriate
third-party assistance based on :
a. Mutual recognition of the political independence
and territorial integrity of all countries in the area,
encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrange-
ments, including disengagement and withdrawal of
forces, that vriU give them security against terror,
destruction and war;
b. Freedom of innocent maritime passage;
• U.N. doc. A/L. 519.
"For text of the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/
Rev. 1) , see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12.
" U.N. doc. A/L. 520.
"For texts, see Bulletin of July 26, 1967, p. 947,
and July 3, 1967, p. 11.
JULY 10, 1967
61
c. Just and equitable solution of the refugee prob-
lem;
d. Registration and limitation of arms shipments
into the area ;
e. Recognition of the right of all sovereign nations
to exist in peace and security ;
4. Requests the Security Council to keep the situa-
tion under careful review.
This resolution embodies the five principles
■which President Johnson yesterday identified
as fundamental to durable peace, and which I
listed at the outset.
Our objective in offering this resolution is to
encourage a decision by the warring parties to
live together in peace and to secure international
assistance to this end. It is necessary to begin
to move — not some day, but now, promptly,
while the memory of these tragic events is still
vivid in our minds — toward a settlement of the
outstanding issues; and truly, "there must be
progress toward all of them if there is to be
progress toward any." ^^
The Issue Facing the United Nations
There are legitimate gi-ievances on all sides
of this bitter conflict, and a full settlement
should deal equitably with legitimate griev-
ances and outstanding questions, from which-
ever side they are raised. In short, Mr. Presi-
dent, a new foundation for peace must be built
in the Middle East.
Agreements between the parties on these pro-
foundly contentious matters will not come easy.
But the United Nations has an urgent obliga-
tion to facilitate them and to help rebuild an
atmosphere in which fruitful discussions will
be possible. That is the purpose of the resolu-
tion we have submitted.
Mr. President, the United Nations is now
faced with a clear-cut issue: We can either
attack the causes of the disease which has
plagued the Middle East with war three times
in a generation or we can go back to the treat-
ment of symptoms, which has proved such a
dismal failure in the past.
In any grave situation, fraught with so many
differences of opinions and attitudes, the tend-
ency is to say that it defies solution. But we
cannot accept this counsel. Let no one say that
solutions are impossible.
The proposal we offer this morning is in-
spired not by the despairing doctrines of per-
petual enmity but by the hopeful doctrine from
which we in the United Nations have always
drawn our major inspiration : the doctrine en-
shrined in our charter, pledging all nations and
peoples, all cultures and religions, "to practice
tolerance and live together in peace with one
another as good neighbors."
Sometimes that doctrine is called Utopian or
unrealistic. But the greatest unrealism is that
which relies on hatred and enmity. The great-
est realism is the doctrine of peace and concili-
ation and mutual forbearance. From that true
realism, let this organization find the strength
to make a new beginning toward peace in the
Middle East. To this cause the United States
pledges its most dedicated efforts.
U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus
Again Extended for 6 Months
Statement hy Richard F. Pedersen ^
Mr. President, we are all indebted to the Sec-
retary-General for the clear, complete, and per-
ceptive report ^ he has put before the Council.
He has described in forthright language the
problems which confront us all and his distin-
guished representative on the island. It is evi-
dent that ]Mr. [B. F.] Osorio-Tafall has under-
taken his latest assignment with energy and
imagination. And we have no doubt that he,
General [Umarai Armas Eino] Martola, and
the officers and men of the United Nations
Force m Cyprus will continue to serve the cause
of peace with courage, patience, skill, and the
determination to fulfill their mandate im-
partially.
We would also like to note our appreciation
for the services rendered by the distinguished
Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador [Carlos A.]
Bemardes, as the previous representative of the
Secretary-General. Ambassador Bernardes, who
formerly was a colleague of ours on the Security
Coimcil, has shown a dedication to the high
aims of the United Nations and a true devotion
to the best interests of all the people of Cyprus
in carrying out the heavy responsibilities given
' See p. 31.
' Made in the Security Council on June 19 (U.S./U.N.
press release 111). Mr. Pedersen is Deputy U.S. Repre-
sentative in the Security Council.
" U.N. doc. S/7969.
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
him by the Secretary-General with respect to
the difficult situation there.
The mandate of the United Nations Force in
Cyprus is being extended for the 11th time.
Given present conditions, we believe that tliis
was the only realistic and prudent course of ac-
tion ; and accordingly, we voted for the resolu-
tion.' However, as the Secretary-General has
noted, all parties must bear in mind the in-
escapable fact that UNFICYP cannot remain
in Cyprus mdefinitely. The lack of progress on
fimdamental issues requires those concerned
to seek new areas of accommodation even more
urgently than before. All parties should extend
full cooperation in accordance with this new
resolution to the Secretary- General, his special
representative, and UNFICYP, so that prog-
ress may be made toward settling the long-
standing problems on the island.
The essence of UNFICYP's mandate is to
prevent a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus and
to restore and maintain law and order. And it is
evident that this mandate cannot be fulfilled if
the parties concerned do not give full coopera-
tion.
The United States shares the Secretary-Gen-
eral's concern regarding restrictions imposed on
UNFICYP in the discharge of its normal
duties. We deplore any use or threat of force
against UNFICYP by anyone, and we hope that
UNFICYP will receive cooperation in the im-
plementation of its authorized activities. The
Force must, in the first instance, have freedom
of movement, and we note that the Secretary-
General has reminded all parties that such free-
dom is explicitly provided for in written agree-
ment. Neither can any sort of harassment of
United Nations personnel or of UNFICYP be
acceptable.
The United States also continues to believe,
as Ambassador Goldberg stated before the
Council last December,* that the importation of
arms can only be a source of insecurity. The
United States fully concurs in the Secretary-
General's view that any influx of arms and mili-
'In a resolution (S/RES/238 (1967)) adopted
unanimously on June 19, the Security Council extended
"the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-
keeping Force . . . for a further period of six months
ending 26 December 1967, in the expectation that suf-
ficient progress towards a solution by then will make
possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the
Force."
* BirLMjnN of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 179.
tary equipment is a cause for concern to
UNFICYP in the execution of its mandate. In
this connection, the United States is gratified by
paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General's report
concerning the results of inspections made of
certain arms by the Commander of the United
Nations Force, and we welcome the assurances
in this respect given by the Government of
Cyprus.
The allegations of the distinguished repre-
sentative of the Soviet Union of a hostile NATO
design against Cyprus are, of course, a fantasy.
A more positive contribution to our debate
would have been to express tangible support
for the United Nations Force on the island.
We will not comment on the digression made
in the understandable need to defend the recent
recourse to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.
Our own views on the relative responsibilities of
the General Assembly and of the Security Coun-
cil are well known and unchanged.'
Despite our disappointment at the lack of
progress toward solving the fundamental issues
and the many problems which have beset the
United Nations in its efforts to maintain peace
and promote a settlement, the United States
continues fully to support UNFICYP. As evi-
dence of this statement, I wish to announce on
behalf of the United States a pledge of up to $4
million toward the cost of maintaining
UNFICYP for the next 6 months. This pledge,
as has been true of our previous pledges, will
depend upon the amounts contributed by other
governments toward the cost of the operation.
The United States pledges toward the cost of
UNFICYP, including the amount I have just
announced, now total over $32 million.
Mr. President, the United States hopes that
the knowledge that UNFICYP will continue
for another 6 months will encourage those most
directly concerned to renew and intensify their
efforts to reach a just and lasting solution. This
extension should be regarded as an opportunity
for progress, not as a reason for inaction. We
hope that when the Security Council next meets
on this matter we shall have evidence that the
time provided by this extension has been well
used. A wise man has said that time cools, time
clarifies, and no mood can be maintained for-
ever. Let us hope that these words will be
justified by the course of events during the next
6 months.
' For background, see ibid., July 3, 1967, p. 12.
OXTLT 10, 1967
53
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Counterfeiting
International convention and protocol for the suppres-
sion of counterfeiting currency. Done at Geneva
April 20, 1929.'
Accession deposited: Ceylon, June 2, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Maldive Islands, May 31, 1967.
Reciprocal Assistance
Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance. Done
at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947. Entered into
force December 3, 1948. TIAS 1838.
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, June 12,
1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En-
tered into force January 1, 1967.
Ratification deposited: United States and Territories
of the United States, May 29, 1067.
Entered into force as to the United States: May 29,
1967.
Proclaimed ip the President: June 20, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965.'
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, May 31, 1967;
Poland, May 22, 1967; United States, May 31,
1967.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
September 29, 1948 (TIAS 5507). Effected by ex-
change of notes at La Paz May 4 and 17, 1967.
Entered into force May 17, 1967.
Canada
Agreement relating to a special operating program for
the Duncan Reservoir, constructed under the Co-
lumbia River Treaty. Effected by exchange of notes
' Not In force for the United States.
' Not in force.
at Ottawa May 8 and 18, 1967. Entered into force
May 18, 1967.
Agreement relating to pre-sunrise operation of certain
standard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31 and
June 12, 1967. Entered into force June 12, 1967.
El Salvador
Agreement relating to the granting of authorizations to
permit licensed amateur radio operators of either
country to operate their stations in the other
country. Effected by exchange of notes at San
Salvador May 24 and June 5, 1967. Entered into
force Jime 5, 1967.
Ethiopia
Parcel post agreement, with regulations of execution.
Signed at Addis Ababa and Washington June 3
and 15, 1967. Enters into force on a date to be
mutually agreed upon by the respective competent
authorities of the two countries.
Guyana
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Guyana. Effected by exchange of
notes at Georgetown May 31 and June 7, 1967. En-
tered into force June 7, 19i67.
Hong Kong
Agreement amending the agreement of August 26, 1966,
relattng to trade in cotton textiles (TIAS 6088).
Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong May
31, 1967. Entered into force May 31, 1967.
Italy
Agreement for a cooperative program in science. Signed
at Washington June 19, 1967. Entered into force
June 19, 1967.
Japan
Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for
United States administrative and related expenses
for Japanese fiscal year 19G7 pursuant to the mutual
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo June 2, 1967. Entered into force June 2, 1967.
Panama
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
March 31, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1932 and 2551).
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Jvme 5,
1967. Entered into force June 5, 1967.
Rv\^anda
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Kigali July 6 and August
9, 1965.
Entered into force: April 27, 1967.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement amending the agreement of December 9,
1963, and January 6, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5659,
6071), relating to the establishment of a television
system in Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of
notes at Jidda May 23 and 27, 1967. Entered into
force May 27, 1967.
Viet-Nam
Agreement regarding income tax administration. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 31 and
May 3, 1967. Entered into force May 3, 1967.
54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 10, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. H63
Africa. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Asia. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Canada. U.S.-Canada Ek;onomic Committee Con-
cludes Eleventh Meeting (communique) . . 44
Congress. U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed ... 46
Cyprus. U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Ex-
tended for 6 Months (Pedersen) 52
Denmark. European Leaders Meet With Presi-
dent Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40
Economic Affairs. U.S.-Canada Economic Com-
mittee Concludes Eleventh Meeting (com-
munique) 44
Europe. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Italy. European Leaders Meet With President
Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40
Malavn. President of Malawi Visits the United
States (Banda, Johnson) 42
Near East
European Leaders Meet With President Johnson
(Johnson, Krag) 40
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John-
son) 31
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Resulting From
Near East Conflict 41
Passports. U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Re-
sulting From Near East Conflict 41
Presidential Documents
European Leaders Meet With President John-
son 40
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems 35
President of Malawi Visits the United States . 42
Principles for Peace in the Middle Bast ... 31
The Spirit of Hollybush 38
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 54
U.S.SJI.
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session ; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac-
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44
United Kingdom. European Leaders Meet With
President Johnson (Johnson, Krag) .... 40
United Nations
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Extended for
6 Months (Pedersen) 52
U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session of U.N.
General Assembly Confirmed 46
Viet-Nam
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John-
son) 31
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac-
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44
Name Index
Banda, H. Kamuzu 42
Buffum, William B 46
Goldberg, Arthur J 46, 47
Johnson, President 31,35,38,40,42
Kosygin, Aleksei N 35
Krag, Jens Otto 40
Pedersen, Richard F 46,52
Sisco, Joseph John 46
Check List of Department of State
Press
Releases: June 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.
No.
Date
Subject
tl45
6/19
U.S.-Italian science cooperation
agi-eement.
»146
6/20
Meeting of the Joint United
States-Canadian Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs.
147
6/20
U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning
incident at Cam Pha.
148
6/21
Revision of travel restrictions re-
sulting from Near East hostili-
ties.
*149
6/22
Amendment to program for visit
of King Bhumibol Adulyadej
of Thailand.
a.
*Not printe
tHeld for a
later issue of the BtiLLETiN.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICEit»67
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PBINTINS OFFICE
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Boston Public Li^-^^"^ .
A r,t nf Documents
Superintendent ot ^"-
- 2 3 ia^7
DEPOSITORV
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1464
Jvly 17, 1967
THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Excerpts From an Address hy President Johnson 59
REGIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER
hy W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 66
THE ATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY LOOKS TO THE FUTURE
T)y Secretaiy of Commerce Alexander B. Troxobndge 70
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1464 Publication 8263
July 17, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
tr.S. Government Printing OflBce
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $16.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In
the Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Th^ Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
icith information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the JFhite House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative nuiterial in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Right of All Peoples to Self -Determination
Eemarks hy President Johnson {Excerpt) '
I want to conclude now by just quietly say-
ing a word to you about this larger world that
we all live m. I think it is on your mind and in
your heart — as it is on mine and in mine.
We are in South Viet-Nam today because we
want to allow a little nation self-determination.
We want them to be able to go and vote for the
kind of leaders they want and select the type of
government they want. We want them to be free
of terror and aggression in doing that — as we
want it for ourselves.
We made a contract. We had an agreement.
We entered into a treaty that was confirmed by
our Senate, 82 to 1, saying that in the face of
common danger we would come and help.
We came. We are helping. We are doing our
best. I solicit the cooperation of each of you to
the extent that you can give it.
We Americans are deeply concerned about
the recognition of the right of self-determina-
tion. That is what each of you demands for
yourself. So let us help your fellow man in other
parts of the world enjoy it, too.
Self-determination is really the right to live.
That is what we ask for all of the nations of the
Middle East — not just for some of them.
We believe that for the peoples of the 122 na-
tions of the world— speaking now of the under-
developed nations of the world specifically —
real self-determination only comes when hun-
ger and disease and ignorance and poverty are
overcome. We believe that the peoples of all of
these nations are entitled to that self-determi-
nation. They won't have it until we can conquer
those ancient enemies: illiteracy, ignorance,
disease, and poverty.
Just as it is here in our home, we believe in
the first amendment, in free speech and in a
fi-ee press. We believe in the Bill of Rights.
We believe what matters abroad is also freedom
' Made before the National Convention of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce at Baltimore, Md., on June 27
(White House press release) .
from fear and freedom from want — the free-
dom to make choices and not just to submit to
a brutal destiny.
Two days ago, not very far from here, I met
with Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union.^
The nations we spoke for are two of the most
powerful nations in all of the world. In the
family of nations, two of the strongest have two
of the greatest responsibilities.
For my part, and for your nation, that re-
sponsibility involves helping other nations to
choose their own future as they see it.
We seek as well maximiun understanding be-
tween these two great powers. For 10 hours we
looked at each other with only the interpreters
present in a very small room.
Though our differences are many, and though
they rim very deep, we knew that in the world's
interest it was important that we imderstand, if
we could, the motivations as well as the com-
mitments of each other. We religiously, dedi-
catedly, and determinedly worked at that as-
signment for those 2 days.
That is why we met in the house called Holly-
bush. To bring about better understandings and
to discuss respective goals and commitments we
came there.
When we left I believe we had achieved that.
We agreed we would continue to maintain con-
tact through diplomatic channels, through
other means of communication, and direct
contact.
In Saigon, in the Sinai, at Hollybush in New
Jersey, in the slums of our cities, in the prairies
of our land, in the hollows of Appalacliia, in
scores of underdeveloped countries all around
the world where men struggle to make their
own future and to secure their little families,
that is what we are about.
If the young leadership of our country sup-
ports us over the long hard pull that lies ahead,
"For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 35.
59
if you can endure the tensions, if you can under-
stand that the air is going to be rough and
the road is going to be bumpy, you can, in the
words of your own creed, "Help us unlock
earth's great treasure — human personality."
Then the cussers and the doubters will be rele-
gated to the rear; the doers and the builders
will take up the front lines.
Now you are going to return to your homes.
You have engaged in looking at yourselves and
at your country. I have been able to discuss it
for only a vei-y brief time.
I am going back to attend a 1 o'clock meet-
ing with Secretary Rusk and Secretary Mc-
Namara and others who are giving everything
they have to your country. We are not only
going to talk and plan and work and pray to
develop ways and means of keeping your coun-
try and your families secure, but we are going
to do our dead level best to bring peace to every
human being in the world.
Our problems are many. Our solutions are
few. I am not as concerned about the individual
differences which we have with other nations,
because with few exceptions I think those can
be reconciled; but I am concerned that every
boy and girl, that every man and woman who
enjoys citizenship and freedom and prosperity
and the blessings of this land know what they
have and are determined to build upon it, to
improve it — and by all means to keep it.
United States Reiterates Policy
on Status of Jerusalem
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 28
White House press release dated June 28
The President said on June 19 that in our
view "there . . . must be adequate recognition
of the special interest of three great religions
in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^ On this prin-
ciple he assumes that before any unilateral ac-
tion is taken on the status of Jerusalem there
will be a^jpropriate consultation with religious
leaders and others who are deeply concerned.
Jerusalem is holy to Christians, to Jews, and to
Moslems. It is one of the great continuing trag-
edies of history that a city which is so much
the center of man's highest values has also been,
over and over, a center of conflict. Eepeatedly
the passionate beliefs of one element have led
to exclusion or unfairness for others. It has
been so, unf ortimately, in the last 20 years. Men
of all religions will agree that we must now do
better. The world must find an answer that is
fair and recognized to be fair. That could not
be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the
President is confident that the wisdom and
good judgment of those now in control of Je-
rusalem will prevent any such action.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JUNE 28^
The hasty administrative action taken today '
cannot be regarded as determining the future of
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in re-
lation to them.
The United States has never recognized such
unilateral actions by any of the states in the
area as governing the international status of
Jerusalem.
The policy of the United States will be gov-
erned by the President's statement of June 19
and the Wliite House statement this morning.
The views of the United States have been
made clear repeatedly to representatives of all
govermnents concerned.
' Btjixetin of July 10, 1967, p. 31.
' Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman.
' On June 27, the Israeli Parliament approved three
bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdic-
tion, and public administration over the Old City of
Jerusalem and other territory of the former mandate
of Palestine which has been under the control of Jor-
dan since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On
June 28, the Government of Israel took administrative
action under the new legislation to extend its munic-
ipal services and controls over the entire city of
Jerusalem.
I
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue
Close Cooperation To Promote Peace
Their Majesties King Bhumibol Adulyadej
ancl Queen Sirikit of Thailand visited the
United States and Canada June 6-29, conclud-
ing with a 3-day oificial visit to Washington
June 27-29. Following are texts of an exchange
of greetings between President Johnson and the
King at an amval ceremony on the South Lawn
of the White Hou^e on June 27, their exchange
of toasts at a dinner at the White Rouse that
evening, and a joint statement released on
June 29.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated June 27
President Johnson
Your Majesties: On behalf of the people of
the United States, I welcome you once again
to my country.
All of us who had the pleasure of meeting
you when you were here in 1960 remember that
visit with a very special warmth and with great
pleasure.
Since that time, Mrs. Jolmson and I both
have had the privilege of visiting Your Majes-
ties in Thailand. We will never forget your
hospitality nor the friendship of the Thai peo-
ple themselves and the warmth with which they
welcomed us to your country when we were
there last fall during our trip to Asia.
That our heads of state and government have
met often in recent years I think is a symbol of
the changing times and the changing relation-
ships. Until very recently, the United States
and Thailand were thought of as the most dis-
tant of lands. They were widely separated by
both geography and interests. Today, we look
at it from an entirely different viewpoint. We
see ourselves as your neighbors. We are only
hours apart. We are neighbors who share the
problems and the opportunities of a great com-
mon Pacific frontier.
We welcome Your Majesties as the beloved
leaders of a gallant nation which has not only
the desire to be free — because all nations have
that — ^but the wisdom and the courage to do
what is necessary to be free.
There was a time not long ago when some of
our friends in Asia were deeply concerned about
their future. They wondered whether they were
destined to be dominated by an aggressive alien
power.
They wondered whether they would have to
face that power alone, imaided by friends who
wished them well but whose wishes could not be
translated into reality.
Those days are gone. Throughout Asia there
is a new spirit. It is a spirit of faith in the fu-
ture. It has brought in its wake confidence, con-
fidence that the future of Asia is not something
that is preordained but is something that can
be built and shaped to Asian desires by Asian
efforts.
I am glad to say that the people of your na-
tion of Thailand have led the way. Thailand
never gave in to despairs. Thailand never as-
sumed that its independence could not be
maintained.
Your people knew that men are not the vic-
tims of history but are the makers of history.
You were among the first to send your sons to
fight for liberty in Korea. Without hesitation,
you took your stand as a charter member of the
SEATO alliance.
Now, today, you are making an invaluable
contribution to the struggle of freedom in Viet-
Nam.
I have no doubt about the outcome of those
efforts in which we have joined as Pacific part-
ners. Wlien the free men of Asia's future write
the history of the present, the gallantry and the
courage of the Thai nation will be a luminous
page.
Your Majesties, Mrs. Johnson and I are so
delighted that we could welcome you once again.
We look forward to very useful and fruitful
JXTLT 17, 1967
61
discussions with you and a happy evening in the
Wliite House together tonight.
Thank you.
His Majesty the King
Mr. President, I am veiy thankful for your
kind words of welcome. This welcome is really
a warm welcome.
We come on this visit to the United States on
a people-to- people visit. That means we have
had the opportunity to meet people of different
walks of life and that we have had the occasion
to know a little more about your country's as-
pirations and also that we may present our
views and bring our ideas to you directly.
This visit is drawing to its end. It is a very
suitable conclusion that we should come here to
Washington to meet the President and Mrs.
Johnson. We meet you both not only as head
of state but as old friends. That is part of our
people-to-people visit.
We hope the result of this kind of visit, which
is not only a visit of protocol and red carpets, but
it is a meeting of people who have the same ideas
and ideals — so that we can cooperate better and
we can bring better understanding between the
people of your great nation and the people of
Thailand, so that we may work in cordiality
toward world everlasting peace.
In coming here, we bring the greetings and
the wishes of our people to the people of this
great country. We want to share with you all
the hopes for future progress of the world and
future peace of the world.
Thank: you.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated June 27
President Johnson
Your Majesties, distinguished guests, ladies
and gentlemen : I'm sure that you have read the
story of His Majesty's remarkable address at
Williams College. A speech had been prepared
for his approval and for his use upon that oc-
casion. But evidently he foimd it not to his
liking. So he spoke extemporaneously — and the
judges, I am told, would have given him the
annual speaking prize if visitors had been
eligible.
When His Majesty finished, someone asked
if he had been able to see his wife's face and
to read her reaction to his address. His Majesty
is said to have replied : "Confidentially, I wasn't
looking at my wife. I was watching my Minister
of Foreign Affairs."
Secretary Katzenbach [Nicholas deB. Katz-
enbach. Under Secretaiy of State] I am care-
fully observmg your reactions.
We feel a very special bond of kinship with
Your Majesty because you were born among us.
I have heard that during your early years
you used to go from Cambridge to an island off
the Massachusetts coast known as Martha's
Vineyard.
Some members of my Cabinet, some members
of my staff, have been known to disappear into
the fogs of the Vineyard for long stretches of
time. Some of them even claim that the fog ob-
scures not only land and sea but the sound of
the Wliite House telephone.
We are delighted that you were able to find
your way back from that isolated and mysteri-
ous place.
We are delighted, as well, that we have this
opportunity to repay, in some small measure,
the warm hospitality bestowed on us in Bang-
kok last October.
The world is a good deal smaller than it was
when our United States President Jackson sent
our first diplomatic mission across the seas to
Siam, as it was then called, in 1833.
But the nearness of two countries is not meas-
ured by the flight time of jet planes. It is meas-
ured more by imderstanding and by shared pur-
poses. And though we have different customs,
different histories, and different religions, what
we share. Your Majesty, far surpasses our dif-
ferences.
Part of our conunon heritage is a passionate
belief in man's right to decide his own destiny,
a love of freedom and independence, and a de-
termination to secure their blessings.
Wlaen I learned on my first trip to your coun-
try that "Thailand" in your language means
"Land of the Free," I thought of those words
in our national anthem : "the land of the free
and the home of the brave."
The people of the United States and the peo-
ple of Thailand have always understood that
those who would remain free must first be brave.
In the past. Your Majesty, brave Thai and
brave Americans have stood shoulder to shoul-
der in the cause of freedom. Today, we face to-
gether another test of man's will and determina-
tion to be free. We shall meet that test with
courage and determination imtil the tide of
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN"
aggression recedes and our people can live in
peace once more.
Your Majesty's people have been brave in
time of war. You have helj^ed men forge a shield
against the disciples of violence.
You have also been equal to the demanding
tasks of peace. You have asserted your leader-
ship in the works of peaceful construction that
always must be carried on behind that shield.
I am confident, Your Majesty, that from our
mutual commitment will someday flow peace
and order and development in prosperity for
the people of a free Asia.
Tonight we are called upon to make addi-
tional sacrifices. In the days ahead, we are go-
ing to have requests made of vis that are going
to be difficult to honor. But we approach these
requests with confidence, knowing that our al-
lies will face them with courage and with fair-
ness.
And those who love peace will be eternally
in your debt. Your Majesty, for the contribu-
tion that you and your country have made.
Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and
toast Their Majesties the King and Queen of
Thailand.
His Majesty the King
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: This
time the machine came to me. You spoke about
looking at my Foreign Minister. Today I won't
look at him. I will look at my text.
You mentioned my trip to Martha's Vineyard
and wondered how I came back. I had nothing
to do with the coming back, because I was too
small. It was because my parents were very
good and went home, and they took me home,
also.
But apart from this, there are other things
that are to be said.
First, I must thank you for the kind invita-
tion to visit this great city of Washington and
for the warm welcome and hospitality which
we have received during this our second visit to
the United States.
Wlien we came here on our first visit, we
came to make friends with the people whom
we had admired for their freedom, fairness,
and generosity. We were received with the great
warmth and cordiality that only Americans can
offer.
Your visit to my country in October last, Mr.
President, is still a happy memory with us;
and we are most gratified to be with you tonight,
because we know that we are once again among
friends.
We are happy to see Mrs. Johnson with us
tonight. Your presence here is a good surprise.
Although ourselves we are still quite far re-
moved from having the honor and the dignity
of being grandparents, not to mention the ir-
responsible enjoyment that accompanies such
a privilege, we do imderstand and appreciate
the thrill and anxiety of a new grandmother —
and grandfather, also.
It is a source of gratification for me to hear
the kind words that you have spoken and your
reiteration of the friendship that the United
States Government and people extend to my
country and my people.
Allow me to say again that we on our part
sincerely and wholeheartedly reciprocate the
very same sentiments — the firm belief that on
your part you earnestly and sincerely desire
peace and a better way of life for the people of
all nations.
The happy association between the United
States and Thailand is to us a matter of historic
pride.
You already mentioned the mission of Mr.
Edmimd Roberts, who was received by my
august ancestor Kmg Rama the Third.
In spite of his pet aversion to receiving for-
eign envoys from abroad that was due to our
past unfortimate experiences, my ancestor was
somehow won over by the American honesty of
purpose and decided to extend a very warm
welcome to the emissary of your early predeces-
sor President Jackson.
Mr. Edmund Roberts arrived in Bangkok in
February of 1833. Within a period of less than
a month and in spite of linguistic disadvan-
tages— every sentence spoken by either side had
to imdergo four successive translations, from
English to Portuguese, and from Portuguese
to Chinese, from Chinese to Thai, and vice
versa — in spite of all these difficulties, a treaty
of friendship and commerce was agreed upon
and signed on the 20th of March 1833.
This agreement constituted the first treaty
ever signed by the United States with any
country in Asia. Thus my country came to be
the first country in Asia to recognize and to ex-
tend the hand of friendship to the newly inde-
pendent United States of America.
War, the punctuation of human history,
brought a new sentence in American-Thai re-
lationships. President Woodrow Wilson, who
genuinely understood our difficulties and dis-
JTILT 17, 1967
63
advantages in our relations with foreign
countries, agreed at Versailles after World
War I to revise the U.S.-Thai treaty of friend-
ship by abrogating all obnoxious clauses con-
taining the one-sided ijnposition of extraterri-
toriality and fiscal restrictions as contained in
earlier treaties which had no terminating
clause.
Other gi'eat nations, at that time, later fol-
lowed the American example of justice and
broadmindedness. Thailand thus gained an im-
proved standing.
World War II brought about another sen-
tence in the history of American-Thai friend-
ship. The United States has shown real concern
over the security and development of Thai-
land— and gave not only good advice but also
several forms of aid and assistance of material
nature, both in the military and in the economic
sphere.
This last sentence is not completed yet. We
can only hope that it may end happily for the
sake of beginning another one.
We can only say that at present we are proud
in the knowledge that it is being written with
our mutual good will and cooperation.
Ladies and gentlemen, may I invite you all
now to rise and join me in a toast to the happi-
ness of President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson
and to the prosperity and progress of the people
of the United States.
gional economic and political cooperation in South-
east Asia.
In their review of the situation in Southeast Asia,
the President reaffirmed that the United States regards
the preservation of the independence and integrity of
Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United
States and to world peace. His Majesty and the Presi-
dent agreed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion is the foundation of collective security in the area
and that both nations are determined to strengthen the
role of the organization in protecting the area against
aggression and subversion.
The President stated his admiration and apprecia-
tion for the generous and courageous assistance of
Thailand to the common effort to protect the Republic
of Vietnam and the entire Southeast Asia region
against Communist aggression and for the resolute
measures of the Royal Thai Government against the
subversion directed against Thailand itself.
His Majesty stated the appreciation of the Thai
people for the efforts of the U.S. and expressed the
determination of Thailand not only to maintain its
historic independence but to continue to contribute
to the maintenance of the freedom and independence
of others threatened by Communist aggression.
His Majesty and the President reaffirmed the his-
torical bonds of friendship between the United States
and Thailand and, confident that this is the heartfelt
desire of the people of the two countries, pledged to
continue close and cordial collaboration, directly and
through international organizations, to promote mutual
security and world peace.
U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief
Programs for the Middle East
JOINT STATEMENT
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated June 29
Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand
have concluded a three-day official visit to Washington
at the invitation of President Johnson. His Majesty
discussed with the President at the White House
affairs of mutual concern to Thailand and the United
States.
The President welcomed His Majesty again to the
United States and .stated the deep appreciation of Mrs.
Johnson and himself for the gracious hospitality ex-
tended to them by Their Majesties during the Presi-
dent's visit to Thailand in October 1966.
The President expres.sed admiration for the rapid
economic development and improvement in education
and social services that have taken place in Thailand
under His Majesty's leadership. The President voiced
deep respect for His Majesty's concern that the benefits
of this progress extend to every part of the Kingdom.
His Majesty and the President recalled the warm
traditional friendship of the United States and Thai-
land which is solidly based on common ideals and desire
for lasting peace and a world order based on justice
and respect for the independence and sovereignty of
individual nations. The President noted his admiration
for the constructive role of Thailand in furthering re-
Following is a statement ty President John-
son released hy the White House on June ^,
together with the text of a letter dated June 29
from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative
to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White nouse press release dated June 27 *
The recent hostilities in the Middle East took
their inevitable toll in human suffering. Wliile
we are urgently searching for a lasting settle-
ment of the Middle East problem, we must bear
in mind that the first humanitarian task and the
first task of reconstruction is to bind up the
wounds of conflict — to begin to find homes for
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medical
care for the sick and wounded.
The American people have always responded
generously to human suffering anywhere in the
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
world. In tliis humanitarian tradition, the
United States will join with other nations in a
special effort to provide emergency assistance
in the Middle East now. I have directed the es-
tablishment of a reserve of $5 million from con-
tingency funds, to meet urgent relief needs in
the period immediately ahead. We will allocate
these funds through a number of channels in
whatever ways best help the war victims and
encourage contributions from others, including
the countries within the area.
As a first step, I have directed that our Gov-
ernment ^participate in the appropriate United
Nations emergency programs of food and
medical relief. In addition, we are offering
$100,000 to the American Bed Cross for imme-
diate use by the International Red Cross to as-
sist all victims of the conflict.
The Secretary of State will keep emergency
needs under constant review and will cooperate
fully with the intergovernmental and private
organizations now at work.
I must emphasize that this is an emergency
relief program. Even while we are joining in
this effort to meet urgent needs, we must look
toward a permanent and equitable solution for
those who have been displaced by this and previ-
ous wars. It will not be enough simply to fall
back on the relief arrangements of the past.
There will be no peace for any party in the Mid-
dle East unless this problem is attacked with
new energy by all and, certainly, primarily by
those who are inmiediately concerned.
LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S. /U.N. press release 115
June 29, 1967.
Dear Mr. Secretary General: I have the
honor to call to your attention the June 27 state-
ment of President Johnson on emergency as-
sistance for war victims in the Middle East. The
text of the statement is as follows :
[Text of President Johnson's statement.]
You will note that the President has stated
that funds will be allocated through a number
of channels, in whatever ways best help the war
victims and encourage contributions from
others, including the countries within the area.
The United States has been the major con-
tributor to UNRWA [United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees]
since its establishment seventeen years ago. I
am pleased to inform you now that, in accord-
ance with the President's announcement that a
reserve of $5,000,000 has been established to
meet urgent relief needs in the Middle East, the
Government of the United States is making
available a special contribution of $2,000,000 to
UNRWA to help meet these urgent needs in
the period immediately ahead. We are under-
taking immediate consultations with the Com-
missioner-General of UNRWA with a view to
ascertaining how best and in what form this
contribution could be made so as to be of maxi-
mum utility in meeting these urgent relief needs
in the area.
I would appreciate it if this letter could be
distributed as a Document of the current Emer-
gency Session of the General Assembly.
Sincerely,
Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement
on Texts of New Canal Treaties
White House Announcement
WhUe House press release dated June 26
President Johnson announced on June 26,
jointly with President Marco A. Robles of
Panama, that the negotiating teams of the
United States and of Panama had reached
agreement on the form and content of new trea-
ties relating to the present canal and a j^ossible
new sea-level canal in the future. The proposed
texts of the treaties are being submitted to their
respective Governments by the negotiators with
their recommendations and conclusions.
Wlien approved by the two Presidents, ar-
rangements will be made for signature. The
treaties will then be presented to each country's
legislative body for consideration in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes.
Three separate but closely related treaties
have been negotiated: (1) Treaty Between the
Republic of Panama and the United States of
America Concerning the Panama Canal, (2)
Treaty Between the Republic of Panama and
the United States of America Concerning a Sea
Level Canal Connecting the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans, and (3) Treaty on the Defense of
the Panama Canal and of its Neutrality.
OXTLT 17, 1967
65
". . . we are now actively supporting the building of regional
institutions and regional cooperation in Latin A7nerica, Asia,
and Africa as well as in EuropeP Mr. Rostow, who is Special
Assistant to the President, discussed the ''''spreading regional
impulse''^ in his commenceinent address at Middlebwy College,
Middlebury, Vt., on June 12.
Regionalism and World Order
by W. W. Rostow
It may have occurred to those of you receiv-
ing degi-ees on this 12th day of June 1967 that
there were better times to graduate and possibly
even better worlds into which to go. Under the
circumstances, you might expect me — a working
bureaucrat from Washington — to shout across
the generational gap, pointing out that things
are not as bad as they seem and ending with the
approved commencement doctrine, that great
challenges await you in the world outside
Middlebury.
But I am by profession a teacher and an his-
torian. That means I would not deny the gen-
erational gap. I welcome it and recognize it,
and even treasure it, as the enormous force for
vitality and good it is in human affairs. It is
essentially by judging skeptically what the last
generation takes for granted — selecting what
seems viable — rejecting what is irrelevant — that
the human race makes such progress as it does
make.
Far from denying the generational gap, I am
here to use it, in a way, as my theme. Far from
denying the cliche that challenges await you,
I shall try to offer a kind of roadmap to one
particular major challenge.
For I am 50 years old — my generation met its
most formative challenge just before you were
born and while you were staggering through the
rigors of early childhood.
Your average age, I am told, is 211/0. You
belong, therefore, to a second and quite different
postwar generation, whose tasks and challenges
are only now beginning to emerge.
I should like to discuss this morning what I
believe is one of those tasks, but only you will in
fact decide. That task is the building of effective
regionalism as a component of world order.
The concept of regionalism began for me in
1945 when I was a junior officer in the State De-
partment, where I was put to work on German-
Austrian economic affairs when I was not yet
out of uniform. That work initially involved
such issues as reparations ; the provision of food
and shelter and clothing to peoples of war-dev-
astated nations; and the revival of the German
coal industry, on which the recovery of Western
Europe then heavily depended.
In the midst of these urgent postwar house-
keeping problems, a distinguished young
French diplomat — named [Maurice] Couve de
Murville — came to Washington m November
1945, after visits to Moscow and London. He
argued that, because of its importance for all of
Europe, the Rulir should be detached from Ger-
many and separately administered. I had the
privilege of sitting in on his exposition of what
was then French policy. His challenging pro-
posal stirred my mind because the question he
posed was real, but as an historian I instinc-
tively felt the proposed answer would not be
viable.
I concluded by deciding that the right answer
was to bring about the economic revival of
Europe on the basis of economic unity, which
would make even a fully revived German econ-
omy part of a larger whole and which would
provide to the small Austrian economy, about
which I was also concerned, a market environ-
ment large enough for it to find a prosperous
and orderly place.
And so, like all bureaucrats when seized with
66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
an idea, I wrote a memorandum. That bureau-
cratic effort has, perliaps, a very small i)lac6 in
the stream of American thought of that time,
and happily many other bureaucrats in many
other places were doing the same. But, in fact,
the concept of Western European unity which
gradually emerged in the succeeding months
and years was the product of deep roots, power-
ful forces, and many men — mainly Europeans :
— The Second World War had demonstrated
to many Europeans the almost suicidal danger
of Europe's continuing with its traditional
rivalries ;
— The postwar power of the Soviet Union and
the United States made many Western Euro-
peans look toward imity as a way of acquiring
a dignity which was no longer possible on the
basis of traditional European statehood;
— The inevitable interconnections between the
United States and Western Europe were seen as
better conducted between a united Western
Europe and the United States than on the basis
of inherently unequal bilateral relations.
Quite aside from the economic and technolog-
ical advantages of a big European market,
many Europeans perceived that, if Western
Europe was to maintain a stature and responsi-
bility appropriate to its tradition and capacity,
unity was the right road. To the credit of our
country, we decided to throw our full weight
behind this movement and look to a great if
not always compliant partner rather than to
the superficially greater influence we might
have wielded in Western Europe on a divide-
and-nile basis.
The first major articulation of our support
for Western European economic miity was in
Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at
a graduation ceremony in another New England
college 20 years and 1 week ago today.
Since that time the movement toward West-
ern European unity has by no means been
smooth or easy. The process is evidently in-
complete. Nevertheless, it moves forward ; and I
believe it will continue to move forward as the
logic of European interest and the character of
the world environment in which Europe must
live press in this direction.
In the last few years we have seen essentially
this same logic beginnijig to take hold in the de-
veloping parts of the world. If I were address-
ing you in 1961, for example, I might have
talked about our support for Western European
unity and the Atlantic partnership and then
referred to the conmion responsibilities of the
Atlantic community for the nations and peoples
of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America. And at that time, representatives of
those nations and regions tended to think in
terms of the common interests of developing
nations. But quietly, slowly, almost imper-
ceptibly, there has been a change.
It is, I believe, one of the most important, if
minoticed, transitions in policy under President
Jolmson — and transitions of thought in the
world community — that we are now actively
supporting the building of regional institutions
and regional cooperation in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa as well as in Europe. And we
are doing this because, despite the continuing
power of nationalism, men and governments in
those regions are becoming seized with the same
kind of thoughts that gripped Western Europe
in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
Economic Unity in Latin America and Africa
For example, between the Punta del Este con-
ference of 1961 and the meeting of Presidents in
Punta del Este in 1967, the gi-eatest change —
aside from an increase in confidence in Latin
America's destiny under fi'eedom — was the rise
in emphasis on the movement toward Latin
American economic integration.
I have had in recent years the privilege of
working with Latin Americans as closely as I
was permitted to work with Western Europeans
in the immediate postwar years. I have found
emerging in Latin America underlying forces
and thoughts quite similar to those which moved
Europeans a generation earlier. Latin Ameri-
cans understand the technical advantages of
economic integration ; they understand that they
can solve more problems for themselves and ac-
quire a position of greater strength and dignity
on the world scene through economic integra-
tion ; and they understand that they will be able
to work as a strong partner to the United States
only if they move in this direction.
As in Western Europe, the economic integra-
tion movement in Latin America is drawing to
it some of the best and proudest minds and
spirits in that continent.
In Africa, of course, the movement toward
economic unity and cooperation is much less
well developed. The nations of the region are at
an earlier stage of economic and social growth.
JUI^T 17, 1967
208-523—67-
67
Indeed, in some cases the nations bom out of
colonialism have not been able to maintain their
initial unity against the pull of tribal and re-
gional differences. Nevertheless, in counter-
point, there are the first begmnings of regional
spirit and organization: the Organization for
African Unity ; the Economic Commission for
Africa ; and the African Development Bank.
In the first speech wholly devoted to Africa
ever given by an American President, President
Johnson on ]\Iay 26, 1966, threw our weight be-
hind African regionalism.^
We have been particularly heartened by the impetus
toward regional cooperation in Africa.
The world has now reached a stage where some of
the most effective means of economic growth can best
be achieved in large units commanding large resources
and large markets. Most nation-states are too small,
when acting alone, to assure the welfare of all of their
people. . . .
Above all, we wish to respond in ways that will be
guided by the vision of Africa herself, so that the prin-
ciples we share — the principles which underlie the OAU
Charter — come to life in conformity with the culture
and aspirations of the African peoples.
One simply cannot build first-rate universities
and tecluiical schools or bring in modem tele-
communications on the basis of states as small
as many of the African coimtries. There is,
therefore, wisdom in trying even now to de-
velop regional and subregional ajjproaches to
African problems. But, as in "Western Europe
and Latin America, the path will be long, un-
even, and frustrating.
Surge of Cooperative Effort in Asia
The most dramatic emergence of a new
regional spirit and policy is, of course, in Asia.
In a speech at Jolins Hopkins University on
April 7, 1965, President Johnson said: ". . .
there must be a much more massive effort to im-
prove the life of man" in Asia ; and he went on
to observe that the "first step is for the countries
of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a
greatly expanded cooperative effort for
development." ^
In the 26 months since the President spoke,
we have seen in Asia a quite remarkable trans-
formation of attitudes and action.
While the war in Viet-Nam goes on, with all
its suffering, the peoples of Asia have begim to
define for themselves a new future. That future
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
' lUd., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
hinges on a conviction that we are serious about
seeing it through in Viet-Nam. Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore has, on a number
of occasions, spoken in the vein in which he was
recently quoted in the Reporter magazine. He
asked of Americans: "Are your people really
serious in Vietnam? If you are, we are with
you." They are with us because they know that
the failure of aggression from Hanoi against
South Viet-Nam and Laos is essential to the se-
curity of the region and only the American
commitment — along with others — can establish
this foundation for the future of Asia.
But they are looking not to us but primarily
to themselves to define their future and to build
it. In the words of this same Asian statesman,
we are "buying tune" for them in Viet-Nam —
time for them to do a job only they can do.
Literally for the first tune in history — thou-
sands of years of history — the governments and
peoples of Asia are coming together in a spirit
of cooperation to begin to map the future of the
region.
The list of Asian meetings that have occurred
in the past 2 yeare is too long to repeat here. But
they have met in various groupings among
themselves — without us — to consider regional
programs in the fields of education, agriculture,
banking, and transportation. In addition, the
Mekong Committee, working on the very edge
of the battlefields, is carrying forward with a
new vitality ; and the Asian Development Bank
is in operation in Manila, led by a distinguished
Japanese.
In the proportions of its initial capital stock,
that Bank foreshadows the kind of cooperation
that may be possible in the future: We have
put in 20 percent ; the Japanese, 20 percent ; the
other Asian nations, 40 percent ; and the balance
comes from many sources outside the region.
This surge of cooperative effort in the new
Asia takes place against the background of re-
markable momentum in South Korea, Taiwan,
Thailand, Malaysia, as well as in Japan; while
Indonesia moves at last to find its feet after
years of stagnation or worse.
On April 30, the Sunday New York Times
ran a story from Bangkok by Drew Middleton
discussing the mood of the new Asia and the
reasons for Asian support for our Viet-Nam
policy. It contained this observation by an Asian
Foreign Minister, which I have heard, in dif-
ferent forms, from Seoul to Kuala Lumpur,
from Tokyo to Bangkok:
68
DEPARTMEKT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
For youth, anticolonialism is part of history and
Communism has split and lost its appeal in the process.
Perhaps regionalism with its promise of stability and
economic progress will be youth's big concept for the
future.
Divisions in the Middle East
The one region in the non-Communist world
where regional institutions and spirit have not
yet begim to emerge is, of course, the Middle
East. During the whole postwar period, that
region has been bedeviled by multiple splits and
quarrels : not only between the Arab states and
Israel but also by divisions among the Arab
states and between certain Arab and other
Moslem states.
No one from outside a region can create a
spirit of determination to face and solve prob-
lems by regional cooperation. No one outside a
region can build regional institutions. But we
would hope that out of the frustrations and
tragedies of postwar Middle Eastern history we
might see emerge a new desire to achieve dig-
nity and stability and progress for all through
regional cooperation.
I am sure we and others outside the region
will be prepared to be helpful if the peoples
and governments of that area themselves decide
that this is the right road and if they begin to
move — in their own ways — along the path al-
ready taken by Western Europe, Latin Amer-
ica, and Asia.
As we look from the past to the future, this
spreading regional impulse has a particular
meaning for our country, its policy, and its
future position on the world scene ; for, despite
Professor [Marshall] McLuhan's skepticism,
policy in Washington is not made in a rearview
mirror. Speaking at Lancaster, Ohio, on Sep-
tember 5, 1966, President Johnson said : ^
Our purpose in promoting a world of regional part-
nerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow
in strength inside a strong United Nations, we can
look forward to a decline in the burden that America
has had to bear In this generation.
We are finding, then, in regionalism, a new
relationship to the world community somewhere
between the overwhelming responsibility we
assumed in the early postwar years — as we
" Ibid., Sept. 26, 1966, p. 453.
moved in to fill vacumns of power and to deal
with war devastation — and a return to isolation-
ism. From the beginning our objective was not
to build an empire of satellites but to strengthen
nations and regions so that they could become
partners.
And in this we are being true to ourselves,
our tradition, and our practical experience as a
nation.
Eegionalism is built into the Federal Consti-
tution of this continental democracy. It is one
way we have learned to share power and re-
sponsibility. We have, therefore, found it easy
and natural to work with those in other parts
of the world who committed themselves to
building regional order and assimiing regional
responsibilities.
To fulfill this vision of regional partnerships
will take time and patience. Above all, it will
take dogged, stubborn pride and effort by the
peoples of the various regions of the world.
Moreover, many problems can only be solved
on a global, rather than a regional, basis.
But, in the great inherently federal task we
all assumed in 1945 with the acceptance of the
United Nations Charter, we have learned that
regionalism has a large and hopeful place.
The record of regional architecture in the
first postwar generation is on the whole good
and promising; but it is evidently incomplete.
As you take stock of the tasks ahead — in your
coming time of responsibility — I am reasonably
confident that the development of regionalism
will engage your generation as much or more
than it has mine. I trust and believe this is one
part of my generation's effort you will not
reject and set aside — but pick up and do better.
Letters of Credence
Japan
The newly appointed Ambassador of Japan,
Takeso Shimoda, presented his credentials to
President Jolmson on June 28. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated June 28.
JULY 17, 1967
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the Future
hy Alexander B. Trowbridge ^
I am very happy to be here. Paris is as en-
chanting as ever, and I would be grateful to you
for no other reason but that your generous invi-
tation to join you here today has given me the
opportunity to visit again this queen of cities.
But I am also grateful for another, far more
substantial, reason. This occasion also gives me
the opportunity to contribute, I hope, a meas-
ure of understanding to a subject of great im-
portance to both Europe and the United States.
Unfortunately, it is a subject that for too long
has been distorted by the catch phrase that has
become its label. I refer to the so-called "tech-
nological gap."
It is indeed a catchy phrase and has the
proper ring of crisis that such phrases must
have if they are to pass into popular usage. But
like all such phrases, it catches only the more
visible aspects of the problem it is intended to
describe and obscures its true dimensions.
To a nonspecialist, for example, it would have
to be explained that the gap is, on the surface,
the industrial disparity that exists between
Europe and the United States and not the vast
technological gulf of centuries that measures
the economic distance between industrialized
countries and those in the early stages of devel-
opment. The technological gap — or perhaps
"technological lag" is a more precise term — is
a much less formidable problem, and one that
we can do something about.
The first step should be to describe the prob-
lem in realistic terms in order to establish a per-
spective on which all involved can agree.
In one very real and basic sense, every indus-
trialized nation, the United States included,
seems to suffer from technological lag within
its own industrial complex. By this I mean the
undue and unnecessary time lost in bringing the
processes of invention and innovation to produc-
tive fulfillment. And whether tliis delay is re-
flected in comparisons with the progress of
other nations is actually incidental to the en-
demic problem of the lag itself.
We have been much concerned with techno-
logical lag within the United States, and just
last January the Department of Commerce is-
sued a report by a high-level advisory commit-
tee which reviewed the problem in depth.^ I
would like to read to you one of the key recom-
mendations of this report, which I think may
shed some much-needed light on the subject
of technological lag, whether internal or
comparative.
It has to do with what the report calls "the
abundance of ignorance about the processes of
invention, innovation and entrepreneurship."
. . . there is too little appreciation and understand-
ing (the report states), of the process of technological
change in too many crucial sectors :
— Throughout much of the Federal Government.
— In some Industries.
— In many banks.
— In many universities.
— In many cities and regions.
More important, therefore, than any specific recom-
mendation concerning antitrust, taxation, the regula-
tion of industry, or venture capital, is one central
proposal :
The major effort should be placed on getting more
managers, executives, and other key individuals — both
in and out of government — to learn, feel, understand
and appreciate how technological innovation is
spawned, nurtured, financed, and managed into new
' Address made at Paris on June 2 before the Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce in France. Mr. Trowbridge
was then Acting Secretary of Commerce ; he was sworn
in as Secretary of Commerce on June 14.
' Technological Innovation: Its Environment and
Management. Copies of the 83-page report are for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ($1.25).
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
technological businesses that grow, provide Jobs, and
satisfy people.
I wholly subscribe to this evaluation of the
situation in the United States, and I think we
should keep it firmly in mind as we analyze the
specific set of disparities we are discussing here
today.
The "Definition Gap"
The European view of the gap, as expressed at
the political level, where much of the discussion
has taken place, frequently gives the impression
that there is an across-the-board gap. This view
asserts that the gap is caused essentially by the
large expenditures for research and develop-
ment in the United States, especially those
financed by the govermnent for space explora-
tion, military purposes, aviation, and other ad-
vanced techiiologies, with attendant spin-off
benefits for the economy in general. This, some-
how, constitutes what is considered an unfair
advantage, and as a result the United States
should take steps to remedy the situation.
The points of the argument, as stated by one
high-level European official, nm something like
this : Between 1920 and 1940, Europe had an in-
comparable potential in scientists, scholars, and
research workers. This was largely destroyed by
totalitarian regimes and war. The rest was
drained away by the United States and the
Soviet Union after the war. Since the war, the
United States has spent increasingly large
amounts on research and development and in
1965 spent two or three times more, in real re-
sources, than did Western Europe. Again,
United States Government assistance to in-
dustry in connection with military and space
programs is much higher than in Europe. And
the United States enjoys a favorable techno-
logical balance of payments with Europe, which
indicates its dominance. Another factor is the
"brain drain," the siphoning of educated Euro-
peans to work for much higher salaries in
America.
The effect of this teclmological deficit, the
argument continues, is to create grave disadvan-
tages for both parties in the Atlantic commu-
nity. For Europe the disadvantages are eco-
nomic. For the United States they are political.
The European official whom I have been para-
phrasing cites the risk — and I am quoting di-
rectly now — "the risk of a scientific colonization
of the old continent by the new" — which would
threaten the viability of the Atlantic com-
munity.
On the opposite end of the argument, the en-
tire notion of the technological gap is dismissed
as a strategic competitive device in many quar-
ters of American business where keen competi-
tion from European products preempts con-
sideration of what is regarded as historical and
inevitable disparities among nations.
Basic science can and does flow freely across
national boundaries — this latter position as-
serts— but teclmology, wliich is the inventive
application of this basic knowledge for practi-
cal purposes, may or may not be shared; it is
usually private property and its disposition de-
pends on the wishes of those who own it. Fur-
thermore, this argument continues, different
countries historically apply technology in dif-
ferent ways. A landlocked country, for example,
will use it differently than a maritime nation.
Therefore, there will always be technological
disparities or gaps between nations. Only identi-
cal nations would have identical technology.
In effect, tliis argument states that what mat-
ters most is how the teclmology is applied, the
extent to which it is utilized, and not the relative
presence or absence of the technology itself.
Obviously, on opposite sides of the Atlantic,
the definition gap is immeasurably greater than
the technological gap we are seeking to define
and describe.
One thing is clear, however. To reject the
problem out of hand is as unrealistic as to limit
our investigation of it to the purely techno-
logical aspects.
These two approaches can result only in ex-
treme, and equally absurd, solutions. One is to
do nothing and accept the results as the inex-
orable verdict of history, as though history were
a supernatural force unaffected by the actions
of men. The other extreme is to insist that the
United States is somehow obligated to engage in
a giveaway program of technology. Otherwise,
it is argued, there will be a relative decline in
Europe's power, economically, militarily and
politically, that will result in a weak grouping
of states relative to the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Happily, these are not really the alternatives.
In the first place, the United States could not
give away its teclmology if it wanted to, because,
as I have indicated, most of the technology is
the private property of individuals or business
establishments. And in the second place, even if
71
this were not the case, the gift of American tech-
nology would not relieve the problem, because
the basic factors involved go much deeper than
technology.
Let us examine not only the disparities in the
current levels of productivity between the
United States and Euroi^e, which are cited as
evidence of the technological gap, but also the
essentially nontechnological factors that so
radically affect the utilization of the teclmology
that could reduce these disparities.
Using comparative GNP dollar values per
civilian employee in 1964 as a basis for com-
parison, it appears that the productivity levels
of most of the countries of northwestern Eu-
rope were a little over half that of the United
States, with Italy's a little over one-third. To
achieve parity with the United States, the pro-
ductivity of these countries would have to in-
crease, on the average, about 80 percent, while
Italy's would have to triple. Japan's produc-
tivity, incidentally, is slightly more than one-
fourth that of the United States and would
have to quadruple.
Some Causes of the Disparities
To sum up adequately the underlying
causes — and that is plural — causes of these
disparities requires a vehicle far more expan-
sive than a single speech, let alone a smgle
phrase. But I will try to touch briefly on what
I consider to be principal factors.
One appears to be differences in the use of
fixed business capital stock per worker. Pre-
liminary estimates indicate that Western Euro-
pean countries, relative to the United States,
use less capital per pei-son employed by about;
the same proportion as the lag in output per
person employed. In other words, there is more
intense utilization of capital stock in the
United States than in Europe. On the average,
plants and equipment in the United States are
utilized longer hours per year. Another big
difference lies in the smaller use of mechaniza-
tion in materials handling and other "indirect"
operations in industry, mming, and fanning in
Europe than in the United States, even tliough
Europe has the technology for mechanizing
these operations. The explanation probably lies
in the lower relative prices of labor versus capi-
tal in Europe. In short, there appears to be a
lack of economic incentive to substitute capital
for labor in Europe compared to the United
Sta)t©s.
Another disparity factor is the greater per-
centage of the European work force employed
in agriculture. In 1962, the Unit«d States had
8.2 percent of its working population in agri-
culture while France had 19.8 percent; and
Italy, 27.4 percent. And the productivity of
European agriculture lagged further behind the
United States than did their economies as a
whole. Our high agricultural productivity is
largely due to efforts that began more than 100
years ago, during the presidency of Abraham
Lincoln, to apply science and teclmology to
agriculture. I should add that virtually none of
this science and technology is or has been exclu-
sive to the United States.
A third factor is the economics of scale. In
the United States, business enterprises are
much larger than the family-owned firms of
Europe, and the gains from specialization are
greater, more efficient capital-intensive tech-
nologies are used, and there is fuller utilization
of overhead.
A fourth, and much overlooked, factor is edu-
cation. I am not referring to the quality of
European universities, which is, of course, ex-
ceptional, but rather to the relatively narrow
educational base in most European countries. An
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] study showed that the
United States in 1957-58 had a much higher
enrollment ratio than Europe: 66.2 percent in
the 15-19 age group were enrolled in the United
States compared to only 30.8 percent in France
and less than 20 percent in West Germany,
Italy, and the U.K. At the higher 20-24 year
level, the United States had 12 percent enrolled,
whereas West Germany led France, Italy, and
Britain with only 4.6 percent. Significantly, at
the university level, the United States had four
to five times as many science and engineering
graduates per million of population, except for
France, where the U.S. advantage was still two
to one.
Technological Lag Not Uniform
Natural resources endowment is certainly an-
other factor, but because it is so obvious and in-
alterable a one, I would rather pass over it to
the factor that has received the most notice, or
perhaps I should say "notoriety." That is the
apparent European lag in new teclmology.
On analysis, this lag is neither as dramatic
nor as uniform as might be expected. There are
many sectors in which European technology is
72
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIIf
predominant. Europe appears to lag only mod-
erately in seven significant areas. These are:
nuclear reactors, pipeline freight transporta-
tion, automatic railroad yard classification and
car scheduling, and in the manufacture of large-
capacity generator equipment, numerically con-
trolled machine tools, jet aircraft, and semicon-
ductors. The lag is admittedly greater in a few
other areas such as computer manufacture and
solid-state microcii'cuitry.
There are various reasons for the lag in know-
how and the use of know-how in these fields. It
takes some innovations a long time to spread.
For example, the oxygen steel process and ex-
tra-high-voltage transmission of electric energy
were a long time in reaching the United States,
just as the taconite process and solid-state cir-
cuitry have taken time to come into use in
Europe.
The lack of a large home market in European
countries to support the application of tech-
nology is also a factor in some areas, such as
jets, which originated in the United Kingdom
and Germany. In other cases, economic incen-
tives are lacking; the laborsaving advantages
of numerically controlled machine tools have
much less attraction to the labor-intensive in-
dustries of Western Europe than in the United
States.
As for the spin-oflF advantages from space and
defense programs in the United States, I can
only say that this is an awfully high priced
way to get new industrial technology.
The importance of another much-cited fac-
tor is also open to question. This is the smaller
European investment in research and develop-
ment. If you discount U.S. expenditures for
military and space purposes, the United States
is seen to spend 1.5 percent of its GNP on re-
search and development. This compares with
1.4 percent for Britain, 1.2 percent for France,
1.1 percent for Germany, and 1.5 percent for
Belgium.
Of course, the difference in absolute terms is
enormous. But if realism is allowed sway over
wishful thinking and resentment and each coun-
try fits its scientific effort to its scientific re-
sources, it becomes readily apparent that there
is plenty of room in the vast field of science and
technology for nations of all sizes, however lim-
ited. Not every effort has to fall into the cate-
gory of "big science and big teclinology." This
is wasteful, although even here, smaller nations
can participate by combining their efforts inter-
nationally.
The wise allocation of resources has always
been a cardmal rule of international economics.
Participation in science and technology is ex-
pensive at best, and all countries have to budget
their resources with care, even the largest.
Management Policies and Practices
A much more important factor in technologi-
cal progress, indeed a crucial factor, is the man-
agement of teclinology, the industrial response
to technology.
Let me quote for you the statement of a dis-
tinguished European speaker at a symposium
on teclinology and world trade which we held
last November at the Department of Ck)mmerce.
"I believe," he said "that the fundamental rea-
son for the (technological) gap is more a ques-
tion of mentality and attitude. . . . Science and
technology have been present in Europe many
years. What we'd like is the attitude necessary
for the creation of more big industries with
leaders who know how to make use of science
and teclinology."
It is primarily a question of the organiza-
tional environment, another European stated —
of management, and of the training of execu-
tives to accept and adapt what already exists.
These two views suggest, as do others ex-
pressed at the symposium, that European in-
dustry must review its management policies and
practices in order to improve its vital industrial
response in the processes of innovation.
This is heavily underscored by a look at the
origins of some of the major advances in tech-
nology since World War II— such things as
"wonder" drugs, synthetic detergents and fibers,
plastics, electronics and communications, data
processing, steelmaking, and so on. Of a hun-
dred or more major advances, Western Europe
accoimted for 49 percent, the United States for
31 percent.
It would seem that the reasons for any indus-
trial lag in these fields must be something other
than a lack of teclmological know-how.
Moreover, it bears notmg that the overall
economic growth of Western Europe, despite
disparities in productivity, has been greater than
that of the United States in recent years — with
the exception of the United Kingdom. This
rapid rate of development has put Europe in an
excellent position to compete with the United
States in the export of teclinologically intensive
commodities such as chemicals, nonelectric ma-
chinery, electric machinery, and transport
JITLT 17, 19C7
73
equipment. In fact, in total export of manufac-
tures, the U.S. sliare of the world market
dropped from 18.1 percent in 19G0 to 16.G per-
cent in 1964. And it dropped in each major
category. Western Europe during this same
period maintained a sizable 54.3 percent share.
Problem of the "Brain Drain"
Paralleling the problem of the technological
gap has been the so-called "brain drain." There
has been almost as much concern expressed over
the loss of talented people to the United States
as over the differences in our teclmological
capabilities.
In a very real sense, there is nothing new
about the emigration of skilled people from
Europe to the United States, and indeed from
every part of the world. It has been going on
since the earliest days of our settlement, when
trained artisans of every kind — shipwrights,
ironworkers, glassblowers, some of the world's
best farmers, and many others — arrived in
search of freedom, greater opportunity, greater
challenge. And essentially, some of these are
the factors that still attract skilled people to
the United States or, for that matter, to any
otlier country.
The question today is, Wliat is the magnitude
of this movement, and what is the impact on
the countries from which they come? Would
the talents of the migrants be fully utilized if
they stayed home ? Are tliey lured to the United
States in the beginning as students under gov-
ernment programs and then remain to enter the
work force ? Wliat can be done about the prob-
lem as a whole?
As to the number, 30,039 skilled persons of
all types migrated to the United States in fiscal
year 1966. More than 70 percent of these came
from the developed countries and the remainder
from the less developed nations. As a percent-
age of total immigrants, the number of skilled
personnel was very small — only about 15
percent
As for the number of students who come to
the United States for training and remain, the
Interagency Council on International Educa-
tion and Cultural Affairs found that they are
an exceedingly small part of the problem.
Among those who come under exchange pro-
grams supported and financed by the United
States Government, less than 1 percent even-
tually become permanent residents. Among
those who pay their own way, only 8.3 percent
remained as permanent residents during the
past 5 years.
Most of our skilled immigrants are trained
adults recruited by American industries, re-
search organizations, hospitals, and universities.
What can be done about the problem?
Is there a free nation that would restrict the
right of its citizens to migrate in search of
greater opportunities?
Should the United States specifically restrict
by law the immigration of people with skills
and talents? Already our immigration laws
contain provisions that encourage students and
visitors to return home. For example, for cer-
tain categories, the visitor must leave the
United States after a specified date and is not
eligible to apply for inunigration for 2 years
thereafter. But for us to bar talented people
would be a form of discrimination, and we only
recently revised our immigration law to elimi-
nate disci'imination. Besides, if we did bar
them, would this insure that they would remain
in their home countries?
The problem presents many of the same
tangled aspects that we fiind in the technologi-
cal gap.
The solutions seem to lie largely in tlie home
countries. In the case of the "brain drain," in-
centives must be pro^-ided that encourage edu-
cated people to remain at home and students to
return home. To interfere with the free move-
ment of such people by legislation would be
contrary to the principles that are the founda-
tion of a free society.
Technology Alone Is Not the Key
In the case of the technological gap, the basic
problem goes much deeper than technology. It
involves all the factors that affect productivity,
of which technology is only one.
The fact that teclmology alone is not the key
solution is illustrated by conditions within the
United States itself.
There are wide disparities, for instance, in
the ability of our various States to attract the
latest teclmology. Some States have a lower
level of education and fewer scientists and engi-
neers as a percentage of population. They also
lose many of their most promising scientific
and engineering graduates to other States offer-
ing increased opportunities. There is a serious
"brain drain," for example, from the Midwest
to both coasts.
Even some of our largest cities have prob-
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUI.LETIN
lems attracting new industries employing the
most advanced teclinologj'. The cause would
appear to involve not a lack of scientists, but
other factors. A study by our Commerce De-
partment Teclmical Advisory Board indicates
that universities in these cities fail to play a
leading role in bringing in such firms and banks
in the area are not inclined toward financing
small, science-based companies.
Solutions to Technological Disparities
What, then, are the solutions to the techno-
logical disparities between Europe and the
United States?
The things which can be done that lie deep
in the social and economic systems of Europe,
only Europeans can do.
Only Europeans can create an educational
system that raises the level of competence
among the general population and that also
offers the best training in science and tech-
nology to the more capable students. Only
European industry can create an aggressive
managerial structure that encourages the inno-
vation which leads to the use of more advanced
technology and finally to increased productiv-
ity. Only Europeans can create the tax and
monetary incentives which foster the more
rapid use of advanced technology by industry.
The increasing economic integration of Eu-
rope and the mass markets it creates also are
important factors in the spread of advanced
technology. For this permits industry to effect
the economies of scale that makes its use
profitable.
There also are a number of areas where the
United States can collaborate to improve the
transfer of technology across international
boundaries.
To the extent that teclmology lies in the
public domain, its transfer can be facilitated by
improving its dissemination among govern-
ments, including organizational arrangements,
and by industry-to-industry transfer. Wliere
technology is subject to patents, closer inter-
national cooperation on patent practices can
vastly improve its transfer. The time is pro-
pitious because of work already underway
internationally in the patents field and because
of reconunendations recently made in the
United States by the President's Commission
on the Patent System. Efforts can also be made
to minimize or eliminate any other restrictions
hampering the flow of teclmological informa-
tion across international boimdaries.
Another field which is beginning to receive
renewed attention is industrial standardiza-
tion. Efforts at both the national and interna-
tional levels can contribute a great deal to the
flow of technology.
Improved utilization of scientific and tech-
nological information can be enhanced by
positive action to establish conferences, utiliza-
tion centers, training programs, personnel and
materials exchanges, and consultative services.
The Office of State Teclmical Services in the
United States Department of Commerce has
had impressive success in its first year and a
half in such a program of teclmical services.
There is no reason why industry-to-industry
contacts should not yield results of great bene-
fit for all participants. There was much of this
in the first years after World War II, and with
important gains for all concerned.
The United States already has a policy of
sharing peaceful know-how and cooperating in
peaceful international endeavors in those areas
where the United States has an important posi-
tion. A few examples are: Antarctic studies,
atomic energy, meteorology, telecommunica-
tions, space exploration, oceanography, and
such long-term programs as the International
Geophysical Year and the International Co-
operation Year. This kind of cooperation will
be continued and expanded as needed. President
Johnson himself made clear last fall our inten-
tion to cooperate in this field when he stated :
"We are exploring how best to develop science
and teclmology as a common resource." ^
I believe there should be contmuing cross
fertilization in industrial technology and I
offer an invitation to French industrialists to
come to the United States with their know-how
and invest in our economy. We have recently
welcomed a new plant in our Pacific Northwest,
built by a French- American joint venture in-
volving Pechiney, and I am told it is technically
without equal in its ability to produce alummum
at low cost. French engineering and design
have made this plant highly productive at low
operating cost and have developed a highly
significant air pollution control system at the
same time. We in the United States welcome this
technological advance made possible by French
industry, and we favor the freedom of invest-
ment which allows such transfers to take place.
' For President Jolmson's address at New York, N.T.,
on Oct. 7, 1966, see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
75
Progress comes by reducing, not creating, bar-
riers to such flows of technology and investment.
There is evei-y reason to believe that Europe,
with its traditional ingenuity and ability, will
take the kind of action needed to overcome its
present difficulties. And there is no question but
that the United States will in the future, as in
the past, cooperate willingly and effectively in
this effort which will mean so much to the
United States as well as to Europe. After all,
who makes better friends, allies, trading part-
ners— countries with stagnating or under-
developed economies, or those with a high level
of economic activity and purchasing power?
The question needs no answer.
White House Panel Completes
Study of World Food Problem
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release dated June 17
Background
Kesults of a comprehensive study of the world
food problem by the World Food Panel of the
President's Science Advisory Committee were
made public on June 17. The first volume of
a three-part Committee report was released by
the Wliite House.^
The report of the year-long study concludes
that the scale, severity, and duration of the
world food problem are so great that a massive,
long-range, innovative effort will be required
to master it.
The report stresses the "reality of the food
shortage that will occur during the next 20
years" unless agricultural production in the de-
veloping countries can be mcreased through the
use of fertilizer, new plant varieties, pesticides,
and farm machinery, and adaptive research to
develop and to apply new cropping systems for
1 The World Food Prohlcm, a. Report of the Presi-
dent's Science Advisoi-y Committee. Two volumes of the
Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply have
been released and are for sale by the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402 : vol. I, summary of the world
food problem and recommendations for policy and ac-
tion, 123 pp., 60 cents; vol. II, snbpanel reports, 772
pp., $2.75.
each country's climate and soil. In addition, if
"subsistence f armmg" is to be transfonned into
"commercial agriculture," improved transpor-
tation, marketing, farm credit, storage, and dis-
tribution systems will be needed on a huge scale.
The problem of increasing food production, the
Panel concludes, is actually the overall problem
of economic development and cannot be consid-
ered in isolation from other problems of the
new nations of the world.
In the foreword to volume I of the report,
President Jolmson states :
The World Food Problem is one of the foremost chal-
lenges of mankind today. The dimension of the chal-
lenge will define the dimension of our response and
the means for that response. We must join with others
in a massive effort to help the less fortunate of the
earth to help themselves.
The complete report will be published in
three volumes. The fijial volume, comprised
mainly of technical reports, is expected to be
issued in July.
The study was carried out by more than 100
experts and consultants drawn from the Fed-
eral Government, universities, foimdations, and
industry.
The study chairman was Ivan L. Bennett, Jr.,
Deputy Director of the Office of Science and
Technology, Executive Office of the President;
H. F. Eobinson, administrative dean for re-
search of the University of North Carolina,
Raleigh, served as executive director.^
Summary of the Report
The report concludes that the solution to the
world food problem during the next 20 years is
biologically, teclmologically, and economically
possible. It makes clear however, that it will re-
quire the institution of major programs to ac-
complish the job.
A maximum effort will be required from all nations,
developing and developed alike, if the pangs of hun-
ger are to be alleviated . . . and if the growing threat
of outright mass starvation is to be turned aside.
Food and population: While overall world
food requirements will rise by about 50 per-
cent, the requirements in the developing nations
are expected to double by 1985. The report rec-
ommends that voluntary programs of family
plamiing be supported and expanded in the de-
veloping countries to assure a long-range ad-
' For a list of members of the panel, see White House
press release dated June 17.
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
justment of food needs in conjunction with pop-
ulation control.
Food shortage and rapid population growth are sep-
arate, but interrelated problems. The solutions, like-
wise, are separate, but related. The choice is not to
solve one or the other; to solve both is an absolute
necessity. . . .
The twin problems of food and population balance
have one feature in common that adds immeasurably
to the difficulties of achieving control. Their eventual
solution is crucially dependent upon success in con-
vincing millions of citizens in developing nations to
take individual action. . . . The provision of these per-
sonal incentives Is a task that encompasses a vast array
of social, economic, and political considerations which
differ between countries and within countries. Indeed,
the very fabric of traditional societies must be re-
woven if the situation is to change permanently.
Food synthesis : The report warns against the
false hope that some "panacea" will appear as
an easy answer to worldwide food shortages and
decries the publicity accorded to synthesis of
food from petroleum, food from algae, and
similar processes as raising false hopes and un-
doubtedly lessening public concern about the
seriousness of the food supply in the develop-
ing nations. Strong support for research and
development on food synthesis is recommended,
but it is pointed out that it will be several years
before any decision about the usefulness of new
processes will be possible because of teclmical
problems as well as questions of cost and con-
sumer acceptability.
Agricultural development : Stressing agricul-
ture within the needy countries as the main
source of food during the next 20 years, the re-
port states :
Agricultural development has never been a particu-
larly appealing or inspiring national goal ; it is politi-
cally unglamorous, unrecognized, and unrewarding. It
does not raise visions of the 20th century, the age of
technological revolution, in the minds of mo.st people.
Until agricultural development is accorded its right-
ful place by both donors and recipients of foreign aid,
the imbalance between the world's food supply and its
population will continue to outpace our efforts to meet
the increasing need.
Capital investment and economiG health: The
report details the huge investments of capital
that will be needed for irrigation, fertilizer,
new seed varieties, pesticides, and agricultural
machinery if the "subsistence" farming in the
developing countries is to be transformed into
modem commercial fanning, emphasizing addi-
tional needs for improved farm credit, market-
ing, storage, and distribution systems, and
improved transportation. Commercial food pro-
duction for the market is dependent upon total
economic development. There must be a balance
between modernization of the agricultural sec-
tor and the industrial sector of any economy if
either is to flourish and to achieve sustained
gi'owth.
Economic assistance: The report emphasized
heavily the need for long-term support of over-
all economic assistance in the hungry countries :
The eventual alleviation of world hunger will require
many years. It is dependent on far-reaching social re-
forms and long-range programs of hard work which
offer no promises of quick and dramatic results of the
type so helpful in maintaining enthusiasm for a con-
certed, difficult undertaking. The results cannot be
seen as a dedication of new buildings, as a successful
launching into space, or as other spectacular, "news-
worthy" events to punctuate the year in and year out
toil. . . .
. . . long-term commitment of substantial resources
is an absolute necessity. The fallacious notion that for-
eign aid's tnain business is to put itself out of business
should be dropped for the remainder of this century.
All programs based upon this thesis have succeeded
only in proving otherwise. When one program of assist-
ance has terminated, others have had to take over.
Research and development: Pleading for
abandonment of the "know-how, show-how"
idea of "practical help" for agriculture in the
developing countries, the Panel states emphati-
cally that agricultural technologies are not di-
rectly transferable to different soils and cli-
mates, and the report underlines the need for
adai^tive research in devising agricultural sys-
tems for each region of the world:
A blueprint for a bicycle or a steel mill can be
shipped overseas and utilized without alteration but
the blueprints and architecture for a food crop must be
developed overseas. There, as in the United States,
new plant varieties, each better than the last, must be
produced frequently to increase plant resistance to in-
sects and disease.
There is an urgent need to carry out this adaptive
research, to establish strong indigenous institutions,
and develop the manpower that will enable the poor,
food-deficit nations to carry out the self-sustaining,
continuing programs of research and development that
are essential to modem food production.
Manpower: The Panel's analysis of the food
problem points out that it is not nutritional
need alone but effective economic demand which
stimulates increased food production. Aggregate
calculations indicate that the annual capital in-
vestment that will be required to increase food
demand to the levels required to meet needs is
approximately 4 percent of the GNP of tlie de-
veloping countries, amounting to about $12 bil-
lion for 1965-66. Despite these enormous re-
quirements for capital investment, the report
warns that the greatest problem to be faced is
the shortage of trained manpower and urges a
JTJLY 17, 1967
77
renewed emphasis upon teclinical assistance to
the developing countries :
The scarcest and most needed resource in, the devel-
oping countries is the scientific, technical, and manage-
rial skill needed for systematic, orderly decision-making
and implementation. Through technical assistance
programs, the United States should emjAasize guid-
ance, education, and the development of indigenous
capabilities — for the long term — because the task in
the developing nations has only just begun and will
continue for many decades to come.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOREWORD
TO THE REPORT
In all of recorded history, none have sur-
passed the American people in "willingness to
share their abiuidance with others. We have
given unstintingly of our material wealth and
our precious human resources to benefit the less
fortmiate of this earth. We have sought to re-
store those whom war has shattered. We have
sought to provide assistance to the newly inde-
pendent members of the family of nations who
are making the effort to break the shackles of
tradition and achieve a better life for their
peoples.
But as success in programs to eradicate dis-
ease and to improve health have given more and
more millions the opportunity to live out their
natural span of life, the problem of hunger has
lingered on and the shadow of starvation and
impending famine has grown ever darker.
Hunger's unceasing anguish drains hope,
crushes aspirations, and obstructs the genera-
tion of programs of self-help. The threat of
starvation sets man against man and citizen
against government, leading to civil strife and
political unrest.
Our programs to help these new countries to
increase food production have brought about
striking improvement in a few instances. But in
the total balance, food has not kept pace with
population and the developing world continues
to lose ground in this race.
The World Food Problem is one of the fore-
most challenges of mankind today. The dimen-
sion of the challenge will define the dimension
of our response and the means for that response.
We must join with others in a massive effort to
help the less fortunate of the earth to help them-
selves. I am making this report public because
of its significance for the American people and
people all over the world.
U.S. and Philippines To Discuss
New Trade Agreement
White House press release dated June 20
President Jolmson on June 20 announced the I
composition of the U.S. team to conduct inter- ■
governmental discussions with representatives
of the Govenunent of the Republic of the
Philippines on the concepts underlying a new
instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley Trade
Agreement ^ after its scheduled expiration in
1974.
The members of the U.S. team are Deputy
Assistant Secretax-y for Economic Affairs Eu-
gene M. Braderman, Department of State
(chairman) ; Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Trade Policy Robert L. McNeill, Department
of Commerce ; Assistant Legal Adviser George
H. Aldrich, Department of State; and Philip-
pines Country Director Richard M. Service and
Philippines Economic Desk Officer Dawson S.
Wilson, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State.
The undertaking of early discussions was
agreed upon by President Jolmson and Presi-
dent Marcos in paragraph 12 of the joint com-
munique^ issued in Washington following
talks September 14 and 15, 1966.
President Recommends Ratification
of OAS Charter Amendments
Message to tlie Senate ^
To the Senate of the United States:
I request the advice and consent of the Senate
to ratification of the protocol of amendment to
the Charter of the Organization of American
States — the "Protocol of Buenos Aires" — signed
at the Third Special Inter-American Confer-
ence at Buenos Aires on February 27, 1967.*
The signing of the protocol of Buenos Aires
was a major development for the inter- Ameri-
can system. The amendments to be effected in
^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348 ;
for background and text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19,
195.5, p. 463.
" For text, see iUd., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.
» Congressional Record, June 12, 1967, p. S8076.
* Exec. L. 90th Cong., 1st sess. ; for background, see
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 472.
78
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Charter of the Organization of American
States by the protocol of amendment, the first
such amendments since the adoption of the
charter in 1948, will go far toward the neces-
sary modernization of the structure of the
Organization and the strengthening of its ca-
pacity to act effectively in the interest of
hemispheric cooperation and solidarity. The
amendments gi-ant certain fuller responsibili-
ties to some of the organs of the Organization,
for instance, in the field of peaceful settlement.
They establish new and specific objectives and
standards for the promotion of economic, social,
and cultural development.
Following in general the guidelines prepared
at the Second Special Inter- American Confer-
ence at Eio de Janeiro in November 1965, and
the draft amendments prepared by the OAS
Special Committee which met in Panama in
March 1966 and by the Inter- American Eco-
nomic and Social Council which met in
Washington in June 1966, the Buenos Aires
Conference adopted the amendments which are
embodied in the protocol of amendment.
Among the more significant changes in the
amendments relating to the structure of the Or-
ganization and to the responsibilities of its or-
gans are those concerning (1) the provision in
the charter of procedures for the Organization
to authorize the admission of new members;
(2) the replacement of the Inter- American Con-
ference which meets every 5 years by a General
Assembly which meets annually and which as-
sumes certain functions now performed by the
OASCoimcil; (3) the redesignation of the OAS
Coimcil as the Permanent Council, and the
granting of additional responsibilities to the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council
and Inter-American Council for Education, Sci-
ence, and Culture — formerly the Inter-Amer-
ican Cultural Council — which become organs
directly responsible to the General Assembly as
is the Permanent Council ; (4) the elimination
of the Inter- American Council of Jurists and
the upgrading of the Inter- American Juridical
Committee; (5) the assignment to the Perma-
nent Council of specific additional authority
in the field of peaceful settlement; (6) the in-
corporation of the Inter- American Commission
on Human Rights into the OAS Charter as an
organ with fimctions to be later determined by
an inter- American convention on human rights ;
and (7) the election of the OAS Secretary Gen-
eral and Assistant Secretary General by the
General Assembly for 5-year terms, rather than
by the OAS Council for 10-year terms as pres-
ently provided.
The expanded economic standards under-
scoi-e the importance of self-help eilorts and
reiterate the present charter undertaking of
members to cooperate with one another in the
economic field "as far as their resources permit
and laws may provide." The amendments pro-
vide that States should make individual and
united efforts to bring about improved condi-
tions of trade in basic commodities and a reduc-
tion of trade barriers by importing countries.
Several articles deal with efforts to accelerate
Latin American economic integration.
The social and the educational, scientific, and
cultural standards elaborate on the principles
in the present charter in these areas.
The various amendments are dealt with in de-
tail in the enclosed report by the Secretary of
State and summary of amendments.
I believe it to be in the national interest of
the United States to ratify the proposed amend-
ments. I therefore urge that the Senate consent
to ratification by the United States of these
amendments to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, June 12, 1967.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Government, Science, and International Policy. Pro-
ceedings of the eighth meeting of the Panel on Sci-
ence and Technology of the House Ckimmittee on Sci-
ence and Astronautics ; January 24-26, 1967 ; 220 pp.
Compilation of papers prepared for the eighth meet-
ing of the panel ; April 1967 ; 81 pp. [Committee
print.].
United States Armament and Disarmament Problems.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb-
ruary 3-March .3, 1967. 186 pp.
The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Part II. February 15-April 5, 1967. 204 pp.
U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program. Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
S. 1030. March 21 and April 25, 1967. 122 pp.
Policy Planning for Technology Transfer. Report of the
Subcommittee on Science and Technology to the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business. S. Doc.
15. April 6, 1967. 192 pp.
JTJLT 17, 1967
79
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Italy Sign
Science Cooperation Agreement
Press release 145 dated June 19
All Agreement for a Cooperative Program in
Science between the United States and Italy
was concluded on June 19 at a ceremony at the
Department of State. Eugene Rostow, Under
Secretary of State for Political Ailairs, and
Donald Hornig, Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Teclmology, signed the
agreement on behalf of the Government of the
United States. Ambassador Egidio Ortoiia;
Leopoklo Rubinacci, Mmister for Coordination
of Science and Technology ; and Vincenzo Ca-
glioti, President of the National Research Comi-
cil (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) signed
on behalf of the Government of the Republic
of Italy.
The agreement provides that the two coim-
tries will midertake a broad-range program of
scientific cooperation for peaceful purposes.
Each country will provide financial support to
its respective portion of the program.
The aim of the program is to strengthen
cooperation between the scientists of the two
countries and to provide additional opportuni-
ties for them to exchange ideas, skills, and tech-
niques, to attack problems of particular mutual
interest, to work together in unique environ-
ments, and to utilize special facilities.
Activities under this program will involve
participation by scientists of both countries
and may include exchange of scientists, pursuit
of joint research projects, and seminars to ex-
change information. Scientific information
derived from these activities shall be made
freely available to the world scientific commu-
nity through customary channels.
Tlie agreement makes provision for the par-
ticipation of scientists of other countries m the
jomt projects and encourages extension of the
cooperation to a multilateral basis.
The agreement provides for the designation
by each Government of an "executive agency"
with responsibility for coordinating the imple-
mentation of its side of the program. The Na-
tional Science Foimdation (NSF) in the United
States and the Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche (CNR) in Italy will serve as the
respective executive agencies.
The cooperative program is being initiated
with three jarojects which have been approved
by the NSF and the CNR :
1. Establishment of an international grad-
uate school of molecular biology through coop-
eration between the University of California
and the International Laboratory of Genetics
and Biophysics (ILGB) at Naples, Italy. The
ILGB is governed and supported by the CNR.
Under an NSF grant to the University of Cali-
fornia, the university will furnish some teach-
ing staff and laboratory equipment. The
classroom and laboratory facilities and ad-
ditional staff will be provided through the
ILGB, which is a large, well-equipped, and
experienced research institution. The school will
accept students from all countries and will
award the Ph. D. degree on the basis of a cur-
riculum designed on the American system but
employing some experimental variations. The
school can serve as a prototype for international
graduate schools in other fields.
2. A scientific exchange progi-am between the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
University of Palermo. Laboratories at both
institutions have conducted significant research
in molecular developmental biology. The ex-
change is expected to result in the coordination
of effort and the establishment of a core of sim-
ilar teclmical and theoretical competence in
laboratories at the two institutions. Program
emphasis will be on support of the research and
training of professional scientists, graduate stu-
dents, and technical personnel between the two
institutions. NSF has awarded a grant to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to sup-
port the U.S. portion of this program, and the
CNR is funding the University of Palermo
participation.
3. Extension of collaboration between scien-
tists at the Department of Zoology, Washington
University, St. Louis, Mo., and the Center for
Neurobiology of the Istituto Superiore di
Sanita and the Institute of Experimental Medi-
cine of the CNR in Rome. The work involves
study of a nerve growth factor which induces
increased growth of specific nerve cells of birds :
and mammals as well as of embryonic sensory
cells. This activity is also being supported by
NSF and CNR.
80
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement between the International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States and Indonesia for the appli-
cation of safeguards. Signed at Vienna June 19, 1967.
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency
shall have received from the two Governments writ-
ten notification that they have complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements for its
entry into force.
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 23, 1963.
Entered into force: March 19, 1967.'
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig-
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan-
uary 27, 1967."
Ratification deposited: Hungary, June 26, 1967.
Signatures: Jamaica, June 29, 1967 ; Peru, June 30,
1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965."
Ratification deposited: Burma, June 8, 1967.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notification that it considers itself iound: Congo
(Brazzaville), January 30, 1967.
BILATERAL
Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation
in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA)
Agreement relating to services and facilities for air-
craft operated by or on behalf of the United States
Government, with exchange of letters. Signed at
Paris June 22, 1967. Entered Into force June 22, 1967.
Brazil
Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel
(U.S.S. Lewis Bancock) to BrazU. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington June 15 and 28, 1967.
Entered into force June 28, 1967.
Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel
(U.S.S. Irtvin) to Brazil. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington June 23 and 28, 1907. Entered
into force June 28, 1967.
Malta
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Valletta June 14, 1967.
Entered into force June 14, 1967.
Norway
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio oper-
ators of either country to operate their stations in the
other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
May 27 and June 1, 1967. Entered into force June 1,
1967.
Romania
Agreement amending the agreement of April 20,
May 14 and 26, 1962 (TIAS .5063), relating to the
issuance of visas to diplomatic and nondiplomatic
personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucha-
rest May 31 and June 17, 1967. Entered into force
June 19, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.G. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi Novem-
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force November 21, 1966.
Effective July 1, 1966. TIAS 6153. 15 pp. 10<f.
Education — Commission for Educational Exchange
and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with
Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro
October 5 and 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19,
1966. TIAS 6163. 11 pp. 10(>.
Treaties — Continued Application to Botswana of Cer-
tain Treaties Concluded Between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Agreement with Botswana.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Gaberones September 30,
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6165.
3 pp. 5(t.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the
Congo — Signed at Kinshasa October 3, 1966. Entered
into force October 3, 1966. Witt exchange of notes.
TIAS 6166. 11 pp. 10^.
* Not in force for the United States.
• Not in force.
JTJLT 17, 1967
81
Desalination. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of No-
vember 18, 1964. Exchange of notes — Dated at Moscovir
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into force
December 3, 1966. TIAS 6174. 2 pp. 5(t.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Italy, amending the agreement of Decem-
ber 18, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Rome October 5, 1966. Entered into force October 5,
1966. TIAS 6179. 5 pp. 54.
Military Bases in the Philippines — Relinquishment of
Certain Land Areas in Camp John Hay. Agreement
with the Philiijpines. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Manila December 13, 1966. Entered into force Decem-
ber 13, 1966. TIAS 6180. 3 pp., map. 30(5.
General Agreement on Tarififs and Trade. Protocol for
the accession of Yugoslavia to the agreement of Oc-
tober 30, 1947. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered
into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 6185. 28 pp. 15«(.
Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with
Jamaica. Exchange of notes — Signed at Kingston De-
cember 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 1966.
TIAS 6187. 3 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Iraq — Signed at Baghdad Decem-
ber 19, 1966. Entered into force December 19, 1966.
With exchange of notes. TIAS 6188. 14 pp. 10(J.
Trade — Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From
Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington October 19,
1966. Entered into force October 19, 1966. Effective
January 1, 1966. TIAS 6191. 3 pp. 50.
Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for De-
fense Purposes. Agreement with the United Kingdom
of Great IJritain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered
into force December 30, 1966. TIAS 6196. 15 pp. 100.
Tracking Stations — Facility on the Island of Mahe
(Seychelles). Agreement with the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered
into force Decemt>er 30, 1966. With agreed minute.
TIAS 6197. 30 pp. 150.
Settlement of United States Claim for Postwar Eco-
nomic Assistance. Agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg December 29, 1966.
Entered into force December 29, 1966. With related
notes — Dated at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg Jan-
uary 4 and 20, 1967. TIAS 6204. 5 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Dominica. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Bridgetovra December 16, 1966, and
at Dominica January 11, 1967. Entered into force
January 11, 1967. TIAS 6206. 3 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with St. Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bridge-
town and St. Kitts December 19, 1966, and January 10,
1967. Entered into force January 10, 1967. TIAS 6209.
3 pp. 50.
Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band.
Protocol with Mexico, amending the agreement of
January 29, 1957— Signed at Mexico April 13, 1966.
Entered into force January 12, 1967. TIAS 6210. 4 pp.
50.
Peace Corps. Agreement vnth St. Vincent. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Bridgetown December 16, 1966. and
at St. Vincent January IS, 1967. Entered into force
January 18, 1967. TIAS 6211. 3 pp. 50.
Customs Administration. Agreement with the Philip-
pines— Signed at Washington January 4, 1967. Entered
into force January 4, 1967. TIAS 6212. 9 pp. 100.
Defense — Disposition of Equipment and Materiel.
Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of note.s — Signed
at Rio de Janeiro January 27, 1967. Entered into force
January 27, 1967. TIAS 6213. 5 pp. 50.
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967
INDEX J'uJ'y 17, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. llfiU
Africa. Regionalism and World Order (Ros-
tow) 66
American Principles. The Right of All Peoples
to Self -Determination (Johnson) 59
Asia. Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . 66
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 79
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78
Developing Countries
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . . 66
White House Panel Completes Study of World
Food Problem 76
Ek;onomic A£Fairs
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to
the Future (Trowbridge) 70
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of
New CanaJ Treaties 65
Europe
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to
the Future (Trowbridge) 70
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
Foreign Aid. White House Panel Completes
Study of World Food Problem 76
Italy. United States and Italy Sign Science Co-
operation Agreement 80
Japan. Letters of Credence (Shimoda) ... 69
Latin America
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
Near East
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
United States Reiterates Policy on Status of
Jerusalem 60
U.S. To Join in Emergency ReUef Programs for
the Middle East (Johnson, Goldberg) ... 64
Panama. U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on
Texts of New Canal Treaties 65
Philippines. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss
New Trade Agreement 78
Presidential Documents
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments 78
The Right of All Peoples to Self-Determina-
tion 59
United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue
Close Cooperation To Promote Peace ... 61
U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief Programs for
the Middle East 64
White House Panel Completes Study of World
Food Problem 76
Publications. Recent Releases 81
Science
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the
Future (Trowbridge) 70
United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera-
tion Agreement 80
Thailand. United States and Thailand Pledge
To Continue Close Cooperation To Promote
Peace (Bhumibol Adulyadej, Johnson, joint
statement) 61
Trade. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New
Trade Agreement 78
Treaty Information
Current Actions 81
United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera-
tion Agreement 80
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of
New Canal Treaties 65
U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New Trade
Agreement 78
U.S.S.R. The Right of All Peoples to Self-De-
termination (Johnson) 59
United Nations. U.S. To Join in Emergency
Relief Programs for the Middle East (John-
son, Goldberg) 64
Viet-Nam. The Right of All Peoples to Self-
Determination (Johnson) 59
Name Index
Bhumibol Adulyadej 61
Goldberg, Arthur J 64
Johnson, President 59,61,64,76,78
Rostow, W. W 66
Shimoda, Takeso 69
Trowbridge, Alexander B 70
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 26-July 2
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release issued prior to June 26 which appeal's
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 145 of
June 19.
No. Date Subject
*150 6/30 Oliver sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for Inter-American Affairs
and U.S. Coordinator for the
Alliance for Progress (biographic
details).
tl52 7/1 Rusk: replies to questions sub-
mitted by Daniel Viklund, Dagens
Nyheter, Stockholm.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY KECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVJI, No. 1465
July U, 1967
OtPOi>»
:unT-
THE ROAD TO A LASTING PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 87
INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
hy Assistant Secretary Oliver 102
,N. ADOPTS RESOLUTIONS ON AID TO REFUGEES AND STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
REJECTS OTHER RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Tests of Resolutions 108
KENNEDY ROUND AGREEMENTS SIGNED AT GENEVA
Svmvmary of Agreements 95
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1465 Publication 8265
July 24, 1967
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The Road to a Lasting Peace
Address by Secretary Rusk '
It's a high privilege to meet with this great
international organization, especially as you
celebrate your golden anniversary year. Few
of your members in 1917 could have predicted
that in 60 years you would have more than
829,000 members in moi'e than 21,350 clubs in
137 countries or geographic areas. Your re-
markable growth is proof of the value of the
purposes and programs of Lionism. ^Ind your
large membership in other lands on six conti-
nents is compelling evidence that free men
everywhere — free men of all races and re-
ligions— share the same basic aspirations and
ideals. I am glad to have this chance to con-
gratulate Lions International on its splendid
achievements in so many important fields in
the past and on its plans and prospects for
the future.
As Secrtary of State, I am of course espe-
cially interested in the contributions of Lions
International to better international under-
standing. It is i^articularly gratifying and
encouraging to know that you have put at the
center of your future endeavors the search for
peace. I have read the excellent article by Presi-
dent [Edward M.] Lindsey in the January is-
sue of the Lion on "A Generation of Peace."
And only a few days ago I read, as a judge in
your peace essay contest, some very moving es-
says on peace.
The search for peace is, I believe, the most
momentous challenge before the human race.
It must succeed. The nations and peoples of the
world must establish a lasting peace — not just
because war is barbarous and horrible but be-
cause frail man now possesses weapons capable
of demolishing most of civilization in a few
hours. The organization of an enduring peace
is the great imperative of our time.
^ Made before the golden anniversary convention of
Lions International at Chicago, 111., on July 6 (press
release 154).
A lasting peace cannot be achieved merely by
wishing for it or by talking about it or by pass-
ing resolutions. It has to be organized and built,
and there must be effective means of enforcing
it.
Wliat are the essential ingredients of lasting
world peace? I know of no better answer than
the United Nations Charter — particularly the
preamble and article 1. Those paragraphs rep-
resented what the authors of the charter be-
lieved to be the lessons of history, especially the
lessons taught by the events which led to the
Second World War. They were written while
the fires of that most destructive of wars still
raged, when men were tliinking hard and pray-
erfully about the millions of dead and how "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind."
Article 1 of the charter speaks :
— Of effective collective measures to prevent
and to remove threats to the peace and to sup-
press acts of aggression and other breaches of
the peace ;
— Of the peaceful adjustment or settlement
of disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace ;
— Of developing friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
— Of international cooperation in solving in-
ternational problems of economic, social, cul-
tural, or humanitarian character ;
— And of promoting respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all, without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Those are the basic purposes of the United
Nations as set forth in article 1. They are also
an accurate smmnary of the abiding goals of
the foreign policy of the United States. That
identity of purposes should not surprise any-
JULY 24, 19G7
269-166 — 67
87
body, for we joined with others to share the
lead in organizing the United Nations and in
drafting the charter. Leaders of both our major
parties joined in this enterprise, and our com-
mitment to the charter was approved by the
United States Senate with only two dissenting
votes.
After the charter was adopted at San Fran-
cisco came the fission bomb — followed in a few
years by thermonuclear warheads and long-
range missiles. These transformed the "scourge
of war" into the possibility of destroying civi-
lization. We shall not have an opportunity to
learn the lessons from a third world war — there
will not be enough left. We must apply the
lessons we have already learned to prevent a
catastrophe for the human race.
The First Requirement for Building Peace
If a lasting peace is to be achieved, the fii'st
requirement is collective action to prevent or
remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts
of aggression or other breaches of tlie peace.
The charter put that first for the clearest of
reasons: Unless this requirement is met, all
other efforts to build peace will come tumbling
down.
Unhappily, some members of the United Na-
tions have been unwilling to discharge this pri-
mary responsibility. That possibility was fore-
seen when the charter was drafted. Article 51
specifically affirms the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense against armed
attack.
The charter also provides for regional ar-
rangements or agencies to deal with matters re-
lating to the maintenance of international peace
and security. And it makes plain that resort to
the United Nations is not intended to supplant
other means of settling disputes.
The founding fathers of the United Nations
understood that inflammatory debate can make
a settlement more difficult. So, they specified in
article 33 that parties to a dispute "shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, me-
diation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their own
choice."
Although the United Nations has been able
to deal effectively with many situations and has
assisted in dealing with still more, some of the
burden of preventing or repelling aggression
and of settling disputes since the Second World
War has been borne outside the United Nations.
The Organization of American States has
dealt with problems in the Western Hem-
isphere. The young Organization for African
Unity has been helpful in situations arising in
the great continent of Africa. Certain disputes
have been referred to the World Court. Others
have been settled by quiet diplomacy — in some
cases by direct negotiations, in others with help
of mediation.
Basis for Settlement in the Middle East
Regi'ettably, some disputes have remained
unsettled. Recently one of them once again
flared into war. We can impose no blueprint
for peace in the INIiddle East; the primary re-
sponsibility rests upon those who live there and
upon their governments. But President Johnson
has set forth the principles which we think any
settlement must encompass : ^
First, recognition that every nation in the
area has a fundamental right to live. This
means an end to belligerency and terrorism.
Second, justice for the Arab refugees.
Third, free navigation through international
waterways.
Fourth, an end to the Middle East arms race.
This requires the cooperation of larger states
outside the area.
Fifth, respect for the political independence
and territorial integrity of all the states of the
area. This requires recognized boundaries and
other arrangements to provide security against
terrorist raids and war.
Further, as President Johnson has empha-
sized, we believe there should be adequate rec-
ognition that three great religions have a deep j
interest in the holy places of Jerusalem.
Some have urged an immediate return to the 1
situation as it was on June 4. But that, as my
distinguished colleague. Ambassador Goldberg i
[U.S. Representative to the United Nations f
Arthur J. Goldberg], has said, is a prescription
not for peace but for renewed hostilities.^ We
believe that the goal must be a lasting
settlement.
' For an address by President Johnson at Washing-
ton, D.C., on June 19, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 31.
' For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
in the U.N. Security Council on June 13, see ibid., July
3, 1967, p. 5.
88
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
As President Jolmson has said :
If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward
the worlv of peace, they can count with confidence upon
the friendship and the help of all the people of the
United States of America.
In a climate of peace, we . . . will do our full share
to help with a solution for the refugees . . . our full
share in support of regional cooperation . . . (and) to
see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is ap-
plied to the critical problem of desalting water and
helping to make the deserts bloom.
The main burden of deterring or repelling
major aggression has been borne by the armed
forces and defensive alliances of the free world.
Since the Second World War, the armed forces
of the United States alone have incurred more
than 240,000 casualties in the defense of
freedom.
In addition to our general commitments un-
der the United Nations, we are pledged specifi-
cally to the defense of more than 40 nations. We
are presently honoring such a pledge in South
Viet-Nam.
Misconceptions About the Viet-Nam Conflict
To clear away all the underbrush of miscon-
ception about the struggle in Viet-Nam would
take more time than you or I have this morning.
But I shall discuss briefly a few main points.
The conflict there has often been called a
civil war. There is a genuine South Vietnamese
element among the Viet Cong. But that is not
why American combat forces are in South Viet-
Nam. They are there because of what North
Viet-Nam has been putting into the South:
cadre, arms, men, and, since late 1964, major
organized units of the Regular Army of North
Viet-Nam. It has continued to infiltrate regi-
ments and divisions as well as replacements for
the Viet Cong main forces.
If the Federal Republic of Germany were to
send 20 to 25 regiments into East Germany,
you may be sure that the Soviet Union would
not call it a civil war — just a family affair
among Germans.
I can assure you that if the North Koreans
were to send 20 or 25 regiments into South
Korea, we would not look upon that as just a
family affair among Koreans, no more than we
did before.
If there had been no aggression by North
Viet-Nam, there would have been no American
combat forces in South Viet-Nam. And if every-
one who has come down from the North were
to go home, our armed forces would come home.
It is sometimes asserted that we are asking for
"unconditional surrender."' We are not asking
North Viet-Nam to surrender an acre of ground
or a man, or to modify their regime or to change
their relations with the Communist world. All
we are asking them to do is to stop sending their
men and arms into Laos and South Viet-Nam
for the purpose of seizing those countries by
force. To call that "unconditional surrender"
is a serious abuse of language.
Then, there is that word "escalation" — which
seems to be reserved for the United States and
our allies.
For nearly a year, the other side has been
mining the port of Saigon and the channel lead-
ing into it. That, apparently, is not escalation.
But if we were to take those same mines back
home — to Haiphong — I imagine we would be
widely charged with escalating the war.
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are
using Cambodian territory for infiltration into
South Viet-Nam and as a base and sanctuary.
So far as I am aware, few have called that es-
calation or widening the war. But if we were to
send troops into Cambodia to go after those base
areas, I imagine that we would be accused of
escalation.
North Viet-Nam has had three or four divi-
sions of its Regular Army in or near the demili-
tarized zone. It harshly rejected our proposals *
that the zone be genuinely dimilitarized and be
extended 10 miles on both sides to create a
buffer area. In the last few days. North Viet-
Nam has again attacked in force across the
DMZ. So far as I am aware, few have called
that escalation.
Upside-Down Comments on Peace Moves
There have been a good many upside-down
comments on peace moves also. We have tried
unremittingly to bring the other side to the ne-
gotiating table. We have made many proposals
ourselves and have supported the initiatives of
many other governments and individuals.
Hanoi has said "No" to all of them.
Periodically, we have been urged to stop
bombing the is'orth, on the ground that that
would make peace talks possible. Well, we have
tried that several times, once for as long as 37
days. In fact, Hanoi chose to regard a pause
in the bombings as an ultimatum.
*For a Department statement of Apr. 19, see iJ)id.,
May 15, 1967, p. 750.
JULY 24, 19G7
89
We think reciprocity is essential. Suppose
that we were to say that we would negotiate
only if the Communists stopped all the violence
in South Viet-Nam, while we continued to bomb
North Viet-Nam. Everybody would say we
were crazy. But when North Viet-Nam makes
the same proposition the other way around,
some people seem to think it is reasonable.
We stand ready to talk with the other side
without conditions or about conditions. We are
ready to discuss the terms of a settlement and
then work out the steps for reaching it. We are
willing to discuss any piece of the problem, such
as the territorial integrity of Cambodia or de-
militarizing the so-called demilitarized zone.
Or we are ready to take reciprocal steps to de-
escalate the conflict.
But we shall stay in Viet-Nam until the right
of the South Vietnamese people to work out
their own future under a government of their
own free choice has been secured. More is at
stake than self-determination for the South
Vietnamese, important as that is. Even more is
at stake than the security of other nations in
Southeast Asia, impoi-tant as that is. The
greater question is whether aggression is to be
allowed to succeed, thus opening the way for
further aggi'ession. And tied to that is the in-
tegrity of the commitments of the United
States. Our commitments in the Pacific are
just as binding as our commitments in the At-
lantic. If those who wish to pursue world revo-
lution by force should come to believe that the
United States will not do what it has promised,
the prospects of peace would rapidly vanish.
Improving Relations With Eastern Europe
It is sometimes said that the war in Viet-
Nam stands in the way of a detente between the
Soviet Union and the West.
President Joluison is deeply intent on trying
to improve our relations with the Soviet
Union and the smaller nations of Eastern
Europe. The fact is that the war in Viet-Nam
has not prevented the Soviet Union and the
United States from concluding a civil air agree-
ment and a consular agreement and from sign-
ing the treaty on peaceful uses of space. It has
not prevented consideration of a nonprolifera-
tion treaty. It did not prevent useful direct
communication between the heads of the two
Governments during the recent fighting in the
Middle East. And it did not prevent President
Johnson and Premier Kosygin from engaging
in long and frank exchanges of views at
Glassboro.^
We will continue to do our full share to try
to improve relations with the Soviet Union and
other Communist nations. We will continue to
do our full share to try to settle or narrow the
differences which separate us and especially to
achieve agreements or arrangements which
would reduce the danger of another world war.
We are eager to make headway in controlling
and reducing armaments.
We hope for genuine peaceful coexistence, a
genuine detente. But if today the West is at the
beginning of a detente with the Soviet Union,
we did not get there by forgetting the require-
ments for maintaining the peace in many a
crisis since 1945.
If we and certain of our adversaries are grow-
ing in prudence this may be related to the
knowledge that resort to force is a very risky
business for all.
International Cooperation for Peace
The foreign policy of the United States is
concerned not only with the adversaries of free-
dom but even more with its friends and
practitioners.
We seek ever-closer partnerships with other
economically advanced countries of the free
world. And we are grateful that these include
three nations which were our enemies in the
Second World War — now three thriving democ-
racies which add immensely to the strength of
the free world and which we are proud to have
as close friends and allies.
In the Western Hemisphere we are fully com-
mitted to the great cooperative enterprise in
economic development and social progress: the
Alliance for Progress.
We have provided large resources to assist
developing countries in other parts of the world
to increase their production and living stand-
ards. Here I would emphasize our deep concern
about the war on hunger. President Johnson
has alerted the world to the fact that only
comprehensive all-out efforts to deal with the
food-population problem can avert extensive
starvation a decade hence.
We have worked to strengthen and expand
useful international institutions. And we have
welcomed such activities by others. In the past
" For background, see iUa., July 10, 1967, p. 37.
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
2 years we have been especially pleased to see
the steps toward regional cooperation taken by
the free nations of East Asia and the Western
Pacific.
The major part of our work at the Depart-
ment of State is quiet and little noticed — con-
cerned with the daily business of man wliich re-
quires some form of international cooperation.
We take part in more than 600 international
conferences a year with other governments. We
belong to many international institutions. We
have approximately 4,500 treaties and other
international agreements. Gradually there is
developing what Sir Wilfred Jenks of the In-
ternational Labor Organization has called the
"common law of mankind."
We have fostered cooperative international
undertakings in science, education, and tech-
nology. We strongly favor more people-to-
people contacts. Here I would applaud again
the major contribution made by Lions Interna-
tional. All of these activities help to build
peace.
The road to a lasting world peace is filled with
obstacles and surrounded by frightful dangers.
But we — all of us — must do our best. As Presi-
dent Johnson has said, the search for peace is
"the assignment of the century."' ® We must not
fail. For on the organization of a lasting peace
depends the survival of all that free men, and
most men everywhere, cherish or aspire to for
themselves and their posterity.
Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions
on Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper
Following are replies hy Secretary Rusk to
questions submitted hy Daniel Viklund of
Dagens Nyheter, StocJcTiolm.
Press release 152 dated July 1
1. Which were the decisive reasons for the
original U.S. decision to intervene militarily in
Viet-Nam, and do you think that those reasons
have in any way been affected hy later develop-
ments, in terms of direct American interests,
locally in Southeast Asia or internationally?
Secretary Rush: The simplest way to an-
swer this question is to remind you that we
had a promise to keep. Since the Geneva con-
ference of 1954 and the SEATO agreement of
the same year, three American Presidents have
pledged that the United States will help South
Viet-Nam defend itself against Communist ag-
gression. AVe have undertaken similar pledges
for the mutual defense of the NATO area. We
believe that it is important to the prospects for
peace that it be fully understood that, on such
matters, we mean what we say.
We had hoped that the defense of South
Viet-Nam would not require the participation
of United States military forces in combat op-
erations. For more than 6 years the South
Vietnamese managed to withstand an unrelent-
ing and extremely efficient political and mili-
tary aggression. By the spring of 1965, how-
ever, the armed agents of Hanoi in the South
were being massively supplemented by reg-
ularly constituted units of the North Viet-
namese army in virtually open armed attack
against South Viet-Nam. At that point, only
the military support of South Viet-Nam's
friends could save it from conquest. That is
why our troops, along with 45,000 Koreans and
thousands of Australians, New Zealanders,
Filipinos, and Thais, are in South Viet-Nam.
As for our interests in Southeast Asia, we
have declared them on many occasions. As late
as August 1964 our Congress, with only two
dissenting votes in the entire Congress, declared
that "The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the mainte-
nance of international peace and security in
southeast Asia." " We do not see how a durable
peace can be achieved unless all nations, large
and small, have a chance to live in safety and
in peace. This applies quite specifically to those
countries with whom we have undertaken
mutual defense alliances.
2. What is your opinion of the vieio, fre-
quently voiced in Europe, that both North Viet-
Na7n and NLF [National Liberation Front"]
(Viet Cong) hold independent positions on the
issues of the war, not necessarily always the
same?
A. It is curious, if true, that this view should
gain currency in Europe, with its sopliistica-
tion and experience regarding Communist
fronts. Neither the history of the origin of the
NLF nor intelligence based on Communist
statements, NLF documents, and prisoner in-
• lUd., Oct 19, 1964, p. 555.
^ For text of a joint congressional resolution of
Aug. 7, 1964, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
JULY 24, 1967
91
terrogations sui>ports this view. A concerted ef-
fort has of course been made, particularly
abroad, by Hanoi to create the illusion that the
NLF is an independent organization, but this
does not convince many South Vietnamese —
nor many knowledgeable foreign observers, for
that matter. If you examine with care Hanoi's
programs and those issued by the NLF, you
will agi-ee, I am sure, that there is no substan-
tial difference in what they are proposing to
do to South Viet-Nam. Tactics on occasion de-
mand differences in emphasis, particularly for
foreign consumption. But Hanoi's control of
the NLF has been amply demonstrated over the
years. Were this not so, the NLF has had many
chances to demonstrate it and has not done so.
Military Situation in Viet-Nam
3. What is your assessment of the military
situation in Viet-Nam as of today, and do you
think that there is any possibility of any U.S.
troop toithdrawals within the next 6 months f
A. You will recall the address of General
Westmoreland to the Congress on April 28,- in
which he compared the situation today with
what it was some time ago. Although no one
foresees any United States troop withdrawals
within the next 6 months, the United States
is confident that the efforts by South Viet-Nam
and its allies will continue to bring improve-
ment, although there may be ups and downs.
The important point to bear in mmd is that
the military and nonmilitary developments are
inextricably intertwined in South Viet-Nam,
even more than elsewhere, so that the most
significant indicators of military success may be
found not in battle reports and casualty statis-
tics but in the evidence that the country is
moving forward, creating political institutions,
holding village and hamlet elections, improv-
ing communications and stabilizing the econ-
omy. You are aware of the many proposals
which we and others have made for a deescala-
tion of the violence in Viet-Nam. We have of-
fered to put on the table a schedule of with-
drawal of United States forces if North Viet-
Nam would do the same.
4. // the Viet-Nam war should continue for
a long time, hoio seriously do you judge the
risk that it might lead to a direct confrontation
between the U.S. and Russia or China?
A. It is prudent always to keep such pos-
sibilities in mind. Our objective in Viet-Nam
remains limited to forestalling the aggression
from the North, and our military response re-
mains a measured one calculated to reach this
goal. We have repeatedly made it clear that
our ends do not include the destruction of the
North Vietnamese Government or the occupa-
tion of the country. In any event, while the
common defense requires in some instances the
taking of risks, we believe that there is a far
greater risk in shirking responsibility and al-
lowing aggression to go unchallenged.
5. Do you think that the American air bases
in Thailand ivill increase or reduce the risk that
that country might be drawn in and that the
war will spread f
A. Let me make it clear, first of all, that there
are no American bases in Thailand. The Royal
Thai Government, recognizing the common
danger, allows us to use jointly with its forces
certain of its defense facilities. That Tliailand
itself is on the Communist timetable for the
new kind of warfare the Communists dub
"wars of national liberation" is sufficiently doc-
umented. Peking has said this, publicly and
often. But the Thais are not waiting passively
for the blow to fall. They are actively cooperat-
ing today in the defense of Southeast Asia.
In addition to making their facilities avail-
able to us in Thailand, they have sent air and
naval training units to South Viet-Nam, and
they are presently training and equipping an
augmented battalion of ground troops to join
the Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders, and
Americans who are fighting side by side with
the South Vietnamese troops to defend the
country.
Agreements on Laos Ignored by Hanoi
6. In retrospect, do you think that there was,
at any time, a reasonable chance to end the
fighting on conditions acceptable to all parties
involved, and, if so, why was an agreetnent
impossible?
A. We thought such an opportunity had
come with the accords on Laos in 1962. At that
conference we accepted the nominee of the Com-
munist side as the Prime Minister for Laos,
as well as a coalition government worked out
' For text, see ibid.. May 15, 1967, p. 738.
92
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
among the so-called "Three Factions." Presi-
dent Kennedy was bitterly disappointed with
the results of those accords. Hanoi refused (a)
to withdraw its forces from Laos, (b) to cease
using Laos as an infiltration route into South
Viet-Nam, (c) to permit the coalition govern-
ment to exercise authority in the Communist-
held areas of Laos, and (d) to permit the In-
ternational Control Commission to exercise its
functions in those same areas. All of these were
specificallj^ required by the accords themselves.
Performance and good faith of the agreements
of 1962 would have represented a giant step
toward peace throughout Southeast Asia. Since
then we have not seen any indication that
Hanoi is prepared to stop its effort to seize
South Viet-Nam by force. Were they to do so,
peace could come very fast.
7. Which are the main reasons for the Amer-
ican refusal to recognize NLF {Viet Cong) as
an independent representative for a part of the
pojmlation of South Viet-Nam?
A. The WLF does not say that it represents
a part of the people of South Viet-Nam but
rather that it is the sole legitimate representa-
tive of aU these people. The Catholics, Bud-
dhists, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Montagnards, ethnic
Cambodians, all making up an overwhelming
majority of the people of South Viet-Nam,
reject this pretension of the NLF. Obviously,
we cannot "recognize" the NLF on their terms.
Nevertheless, as President Johnson has said,^
"The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in
being represented and having their views pre-
sented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants
to cease aggression."
8. What measures loould you consider neces-
sary to protect the civilian population of South
Viet-Nam, following the toithdrawal of Amer-
ican troops within 6 montlis of a peaceful solu-
tion, as visualized iy the President?
A. It is too early to discuss this in any mean-
ingful detail. Perhaps a final settlement would
include some type of continuing international
assistance. We believe, however, that once
North Viet-Nam withdraws its leadership, its
troops, and its supplies, the Republic of Viet-
Nam will be able to make further progress in
assuring economic and social betterment for
the South Vietnamese people and to handle any
insurgency situation which might persist or
arise subsequently. As you know, the South
Vietnamese have offered full amnesty and rec-
onciliation to the South Vietnamese who are
now assisting Hanoi.
U.S. Ready To Negotiate
9. Is your willingness to negotiate with
North Viet-Nam unchanged in spite of the es-
calation of tlie hombing of the North, and wJiat
would you say are now the minhnum Ameri-
ican conditions for negotiations?
A. I find it very curious that the word "es-
calation" seems to be reserved for actions taken
by the United States and its allies and is not
applied to actions taken by North Viet-Nam.
For example, for almost a year North Vietnam-
ese mines have been placed in the Saigon River
approaches to Saigon harbor. Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese forces today are using Cam-
bodian territory. Has the Dagens Nyheter
called either of these "escalation" ? I would sug-
gest that if we picked up North Vietnamese
mines in the Saigon River and simply took
them home to their point of origin, namely
Haiphong, that there would be a great outcry
about "escalation."
As for our conditions for negotiations, we
have none. We have stated many times that
we are ready to negotiate at once without con-
ditions. Since the other side has imposed con-
ditions, such as stopping the bombing, we have
said we will negotiate about the conditions
themselves. As for the shape of a final settle-
ment, our views have been set forth many times
in such summaries as our Fourteen Points * and
our reminder of the 28 proposals made by our-
selves and others which Hanoi has rejected.^
Fundamentally, we believe that the Geneva
agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate
basis for peace in Southeast Asia. But no one
has been able to produce anyone from the other
side with whom to talk — either without condi-
tions or about conditions.
10. How do you assess the possihilities to win
the population of South Viet-Nam for a gov-
ernment friendly to the United States, and
which elements of the pacification and de-
mocratization program appear to you most es-
sential in that context?
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.
• Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 284.
= IhUl., May 22. 1967, p. 770.
JULY 24, igGI
93
A. It is not a question of winning the South
Vietnamese people's support for a government
friendly to the United States but of relieving
them of the burden of North Vietnamese ag-
gression and subversive insurgency. Security is
the element basic to pacification, and with se-
curity the broad progi'am of revolutionary de-
velopment can accelerate its forward move-
ment. The remarkable progress being made in
the direction of a constitutional government
augurs well for tiie future if security can be
maintained. Our basic interest is that the South
Vietnamese people have a chance to decide for
themselves what kind of government they want
and what their international orientation should
be.
11. If free elections., including some form of
de facto NLF participation, were held in South
Viet-Nam now, how big a part of the voters do
you thinJc would back the present government
and NLF, respectively?
A. If Hanoi were to abandon its attempt to
take over South Viet-Nam, it is conceivable
that those indigenous elements who have co-
operated with the Front would wish to parti-
cipate in politics in some way. Their right to
do so would appear to be present in the Doan
Ket or national reconciliation program. How
many votes they might get would depend on
many factors, such as whether these per-
sons integi-ated with other political groupings,
what support these groupings might have in
various areas of the country, and so on. How-
ever, a recent poll undertaken independently in
South Viet-Nam by CBS News shows clearly
that the South Vietnamese people do not want
communism and/or a government dominated by
the NLF.
12. Do you think that Sioeden could contrib-
ute in any way to establish contacts leading to
a peaceful solution of the Yiet-Nam conflict?
A. We have frequently stated that we wel-
come the efforts of any country which would
advance the course of peace. But I would be
less than frank if I did not add two points:
We see no sign that Hanoi is willing to move to
an honorable settlement, and we do not believe
that the prospects for such a settlement are
enhanced by proposals which ask us to stop half
the war while the other side continues unabated
its half of the war. Suppose that the United
States were to say that we would negotiate only
if the other side stopped all of the violence in
South Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb
the North. Everyone would say that we were
crazy. Wlien the other side makes exactly the
same proposal in reverse, why do many people
say that their proposal is reasonable and ought
to be accepted ?
94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva
The Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations announced at Washington
on June 29 that, by direction of the President,
W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Rep-
resentative for Trade Negotiations, would sign
the multilateral agreements negotiated in the
Sixth Round of Trade Negotiations at Geneva
June 30.
The signing ceremony concluded the most
comprehensive assault on barriers to interna-
tional trade that has ever taken place. The nego-
tiations, known as the Kennedy Round in rec-
ognition of the late President's leadership in
inaugurating the effort, formally opened in
May 1964.
The important elements of the Kennedy
Romid package are :
Tariff cuts of 50 percent on a very broad
range of industrial goods and cuts in the 30 to
50 percent range on many more.
Agricultural concessions to which the United
States attaches great value because they create
new trading opportunities for our farmers and
because they support our contention that inter-
national negotiation on trade m farm products
can accomplish something.
A world grains arrangement guaranteeing
higher minimum trading prices and establish-
ing a program under wliich other nations will
share with us in the vital but burdensome task
of supplying food aid to the undernourished
people in the less developed countries.
Nontariff barrier (NTB) liberalization in-
cluding a very significant accord on antidump-
ing procedures as well as European NTB modi-
fications in the American Selling Price (ASP)
package.
Useful, if limited, progress on the complex
and sensitive problems in the steel, aluminum,
pulp and paper, and textile sectors, including
a 3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton
Textile Arrangement (LTA).^
An agreement on the treatment of chemical
products that deals with the American Selling
Price issue in a manner that provides major
chemical traders with mutually advantageous
concessions in the main Kennedy Round agree-
ment and a separate and balanced package that
makes additional concessions available to the
United States if it abandons the American Sell-
ing Price system.
Significant assistance to the less developed
coxmtries through permitting their participa-
tion in the negotiations without requiring recip-
rocal contributions from them, through special
concessions on products of particular interest
to them, and through the food aid provisions of
the grains arrangement.
U.S. participation was made possible through
authority granted the President by the Congress
through the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.^ The
late Christian A. Herter directed U.S. partici-
pation as the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations until his death in late 1966. He
was succeeded by William M. Roth, who con-
tinues to serve as Special Representative.
The agreements signed June 30 comprise :
1. A Final Act, which authenticates the texts
of the agreements described in paragraphs 2-5
below and which expresses the intention of all
the signatories to take appropriate steps, sub-
ject to their constitutional procedures, to put
these agreements into effect.
2. The Geneva (1967) Protocol to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
embodies most of the tariff and other conces-
sions exchanged in the negotiations.
3. An agreement relating primarily to chemi-
cals, which provides for the elimmation of the
American Selling Price system.
4. A memorandimi of agreement on basic ele-
ments for a world grains arrangement.
* Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5240 ;
for background and text of the Long-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement, see BtTLUETiN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 430.
' For a summary of the act, see iWd., Oct. 29, 1962,
p. 6o5.
95
5. An agreement on implementation of article
VI of the GATT, in the form of a code of anti-
dumping practices.
The negotiations were concluded in all essen-
tial respects in INIay at a series of high-level
meetings in Geneva. Since that time, the nego-
tiators liave been putting the details of their
concessions and understandings into the final
conference documents.
It is estimated that the agreements will apply
to about $40 billion of world trade. In industry,
the United States and the other countries have
agreed on cuts averaging about 35 percent. In
agriculture, the average cut is less, but the
United States has obtained important conces-
sions covering a substantial volume of trade.
Full details of the specific tariff reductions
granted and obtained will be published in a
final report on the negotiations to be issued by
the Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations in mid-July. This final re-
port will give information on all changes in
U.S. import duties and on the concessions of
principal interest to the United States made by
other participants in the negotiations. The
schedules of concessions annexed to the agree-
ment will contain more than 4,000 pages.
U.S. tariff reductions will not enter into
force until proclaimed by the President. It is
expected that their effective date will be Jan-
uary 1, 1968. In accordance with the require-
ments of the Trade Expansion Act, most U.S.
duty reductions will be made in five equal
annual stages starting January 1.
In overall trade terms, covering both indus-
trial and agricultural products, the tariff cuts
made by the United States are in balance with
those of the other industrialized countries. In
terms of 1966 trade the United States is giving
tariff cuts on about $71/2 billion to $8 billion of
industrial and agricultural imports and is ob-
taining tariff' concessions on about the same
amount of U.S. exports.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gave the
President authority to make the tariff conces-
sions to which the Kennedy Round agreement
will commit the United States.
None of the multilateral agreements nego-
tiated in the Kennedy Round will require con-
gressional action except the agreement provid-
ing for the elimination of the ASP system with
^ respect to chemicals. The world grains arrange-
ment envisaged by the memorandum of agree-
ment on grains will require consent of two-
thirds of the Senate.
Industrial Negotiations
Import duties are being cut in half on a broad
range of industrial products in international
trade. Cuts in the 35 to 50 percent range are be-
ing made on many more products. Categories of
products on which the principal negotiating
countries, including the United States, have
made cuts that in the aggregate average over
35 percent include: machinery, both electrical
and nonelectrical ; photographic equipment and
supplies; automobile and other transport equip-
ment; optical, scientific, and professional in-
struments and equipments; paper and paper
products; books and other printed material;
fabricated metal products; and lumber and
wood products, including furniture.
Steel Sector
Negotiations on steel were conducted against
a backgroiuid of tariff rates where U.S. duties
are generally lower than those of other par-
ticipants. These negotiations, held bilaterally
and multilaterally, resulted in closer harmoni-
zation of tariffs among the major steel pro-
ducing countries. Virtually all the peaks in
these countries' tariffs were eliminated, so that
almost all rates will be no higher than 15 per-
cent and most will be well below 10 percent.
Except for U.S. rates, most steel tariffs have
not heretofore been boimd. In the final nego-
tiating package, however, almost all rates of
other countries were bound and many were
reduced.
The international harmonization of steel
tariffs should also reduce the tendency for ex-
ports to be deflected to the U.S. market in in-
stances where U.S. tariffs were much lower
than those of other countries. Although the
United States is primarily an importer rather
than an exporter of steelmill products, lower
tariffs abroad will also provide opportunities
for U.S. exporters.
The European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) adoj^ted a miified tariff and agi-eed to
reduce rates to an arithmetic average of 5.7
percent. The European Economic Community
(EEC) agreed to reduce rates within its juris-
diction correspondingly so that a tariff relation-
ship would be maintained between more highly
fabricated EEC steel items and primary and
less fabricated ECSC items. The ECSC/EEC
concessions are a 23 percent reduction from
existing rates (a 10 percent reduction from the
pre-February 1964 rates on 1964 imports from
the United States) .
96
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United Kingdom is reducing most of its
rates by 20 percent. Japan is reducing its rates
by 50 percent except for a few alloy steel items.
Sweden is binding its rates at existing low
levels. Austria is harmonizing its tariffs with
the ECSC/EEC at a somewhat higher level.
Tlie U.S. reductions average 7 percent on
1964 imports. It is generally harmonizing its
tarilfs with the ECSC/EEC where they have
been above those rates. U.S. rates higher than
ECSC/EEC rates are to be reduced to ECSC/
EEC levels, but no cuts are to be made where
rates are now below ECSC/EEC concession
levels. U.S. concessions take account of differ-
ences between the United States f.o.b. and
ECSC/EEC c.i.f. customs valuation systems so
that, nominally, U.S. rates would be somewhat
higher than ECSC/EEC rates. Also, the differ-
ential in the U.S. tariff between ordinary and
alloy steel is being reduced by 50 percent but is
not being eliminated as complete harmonization
would have required.
Aluminmn Sector
The Community offer consisted of a binding
of a 130,000-ton annual quota at 5 percent. The
EEC had previously bound in the GATT a 9
percent rate of duty on ingot aluminum. Some
imports were allowed entry amiually under a
tariff quota at 5 percent, but neither the amount
of the quota nor the lower rate had been bound.
The United States is making a 20 percent cut
on ingot aluminum, of benefit primarily to
Canada and Norway.
On unwrought aluminum (further advanced
than ingot), tariff cuts by the United States
averaged less than 30 percent. The EEC aver-
age cut was about one-third, while the tariff
cuts by the U.K. and Canada were larger than
those of the EEC. Other EFTA [European
Free Trade Association] countries and Japan
also made substantial cuts in the alimiinum sec-
tor. Of special interest to U.S. aluminiun ex-
porters will be the adoption by Canada of an
injury requirement in its antidumping legisla-
tion to conform to the new antidumping
agreement.
Chemical Sector
The chemical sector negotiations were cen-
tered on the American Selling Price issue.
European countries maintained from the start
that any more than token reductions in their
chemical tariffs were conditional on U.S. elimi-
nation of the ASP valuation system. Since elim-
ination of ASP would require congressional
action, U.S. negotiators insisted that chemical
concessions be implemented in two packages:
first, a balanced settlement in the Kennedy
Round ; second, reciprocal concessions by other
countries in return for abolition of ASP.
The pattern and volume of chemical trade is
such that the outcome of negotiations in this
sector inevitably played a major role in the
outcome of the entire Kennedy Round. U.S.
dutiable chemical imports fi-om countries with a
major stake in world chemical trade (EEC,
United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland) were
$325 million in 1964; these countries' dutiable
chemical imports fi'om the United States
totaled nearly $900 million.
In the end, all major Kennedy Round partici-
pants made concessions in the chemical sector.
Many concessions have been agreed on uncon-
ditionally, while certain other concessions are
conditional on United States elimination of the
American Selling Price valuation system.
The concessions on chemicals are, therefore,
in two parts : first, the Kennedy Round chemical
package, and second, the ASP package.
The Kennedy Round Chemical Package : Un-
conditional obligations undertaken in the Ken-
nedy Roimcl are as follows:
1. The United States agreed to duty reduc-
tions on products accounting for nearly all (95
percent) of U.S. dutiable chemical imports.
Tariffs will be reduced 50 percent on most items
with rates above 8 percent ; 20 percent on items
8 percent and below. These commitments will
result in a weighted average duty reduction of
43 percent in United States chemical tariffs on
$325 million of dutiable imports from the EEC,
U.K., Japan, and Switzerland. The combined
tariff' reduction made by these four participants
averages 26 percent on nearly $900 million of
U.S. chemical exports, and the United States
retains the ASP method of valuation for ben-
zenoid chemicals.
2. The European Economic Community
agreed to duty reductions on tariff items ac-
counting for 98 percent of its dutiable chemical
imports from the United States. Most duties
will be reduced by 20 percent. Certain items,
however, will be subject to reductions of 30 per-
cent and 35 percent, while some others will be
reduced less than 20 percent. These commit-
ments will result in a weighted average reduc-*'
tion of 20 percent in EEC tariffs on $460 mil-
lion of 1964 chemical imports from the United
States.
JULY 24, 1967
97
3. The United Kingdom agreed to duty re-
ductions on virtually all chemical imports from
the United States except certain plastics. Most
British plastics duties are curi-ently 10 percent,
a level considerably lower than other major
trading countries. The United Kingdom has
agreed to reduce tariffs at rates of 25 percent
and above by 30 percent, and rates below 25
percent by 20 percent. These commitments will
result in a weighted average reduction of 24
percent in United Kingdom imports of more
than $100 million of chemicals from the United
States.
4. Japan agreed to tariff reductions which on
a weighted a.verage basis amount to 44 percent
on dutiable chemical imports from the United
States. These imports were over $200 million
in 1964.
5. Switzerland agreed to tariff reductions
which on a weighted average basis amoimt to
49 percent on $45 million of chemical imports
from the United States.
6. Other participants, notably Canada and
the Scandinavian countries, agreed to reduc-
tions in their chemical tariffs as part of their
Kennedy Roimd concessions.
The ASP Package: The following conces-
sions are contingent on U.S. elimination of
the ASP valuation system :
1. The United States would eliminate ASP
and replace rates currently based on ASP with
rates that have been proposed by the Tariff
Connnission to be applied on the valuation as
normally calculated for other U.S. imports and
yielding the same revenue as the pi'evious rates.
These "converted" rates would be reduced by
stages, generally by 50 percent or to an ad
valorem equivalent of 20 percent, whichever is
lower. The principal exceptions to this formula
are dyes and sulfa drugs, duties on which would
be reduced to 30 percent and 25 percent, respec-
tively. In addition, the United States would
reduce the 8 percent and below rates subject to
the 20 percent cut in the Kennedy Round pack-
age by a further 30 percent and further reduce
by more than 50 percent a few other items to the
20 percent level. These reductions would pro-
vide a combined weighted average cut on U.S.
chemical tariffs in the Kennedy Round and
ASP packages of about 48 percent on $325
million of imports.
2. The European Economic Community
■would reduce its chemical tariffs by an addi-
tional amoimt so as to achieve a combined Ken-
nedy Round-ASP package reduction of 46
percent on $460 million of chemical imports
from the United States. Virtually all EEC
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 121/2 per-
cent or below. Belgium, France, and Italy would
also modify road-use taxes so as to eliminate
discrimination against American-made auto-
mobiles.
3. The United Kingdom would reduce most
of its chemical tariffs according to the following
formula: Items at present dutiable at 25 per-
cent and above would be reduced to a level of
121/2 percent, for a 62 percent combined Ken-
nedy Round and ASP package reduction. Tariff
items with duties of less than 25 percent would
generally be reduced by the amoimt necessary
to achieve a combined reduction of 50 percent
in the two packages. U.K. plastics tariffs which
would be above the reduced EEC rate on the
same item would be cut to that level and bound.
The combined weighted average reduction in
the level of British chemical tariffs on U.S.
trade would be approximately 47 percent on
$170 million of imports from the United States.
After these reductions virtually all British
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 12i/^ percent
or below. The United Kingdom would also re-
duce by 25 percent its margin of preference on
imports of tobacco.
4. Switzerland would eliminate limitations
on imports of canned fruit preserved with com
syrup.
Textile Sector
Most importing countries reduced tariffs on
cotton, manmade, and wool textiles less than
their average reduction in other industrial prod-
ucts as a whole. The United States agreed to
tariff reductions which, on a weighted trade
basis, averaged approximately 14 percent for
the three fibers. Cotton textiles were reduced
21 percent; manmade textiles, 15 percent; and
wool textiles, 2 percent.
Negotiations on cotton textiles involved three
elements : the extension of the Long-Term Cot-
ton Textile Arrangement, more liberal access
to import markets protected by the LTA, and
tariff reductions. The principal concessions by
exporting countries of interest to importing
countries was the extension of the LTA in its
present form until September 30, 1970. In re-
turn, importing countries agreed to enlarged
98
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quotas under LTA provisions and to tariff
reductions.
Within the context of the LTA, the United
States negotiated bilateral agi-eements with its
main supplying countries. Tliese agreements
typically provided for a 5 percent annual in-
crease in LTA quotas, a one-time bonus for
LTA extension, and certain other administra-
tive improvements.
The United States agreed to cotton textile
tariff reductions that amounted to a weighted
average reduction of 21 percent. Keductions on
apparel items averaged 17 percent; fabrics
tariffs were reduced 24 percent; and yarn, 28
percent.
The EEC reduced cotton textile tariffs by
about 20 percent. It also reached bilateral
understandings with major suppliers provid-
ing for improved access to the EEC market.
Noting that it already accorded liberal access
for imports from Hong Kong, India, and other
Commonwealth sources, the United Kingdom
made token cotton textile tariff reductions
toward other suppliers.
The United States agreed to a weighted aver-
age tariff reduction of 15 percent on imports of
manmade-fiber textiles, excluding fibers. Man-
made-fiber apparel duties were reduced by an
average of approximately 6 percent ; fabrics, by
18 percent; yarn, by 37 percent. Other coun-
tries made significant reductions on these
textiles.
The United States agreed to tariff reductions
on very few wool textiles. The weighted aver-
age duty reduction on wool fabric was about 1
percent; on wool apparel, about 2 percent. On
total wool textile imports the average duty
reduction was 2 jaercent. Other coimtries made
considerably greater reductions on wool
textiles.
Paper, Pulp, and Lumber
Multilateral sector negotiations were
planned for paper and pulp, largely in an effort
to get the EEC to make meaningful tariff
reductions of interest to'the Nordic countries
and Canada as well as the United States.
Although some multilateral discussions were
held, negotiations were essentially bilateral. A
long series of discussions resulted in EEC cuts
of 50 percent on pulp and about 25 percent on
paper. Canada and the EFTA countries also
made significant concessions on pa.per products
exjDorted by the United States. In return, the
United States made comparable concessions.
NontarifF Barriers
Antidwm/ping Code
A major accomplishment in the field of non-
tariff barriers was the negotiation of an anti-
dumping code. In addition to the United States,
the major participants in this negotiation were
the United Kingdom, the European Economic
Community, Japan, Canada, and the Scandi-
navian countries.
Negotiation of the antidumping code cen-
tered on the consideration of international
standards. Although U.S. legislation is consist-
ent with the GATT, foreign complaints wei-e
directed against U.S. procedures. These con-
cerned, particularly, the frequent withholding
of appraisement during antidumping investi-
gations and the length of time taken in
investigations. (Withholding of appraisement
postpones the final determination of customs
duties until an antidumping investigation is
completed. However, imports may be released
under bond from customs custody after
appraisement is withheld.)
The antidumping code supplements the pro-
visions of article VI of the GATT with rules
and procedures to be followed in antidumping
actions. U.S. legislation and administrative
reg-ulations contain detailed provisions relating
to the determination of sales at less than fair
value and injury, but most countries' proce-
dures lack such specificity.
The principal advantages of the antidumping
code to the United States will be the adoption
by other countries of fair and open procedures
along the lines of present U.S. practices. The
code will provide both an opportunity and a
basis for U.S. exporters to defend their interests
in foreign antidumping actions. In particular,
the new common antidumping regulations that
are being developed by the European Economic
Community will conform with the code.
Of special benefit to the LTnited States will be
the adoption by Canada of an injury require-
ment in its antidumping legislation. The lack of
such a requirement has impeded U.S. exports
for many years.
Because the antidumping code is consistent
with existing U.S. law, no legislative changes
are required. However, the Treasury Depart-
JTJLT 24, 1967
ment will revise its regulations to conform with
the code. The principal change in present proce-
dures will concern limiting the time period dur-
ing which appraisement is withheld to a maxi-
mum of 90 days m most cases. Both foreign ex-
porters and domestic importers and j^roducers
favor a reduction of the time taken in antidump-
ing cases. Also, invest) gations will not be initi-
ated unless there is evidence of injury.
Other Nontarif Barriers
In addition to the negotiation of an anti-
dumping code, the principal nontariff accom-
plishment is the agreement to take action on the
nontariff barriers included in the conditional
chemical package; that is, the elimination for
certain chemicals of the American Selling Price
system of valuation by the United States, the
elimination of the discriminatory aspects of
automobile road-use taxes in France, Italy, and
Belgium, and the modification by Switzerland
of regulations on canned fruit, as well as a re-
duction by the United Kingdom m the margin
of preference on unmanufactured tobacco.
There were also a few other nontariff achieve-
ments as a result of bilateral discussions. In the
negotiations Austria agi-eed to eliminate the
discriminatory effect of automobile road-use
taxes on larger engined U.S. automobiles.
Canada eliminated a restriction prohibiting im-
ports of fresh fruits and vegetables in s^-bushel
baskets. Canada also ceased applying the Cana-
dian sales tax to the full value of aircraft en-
gines repaired in the United States. The 11 per-
cent sales tax is now applied only to the value of
the repairs. In addition, Canada modified re-
strictive standards applying to aircraft engines
repaired abroad.
Although not a subject for negotiation, quan-
titative restrictions were eliminated or modified
by several countries. Of particular importance
to the United States are the elimination of re-
strictions in the United Kingdom on fresh
grapefruit and in Denmark and Finland on
many agricultural products. Japan agreed to
liberalize quota restrictions on some products.
Several developing countries specified action
on various nontariff measures as part of their
contributions to the negotiations. These included
the introtluction of certain tariff reforms, the
liberalization of licensing systems and foreign
exchange controls, and the elimination or reduc-
tion of prior-deposit requirements and tariff
surcharges.
Agriculture
The United States originally set as a goal in
the agricultural negotiations the same broad
trade coverage and depth of tariff cuts as
achieved for industrial products. This did not
prove negotiable, however. The European Eco-
nomic Community, when the negotiations got
miderway, was still in the process of developing
its Common Agi'icultural Policy. It was reluc-
tant to make substantial cuts in the level of pro-
tection at the same time it was formulating a
Common Agricultural Policy among the six
members. The results of the agricultural nego-
tiations with the Community are therefore con-
siderably moi'e modest than the results achieved
in industry. Nevertheless, progress was made in
the negotiations in reducing barriers to agri-
cultural trade.
The United States was able to obtain signif-
icant agricultural concessions from Japan,
Canada, and the U.K., the Nordic countries, and
Switzerland. The EEC made tariff cuts on
agricultural items of trade value to the United
States of over $200 million.
No progress was made in negotiating down
the trade restrictive effects of the variable-levy
system of the EEC. Offers made by the Com-
munity on the basis of this system were not
accepted.
The agricultural negotiations were divided
into so-called commodity groups and nongroup
or tariff items. The commodity groups included
meats, dairy products, and grains. Of the com-
modity groups only grams yielded positive
results.
Grains
A new grains arrangement was negotiated
that establishes a minimum price for U.S. No.
2 hard red winter ordinary wheat f.o.b. Gulf
ports at $1.73 per bushel. Tliis represents an
increase of about 21.5 cents per bushel over the
equivalent minimum price for U.S. hard red
winter ordinai-y under the present International
Wheat Agreement.^ There will be a comparable
increase in the minimum price of other grades
and qualities of wheat under the new
arrangements.
Market prices are currently above the mini-
mum prices of the new arrangement, but the new
minimum prices should establish an effective
floor under U.S. wheat exports for the 3 years
» TIAS 5240, 605T.
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of the arrangement. Adequate provision is made
for adjusting differentials for various grades
and qualities of wheat as required if trading
prices should fall to the minimum. There is
nothing in the arrangement that will prevent
U.S. wheat from being priced competitively as
required.
Participating countries have agreed to con-
tribute 4I/2 million tons of cereals to a multi-
lateral food aid program. The U.S. share of
this program will be 42 percent of the total, or
slightly less than 2 million tons. Importing
countries as a whole will contribute about 2
million tons of the total. The grains arrange-
ment thus represents further progress toward
one of the United States' key objectives of
foreign aid, the multilateral sharing of the food
burden.
Meat and Dairy Products
During most of the Kennedy Round, the
countries principally involved in world trade
in fresh, chilled, and frozen beef and veal, and
in butter, cheese, and dry milk, sought to
negotiate general international arrangements
for these products. The purpose of these negoti-
ations was to provide for acceptable conditions
of access to world markets in furtherance of a
significant development and expansion of world
trade in agricultural products, consistent with
tlie principle agreed by the GATT ministers at
the outset of the negotiations. Although these
negotiations continued until late in the Ken-
nedy Round, it was not possible to work out an
acceptable multilateral arrangement. Countries
then shifted to bilateral negotiations, through
which they were able in some cases to negotiate
improved access to important markets.
The United States made no offers on fresh,
chilled, or frozen beef or veal. The duty on
canned ham was bound but no reduction made.
We did not reduce the duty on domestic types of
raw wool. No offers were made on any products
subject to quotas, including butter, dry milk,
and certain types of cheese. On certain nonquota
cheese, cuts averaging 13 percent were made.
Agricultural Tariff Items
Tlie United States achieved a wide range of
concessions from its principal negotiating
partners, which should improve the export op-
portunities for such products as soybeans,
tallow, tobacco, poultry, and horticultural
products, including citrus and camied fruit.
In particular, the United States and Canada
negotiated a balance of agricultural concessions
covering a substantial range of products.
The Developing Countries
The United States negotiated with the de-
veloping countries on the basis of the plan
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee,
the steering committee of the Sixth Round.
One of the objectives of the negotiations, that
of reducing barriers to exports of developing
countries to the maximum extent possible, was
taken into account in the plan. The plan also
took into accoimt the ministerial decisions to
the effect that developed countries could not
expect to receive full reciprocity from the
developing countries in trade negotiations and
that the contributions of developing countries
should be considered in the light of the develop-
ment, trade, and fuiancial needs of those
countries.
Accordingly, the United States made conces-
sions of benefit to developing coimtries, includ-
ing nonparticipants, which cover over $900
million of their exjDorts. Included in these con-
cessions will be the complete elimination of the
duty on more than $325 million of imports from
these countries. Moreover, the elimination of
duties on $45 million of these products does not
need to be staged over a 4-year period and thus
meets one of the more important desiderata of
the developing countries. Since many of the con-
cessions on tropical products were negotiated in
the context of joint action by industrialized
countries, the total benefits which developing
countries will receive were further increased.
Ten developing countries made concessions
benefiting the United States.
JTILT 24, 1967
101
Institution-Building and the Alliance for Progress
ty Covey T. Oliver
Assistant Secretary -designate for Inter- American Affairs ^
I am delighted to have this opportunity to
share with my fellow members of the World
Affairs Council of Philadelpliia a few thoughts
on Latin American development and the Al-
liance for Progress.
When we think of Latin America and the Al-
liance, the characterizing word is "change" —
urgent, basic, needed change. The Alliance was
created to answer the needs of swiftly chang-
ing times, and indeed the Alliance already has
been the engine for vast and sweeping changes
in this hemisphere.
Sometimes changes are completely unex-
pected : Wlien, on May 16, 1967, I accepted the
invitation to talk here, I certainly did not fore-
see the rather substantial change that has since
occurred in my own relationship with Latin
America !
The nature of the change between my former
professional responsibilities and my new official
ones recalls to my mind an experience of more
than 20 years ago, when I was a member of the
American delegation at the Paris Peace Con-
ference. During one session, I, as a Govei-nment
"expert," sat directly behind a distinguished
congressional member of that delegation. Sen-
ator Arthur Vandenberg. The Soviet bloc was
blocking. There were long speeches repeating
endlessly the same dreary Marxistese (we were
just learning how dully repetitive the Red dele-
gates could be). During most of the long, bor-
ing, irritating session, Senator Vandenberg,
smoking cigar after cigar, listened quietly and
' Address made before the World Affairs Council at
Philadelphia, Pa., on June 7. Mr. Oliver was sworn in
on June 30 as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress.
kept his pencil moving — working on an elabo-
rate doodle of the Great Seal of the United
States with fine draftsmanship and beautiful
shadings. As the session droned on, the Senator
finally pushed his chair back and, as he rose to
leave, briefly turned to me and said, "Young
man, life was a lot simpler for me when I was
an isolationist."
Life was simpler for me as a professor speak-
ing on what ought to be done about development
than ever it will be as U.S. Coordinator of the
Alliance, trying actually to get things done.
But I look forward to these new duties with
optimism and with sober awareness of our
country's interests and opportunities in helping
the New World to become a better place for all
its people to live in. It has been my good fortune
to have spent some memorable years in various
roles in the Alliance area and to have worked
closely with our good neighbors to the south. I
am happy that so many of these good neighbors
are also good friends, whose aspirations I be-
lieve I understand, whose views I respect, whose
amistad — even carino — I cherish.
Thus, with considerable development-oriented
field experience with one of the larger AID
[Agency for International Development] pro-
grams, with familiarity with the languages and
cultures of Alliance coimtries, with a firm be-
lief in the need for development, I approach
with a measure of confidence the big and difficult
job of directing the United States programs in
support of the Alliance. So while there are ties
that will always link me fraternally with this
city and with the university, I could not have
let go by this unexpected opportunity to return
once again for a while to Government service —
particularly at this time, when a spirit of change
characterizes inter-American affairs.
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Embarking Upon "the Decade of Urgency"
It is clear that we are entering a new era in
the Americas — an era of renewal of expecta-
tions, of sighting new horizons, of moving on
toward them. The Summit Meeting of the Presi-
dents of America ^ focused world attention anew
on the Alliance for Progress. It will stand his-
torically as a milestone in hemispheric history.
It marks the turning point between what might
be called the first phase of the Alliance and this
new, second phase we have now embarked upon
in the "decade of urgency," as President John-
son has called it.
Standing where we are today, looking back to
where we have been and ahead toward where
we must go with the development, I see three
phases of the Alliance for Progress.
First, there was the organization, mobiliza-
tion, and cori'ection, or "feedback," phase. The
hemisphere had to agree on the nature of the
problems and the goals of our Alliance. It had
to mobilize its efforts — in money, manpower,
and will. But it also had to deal with serious
distortions which impeded economic and social
growth: rampant inflation that robbed middle
and lower income groups of initiative; heavy
debt burdens that could not be amortized with
current income ; currency, balance-of-payments,
and other difficulties that made economic and
social growth almost impossible. These prob-
lems are still with us, but Latin America has a
much better grip on them, and they now seem
manageable.
The adjustments which Latin American
countries have made in the early years of the
Alliance have been painful, demanding in per-
sonal and political courage. As I participated
in the development and execution of Alliance
policies from 1964 to 1966, I can attest that the
task of development is not easy for them. But I
can also attest that our neighbors truly want to
better themselves in lasting and self-reliant
ways. They are too much men and women at-
tuned to human dignity to be satisfied with doles
and relief. For them and for us the goals are
the same, and we move together along the road
to them, helping each other over the rough
places. As we travel this road, we come to places
from which, across the valleys ahead, we also
see the peaks we would attain, glimpsed sudden-
' For statements by President .Johnson and text of
the Declaration of the Presidents of America, see
Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 706.
ly in such splendor as not to be forgotten as we
move on.
The Summit Meeting was such a place on the
road. There the hemisphere's highest political
leaders met, assessed our modest but encourag-
ing progi'ess, and gave direction for vigorous
new steps forward.
Thus — to leave my metaphor — while we are
still working in many places on the first phase
of the Alliance, the Presidents clearly outlined
both the second and third phases : a major effort
on institution-building and concrete measures
to achieve a Common Market by 1985.
Intermediate Phase of the Alliance
While we should never lose sight of the ulti-
mate goals tied to hemispheric unity, it is the
new, intermediate phase that I want to discuss
with you.
Latin America has many dreams but probably
none that its people more passionately seek to
fulfill than those of democratic growth and
social justice. We share that dream, for nothing
is more precious to us than human dignity, the
worthwhileness of the individual person as a
child of God ; free and democratic institutions ;
and, as our great Declaration bravely given in
this City of Brotherly Love puts it, "the pur-
suit of Happiness."
We must, therefore, help create, strengthen,
modify, and build institutions that provide:
— the opportunity for all to share equitably
in the cost of building their country with the
assurance that their contributions are used wise-
ly and honestly.
— the opportunity for the farmer to own land,
to obtain credit, and to market his production at
fair prices.
— the opportimity for youth to obtain an edu-
cation and to make an intelligent and meaning-
ful contribution to society while preparing also
to lead it witliin short years.
— the opportunity for the worker to get work
and to be rewarded properly for his labor.
— the opportunity for business to invest im-
der just and equitable laws and earn fair
returns.
— the opportunity for all to stand equally be-
fore the law without fear or favor and to live
out their years in peace, honor, and social
effectiveness.
Let me be specific: Improved productivity
and greater monetary stability alone are not
JTJIiT 24, 1967
103
enough; there must be modernization of exist-
ing institutions and the development of new
ones. Many of these changes there, as here, re-
quire state action — legishition, law, public ad-
ministration. There must be changes in distri-
bution, in the processes for meeting the exj^ec-
tations of various groups in the social structure.
As we move into an intermediate stage of the
Alliance, wherein human needs and hopes, in-
stitution-building, and modernization will be
principal themes, we note with satisfaction that
our Alliance-oriented operations in the first, or
stability-seeking, phase have themselves had im-
portant relationships to social and politicocul-
tural goals. A good example is taxation. The
development of fair, effective, and respected
systems of taxation is a major objective of exist-
ing development programs in a number of
countries. From one point of view, "technical
assistance" is involved, as we have made avail-
able experts and tax technology. Technical as-
sistance is an original and still useful aspect of
development help — at one time the only civilian
kind we offered to Latin America. The "tax
projects" are also related to fiscal stability — a
short-range, or "precondition," goal — and to a
number of middle-phase goals, ranging from
distributive justice to more local currency re-
sources for social service budgets related to ed-
ucation, health, and the like.
We of the Alliance community have done and
are doing well with "tax reform." Improved
revenue-raising is a mutually recognized devel-
opment objective. We all talk to each other (now
through our experts mainly) about tax matters;
and as to tax issues and ideas, we deal with each
other in ways that in a more traditional era
would have been regarded as improper even for
dialog between different nations.
Land reform is another example. Here, we of
North America have had to disabuse ourselves
of our tendency to generalize about landholding
conditions as if they were the same throughout
the rest of the hemisphere ; and we have had to
reconsider some of our simplistic, though well-
intentioned, notions about the per se virtues of
small holdings, regardless of their relationship
to the subsistence needs of owners and to na-
tional productivity. But here again we have been
working intimately with our neighbors ; and as
part of our programs to increase agricultural
production the landownership, land-develop-
ment, colonization problems are getting intelli-
gent, frank, and continuous attention.
Land utilization, on the other hand, is hardly
in the realm of discourse between us. Regard-
less of who owns them, what should the good
lands — those that are capable of bountiful pro-
duction of a wide range of crops — be used for ?
What is the relationship of land utilization to
nutrition and dietary habits; between govern-
mental policies and incentives for increased ag-
ricultural production ?
Modernizing the Conditions of Rural Life
The Presidents called at Punta del Este for
modernization of the conditions of rural life. It
may be that much that needs to be done along
lines I have just mentioned can be related to this
Presidential sujjport for further study and
work. Additionally, m most countries there lie
ahead :
(a) The development of food processing and
food storage ;
(b) Improved physical facilities for urban-
rural exchanges of goods and services,
(c) Institutional changes in the marketing
process itself.
The first two of these are mainly the business
of private enterprise, whose role in development
is exceedingly important especially in this sec-
ond stage of the development process. The inter-
national agencies and the United States can
help with ideas, feasibility-study financing, and
the supplying of marketing experts under
teclinical assistance. Much of the capital, most
of the risk-taking and innovating initiatives
must come from the private sector in a combina-
tion that is suitable to the times and the fair
needs of all groups involved. Also, the United
States seeks constructive opportunities to help
in the financing of more cooperatives for both
production and marketing, more agricultural
credit mechanisms, and more private investment
funds which can help agroindustry. President
Jolmson has stated he will seek new funds to
help the modernization of agriculture in these
ways.
The program of action agreed by the Presi-
dents at Punta del Este emphasized the need
for "multinational infrastructure projects" as
steps toward economic integration and the Com-
mon Market. One essential for modernization
of the market jirocess in Latin America is
roads — and more roads. Although waterway im-
provement is important in some countries, it
1(M
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIN
is roads, from through highways to rural ac-
cess routes, that are the greatest single need for
increased velocity and efficiency in the exchange
of goods and services within a country and, in-
deed, for exi:)ort and regional trade improve-
ment as well. Intensive roadbuilding programs,
moreover, give jobs to unskilled and semiskilled
labor in countries where far too few of those
seeking work can find it.
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development has been doing laudable de-
velopment work of this nature in particular
countries. At the Summit, the Presidents en-
dorsed the leading role of the Inter- American
Development Bank in studying and financing
multinational projects in such fields as trans-
portation, telecommunications, and hydroelec-
tric power.
Changes in Marketing Process
Institutional changes in the marketing pro-
cess itself are parts of social change. This means
that, first, attitudes and, ultimately, the legal
order must guide the developing countries into
modem patterns of distribution. In the develop-
ing countries there must be more awareness of
free-world experience with the "mix" between
laissez-faire and enforced competition, counter-
vailing power and public regulation, that char-
acterizes developed free economies — and so-
cieties— today.
No single, "all-countries, all-times," mechan-
ical adjustment of public-sector, private-sector
relationships is possible. Each country, each
community, has to work out its own "mix." But
for that to happen in the less developed world
there has to be in that world more awareness
and evaluation of these problems than there has
been. Note, for example, that unlike the Treaty
of Rome creating the European Economic Com-
munity, neither the LAFTA [Latm American
Free Trade Association] nor the Central Amer-
ican Common Market arrangements deal with
monopoly problems.
Does this mean that our AID missions in
Latin America should become involved with
"antitrust" in about the same manner as they
have been with tax reform ? My tentative view
is that our bilateral involvement should be lim-
ited to developing a dialog, giving information,
and sharing research techniques, because in this
field, unlike taxation, there is now such a wide
variety of models in developed country experi-
ence as to encourage caution in putting forward
our own antitrust system as if we thought it the
only approach to coping with restrictive trade
practices and monopolies. But Latin America
must assure competition in the national market-
place if the area is to develop and compete in
world markets.
And we should consider more effective en-
couragement for cooperative and community de-
velopment movements, because these are "of the
peojile" programs that hold promise for wide
popular involvement in all aspects of develop-
ment— social and j^olitical as well as economic.
Educating the "Decisionmakers-To-Be"
Institution-building is now a national process
and must eventually become a community proc-
ess. The dynamism, the know-how, for social
change has to come from within the system.
This means, above all, education of the de-
cisionmakers-to-be. All education is an Alliance
goal, but good university education is an imme-
diate, absolute necessity for the articulate, dis-
satisfied young people who, through their own
energies and frequently over very great diffi-
culties, have made their ways to the public uni-
versities of Latin America with eventual public
leadership in mind. These public universities
are, right now, turning out the decisionmakers
of tomorrow. They are the major civilian en-
gines of social mobility in Latin America — the
only way a poor but energetic and determined
young person can rise in society without joining
the military services. Communists and other ex-
tremists know this quite well. The public uni-
versities are prime targets of the extremist ele-
ments. I consider public university betterment
very urgent.
The greatest substantive needs of the univer-
sities as I now see them are: (a) more full-time
teachers, better trained and with more time to
give to students, and (b) more extensive and
more modern social studies curricula. Students
should have opportunities to study and appraise
all the roads to social justice, not just the illu-
sory— and outdated — Marxist one. As a result
of lack of information as to how societies really
work in developed countries, including even the
U.S.S.R., far too many young Latin Americans
tend to choose some brand of Marxism over free-
world systems, which they mistakenly assume to
be sometliing these systems never were — com-
pletely dominated by heartless, mechanistic con-
cepts of pure laissez-faire capitalism. The stu-
dents should be led to inquiry — factual, scien-
JULT 24, 1967
105
tific inquirj'. The universities themselves should
be enabled to undertake sociocultural, self-dis-
covery, research projects, such as "attitude
studies," for greater understanding of how total
development may occur.
Inter-American studies need almost every-
where in Latin America to be developed, es-
pecially now that economic unification is specifi-
cally foreseen. In universities in the United
States, Latin American studies is a standard
field for teaching and research, and President
Johnson promised his colleagues at Punta del
Este that he would seek further enlargement of
university work here in this sector.
But for the future we all want, we must make
sure that scholarly study and teaching of inter-
American relations is truly a hemispherewide
matter and not one confined to the United States.
University development along the lines that I
have described should not be delayed until the
country has "taken off" in the economic sense,
thus being able to support the improvements
needed out of increased social capital. Many of
these should come sooner by additions to univer-
sity operating budgets to support properly
planned changes in teaching, curriculum, li-
braries, and research.
After some years as a universitarian, I know
how delicate and difficult university changes in-
volving faculty and courses can be. They will be
so in Latin America, in part because in some
quarters there is satisfaction with present ways
of doing things. But every day there are more
intelligent Latin Americans coming to see that
their universities must be modernized as to the
substance of what they teach and how they teach
it. In such a delicate area as this, a bilateral ap-
proach is not as promising as a transnational
one, provided that the latter is vigorous, scien-
tific, and effective. We must, all of us, look
around for the right institution or institutions
to spearhead the important work of university
substantive modernization ; and if we do not find
it, or them, among our existing hemispheric
agencies, we must create one adequate to the
task.
Latin America cannot modernize demo-
cratically without modernized political leaders,
administrators, businessmen. And the mod-
ernization of men should be mainly a national
and regional process, not one that relies too
heavily on sending the leaders-to-be off to the
United States or Europe to be educated, valu-
able though such experiences are. One danger
of the latter course is that he might not come
home — the "brain drain" problem. Another is
that he will not have lived through — grown up
intellectually with — the change of his own
counti-j' and thus be too remote from change
underway when his generation assumes leader-
ship.
Spirit and Purpose of the Alliance
As President Johnson has pointed out, there
is no exact science of development yet. All of us
in the Americas are learning development on
the job. We have learned that hemispheric de-
velopment is not a short-term matter, and our
plans and policies have now recognized that it
is not. We know that the Alliance, although it
springs from past development operations else-
where, has a highly differentiated spirit and
purpose — very special neighborhood character-
istics— of its own. In this country, our apprecia-
tion of the special nature of the AlimiBa is
visible m the broad, bipartisan support the pro-
gram has always had from Congress. Again, a
welcome and significant development was the
addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966
of a section known as title IX, which directs
that, as to the Alliance for Progress, "emphasis
shall be placed on assuring maximum participa-
tion in the task of economic development on the
part of the people of developing countries. . . ."
As we enter a new phase of the Alliance for
Progress, the spirit and mood of inter- American
affairs is encouraging, exciting, and challenging.
The Presidents of America at Punta del Este
laid out a wide-ranging but specific program
of action, based on careful factual studies that
required many months and high and dedicated
talent.
All of us recognize, especially following the
meeting of Presidents, that the burden of solv-
ing these problems falls mainly upon the Latin
Americans themselves. The helping hand that
we of the United States can and do offer rep-
resents only a small part of the effort required
of the hemisphere if we are to move forward to-
gether toward the ultimate Alliance for Prog-
ress goal of bringmg a better life to all the peo-
ples of the Americas.
Throughout the Americas there is renewed ac-
tivity, new confidence. Many and difficult are the
tasks ahead of us. The war on poverty and un-
derdevelopment in the neighborhood is not yet
won. But the strategy for victory has been given
106
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to us by our Presidents. The challenge of great
opportunity is before us. Let us all give in our
respective ways the best we have to give.
As I approach my new role in a Great Em-
prise, I recall great words from a towering
American figure, Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
"If we would guide by the light of Keason, we
must let our minds be bold."
IJC Issues Report on Improvement
of Champlain Waterway
Press release 155 dated July 7
The Department of State announced on July
7 that the United States Government is giving
active consideration to the observations and
recommendations contained in the report on
"Improvement of International Champlain
Waterway for Commercial Navigation" pre-
pared by the International Joint Commission,
United States-Canada. The report was released
by the Commission on July 7.
The report of the Commission finds that the
construction of an improved waterway from
the St. Lawrence Eiver in Canada through Lake
Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany,
N.Y., would present no insurmomitable engi-
neering problems.
On the other hand, the Commission found
that the development of such an improved
waterway for purposes of commercial naviga-
tion is not economically feasible.
Because of the wide disparity between the
benefits and costs of improving the waterway
for commercial navigation, the Commission be-
lieves no further studies of this project are
warranted.
The Commission also recommended that the
United States and Canadian Governments "pur-
sue policies designed to preserve and enhance
the natural beauty, the water quality and the
recreational potential of the Champlain-Riche-
lieu area." The Water Resources Council, es-
tablished under the Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965, has underway an active program
of comprehensive water and related land re-
sources planning, including the United States
portion of Lake Champlain and adjacent
United States areas. This study will undoubt-
edly address itself to this reconmaendation.
The Commission noted that the best route
for a canal requiring only minimum improve-
ment would be along the existing waterway.
The most practicable route for a modern barge
canal or deep-draft ship channel would be along
the existing waterway in the United States, the
Richelieu River in Canada to the vicinity of
St. Jean, and then by a direct overland route
to La Prairie Basin.
Copies of the Commission's report are avail-
able at the offices of the United States Section
of the International Joint Commission, 1711
New York Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C.
20440.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Collective Defense Treaties. Maps, texts of treaties, a
chronology, status of forces agreements, and com-
parative chart. House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
April 10, 1967. 523 pp. [Committee print.]
War or Peace in the Middle East? Report to the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator
Joseph S. Clark on a study mission to Greece, the
United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Israel. April 10,
1967.22 pp. [Committee print]
Encouraging Private Participation in International
Activities. Hearings before the Subcommittee on In-
ternational Organizations and Movements of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7484.
Part I, Testimony of Members of Congress. April 18
and 20, 1967. 85 pp.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma. Report to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Sen-
ator Clifford P. Case, member of the U.S. delegation
to the 21st U.N. General Assembly. April 1967. 37 pp.
[Committee print.]
The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round.
Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
May i, 1967. IS pp. [Subcommittee print]
Expansion of Livestock Exports. Report of the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business on Potentials
and Problems of Expanding Trade in U.S. Quality
Meat Products Together With Additional Views. S.
Rept 343. June 12, 1967. 43 pp.
U.S. Committee for the International Human Rights
Tear. Report to accompany S. 990. S. Rept 344. Jtme
13, 1967. 5 pp.
Modern Communications and Foreign Policy. Report
No. 5 of the Subcommittee on International Orga-
nizations and Movements of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, together with hearings before the
subcommittee February 8-9, 1967, part X, "Winning
the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive."
H. Rept. 362. June 13, 1967. 240 pp.
JULY 24, 19CT
107
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and Status of Jerusalem;
Rejects Other Resolutions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
Following are statements made on July 3 and
Jj. l)y U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldierg
during the fifth emergency special session of the
U.N. General Assembly, together with the texts
of resolutio-ns on ^^humanitarian assistance" and
'■''measures taken hy Israel to change the status
of the City of Jerusalem" which tcere adopted
hy the Assembly on July }^.
STATEMENT OF JULY 3
U.S. /U.N. press release 117, Corr. 1
As we approach a vote on the pending resolu-
tions, this General Assembly can have but one
overriding purpose in the spirit of our common
charter: a stable, enduring, and just peace in
the Middle East.
Wliat must be done to achieve this purpose
of peace? The essential steps, as my Govern-
ment sees them, can be suimned up in 10 points :
1. Without delay, armed forces should be dis-
engaged and withdrawn to their own ter-
ritories; and without delay, any claims to a
state of war or belligerency should be
terminated.
2. The right of every member of the United
Nations in the area to maintain an independ-
ent national state of its own and to live in peace
should be respected by every other member.
3. The territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of all the states in the area should
be respected and assured by appropriate
arrangements.
4. Vital security interests of all states in the
area should be protected.
5. All states in the area should refrain in
their mutual relations from the threat or use
of force in any manner whatsoever.
6. The rights of all nations to freedom of
navigation and of innocent passage through in-
ternational waterways should be respected.
7. A just and permanent settlement of the
refugee problems should be conchided.
8. The development of national economies
and the improvement of the living standards
of the jieople should take precedence over a
wasteful arms race in the area.
9. The safeguarding of the holy places, and
freedom of access to them for all, should be in-
ternationally guaranteed; and the status of
Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided
not unilaterally but in consultation with all
concerned.
10. International arrangements should be
made to help the parties achieve all these re-
sults, including appropriate assistance from the
United Nations or other thii'd parties.
U.S. Position on Pending Resolutions
It is in the light of these views that we have
decided the position of the United States on
the two major resolutions which are about to
come to a vote. I wish to state that position ex-
plicitly and our reasons for it.
The United States will vote for the resolu-
tion presented by the 19 Latin American
states.^
The United States will vote against the res-
olution presented by Yugoslavia and 16 other
members.^
A basic diiference exists between these two
resolutions — a difference which no embellish-
ments or details can obscure.
The Yugoslav text proposes to deal with the
problem of peace and security in the Middle
East by calling basically for one fundamental
' U.N. doc. A/L. 523/Rev. 1.
" U.N. doc. A/L. 522/Rev. 3/Corr. 1.
108
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
action : the witlulruwal of Israel's forces "to the
positions they held prior to 5 June 1967." It
leaves untouched the other half of the problem
which must be immediately addressed if the de-
mands of the charter are to be satisfied : namely,
the persistent claim by certain members of this
organization of the right to annihilate another
member. This claim, which directly affronts the
charter and every sense of fairness, is to be left
imimpaired — and those who assert it are to be
left free, at a time of their own choosing, to
make good on it by force.
Indeed, the Yugoslav text contains no clear
provision to deal with any of the longstanding
grievances and causes of conflict which have
kept the Middle East in a fever of tension for
20 years.
Let me emphasize that the successive revi-
sions of paragi-aph 6 in the Yugoslav draft have
not cured the basic defects of this resolution.
Paragraph 1, concerning withdrawal, could not
be more clear and definite. Paragraph 6, con-
cerning "all aspects of the situation'* is vague
in the extreme.
The effect of this Yugoslav text, as revised,
is obvious. It calls for withdrawal now, and
every other essential step is left to the uncertain
future. In particular it makes no connection
whatever between withdrawal and the end of
claims of belligerency — claims which are among
the leading causes of all of the troubles of the
past.
The Latin American text, on the other hand,
treats at one and the same time both of the most
vital necessities of peace. Its first paragraph
combines, on an equal basis, the withdrawal of
Israel's forces with the ending of all claims to
a state of belligerency and with efforts to create
"conditions of coexistence based on good neigh-
bourliness." It recognizes that we face a situa-
tion whose two aspects are interdependent, that
neither aspect can be solved in isolation from
the other.
Certainly any fair and meaningful reading
of our charter must lead to the same conclusion.
If the charter is to be invoked — as indeed it
must — to require withdrawal of troops in the
name of territorial integrity, then surely it
must be invoked also — and equally and at the
same time — to require an end to claims of the
right to wage war.
Unless the governments in the area are pre-
pared to refrain from these totally unfounded
claims of belligerency, there obviously can be no
peace. Cooperation to assure troop disengage-
ment and withdrawal — and the other essentials
of peace — must by definition be a two-way
street. The Assembly can hardly endorse a for-
mula in which one side is free to assert that
there is a state of war and the other side is
asked to behave as if there were not.
A choice must be made between the claims of
war and the claims of peace.
Of all the claims of peace, none is more fun-
damental, as every member of this Assembly
must recognize, than the right of a sovereign
state, a member of the United Nations, to have
its existence and its independence respected. In
no other case in the history of the United Na-
tions have members of this organization failed
to accord this elemental right to another
member.
This right has been the subject of important
statements during this debate from a wide
range of speakers. On June 19, in fact, in the
opening statement of the debate, we heard
Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union de-
clare, as "one of the fundamental principles" of
his country's policy, that "every people enjoys
the right to establish an independent national
state of its own." We do not see this point re-
ferred to in the Yugoslav resolution.
Again, at our very last meeting on Friday,
we heard the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Dr.
[Hector] Luisi, declare among the first condi-
tions of peace "the recognition by the parties
to this dispute of the irrevocability of their ex-
istence as sovereign states." We do not see this
point either in the Yugoslav resolution.
In fact, we can search the Yugoslav text
from start to finish without finding any words
about respect for the elemental right of national
existence, the absence of which is the very bot-
tom of the trouble in the Middle East. Instead,
we find vague references to legal and political
problems and charter principles to be consid-
ered at some time in the future. And this fuzzy
treatment stands in strong contrast to the Yu-
goslav resolution's clear and concrete call for
immediate withdrawal of Israel's troops to the
positions held before June 5. That withdrawal,
if it could be brought about at all under such
conditions, can scarcely bring more than a pause
between rounds in this long and terrible conflict.
In candor let me say that we of the United
States, and no doubt many others, would have
preferred a still clearer and more explicit state-
ment on the right of national existence than that
JULY 24, 1967
109
which appears in the Latin American text. But
our careful reading of that text has led us to
conclude that its urgent call for an end to claims
of belligerency, and the other provisions of
paragraph 1 (b), clearly comprehend respect
for national existence and constitute a major
step in the right direction. This is one of our
reasons for supporting the Latin American
draft and for finding it infinitely preferable
to the Yugoslav draft.
There are other reasons also for this prefer-
ence. Tlie Latin American text ofl'ers concrete
guidelines for dealing with many of the other
essentials of peace in the Middle East. More-
over, it deals with just grievances on both
sides — and there have been just grievances on
both sides. Unfortunately, neither of these
claims can be made for the Yugoslav draft.
Reasons for U.S. Preference
Let me specify our grounds for this
evaluation :
— On the refugee problem, the Latin Ameri-
can text calls unambiguously for "an appro-
priate and full solution of the problem of the
refugees." My Government has taken the view
that a fair and lasting solution of the refugee
question is vitally necessary. Indeed, it has been
made all the more urgent by the events of recent
weeks. Yet the sole allusion to this problem in
the Yugoslav text is in the single abstract word
"humanitarian."
— On international maritime rights, the
Latm American text calls for a guarantee of
"freedom of transit on the international water-
ways in the region." This problem is not men-
tioned in the Yugoslav text. And yet it was this
veiy problem that provided the spark which
led directly to the explosion of Jime 5. Mr.
President, wliy do the sponsors of this resolu-
tion glide over this vital issue with vague,
evasive words and with corridor hints about a
possible willingness to deal with the matter?
On this crucial issue, involving not only the
states immediately concerned but also vital
international rights, the Yugoslav text is
altogether deficient.
■ — On the question of Jerusalem, again the
Latin American text contains explicit lan-
guage whereas the Yugoslav text is silent. Tlie
United States view on this subject has been
stated at the highest levels of our Government
in the past few days ' and is reflected in the 10
points which I listed at the outset of this state-
ment. In particular, the United States does not
recognize the recent administrative action
taken by Israel as determining the future of
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in
relation to them. We do not recognize unilateral
actions in this connection. With regard to the
provision on Jerusalem in the Latin American
text, our support is against the background of
tliis policy.
— On security arrangements, the Latin
American text calls for measui-es to guarantee
the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of the states of the region. Among
these measures, it specifies the establisliment of
demilitarized zones and aai appropriate United
Nations presence. But the Yugoslav text con-
tains nothing more on this subject than a refer-
ence to the existing UNTSO [United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization] machineiy.
UNTSO has performed, and is still perform-
ing, a valiant service. But surely we all recog-
nize, and the Secretary- General himself has
reported, that the removal of a still more sub-
stantial United Nations presence — the United
Nations Emergency Force — created, in the
Secretary-General's words, "a new situation."
The situation was altered still further by the
recent hostilities. It is a situation which
UNTSO with its present resources and struc-
ture carmot adequately manage.
Finally, on the tasks of the Security Coun-
cil, the Latin American draft makes concrete
recommendations concerning all of the points
I have mentioned. But the Yugoslav text con-
fines its recommendations to the broadest
generalities.
Arms Limitation a Major Issue
Although, for all these reasons, we find the
Latin American text acceptable and the Yugo-
slav text unacceptable, I must express regret
that neither of these resolutions touches on the
major issue of arms limitations in the Middle
East. This issue has been discussed during this
debate by a number of speakers, including those
of the Soviet Union and the United States. On
June 19 we listened with interest to Chairman
Kosygin when he warned that nations of the
Middle East, "in order to enhance their secu-
° For statements released on June 28 by the White
House and the Department of State, see Bulletin of
July 17, 1967, p. 64.
110
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rity . . . may embark on the jjath of an arms
buildup and increase their military budg-
ets. . . . Those who cherish peace cannot and
must not allow events to take this course."
This statement was very much in our minds
when my Government stated here the next day,
June 20,* that "peace in the Middle East re-
quires steps to avert the dangers inherent in a
renewed arms race. . . . The responsibility for
such steps rests not only on those in the area
but also upon the larger states outside the area."
And we proposed in our own draft resolution,^
as a first step in discharging this responsibility,
a system of "registration and limitation of arms
shipments into the area."
We i-emain very much interested in exploring
this concept, not in order to crystallize any
military imbalance in the area but rather to
maintain a balance at the lowest possible se-
curity level. Our aim is twofold: that this
source of danger shall be controlled and that
scarce resources shall be devoted to a better
cause than armaments — the technical and eco-
nomic progress of the peoples of the Middle
East.
The Refugee Problem
Mr. President, I now wish to cormnent briefly
on one specific aspect of the situation in the
Middle East : We have before us, in addition to
the draft resolutions I have discussed, another
draft resolution ® submitted by Sweden and
several cosponsors dealing with the refugee
problem. Indeed, no task is more urgent than
to bind up the wounds of war, to find shelter for
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medicine
for the sick.
To this end the United States supported in
the Security Comicil the resolution put f orwa,rd
by Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia, which the
Council unanimously adopted on June 14.^ To
the same end we now strongly support the draft
resolution presented by Sweden and other mem-
bers, which is now before the Assembly.
Last week the United States Government al-
located $5 million to help meet the urgent needs
of this situation, and from tliis siun we are
making a special contribution to UNRWA
* Ibid., July 10, 1967, p. 49.
Tor text of the U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc.
A/L. .520), see tfiirf., p. 51.
° U.N. doc. A/L. .526 and Add. 1-3.
' For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 11.
[United Nations Eelief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East] to help
finance its operations in the immediate future.*
There have been reports of the movement of
civilians from their homes — many of them refu-
gees from earlier conflicts. We have heard these
reports with much concern. All civilians in the
area affected should be assured of their safety,
welfare, and security in the same locations in
which they resided before hostilities began. We
welcome the assurances recently given and hope
that they will be implemented with regard to
the population of the West Bank of Jordan and
that they be encouraged to remain in their
homes or return to them. We welcome the news
that a representative of the Secretary-General
is now to go to the area, and we urge all con-
cerned, particularly the Goverament of Israel,
to give him the fullest cooperation.
The Key Question Before the United Nations
In conclusion, Mr. President, I return to the
major choice which faces this Assembly. It is
the key question before us. It is a choice between
a tragic past and a better future. In the Yugo-
slav resolution we are asked to return the situa-
tion to where it stood on the eve of conflict ; and
only in some indefinite future would we try
again to cope with underlying causes, including
the claimed right to do away with a sovereign
state by armed foi'ce. This proposal cannot lead
toward peace but only toward more trouble and
danger. It is unconstructive, and it should be
rejected.
In the Latin American resolution we are
asked to deal forthrightly with the great ob-
stacles to peace : above all and first of all, with
the withdrawal of Israel's forces and with the
need for all states in the area, all members of
the United Nations, to respect each other's right
to live in peace.
The Latin American text treats at one and the
same time both of the most vital necessities of
peace. Its first paragraph combines on an equal
basis the withdrawal of Israel's forces with the
ending of all claims to a state of belligerency
and with efforts to create conditions of coexist-
ence based on good neighborliness. It recognizes
that we face a situation whose two aspects are
interdependent and that neither aspect can be
solved in isolation from the other.
' For background, see ibid., July 17, 1967, p. 64.
JULY 24, 1967
111
Peace is worth sacrifices, and all must sacri-
fice for it. In the wake of conflict there must be
readiness on both sides to acknowledge the
rights and feelings of others. There must be a
willingness to refrain from pressing temporary
advantages and to take a long-range view.
There must be an end to malice, to bitter
thoughts of revenge, to vain threats to end the
life of other nations. There must be, on every
side, a willingness to accept at long last, and
act upon, the admonition in our common char-
ter : "to practice tolerance and live together in
peace with one another as good neighbors."
Thousands of years ago it was written:
""VVliere there is no vision, the people perish."
Let us in this Assembly, in what we decide here,
offer to the suffering peoples of the Middle East
a new vision of peace, a vision by which all can
live in peace and security.^
STATEMENT OF JULY 4
U.S. /U.N. press release 118
The United States abstained on the six-power
resolution dealing with the city of Jerusalem
contained in document A/L.527/Eev. 1.
Insofar as the six-power resolution expresses
" The Assembly had before it five draft resolutions
submitted by the United States, the U.S.S.R., Albania,
Yugoslavia, and a group of Latin American nations.
The United States did not press its draft resolution
(A/L.520) to a vote, having decided to support the
Latin American draft resolution. On July 4 the As-
sembly voted on the remaining four resolutions, as fol-
lows :
The U.S.S.R. draft resolution (A/L.519), which
called for condemnation of "Israel's aggressive ac-
tivities" and for withdrawal of Israeli forces "to posi-
tions behind the armistice demarcation lines," was put
to a vote paragraph by paragraph, and all parts were
rejected.
The Albanian draft resolution (A/L.521), which
called for condemnation of Israel for "its armed ag-
gression" and for condemnation of the United States
and the United Kingdom for "their incitement, aid and
direct participation in this aggression," was rejected
by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 22, with 27 abstentions.
The Yugoslav draft resolution ( A/L.522/Rev.3/Corr.
1) obtained 53 votes to 46 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions,
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re-
quired two-thirds majority.
The Latin American draft resolution ( A/L.523/Rev.
1) obtained 57 votes (U.S.) to 43, with 20 abstentions,
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re-
quired two-thirds majority.
the sense of the General Assembly that no uni-
lateral action should be taken that might preju-
dice the future of Jerusalem, the United States
is in agreement. We were prepared to support a
resolution to this effect. Some, if not all, of the
sponsors were aware that tlie United States
made a serious effort to get such a change in-
corporated in the resolution in the hope that we
would be able to vote affirmatively. Regrettably,
our suggested change was not accej)ted.
The views of the United States on the situa-
tion involving Jerusalem are contained in three
recent statements. On June 28, in a statement
issued by the White House on behalf of the
President, the United States expressed the view
that there "must be adequate recognition of the
special interest of three great religions in the
holy places of Jerusalem." On the same day the
Department of State said the following: "The
United States has never recognized . . . unilat-
eral actions by any of the states in the area as
governing the international status of Jerusa-
lem." I reiterated in the Greneral Assembly yes-
terday: that the "safeguarding of the holy
places and freedom of access to them for all
should be internationally guaranteed; and the
status of Jerusalem in relation to them should
be decided not imilaterally but in consultation
with all concerned."
These statements reflect the considered views
and serious concern of the United States Gov-
ernment about the situation in Jerusalem.
RESOLUTION ON AID TO REFUGEES '°
Humanitarian assistance
The General Assembly,
Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering
inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a re-
sult of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,
1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Coun-
cil resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby
the Council :
(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil
populations and the prisoners of war in the area
of conflict in the Middle East additional .sufferings ;
(6) Con.sidered that essential and inalienable human
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes
of war ;
(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
"° U.N. doc. A/RES/2252 ( ES-V ) /Corr.l ( A/L.526 and
Add. 1-3) ; adopted on July 4 by a vote of 116 (U.S.) to
0, with 2 abstentions.
112
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the
parties involved in the conflict ;
(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of
the areas where military operations had taken place
and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who
had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ;
( c) Recommended to the Governments concerned the
scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles gov-
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro-
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ;
(/) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the
effective implementation of the resolution and to report
to the Security Council ;
2. Notes with gratitude and satisfaction and en-
dorses the appeal made by the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly on 26 June 1967 ;
3. Notes tcith gratification the work undertaken by
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary or-
ganizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
civilians ;
4. Notes further with gratification the assistance
which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing
to women and children in the area ;
5. Commends the Commissioner-General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue
the activities of the Agency in the present situation
with respect to all persons coming within his mandate ;
6. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of the
above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the ef-
forts of the Commissioner-General of the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance,
as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a
temporary measure, to other persons in the area who
are at present displaced and are in serious need of
immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostili-
ties;
7. Welcomes the close co-operation of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East and the other organiza-
tions concerned for the purpose of co-ordinating
assistance ;
8. Calls upon all the Member States concerned to
facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in
which assistance is being rendered ;
9. Appeals to all Governments, as well as organiza-
tions and individuals, to make .special contributions
for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, as well as to the other inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations concerned ;
10. Requests the Secretary -General, in consultation
with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, to report urgently to the General As-
sembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and
6 above ;
11. Further requests the Secretary-General to fol-
low the effective implementation of the present resolu-
tion and to report thereon to the General Assembly.
RESOLUTION ON STATUS OF JERUSALEM"
Measures taken hy Israel to change the status of the
City of Jerusalem
The General AssemMy,
Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in
.lerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel
to change the status of the City,
1. Considers that these measures are invalid ;
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already
taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action
which would alter the status of Jerusalem ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
General Assembly and the Security Council on the
situation and on the implementation of the present
resolution not later than one week from its adoption.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated April 4 from the representative of the
U.S.S.R. transmitting a memorandum of the U.S.S.R.
Government concerning "United Nations Operations
for the Maintenance of International Peace and Se-
curity." S/7841. April 5, 1967. 9 pp.
Reports by the Secretary-General on the situation in
the Near East. S/7S96 ; May 19, 1967 ; 6 pp. S/7906 ;
May 26, 1967 ; 6 pp.
Supplemental information received by the Secretary-
General concerning the Near East and the status of
the United Nations Emergency Force. S/7930. June
5, 1967. 6 pp.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Information furnished by the United States on ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.lOo/INF.
1.52-154, March 31, 1967; A/AC.lO.o/INF.1.55-159,
April 3, 1967; A/AC.105/INF.162-163, May 29,
1967.
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. on objects
launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.160.
April 12, 1967.
Budget Performance of the United Nations for the Fi-
nancial Year 1966. Report of the Secretary-General.
A/6666. April 7, 1967. 39 pp.
Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Emergency Force. A/6669. May 18, 1967.
10 pp.
"U.N. doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V) (A/L.527/Rev. 1) ;
adopted on July 4 by a vote of 99 to 0, with 20 absten-
tions (U.S.).
JULY
113
TREATY INFORMATION
Pakistan to the United States effected by an ex-
change of notes dated November 21, 19C6. 1 con-
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude
New Cotton Textile Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Tlie Department of State amiounced on July
3 (press release 153) that diplomatic notes were
exchanged at Washington on that day consti-
tuting a new bilateral cotton textile agreement
between Pakistan and the United States. The
agreement replaces the cotton textile agreement
signed at Rawalpindi on November 21, 1966.^ It
is based on the undei'standing that the protocol
extending the Long-Term Arrangement ^ on in-
ternational trade in cotton textiles through
September 30, 1970, will enter into force be-
tween Pakistan and the United States on Octo-
ber 1, 1967.
Most of the provisions of the new agreement,
except for the levels, are identical to those in
the 1966 agreement it replaces. A new provision
concerning the identification of cotton textiles
is added, and a provision allowing 5 percent
carryover of shortfalls is also included.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE'
JuLT 3, 1967
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to
the decision of the Cotton Textiles Committee
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
approving a Protocol to extend through Sep-
tember 30, 1970, the Long-Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles, done in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (here-
inafter referred to as "the Long-Term Arrange-
ment"). I also refer to recent discussions be-
tween representatives of our two Governments
and to the agreements between our two Govern-
ments concerning exports of cotton textiles from
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6153 ;
for text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1966, p. 938.
' For text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see ibid.,
Mar. 12, 1062, p. 431.
'Annexes A and B to the U.S. note are not printed
here; for texts, see press release 153 dated July 3.
firm on behalf of my Government, the under-
standing that the 1966 agreement is replaced
with the following agreement. This agreement
is based on our understanding that the above-
mentioned Protocol will enter into force for
our two Goverimients on October 1, 1967.
1. The term of this agreement shall be from
July 1, 1966 through June 30, 1970. During the
term of this agreement, annual exports of cot-
ton textiles from Pakistan to the United States
shall be limited to aggregate, group and specific
limits at the levels specified in the following
paragraphs. It is noted that these levels reflect
a special adjustment for the first agreement
year. The levels set forth in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4 for the second agreement year are 5%
higher than the limits for the preceding year
without this special adjustment; thus the
growth factor provided for in paragraph 6 has
already been applied m arriving at these levels
for the second agreement year.
2. For the first agreement year, constituting
the 12-month period beginning July 1, 1966,
the aggregate limit shall be 57.5 million square
yards equivalent. For the second agreement
year, the aggregate limit shall be 68.25 million
square yards equivalent.
3. Within the aggregate limit, the foUowmg
group limits shall apply for the first and second
agreement years, respectively :
Group
I (Categories 1-27)
II (Categories 28-64)
First Agreement Second Agree'
Year merU Year
(i7i 5yds. equivalent)
50, 225, 000 59, 74,5, 000
7, 275, 000 S, 505, 000
4. Within the aggregate limit and the appli-
cable group limits, the following specific limits
shall apply for the first and second agreement
years :
Group I
Category
Category 9 (Sheeting,
carded)
Category 15 (Poplin &
broadcloth, carded)
Print Cloth (Categories
18, 19 and parts of
Category 26)*
Category 22 (Twill
and Sateen)
Barkcloth Type
Fabrics (Parts of
Category 26)*
Duck (Parts of
Category 26)
Other**
First Second
Agreement Agreement
Year Year
{in syds. equivalent)
24, 375, 000 29, 925, 000
2, 125, 000 2, 625, 000
10, 000, 000 10, 500, 000
2, 350, 000
3, 125, 000
6, 250, 000
2, 000, 000
3, 570, 000
3, 675, 000
7, 350, 000
2, 100, 000
114
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
Group II
Category
First Agreement Year
UnUi
Square Yards
Equivalent
Shop Towels (Part of
Cfategory 31)
T Shirts (Categories
41 and 42)
Other**
3, 900, 000 pes.
270, 735 doz.
1, 357, 200
1, 958, 497
3, 959, 303
Sectmd Agreement Year
Uniti
Square Yards
Equivalent
Shop Towels (Part of
Category 31)
T Shirts (Categories
41 and 42)
Other**
4, 095, 000 pes.
349, 589 doz.
1, 425, 060
2, 528, 926
4, 551, 014
5. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for
Group I may be exceeded by not more than 10
percent and the limit for Group II may be ex-
ceeded by not more than 5 percent. Within the
applicable group limit, as it may be adjusted
under this provision, specific limits may be ex-
ceeded by not more than 5 percent.
6. In succeeding 12-month periods for which
any limitation is in force under this agreement,
the level of exports permitted under such limi-
tation shall be increased by 5 pei'cent of the cor-
responding level for the preceding 12-month
period, the latter level not to include any ad-
justments under paragraphs 5 or 14.
7. In the event of undue concentration in ex-
ports from Pakistan to the United States of
cotton textiles in any category not given a spe-
cific limit, the Government of the United States
of America may request consultation with the
Government of Pakistan to determine an ap-
propriate course of action. Until a mutually sat-
isfactory solution is reached, exports in the
category in question from Pakistan to the
United States starting with the 12-montli pe-
riod beginning on the date of the request for
consultation shall be limited. The limit shall be
105 percent of the exports of such products from
Pakistan to the United States durmg the most
recent 12-month period pi'eceding the request
for consultation and for which statistics are
available to our two Governments.
8. The Govenmient of Pakistan shall use its
best efforts to space exports from Pakistan to
the United States within each category evenly
throughout the agreement year, taking into con-
sideration normal seasonal factors.
*Print Cloth and Bark Cloth type fabrics are further
described in Annex A. [Footnote in original.]
**These "other" categories are not subject to specific
limits. Hence, within the aggregate and the applicable
group limits, as they may be adjusted under paragraph
5, the square yard equivalent of shortfalls in exports in
categories with specific limits may be used in these
"other" categories subject to the provisions of para-
graph 7. [Footnote in original.]
9. The two Governments recognize that the
successful implementation of this agreement
depends in large part upon mutual cooperation
on statistical questions. The Government of the
United States of America shall promptly sup-
ply the Government of Pakistan with data on
montlily imports of cotton textiles from Paki-
stan. The Government of Pakistan shall
promptly supply the Government of the United
States of America with data on montlily ex-
ports of cotton textiles to the United States.
Each government agrees to supply promptly
any other available relevant statistical data re-
quested by the other government.
10. In the implementation of tliis agreement,
the system of categories and the rates of con-
version into square yard equivalents listed in
Annex B hereto shall apply. In any situation
where the determination of an article to be a
cotton textile would be affected by whether the
criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long-
Term Arrangement is used or the criterion pro-
vided for in paragraph 2 of Amiex E of the
Long-Term Arrangement is used, the chief
value criterion used by the Government of the
United States of America in accordance with
paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.
11. The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Pakistan agree
to consult on any question arising in the imple-
mentation of the agi'eement.
12. Mutually satisfactory administrative ar-
rangements or adjustments may be made to re-
solve minor problems arising m the implemen-
tation of this agi-eement including differences
in points of procedure or operation.
13. If the Government of Pakistan considers
that as a result of limitations specified in this
agreement, Pakistan is being placed in an in-
equitable position vis-a-vis a third comitry, the
Govenunent of Pakistan may request consulta-
tion with the Government of the United States
of America with the view to taking appropriate
remedial action such as a reasonable modifica-
tion of this agreement.
14. (a) For any agreement year immediately
following a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in
wliich cotton textile exports fi-om Pakistan to
the United States were below the aggi-egate
limit and any group and specific limits appli-
cable to the category concerned) the Govern-
ment of Pakistan may permit exports to exceed
these limits by carryover in the following
amounts and maimer:
(i) The carryover shall not exceed the
JTJLT 24, 1967
115
amount of the shortfall in either the aggregate
limit or any applicable group or specific limit
and shall not exceed either 5% of the aggregate
limit or 5% of the applicable group limit in the
year of the shortfall, and
(ii) In the case of shortfalls in the categories
subject to specific limits tlie cari-yover shall
not exceed 5% of the specific limit in the year
of the shortfall, and shall be used in the same
category in which the shortfall occurred, and
(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attribut-
able to categories subject to specific limits, the
carryover shall be used in the same group in
which the shortfall occurred, shall not be used
to exceed any applicable specific limit except in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5,
and shall not be used to exceed the limits in
paragraph 7 of the agreement.
(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph are without any adjust-
ments under this paragi'aph or paragraph 5.
(c) The canyover shall be in addition to the
exports pennitted in paragraph 5.
15. During the term of this agreement, the
Government of the United States of America
will not request r&straint on the export of cotton
textiles from Pakistan to the United States
mider the procedures of Article 3 of the Long-
Term Arrangement. The applicability of the
Long-Term Arrangement to trade in cotton
textiles between Pakistan and the United States
shall otherwise be unaffected by this agree-
ment.
16. The Government of the United States
of America may assist the Government of
Pakistan in implementing the limitation pro-
visions of this agreement by controlling the
imports of cotton textiles covered by the agree-
ment initil agreement is reached that Pakistan
will control these exports in accordance with
the limitations of the agreement.
17. Either government may terminate this
agreement effective at the end of an agreement
year by written notice to the other government
to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of
such agreement year. Either government may
at any time propose revisions in the terms of
this agreement.
If the above conforms with the understand-
ing of your Government, this note and your
Excellency's note of confirmation * on behalf
of the Government of Pakistan shall constitute
an Agreement between our Governments. Ac-
cept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State:
Anthoxt M. Solomon
His Excellency
Agiia Hilalt,
Ambassador of Pakistan.
United States and Turkey Extend
Cotton Textile Agreement
Press rele:ise 151 dated July 3
The United States and Turkey exchanged
notes at Washington on June 30, extending
without change the bilateral cotton textile
agreement between the two countries signed at
Washington on July 17, 1961^} The extension
takes ejfect on July 1, 1967, and is valid through
June 30, 1970. Following is the text of the
United States note.
June 30, 1967
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the
cotton textile agreement between our two Gov-
ernments effected by an exchange of notes dated
July 17, 1964, and to recent discussions in
Washington between representatives of our two
Governments concerning exports of cotton tex-
tiles from Turkey to the United States.
As a result of these discussions I propose that
the agreement be amended by changing "1967"
in paragraph 7 to "1970".
If this proposal is acceptable to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Turkey, this note and
your Excellency's note of acceptance - on behalf
of the Govenmient of the Republic of Turkey
shall constitute an amendment to the agreement
between our Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances
of my highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State :
Anthony M. Solomon
His Excellency
Meliii Esenbel
Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey
' Not printed here.
'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5619;
for text, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 293.
' Not printetl here.
116
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain otlier acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Toljyo September
14, 1963.'
Signature: Netherlands, June 9, 1967.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters,
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Notification that it does not consider itself hound:
Barbados, May 25, 1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS
1808, 4613). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.'
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, June 15, 1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, June 9, 1967.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to chapter II of the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).
Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London Novem-
ber 30, 1966.'
Acceptances deposited: France, June 6, 1967 ; Ice-
land, May 15, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965.'
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, June 15, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive.'
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Belgium (for Belgian-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union), June 26, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Korea, July 6, 1967.
BILATERAL
India
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, sup-
plementary to the agreement of February 20, 1967
(TIAS 6221), under title I of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D),
with annex. Signed at New Delhi June 24, 1967. En-
tered into force June 24, 1967.
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op-
erators of either country to operate their stations in
the territory of the other. Effected by exchange of
notes at Wellington June 21, 1967. Entered into force
June 21, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the Special Fund for Education
Textbook Production Project 1967-1968. Effected by
exchange of notes at Manila June 26, 1967. Entered
into force June 26, 1967.
Agreement on the settlement of claims for pay and
allowances of recognized Philippine guerrillas not
previously paid in full and for erroneous deductions
of advanced salary from the backpay of eligible
Philippine veterans. Signed at Manila June 29, 1967.
Entered into force June 29, 1967.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agreement of July 17, 1964
(TIAS 5619), concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June
30, 1967. Entered into force June 30, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
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Recent Releases
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Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, 1967
(revised). Complete and official listing of foreign con-
sular offices in the United States, together with their
jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. De-
partment and Foreign Service Series 128. 88 pp. 35<i'.
A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States
(revised). Booklet for the information of men and
women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the For-
eign Service of the United States. Pub. 7924. Depart-
ment and Foreign Service Series 132. 27 pp., illus. 35^.
The Country Team: An Illustrated Profile of Our
American Missions Abroad. A comprehensive descrii>
tion of the work of American diplomatic and consular
missions, including the activities of the Agency for In-
ternational Development, the United States Informa-
tion Agency, the Department of Defense, and other
U.S. agencies operating overseas. Includes many exam-
ples of the recent experiences of Foreign Service per-
sonnel. Pub. 8193. Department and Foreign Service
Series 136. 80 pp., illus. $1.00.
Social Usage Abroad: A Guide for American Officials
and Their Families. This publication is intended pri-
marily to provide for members of the Foreign Service
an understanding of the rules of protocol and official
conduct. Pub. 8219. Department and Foreign Service
Series 138. 23 pp. 25^.
JULY 24, 1967
117
Commitment for Progress: The Americas Plan for a
Decade of Urgency. Illustrated pamptilet on the meet-
ing of the Chiefs of State of the OAS nations at Punta
del Bste, which includes the Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America, statements made by President John-
son during the conference, and his Pan American Day
proclamation. Pub. 8237. Inter-American Series 93. 40
pp., illus. 30<!.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington January 27,
1967. Entered into force January 27, 1967. Effective Oc-
tober 1, 1966. TIAS 6214. 12 pp. 10<f.
Cultural Relations. Agreement with Morocco — Signed
at Washington February 10. 1967. Entered into force
February 10, 1967. TIAS 6215. 6 pp. 5<J.
Maritime Matters — Liability During Private Opera-
tion of N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Greece. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Athens November 22, 1966,
and January 12, 1967. Entered into force January 12,
1967. TIAS 6216. 3 pp. 5<t.
Fisheries — King Crab. Agreement with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of
February 5, 1965 — Signed at Washington February 13,
1967. Entered into force February 13, 1967. With ex-
change of letters. TIAS 6217. 7 pp. 10<f.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Iran, amending the agreement of March 5,
1957 — Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Entered into
force January 26, 1967. TIAS 6219. 6 pp. 5«S.
Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement
with Mexico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico and
Tlatelolco January 27 and 28, 1967. Entered into force
January 28, 1967. TIAS 6220. 6 pp. 5(^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India —
Signed at New Delhi February 20, 1967. Entered into
force February 20, 1967. TIAS 6221. 14 pp. 10<f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Ghana, sup-
plementing the agreement of September 30, 1958. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Accra and Osn March 3,
1967. Entered into force March 3, 1967. TIAS 6222. 3
pp. 5<t.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Addi-
tional agreement with the Netherlands. Exchange of
notes— Signed at The Hague June 22, 1966. Entered
into force February 28, 1967. Effective January 1, 1965.
TIAS 6223. 6 pp. 5«!.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procfes-
Verbal extending the declaration of November 18. 1962,
as extended, on the provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement. Done at
Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January
18, 1967. TIAS 6225. 4 pp. 5(J.
Status of the Korean Service Corps. Agreement with
the Republic of Korea — Signed at Seoul February 23,
1967. Entered into force March 10, 1967. With agreed
understandings. TIAS 6226. 24 pp. 15^.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Lesotho^
Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967. Entered into force
March 7, 1967. TIAS 6227. 3 pp. 5f
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Poland..
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 15,
1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967. Effective
March 1, 1967. TIAS 6228. 9 pp. 10<!.
Correction
The Editor of the Bttlletin wishes to call
attention to a printer's error in the IssTie of June
12, 1967, p. 889. The first sentence in the para-
graph beginning at the bottom of the first column
should read :
"The greatest disservice to that resolution, and
to its effective implementation, would be for us
to create an impression in South Africa and in
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided
on how these principles are to be achieved."
118
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BXJIiLETIN
INDEX Jvly 2^, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 11^5
Canada. IJC Issues Report on Improvement of
Champlain Waterway 107
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 107
Economic AEFairs
IJC Issues Report on Improvement of Cham-
plain Waterway 107
Institution-Building and the Alliance for Prog-
ress (Oliver) 102
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114
United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116
Europe. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87
Foreign Aid. Institution-Building and the Alli-
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102
Latin America. Institution-Building and the Alli-
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102
Near East
The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and
Status of Jerusalem ; Rejects Other Resolu-
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108
Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cot-
ton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . 114
Publications. Recent Releases 117
Sweden. Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on
Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper (tran-
script) 91
Trade. Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at
Geneva 95
Treaty Information
Current Actions 117
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114
United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116
Turkey. United States and Turkey Extend Cotton
Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . . 116
U.S.S.R. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 113
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and
Status of Jerusalem; Rejects Other Resolu-
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108
Viet-Nam
The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87
Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on Viet-
Nam for Swedish Newspaper (transcript) . . 91
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 108
Oliver, Covey T 102
Rusk, Secretary 87,91
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 3-9
Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release Issued prior to July 3 which appears in
this issue of the Buixetin is No. 152 of July 1.
No. Date
151
153
154
155
Snbject
7/3 U.S.-Turkey cotton textile agreement.
7/3 U.S.-PaMstan cotton textile agree-
ment (rewrite).
7/5 Rusk : Lions International, Chicago.
7/7 International Joint Commission re-
port on Improvement of Champlain
Waterway.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1967
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
B,
'"Pe.
"'fo:,
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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1466
Jvly 31, 1967
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Jyy WUUa/m M. Roth, Specie^ Representative for Trade Negotiations 1S3
BUSINESS' STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
hy Secretary of Com/merce Alexander B. Trowbridge 127
AGRICULTUHE'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
hy Secretary of Agriculture OrvUle L. Freeman 132
LABOR'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
iy Under Secretary of Labor James J. Reynolds 137
For index see inside bach cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1466 Publication 8267
July 31, 1967
For sale by tbe Saperlotendent of Documents
U.S. Oavenimeat Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PEICE:
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed in
the Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Kennedy Round: Proud Chapter in the History
of International Commerce
The multilateral agreements negotiated in the Sixth Round of
Trade Negotiations {the Kennedy Round) under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were signed at Geneva on
June 30. President Johnson, in his message to the signing ceremony,
hailed the negotiations as a '■'■'proud chapter in the history of inter-
national comvfierceP
A national conference on the Kennedy Round, held at Washington
July 7 and sponsored hy the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, provided the first occasion for a formal and informal ex-
change of views between Government officials and representatives of
the business community on the outcome of the negotiatio-m. Follow-
ing are addresses made during the formal sessions by William M.
Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the chief U.S.
negotiator; Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge, Sec-
retary of Agriculture Orville B. Freeman; and Under Secretary of
Commerce James J. Reynolds.
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Ambassador Roth
I must say this Friday morning was an easier
one for me than last Friday morning. Then —
it was June 30th — I was in the office at 3:30
a.m. talking to my deputy, Ambassador Mike
Blumenthal, in Geneva, where it was 8 :30 a.m.
The hour of signing the Kennedy Round agree-
ment was 2 hours away. Even at that time we
were apprehensive that a last-minute crisis
would intervene — as they had with agonizing
regularity in the preceding 2 weeks. Now — fi-
nally— the last crises appeared to be under con-
trol. It was not imtil that early hour in still-dark
Washington that we were entirely certain that
an agreement would be signed.
It \oas signed on schedule. At an enormous
expense in time, energy, and emotion, roe — the
more than 50 participating nations — wrot« what
President Jolmson has hailed as "a proud
chapter in the history of international com-
merce."
The President's message to the signing cere-
mony went on to say :
It will open important new trading opportunities to
each nation, and contribute to the prosi>erity of all. I
salute . . . the architects of this historic landmark
in cooperation among nations.
The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] Secretariat has made preliminary
estimates that the agreement covers more than
$40 billion in world trade, that 70 percent of
dutiable imports of the major particii^ants is
affected, that two-thirds of the tariff reductions
were 50 jDercent or more, and that the nations
making concessions account for 75 percent of
world trade. This is an accomplishment of far
greater magnitude than that of any previous
trade negotiation in history.
Perhaps I should at this point go back in
time to give you a brief history of this endeavor.
In 1962 the 87th Congress passed the Trade
Expansion Act in response to President Ken-
nedy's request for bargaining power to launch
a major assault on barriers to international
commerce. He was authorized to cut our tariffs
by half in exchange for equally advantageous
benefits from our trading partners.
The legislation also created the position of
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
an iimovation placing resijonsibility for the
JULY 31, 1907
123
conduct of such negotiations in the Executive
Office of the President. To this new post Presi-
dent Kennedy appointed the distinguished
former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter,
who directed the Kennedy Eound with great
spirit and wisdom until his death 6 montlis ago.
Armed with the new negotiating authority,
the United States encouraged the convening of
an international negotiating conference. An ini-
tial ministerial-level meeting was held in Ge-
neva in May 1963. Negotiations formally began
a year later.
Most of the major participants agreed to pro-
ceed on the basis of a 50 percent linear — that is,
across-the-board — cut in tariff levels on nonag-
ricultural products. Exceptions, or those items
not to be subjected to the full cut, were to be
limited to those required by reasons of over-
riding national interest. Exceptions lists on non-
agricultural products were exchanged on
November 16, 1964. There followed a period of
intensive exammation of exceptions both on a
multilateral and bilateral basis — each country
making known its interest in the proposals of
the other participants. Negotiators appeared to
be horror-stricken at the protectionism of their
trading partners.
In a few industrial areas of particular im-
portance and complexity — chemicals, textiles,
steel, aluminum, pulp and paper — negotiations
took place on a sector basis.
The importance of agriculture in the Sixth
Round was emphasized by the United States
from the outset. We repeatedly insisted that the
objective of the agricultural negotiations should
be effective trade liberalization. The European
Economic Community, however, sought a more
limited negotiation essentially aimed at the
freezing of present agricultural support levels
on an item-by-item basis.
An early attempt to get agreement on rules
to govern agricultural negotiations proved
futile. For this reason, and because the Euro-
pean Economic Community's offers were not yet
prepared, agricultural offers were not tabled at
the same time as industrial offers. The EEC took
the position it could not make agricultural offers
in the Kennedy Round until its major Common
Agricultural Policy regulations were agreed
upon, and this work was not yet completed.
On grains, however, the GATT ministers had
decided that the Cereals Group should under-
take the negotiation of an international grains
arrangement. Accordingly, in May 1966 major
cereals trading nations exchanged proposals for
an international cereals arrangement.
Nontariff Barriers Attacked
Bilateral and multilateral discussions cen-
tered on such nontariff barriers as discrimina-
tory taxation, customs valuation practices, and
quantitative import restrictions. Notable prog-
ress was achieved in two areas, antidumping
and the American Selling Price system of cus-
toms valuation as it applies to imports of ben-
zenoid chemicals.
The negotiations on antidumping were
directed at elaborating and refining existing
international rules on the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of levying antidumping duties
on goods which are dumped and thereby cause
material injury to a domestic industry. Our
exporters complained of some countries' pro-
cedures that seriously deterred imports which
could in no real sense be considered as "inju-
rious dumping." In other countries, the prin-
cipal difficulty was the lack of any well-defined
procedure or legal recourse. The principal com-
plaint against the United States was that its
procedures were excessively prolonged. Finally,
a very satisfactory agreement was concluded,
which I will describe later.
The American Selling Price system of cus-
toms valuation concerning benzenoid chemicals
came under attack from our trading partners
early in the Keimedy Round. These countries
considered this procedure an unjustified anom-
aly in our tariff structure. They cited the fact
that this valuation system was first imposed in
1922 to protect our then infant chemical indus-
try and that the considerations of the twenties
are hardly applicable today. They pointed out
that this system results in the imposition of
very high or prohibitive actual rates of duty
on many benzenoid chemicals, even though the
duty rates listed in our tariff schedules may
appear moderate. They also stressed the con-
siderable uncertainty beforehand as to the
amount of duty that will be assessed.
Accordingly, the principal producers of
benzenoid chemicals — the Common Market
countries, the United Kingdom, and Switzer-
land— heatedly demanded the abolition of
ASP. We responded that any conversion to the
normal valuation system would require special
counterconcessions and that Congress would
have to approve such a conversion. We would
124
DEPARTMEN'T OF STATE BULLETIN'
enter into negotiations concerning ASP only
on the condition that other participants agree
tliat there be substantial chemical concessions
by all principal trading nations in the context
of the Kennedy Round agreement and a special
package of concessions, including abolition of
ASP, in a separate agreement.
It was only in the final hours of the May
showdown that our conditions were accepted
and a separate ASP agreement was negotiated.
Let me return and conclude my brief his-
torical account.
Negotiations Reach Crisis
A breach among the six members of the
European Economic Community in mid-1965
resulted in an almost complete suspension of
the Geneva negotiations lasting until the late
spring of 1966.
The major decisions necessary to permit the
Community to resume its Kennedy Round
participation — particularly the adoption of the
basis of a Common Agricultural Policy — were
taken by mid-July 1966 enabling the tabling
of the EEC agricultural offer in early August.
This step set the stage for the beginning of
concentrated multilateral and bilateral activity
in Geneva beginning in September 1966.
Talks proceeded through the fall, progress
was laboriously made, but at the end of the
year all of the toughest problems remained. In
fact, by mid-March we had still not begun the
intensive bargaining needed to resolve the
central problems of the Kennedy Round.
After almost 3 years of effort, the prospects
of success began to dim. A March 30 deadline
gave way to an April 30 deadline. I began com-
muting to Geneva.
As late as mid-April, the urgency of the situa-
tion was not fully recognized by other major
participants, particularly the European Eco-
nomic Community. Our deadline was not taken
seriously. The Community negotiators were still
without sufficient authorization to participate
effectively. Many knowledgeable observers be-
lieved it would be impossible to conclude the
Kennedy Round before midnight on June 30.
Others, however, were certain that the political
will was there.
April led into May with the discussions gen-
erating increasing heat but little light. A series
of major crises erupted. By the weekend of
May 13 we were meeting around-the-clock m an
atmosphere of very high tension. On Monday,
May 15, in the early evening, Commissioner
[Jean] Rey and I found the basis for overall
agreement in a compromise proposal put for-
ward by Eric Wyndliam White, the extraordi-
nary Director General of the GATT. Other
pieces fell rapidly into place, and by the end
of the evenuig the Director General could an-
nounce that a Kennedy Round agreement was
assured.
We soon learned, however, that between as-
surance of agreement and signature of that
agreement lay formidable obstacles. Unex-
pected hitches developed to threaten seriously
the successful conclusion of the negotiation. To
the final hour, there were uncertainties.
This last-minute bargaining was extremely
difficult. Positions became hardened. Negotiat-
ing flexibility had been largely exhausted in the
mid-May showdown that produced the main
outlines of the agreement.
Delegations were tired, t«nse, and some-
times querulous, yet dealing with a mass of
numbers and detail and of varied and often
conflicting considerations that were almost
overwhelming.
Inevitably there were misunderstandings
about what had been agreed to. There were
errors made that had to be corrected. Negotia-
tors hopefully or imwittingly exceeded their
authority ; in some cases they failed to get ap-
proval back home and later had to adjust their
offers.
As each coimtry made necessary modifica-
tions, the multilateral balances changed and re-
newed negotiations became necessary. I had to
make a hurried return to Geneva only 2 weeks
before the signing date.
On the 29th of June, with my outer office
crowded with reporters waiting for our advance
release on the details of the agreement, I was
on the telephone to Geneva and several capitals
trying to resolve not one but several crises that
had the potential of blowing up the whole
effort.
Let me now turn to the nature of this agree-
ment itself.
Of course, uppermost in your minds is
whether this agreement is a good deal for the
United States. This was the question the Presi-
dent had to decide, based on the advice of those
responsible for United States participation.
On March 10 of this year, I told tlie Senate
Finance Committee that the United States
JULY 31, 19G;
125
would accept no Kennedy Round agreement
unless it was a balanced package which included
an exchange of both industrial and agricultural
concessions. During this appearance, I was
questioned as to my willingness to quit the nego-
tiating table if the stakes weren't fair and I
answered, "In a negotiation you have to be will-
ing and ready to walk away from the table if
you don't feel that what you are getting is a
balanced deal."
Basing my judgment on the hard-nosed
appraisal of my Government colleagues and
their expert staffs, I am con\-inced that we have
received commitments equal in value to those
we have made. Moreover, I believe that this
balance of mutual exchanges of trading
opportunities should stimulate appreciably
larger volumes of international trade. Eco-
nomic growth at home should result.
Throughout this negotiation, we have had
designated members of the Congress and rep-
resentatives of the public drawn from industry,
labor, farmers, and consumers acting as mem-
bers of their officially accredited delegation.
Through this means, we have taken to the bar-
gaining tables an acute sense of the need for
a fair and balanced deal promoting growth in
all segments of the American economy.
Our Washington organization, in developing
basic policy and strategy jDositions, has made
a conscientious effort to seek expert guidance
from business, labor, and farm leaders in the
formulation of negotiating policy. The Presi-
dent appointed a 45-member public advisory
committee to the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations. This group has met regu-
larly with the Special Representative, and
many of its members have traveled to Geneva
to take a firsthand look at the negotiations. A
roster of 300 technical specialists has served as
a constantly available source of advice and
assistance on day-to-day technical problems.
Six Members of Congress are regular con-
gressional delegates. Almost all have been to
Geneva for important meetings at least once,
and all meet with the Special Representative
on a regular basis.
Consideration of public views did not cease
with the original hearings on proposed U.S.
Kennedy Round offers. We continued to accept
from any interested party oral and written
testimony concerning any matter relevant to
the negotiations. This included updating and
revision of previous testimony, testimony from
interests not previously heard, and new infor-
mation relating to foreign import restrictions.
Indeed, moi-e time and effort than ever before
have gone into the calculation of the value and
probable effect of the concessions we have of-
fered and received.
Principal Accomplishments
The substance of the Kemiedy Round agree-
ment will, of course, be the subject of our dis-
cussions throughout the day. I will only
summarize what I regard as the principal
accomj)lishments.
Tariff' cuts on industrial products will be of
a magnitude far greater than any previously
negotiated. While concessions offered to us have
not justified full use of the authority of the
Trade Expansion Act, we have exchanged with
major tradmg partners a very significant num-
ber of tariff reductions of 50 percent and many
more in the 30 to 50 percent range.
We have succeeded in securing concessions
on a wide variety of farm products. Of greatest
significance is the successful negotiation of a
world grains agreement guaranteeing higher
minimum world trading prices as well as estab-
lishmg a program under which other nations
will share with us in the task of supplying food
aid to the undernourished people in the less
developed countries.
A major accomplishment was the negotiation
of the antidumping code committing other
countries to fair and open procedures along
the lines of present United States practices.
The new common antidumping regulations that
are being developed by the European Economic
Community will conform with the code. Of
special benefit to the United States will be the
adoption by Canada of an injury requirement
in its antidumping legislation. The lack of such
a requirement has impeded United States ex-
ports for many years.
For our part, we agreed to certain viseful re-
finements of the concepts we presently use in
our antidumping investigation and to speedier
completion of such investigations once prelimi-
nary measures are taken against allegedly
dumped imports. I would emphasize — con-
trary to what you may have read in the news-
papers lately — that all our obligations in the
agreement are consistent with existing law and,
in particular, that we have not agreed to a si-
multaneous consideration of price discrimina-
tion and injury.
In addition to the negotiation of an anti-
126
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
dumping code, an agreement was concluded
providing for the elimination of the American
Selling Price system for benzenoid chemicals
and the liberalization of other countries' trade
barriers. For the domestic benzenoid chemical
industry — a strong and efficient industry which
has long demonstrated its international competi-
tive strength — we are confident that the new
rates of duty in the agreement will provide a
sufficient level of tariff protection — one, by the
way, well above that of the other major chem-
ical producing countries. For this and the other
sectors of the overall chemical industry in this
country, which has an export surplus of about
$1.7 billion, the agreement affords very sig-
nificant new export opportunities into rapidly
expanding markets in Europe.
Moreo^'er, the ASP agreement provides for
the elimination of discriminatory automobile
road-use taxes in France, Italy, and Belgium,
which have long hampered exports of the larger
U.S. cars to those countries. Finally, under the
agreement the United Kingdom midertakes to
make a significant reduction in the margin of
tariff preference on inimanufactured tobacco,
which should be of real assistance to one of our
biggest export industries. I would only add that
we fully exi^ect, and indeed welcome, the most
careful examination of the merits of the agree-
ment. I do hope, however, that such an exami-
nation will be made objectively by all concei'ned
and not in the heat of what has all too often been
purely an emotional issue.
Regarding the particularly sensitive sectors
other than chemicals, useful if limited progress
was made on the complex problems in steel,
aluminum, pulp and paper, and textiles, includ-
ing a .3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton
Textile Arrangement.
Finally, the Kennedy Round agreement has
given significant assistance to the less developed
countries through having permitted their par-
ticipation in the negotiations without requiring
reciprocal contributions from them, through
special concessions on products of particular in-
terest to them, and through the food aid pro-
visions of the grains arrangement.
And now, in conclusion, where do we go
from here ? The President has asked me to un-
dertake a comprehensive study of trade policy
to determine what the next steps should be.
The problems are many. What further should
be done about nontariff barriers ? What are the
possibilities for further tariff reductions? "Wliat
can be done to lunit the proliferation of discrim-
inatory trading arrangements among small
groups of countries, which threatens the basic
most-favored-nation principle mider which so
much progi'ess in tariff reductions has been
made? How should policy on international
financial flows be related to U.S. trade policies?
Another set of problems of extreme impor-
tance in the next few years relates to what the
policies of highly industrialized countries ought
to be toward the developing countries. The
developing countries have been pressing for
special trade policies tailored to their specific
needs. Some of them have been receiving spe-
cial benefits from certain mdustrialized coun-
tries, in some cases in exchange for special ac-
cess provisions for their industrialized partners.
The specialized limited arrangements threaten
the interests of nonparticipants. As the Presi-
dent noted in his speech at Punta del Este,^
we are now exploring with other countries the
possibilities of a common approach to develop-
ing-country trade policies which could subsume
these specialized narrow arrangements.
In looking to the future, we shall be lean-
ing heavily on advice from industry. Your own
work in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on
future trade policy will be extremely valuable
to us in making plans for new departures in
the trade field.
BUSINESS' STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Secretary Trowbridge
I think the first and most important thing
we all kiaow about the Kennedy Round is that
the end of the negotiations is not the end at
all ; it is really only the beginning. Many years
of extraordinary labor lie behind us, but dec-
ades of even hai'der work lie ahead if we are
to fulfill the promise that this great trade
liberalization effort holds for the entire fi-ee
world.
It goes without saying, of course, that the
same high degree of cooperation between Amer-
ican industry and government that produced
the Kennedy Round will be required to reap
its benefits. But the major burden of responsi-
bility for seizing the opportunity offered must
be shouldered by our matchless system of free
enterprise. The individual initiative and
' BuLMTiN of May 8, 1967, p. 708.
JULY 31, 1967
127
energy that this system and its rewards release
are what, in the end, are the wellspring of all
our achievement. In this instance, only business
and labor, working together, can produce and
sell the goods abroad that mean more profits,
more jobs, and the rising standard of living
that is the hallmark of our dynamic economy.
One tiling I'm sure is fully understood : The
name of the game is "A Good Offense." Defen-
sive driving may be the safest technique for to-
day's motorist, but for the trader in the post-
Kennedy Round age of trade the only safe
course is to sell abroad with the same aggressive
skill that is applied to the domestic market. I
think single-minded efforts to defend a position
in the home market, with concomitant failure
to take advantage of sales opportunities abroad,
can only lead to trouble.
For the Kennedy Round, to a greater degree
than anything that has ever gone before prob-
ably in the entire history of trade, represents
a very large step toward the thing we've heard
so much about in the postwar years : the truly
one- world market.
And more than anything else, we in the
United States must luiderstand and appreciate
in all its ramifications the full meaning of the
global market concept.
It means, for one thing, that the American
domestic market — the greatest and most lucra-
tive market in the world — is no longer the pri-
vate preserve of the American businessman. We
are but one corner, one segment, of that market.
We are, however, the most competitive part
of that market. And as a general rule, if you can
meet the competition here you can meet it in
many other countries of the world. And we must
sell there, we must make the effort now, if we
are to get in on the ground floor of what hope-
fully will be the greatest surge in international
trade in our history, as a result of the Kennedy
Round negotiations. To fail to do so can hurt
both a company and the Nation.
Certainly our American businessmen have the
tools to do the job — an unequaled bag of tools
that can unlock the doors to burgeoning mar-
kets everywhere. You have the managerial skills,
the capital resources, the advanced technology,
the sales and marketing ability, the skilled
workmen, the higher productivity, the econo-
mies of scale, a more intense utilization of cap-
ital stock, and the greatest array of scientific
talent the world has ever seen. If these aren't the
elements that make for success in selling in the
world market, I'd like to know why not.
But the Kennedy Round results should be
the signal to maximize the use of those tools.
And my task today is to give you an overall
view of the flashing green lights in the indus-
trial area.
Gains for U.S. Exporters
Probably the uppermost question in your
minds is, Just what did American business get
out of the Kennedy Round and what did we pay
for it ? I would like to talk at some length about
this, but as you can appreciate, I cannot talk
about the thousands of individual items that are
affected by the final agreement.
First, what did we get ? On the basis of trade
coverage, the United States received tariff con-
cessions of mostly 50 percent reductions on about
$7 billion of our exports. Close to another $1
billion were bound in a duty-free status, so that
the total package runs close to $8 billion.
These concessions are spread proportionately
among our major export markets. Over $5 bil-
lion of our exports are subject to concessions in
the European Economic Community, the EFTA
[European Free Trade Association] countries,
and Japan. Another $1..3 billion will benefit by
concessions made by Canada, with the remain-
der spread out among a number of smaller
countries.
To assess the meaning of these concessions,
let me take you back about 5 or 6 years to when
the foreign traders of this country were alarmed
at the prospects for their markets once internal
tariffs were eliminated in the EEC and EFTA.
To many U.S. businessmen the choice seemed
to be between getting into one or both of these
blocs with plant and sales organizations or run-
ning the risk of being excluded from the vast
European market by external tariff barriers.
Passage of the Trade Expansion Act gave them
some hope that the two blocs might be per-
suaded, if the other large trading nations joined
in, to move toward freer trade rather than
adopt an inward-looking attitude. At the time,
you will recall, the schedule for eliminating the
internal tariffs between countries of the two
blocs was being accelerated so that the element
of time was very important. The facts are that
the EFTA countries eliminated internal duties
completely on industrial goods at the beginning
128
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of this year, while the EEC will complete its
customs union and remove internal tariffs com-
pletely in July 1968.
Now, these tariff walls are to come down
sharply. For the EEC it will be a reduction by
35 percent in all major trade categories. Most
of the duties of the EEC's common external
tariff, which is effective next July, are in the
medium-low-range rate, that is, 10 to 15 percent.
Next July they will start to come down. In the
EFTA countries the national tariffs apply to
goods outside of the free trade area. For most
countries in the EFTA, duties were already
low. with the United Kingdom having the high-
est rates. These are also coming down, with the
high U.K. rates, generally 33 percent, being
reduced by 50 percent.
I believe that in this context the United States
has been able to reconcile its political and eco-
nomic objectives in Western Europe. At times
it seemed that we were supporting political in-
tegration at the expense of our economic well-
being. The Kennedy Round, I feel, has reduced
any fear that we are sacrificing American eco-
nomic interest for a political objective. In fact,
I think that the gains for our exporters in the
Western European markets as a result of the
Kennedy Round surpass anything that was
realistically hoped for when this problem was
before the Nation in 1962.
Approximately one-quarter to one-third of
our exports move to Western Europe, so that
it is fairly obvious what the implications for
U.S. exporters might be without the Kennedy
Round now that the internal barriers of the
European countries are in the final stage of
elimination. Now that the Kennedy Round is
over, the challenge passes to you men of busi-
ness to take advantage of the new opportimities
which will be opening up over the next few
years.
Canadian Tariff Reductions
Let me now speak of Canada, which is our
largest single trading partner. Our trade with
Canada continues to rise to the mutual benefit
of both countries, and our agreement with
Canada in the Kennedy Round is a sweeping
reduction of tariff barriers. Duties were elimi-
nated on a number of categories of goods, most
significant of which are softwood lumber, some
hardwood lumber, wood flooring except oak.
most fresh or frozen fish, and a variety of other
products. Canada eliminated her duty on coal,
and the United States eliminated its duty on
nickel.
In the field of manufactures the United
States was able to obtain a reduction in the
protective level of the Canadian tariff by about
one-fourth. Protective duties generally rim to
20 to 25 percent in Canada's tariff ; and Canada,
which at the outset of the negotiations said that
it could not join in a 50 percent linear tariff cut
because of her relatively lower industrial status
as compared with the advanced countries, has
reduced this level to about 15 to I7i/^ percent.
This is a major contribution by Canada,
which heretofore has not found it politically
or economically feasible to make significant
reductions in its protective tariff rates.
One of the most important Canadian conces-
sions to the United States, which will affect
hundreds of American exporters, is the reduc-
tion in the Canadian tariff on production ma-
chinery from 22% percent to 15 percent. For
machinery which is "not made in Canada" the
current duty of 7^2 percent will be eliminated.
When these concessions are implemented, all
machinery which is not available in Canada
will benefit from duty-free treatment. In this
one sector, namely, production machinery, the
Canadians have told us that their import entries
number over 2-10,000 per year ; so from this one
concession, duty reductions will most signifi-
cantly assist a broad range of U.S. exporters.
There are many more concessions from Can-
ada which will benefit American exporters
which I cannot cover in detail here today. How-
ever, a wide variety of goods is affected, and
duty eliminations were numerous. I should also
mention that in our negotiations with Canada
we were able to negotiate away a number of
relatively small but irritating problems which
have resulted from differential treatment by
the two countries on items which are traded
both north and south.
Japan's willingness to participate substan-
tially and actively in the Kennedy Roiuid was
a welcome surprise to us. since many felt that
Japan's rationale would be that since she was
doing well with the present setup, why join in
a tariff-cutting exercise? I think the answer
probably is that Japan's export boom has led
it to the conclusion that its economic prosperity
covdd increase enormously if it could develop
JULY 31,
129
the markets for its products in countries other
than the United States.
Japan did join in and agree to mostly 50 per-
cent reductions in her tariffs. It is our hope that
these reductions by the Japanese will open up
areas for our products which have heretofore
been closed to us because of high duties. We
sometimes hear it said by United States manu-
factui-ers that they camiot sell in Japan because
of low-price competition. The fact is that we
do sell large volumes of manufactured goods
in Japan, and Japan's increasing prosperity,
which should gi-ow with the Kennedy Round
settlement, creates a demand for more Amer-
ican products. We hope U.S. exporters will
redouble their efforts to introduce new products
to Japan and take another healthy look at the
market for their current products.
A Reciprocal Bargain
All of these benefits carried a price tag, and
I am not going to stand before yovi and say that
our negotiators gave the otliers a good shellack-
ing. This is rarely the case for any country's
negotiators, but in the Kennedy Round I think
the United States negotiators did a very good
job indeed. The Kennedy Round package is
balanced. We came out with a reciprocal bar-
gain, which was our goal. If the fuial agreement
had not included benefits of roughly equal
value for all concerned, it just wouldn't have
been completed.
I would like to take you back to the begin-
ning of the negotiations. The President's
authority was to reduce all United States tariffs
by 50 percent. This was the prospect for almost
every U.S. business that must compete with
imports. The result, however, is that we reduced
all our tariffs by an average of about 35 percent.
Other countries' average tariff reductions are
in this same area.
The items excluded from our tariff cuts are
basically those which are experiencing severe
import competition and those which in our
judgment woidd be likely to suffer adversely if
they were subject to a 50 percent reduction. So
the United States removed a large number of
articles from negotiation or made less than 50
percent cuts when it judged such a reduction
was called for in light of import sensitivity.
I have been troubled in the last few days to
I'ead some very critical statements coming from
some of our major industries. These statements
have characterized the Kennedy Round as "one-
sided" and have declared that actions taken on
cutting U.S. tariffs will be "ruinous" in certain
areas. I think we have to evaluate the results in
Geneva as to what coidd have happened, what
did happen, why the actions were taken, and
what will be the impact. Let's look at three
major sectors.
In steel, the weighted average reduction in
United States tariffs coming out of the Kennedy
Round was 7.5 percent on dutiable imports in
1964. A total of 54 percent of our steel imports
was not subject to any duty reduction ; only 1
percent of our steel imports was subject to a 50
percent reduction. This small reduction will
bring our average tariff level down from a 7.4
percent weighted average to about 6 percent.
The reductions in tariff's were part of an
attempt to harmonize tariffs on steel hj produc-
ing countries. While we reduced by 7 percent,
the EEC and the United Kingdom reduced by
about 20 percent and Japan by nearly 50 per-
cent. As you are aware, steel has a large dollar
volume, with two-way trade totaling almost
$1.4 billion in 1964. It was not an element which
could be excluded from the negotiations, but the
actual settlement was of minimal impact on our
industry.
Wliat we have done is to try to make steel
import duties a common factor in international
trade. Prior to the Kennedy Round the United
States had the lowest rates. Now the rates of the
major countries are approximately even,
averaging between 6 and 8 percent. Perhaps
more important than the duty reductions is that
for the first time the steel tariff's of all major
producing countries will be bomid against in-
crease. I am not claiming that all problems in
steel have been negotiated away. On the con-
trary, many remain; but the Kennedy Round
agreement has come a good way toward remov-
ing unequal competitive conditions for trade
in st«el.
Textiles is similarly a very large sector of our
international trade, and the gi-owth of textile
imports has been particularly strong in recent
years. In return for a 3-year extension of the
Long-Term Arrangement for cotton textiles on
the part of the exporting countries, the coun-
tries importing textiles agreed to reductions of
about 15 to 20 percent and certain adjustments
in import quota levels. Extension of the Long-
Term Arrangement has been one of our chief
goals in the negotiation, and we are very
pleased with this settlement, as are the leaders
of our cotton textile industry.
In manmade-fiber textiles our overall reduc-
130
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion was about 14 to 15 percent. Our reduction
varied by sensitivity, with yarn reduced by 37
percent, fabric by 18 percent, and apparel by 6
percent.
Our reductions on wool textiles averaged 2
percent. Virtually every major sensitive item
was excepted from negotiations. Items on which
tariffs were reduced were mostly low-trade,
nonsensitive items.
So we can again say that in a trade area of
large dollar value, with heavy pressure from
many sources for expanded entry into our huge
market, we came to a level of agreement in
which all parties found benefit, and our nego-
tiators were responsive to the serious problems
faced by this key industry.
Probably the most publicized and perhaps the
most controversial part of the Kennedy Round
agreement is in the chemical sector. This agree-
ment is in two parts, the first of which stands
by itself as an integral part of the Kennedy
Round package. Within the Kennedy Round
package, the United States agreed to reduce its
duties on chemicals by an average of 43 percent.
The EEC is reducing by an average of about 20
percent, the U.K. by about 23 percent, Japan
44 percent, and Switzerland 49 percent. United
States exports of chemicals benefiting by these
concessions amounted to about $900 million in
1964, while our dutiable imports from those
countries in 1964 amounted to about $325 mil-
lion. The favorable trade balance here is nearly
3 to 1, while the depth of tariff reduction, with
the exception of the U.K. and EEC, is about
equal to ours.
The second part of the chemicals agreement
involves the American Selling Price — a system
where the duty rate is levied not against the
foreign invoice value of the imported product
but against the U.S. selling price of the com-
petitively produced domestic product. In this
part the United States, provided the Congi'ess
enacts the necessary legislation, will eliminate
the American Selling Price on benzenoid chemi-
cals and reduce all rates in its chemical tariff
above 20 percent down to that level with certain
exceptions. These are dyes, pigments, and
azoics, which the United States would reduce
to 30 percent, and sulfa drugs, which the
United States would reduce only to about 25
percent. The EEC and the U.K. will then
place into effect the remaining portion of
their reductions so that the EEC total reduc-
tion on chemicals will equal about 46 percent
and the U.K. 50 percent. Some U.K. rates will
be reduced by as much as 62 percent. The end
result will be that virtually all chemical rates
in the EEC and U.K. will be at 121^^ percent or
below, whereas the United States will have
many rates, as noted above, at considerably
higher levels.
As a further element of the second part of the
chemicals agi-eement, Belgium, France, and
Italy will liberalize the discriminatory aspects
of their road-tax system, Switzerland will
modify its regulation limiting imports of camied
fruit preserved in corn syrup, and the U.K.
will reduce its margin of preference on imports
of tobacco. Action on these nontariff barriers
will be taken as reciprocity for the United
States elimination of ASP.
The chemicals negotiation was the most diffi-
cult to conclude, but at the same time it was one
of the most successful. We believe the United
States has an excellent bargain in both pack-
ages, and we are prepared to present the second
package to Congress for approval as soon as
time and conditions permit. The Kennedy
Round chemical package is self-contained and
will in no way be affected by congressional ac-
tion, which bears only on the second part. The
benzenoid chemical industi-y is a strong and effi-
cient industry which, in our judgment, will be
adequately protected by the rates provided for
in the ASP agreement.
Antidumping Rules
I might conclude by mentioning our attempts
at removing nontariff barriers. Here we have
not achieved everything we wanted, but on the
other hand we certainly did not give others all
they wanted. Our biggest accomplishment, of
course, was the negotiation of international
rules for dumping. These spell out article VI of
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], which covers this subject, and our ac-
complishment here is twofold. First, we have
negotiated rules which do not require changes
in our legislation and very little change in our
administrative regulations on dumping. Sec-
ondly, we have achieved international agree-
ment for fair and open procedures for United
States exporters who are charged with dump-
ing abroad. Canada probably made the biggest
contribution in this area by agreeing to require
an injury fuiding before dumping duties are
imposed.
We must recognize that beyond the ASP
package and the antidumping code relatively
little was accomplished toward reduction of
JULT 31, 1967
131
nontariff barriers, though what was done
amounts to a substantial beginning. The whole
problem of nontariff barriers will be a major
portion of future GATT agendas, and we will
be persistent in seeking effective solutions to
problems we know trouble many American
companies.
These, then, are the broad outlines of the re-
sults in the industrial sector of the historic
Geneva negotiations so skillfully handled by
Bill Roth, the late Christian Herter, and their
able associates.
Thousands of individual barriers have been
cleared from the avenues of world trade. But
only you — the dynamic business leadei'S of
America — can take advantage, for your com-
panies and the whole Nation, of the opportunity
offered. I was delighted to see a full-page adver-
tisement by a major U.S. airfreight carrier an-
nouncing some forthcoming reductions on air
cargo rates which are described as comple-
mentary to the tariff reductions in Europe. It is
this kind of aggressive marketing that will lead
more American companies to take advantage of
increased trade opportunities abroad. The name
of the game is "A Good Offense," and I know
that American business will be even more skilled
as they play it on a field which has fewer bar-
riers as a result of the Geneva agreements.
AGRICULTURE'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Secretary Freeman
I'm happy to be reporting to you today, be-
cause I have a strong personal interest in the
subject we are talking about. For almost 7 years
now, I have worked hard to expand our coun-
try's foreign agriculture trade. And it has been
gratifying work. I have had the satisfaction of
seeing our country's agricultural exports grow
from $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1960, the year
before I took office, to a new record of $6.8 bil-
lion in the 1967 fiscal year that ended June 30.
Exports for dollars climbed from $3.2 billion to
$5.4 billion in the same period.
The other day I was talking to my Cabinet
colleague Joe Fowler. Secretary [of the Treas-
ury Henry H.] Fowler, as you know, fights hard
and effectively to strengthen the balance-of-
payments position of the United States. Our
country has many tough economic problems, but
none is tougher than the balance-of -payments
problem — and it affects all the others. It is com-
plicated by the fact that what other countries
and international bankers do affects us strongly
yet is largely beyond our control.
Secretai'y Fowler said to me, 'T don't know
what we would do today if the annual agricul-
tural exports for dollars hadn't increased $2.2
billion since 1960." He went on to say that we
would long since have faced a national economic
crisis of grave proportions, that the value of the
dollar would have been seriously undermined,
were it not for the substantial flow of dollars
into the Treasury from agricultural exports.
Wliat he said is certainly true. Had dollar
exports of farm products not continued to climb
during these 1960's, we would not have had $7.3
billion in cumulative dollar earnings that have
been added to our balance of payments.
All this means that I approach this matter
of trade negotiations and trade expansion with
a deep personal sense of participation and
involvement.
American agriculture came to the Kennedy
Round in a spirit of expectation. We sought a
general lowering of agricultural trade barriers
which would give efficient farmers, ours and in
other countries, a greater opportunity to sell
competitively in the world's expanding mar-
kets. We looked on the Kennedy Round as a
means of helping world trade in general and
our own export drive in particular.
To some extent our expectations were
realized. Considering the problems encovm-
tered, we emerged with far better results than
we thought possible during some of the darkest
days when negotiations almost broke off.
We also saw fii-sthand why agricultural trade
negotiations are so difficult. We learned that
when our trading partners resisted lowering
their trade barriers on agricultural products,
in most instances they were pressed bj' the need
to protect the income of their farmers.
The Kennedy Round experience confirmed
my conviction that the difficulty of agricultural
trade negotiations lies first and foremost in the
universal farm-income problem. As a rule of
thumb, around the world a farmer gets only
about one-half as much income for his labor
and investment as the nonfarm sectors of the
respective countries enjoy.
Governments, of course, are responsive to this
discriminatory situation. The lowering of agri-
cultural trade barriers will continue to be
exceptionally difficult as long as fann incomes
lag so far behind other incomes. This farm-
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
income problem is not peculiar to foreign coun-
tries. It is our problem, too. In many cases it
determines our own trade positions.
The last 2 months the Secretary of Agricxd-
ture and senior members of the Department of
Agriculture have been holding shirtsleeve ses-
sions with American farmers all around the
country, discussing the farmer's position in our
economy and how to reinforce it. It was obvious
at these meetmgs that farmers across the nation
are deeply and understandably concerned that
they are not getting a fair share in our Ameri-
can prosperity.
Our farm prices today are lower than they
were 20 years ago. Yet the cost of what the
farmer buys has gone up 35 percent. Only by
increasing his labor productivity 6 percent an-
nually, more than twice the improvement made
by American industry, has the American farmer
managed to survive. It is true that Government
payments have helped some, but even so our
per capita farm income is only two-thirds of our
nonf arm income.
And it would be ever so much worse if our
agricultural exports had not been steadily
climbing to a point where today they absorb
the production from one acre out of every four
of his cropland and make a substantial contri-
bution to his total receipts. Agricultural exports
are of vital importance to every American
fanner.
Tangible Benefits for U.S. Farmers
I would like to turn now to what we actually
got out of the agricultural phase of the Ken-
nedy Round.
"We benefited in two ways :
First, we obtained from it some modest trade
liberalization. The Kennedy Round will give
us better access to some important foreign agri-
cultural markets. Concessions won at Geneva
will mean larger export sales in the years ahead
for many of our farm products.
Second, the Kennedy Roimd made us aware
of the problems we still face in bringing more
order into world agricultural trade. It pin-
pointed the problems. To me, this is a very im-
portant result — and I would like to return to it
later.
As to tangible benefits from the Kennedy
Round, we gained considerably in our trade
in fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, tobacco, va-
riety meats, tallow, and a number of other
products. The concessions granted by other
countries covered more than $900 million in
their imports of such products from the United
States, 1964 basis. On agricultural products ac-
coimting for over $700 million — in which we
have an important export interest — they cut
their duties an average of more than 40
percent.
The Kennedy Round also is giving us a new
grains arrangement which will provide ad-
ditional price insurance to U.S. wheat pro-
ducers. This arrangement contains significant
food aid provisions completely unprecedented
in any multilateral accord of which I am aware.
Apart from their intrinsic humanitarian
worth — and this in itself is adequate justifica-
tion for them— these provisions should open
new commercial outlets for wheat and, to some
extent, feed grains.
Reciprocally, the United States cut its duties
on some agricultural products, and imports of
such items can be expected to increase mod-
erately. Duties covering around $500 million of
the products we import were cut by an average
of 39 percent. The existing duty or duty-free
status of an additional $290 million worth of
import products was bound against upward
change. Man}' of our concessions relate to tropi-
cal products which we do not produce and were
granted for the benefit of the developing
nations.
While bargaining is never without its "give"
as well as "take," to the best of my knowledge
no American agricultural producer will be ex-
posed to serious economic injury as a result of
the Kemiedy Round. American farmers as a
whole, because of their comparative efficiency,
will be better off than they would have been had
the Kennedy Round not taken place.
Concessions won at Geneva will mean in-
creased foreign markets for a niunber of our
farm commodities. Our agricultural exports
are inevitably on an upward trend and would
increase had there been no Kennedy Round. But
the rate of increase unquestionably will be
faster because of our negotiation successes.
Now I would like to return to my second
point: our awareness of the problems we still
face in further reducing world trade barriers.
The Kennedy Round has shown the trouble
in trying to buy, with reductions in duties, re-
moval of the major barriers still standing in the
way of international agricultural trade.
The Kennedy Round has also shown that a
JULY 31, 196T
133
massive multilateral trade negotiation involving
all countries and all products may not be the
best way to get at the root of agricultural trade
problems. It i:)rovidos too much opportunity for
sidestepping the real busmess at hand.
It has shown with startling clarity the com-
plex and exasperating nature of the trade bar-
riers in agricultiu-e, and most disturbing of all,
it has shown a fundamental difference among
the major trading partners as to international
trade philosophy. Let me explain this.
A concept of orderly trade is basic to a nego-
tiation. Unless parties can agree on objectives,
they rarely accomplish anything. There must
be a mutuality of interest. There must be com-
mon ground in agricultural negotiations.
During this negotiation, all parties said they
were trying to bring about more orderly agri-
cultural trade, but I detected at least three dif-
ferent ideas of what "more orderly" meant.
Each idea was put forward by a negotiating
bloc powerful enough to prevent consensus.
The first said : Let those who can, produce —
whether the production is efficient or not. The
only test is : Are we physically capable of turn-
ing out the product and are we able and willing
to bear the cost ?
The second said : Let those who can produce
efficiently, produce. The test ought to be based
upon who can produce abundantly, inexpen-
sively, and well, and not upon who has physical
capacity and strength of treasury.
The third said : Let those produce who must
produce to exist. Whether inefficient or not, if
we can only produce a few products, let us pro-
duce them and sell them because we must. This
last view, of course, is put forward with increas-
ing intensity by the less developed countries,
which, in many cases, have neither the resources
to produce cheaply and well nor the financial
capacity to subsidize heavily.
Given these three major conflicting views, is
it any wonder that we were unable to make in
this negotiation all the changes we desired?
The Kennedy Round was primarily a tariff
negotiation. Tariffs I'emain an important means
of protecting producers in many parts of the
world. But in agriculture, particularly, other
barriers are numerous and complex. Negotiators
met with only limited success in removing or
lowering them — and on the really hard-core
products had no success at all.
Overall, as I said earlier, the problem of liber-
alizing trade st«ms from the almost general
disparity in income between farm and nonfarm
people. That disparity jooses an obligation on
evei-y govermnent to protect the incomes of its
farmers and still make sure that all the people
have enough food and fiber and other products
of agriculture. It is an obligation that has called
forth price and income programs in every
country in the world. These take many different
forms and they all affect world trade in one
way or another.
Different Systems of Farm-Income Support
The European Economic Community at-
tempts to keep domestic agricultural prices
high for most products through a variable-levy
system. The EEC sets the prices, and the vari-
able levies remove the effect of outside compe-
tition. This is truly a fonnidable barrier to
trade.
The United Kingdom favors the deficiency-
payment support system. Internal consumer
prices ai"e allowed to seek their own level. But
producer returns are kept at government-set
levels through producer payments. The impact
of this system on exporters is more obscure, but
severe nevertheless.
We have our support programs in the United
States, also. In some cases — in cotton and
wool — the program is a combination of defi-
ciency payments and tariffs or quotas. In dairy,
it is a combination of a support price and quotas
and tariff's. In grains, we use a certificate pro-
gram. Our system is different from others in
that in many cases we tie payments to acreage
reduction. In this manner we prevent price-
depressing surpluses. The United States is the
only country in the world that has taken on the
exceedingly difficult, politically hazardous, yet
im]:)ortant task of limiting production. If we
didn't do so, there would be a growing world
surplus in the grains, cotton, and tobacco, with
resultant international trade chaos. Yet this
major contribution to orderly world trade goes
largely unnoticed.
Government support programs oft«n lead not
only to import control but also to export assist-
ance. The EEC has such export assistance.
Denmark uses a two-price system in which
prices for products marketed at home are held
at one level, while exports are marketed well
below that. Other countries use marketing
boards that have great flexibility in price
practices.
134
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BT7LLETIN
Because of such programs, just the other clay
I had to make the very difficuU decision to
recommend sharp restrictions on imports of
dairy products into tlie United States." This
was not a pleasant decision. A country which
exports as much as we do must be prepared to
import as well.
But the dairy trade had become sick. Under
the EEC system of high dairy support prices
protected by variable levies, production has
increased to the point tliat heavy surpluses of
butter and cheese are a glut on the EEC market.
Under such circumstances, an EEC export pro-
gram operates almost automatically to move
these suri^luses out of the EEC, regardless of
their impact on the trade of more efficient sup-
pliers or on the economies of importing coun-
tries. EEC butter, produced at a price of 60 to
65 cents per pound, was being sold in the
United States for around 22 cents per pound.
It was entering the United States as a butter-
fat/sugar mixture in circumvention of existing
U.S. import controls on butter and in quantities
that were interfering with the operation of our
own support program.
You will recall that not too many years ago
the United States also had burdensome sur-
pluses of dairy products. But we didn't dump
ours indiscriminately into the international
market. We stored them and used them at home
in school lunch programs and to feed our
needy. We moved them abroad only when
demand was such that they did not disturb the
international market. It is a pity that other
major producers have not practiced similar
restraint.
Orienting Trade to Production Efficiency
It can be seen, then, that even if countries
were agreed on the kind of order they wanted
to put into the international trading system,
the task of reshaping its numerous and compli-
cated systems and barriers would be a formid-
able one. Even to catalog and understand them
is difficult. To deal with them all at one time
in a comprehensive way is virtually impossible.
This also we learned from the Kennedy Round.
How then can we deal with these barriers?
What kind of plan can be used? What should
our agricultural trade policy be? Ambassador
Roth has mentioned the trade policy study
" For text of Presidential proclamation 3790 amend-
ing the import restrictions on certain dairy products,
see 32 Fed. Reg. 9808.
which he will undertake next year. This will
help us decide. I cannot, of course, anticipate
it. I can suggest, however, that he explore care-
fully the following princijales, which I think
are essential.
The underlying objective in U.S. agricultural
trade policy must continue to be one of orient-
ing agricultural trade to production efficiency.
In other words, those who can produce abun-
dantly, inexpensively, and well should produce
and should be leaders in trade.
There will be exceptions, of course. If some
countries insist on f)roducing at heavy cost
simply because they are so inclined and have the
money, we can't prevent them. But we can
try in every way we laiow to show them that
they are wrong and where they are wrong and
try to get them to move toward the pi'inciple
of comparative advantage.
We should start by focusing our attention
on individual products or, at most, product
groups, and we should seek to deal in depth
with the barriers affecting them. I think we
should start such explorations among key coun-
tries in the very near future.
Helping the Less Developed Countries
In the work that lies ahead we need also to
recognize that the Kennedy Round had more
significance for the industrialized nations than
it had for the developing countries.
The United States tried hard to make the
Kennedy Round meaningful for the less de-
veloped countries. In agriculture we cut, and
in many cases eliminated, duties on tropical
products valued at almost $120 million — prod-
ucts such as Indian cashew nuts, Brazil nuts,
Philippine desiccated coconut, and so on. We
committed ourselves not to put duties on fresh
bananas and other products now duty free to
the amount of another $140 million. And we
cut duties on some temperate products in which
the developing countries have a trade interest
approaching $70 million. I know of no other
area of the world that did as much in this way
as the United States.
And much more needs to be done along these
lines by all tradmg partners. President Jolmson
said last April at Punta del Este :
We are ready to explore with other industrialized
countries — and with our own people — the possibility
of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all
developing countries in the markets of all the indus-
trialized countries.
JULY 31, 1967
135
In other words, there may need to be special
trade pi'ograms in addition to the special aid
programs through which we have been ex-
tending tecluiical, food, and other forms of
assistance for a number of years.
This is not something that will come about
quickly. But as part of the complex problem
of helping the less developed countries to
emerge, we do need to be openminded about
their obvious need for remunerative markets
for what they produce. Only by having such
markets can they ever hope to pay their own
way.
It is in our own interest that these nations
grow to a trade basis. We are spending millions
upon millions of dollars today in carrying out
our worldwide teclinical, economic, and food aid
programs. Our objective must be to turn this
one-way flow into a two-way trade flow- — and
the only way this can happen is for the less de-
veloped countries to become stronger trading
partners.
The largest potential market in the world
lies in the less developed countries, with their
large populations and largely undeveloped re-
sources. We see evidence of this market's awak-
ening. There needs to be — and can be — a general
springing to life in country after country.
Modem man is an economic being. There is no
tonic more powerful in bringing about this ac-
tion than available markets for what the less
developed countries have to sell — which, in turn,
will make it possible for them to buy the things
they need from us.
Growing Influence of American Agriculture
In this trading world of the future — which
the Kennedy Round and its lessons will help
to shape — I see American agriculture playing
an even more extensive role in feeding and
clothing the world than it is playing today. And
I see this role carried out increasingly through
commercial, dollar-earning export trade.
As I said earlier, during the fiscal year just
ended we exported a new record value of $6.8
billion worth of agricultural products. A record
$5.4 billion of this was in dollar-earning
commercial sales.
A total of $8 billion in U.S. agricultural ex-
ports by 1970 is a target we expect to reach.
And we will go on from there, I predict, with
$10 billion in U.S. agricultural exports by 1980.
Further, I look for the big increases to take
place in the dollar-earning type of exports
which, as my friend Secretary Fowler has said,
are givi:ig timely and strategic assistance to our
nation's balance of payments.
Part of this continuing advance in our agri-
cultural exports will come about through con-
tinued lowering of trade barriers throughout
the world. Our products are competitive and
they are needed. In many countries the continu-
ing pressure for supplies will override pressures
for self-sufficiency.
And as trade barriers are eased, we will con-
tinue— as we are doing — to follow up with ag-
gressive market development actions. The De-
partment of Agi'iculture is teamed today with
U.S. trade and agricutural groups to promote
sales of our farm products in more than 70
countries. This work is effective and is one of
the strong reasons for my optimistic predictions.
As an example of this export promotion, I
am announcing today that the Department of
Agriculture and our many trade and agricul-
tural cooperators will present a major agricul-
tural trade exhibit in Tokyo next spring —
April 5 to 21, 1968. This will be one of our
largest overseas promotion events in our largest
export market. Japan, as you may know, now
buys nearly $1 billion worth of our farm prod-
ucts annually. From this exhibition we will
strengthen further Japan's obvious good will
toward U.S. food and agricultural products.
And, more tangibly, we hope to see Japan con-
tinue to increase its purchases fi'om us, with $1
billion only an interim milestone.
American agriculture has immense and grow-
ing influence in world affairs today. This influ-
ence will grow as world population and incomes
rise and demand is strengtliened for the food
and fiber we can produce with such efficiency.
But trade, ultimately, is the conduit through
which the bounty we produce can reach foreign
consumers. Fundamental to that trade is the
extent to which the world allows comparative
advantage to function.
The Kennedy Round resolved only some of
agriculture's trade problems. Many remain. But
I think the Kennedy Round did help to clarify
the thinking of our own participants and of
our trading partners. It gave us new insight
and perspective as we try again.
And we must try again and keep trying. Only
as trade in food and agricultural products is
allowed to flow in a relatively unrestricted man-
ner will the world's people sliare, as they should
and must, in all the good things that modern
science and technology can make available.
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
LABOR'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Under Secretary Reynolds
Our business in the Labor Department is em-
ployment— and every billion dollars of goods
we export supports close to 100,000 jobs. We
are encouraged with the outcome of the Ken-
nedy Round. "We believe that the substantial
tariff reductions which will become effective
over the next 5 years will encourage expansion
of U.S. exports and enable us to preserve and
expand export-related employment opportuni-
ties in the United States.
In total, we do not anticipate any unmanage-
able situations of labor dislocation resulting
from the stimulus of increased imports, al-
though it could be that particular firms and
groups of workers may be adversely affected.
The combination of gi-adual implementation of
tariff reductions over a 5-year period and rap-
idly expanding manpower programs, in addi-
tion to adjustment assistance, will enable work-
ers and firms to adjust to increased imports with
minimum personal and corporate losses.
Our current balance-of-payments difficulty is
not the only reason for U.S. industry to make
special efforts to increase U.S. exports.
Another reality with significant implications
for domestic employment lies in the fact that
over the years, as U.S. productivity and effi-
ciency improve, the American manufacturer
uses less and less labor per unit of manufacture.
Consequently, we have to accelerate output in
manufacturing just to maintain employment
growth in manufacturing. For example, be-
tween 1960 and 196.5 output in manufacturing
increased by about 34 percent. However, during
the same period employment in manufacturing
only increased by about 7 percent.
We are not complaining, mind you ! We are
aware that employment patterns are constantly
undergoing change. During that same period,
while the U.S. labor force was increasing by
about .5 million workers, the number of unem-
ployed dropped almost one-half million and
the unemployment rate declined a full per-
centage point to an average of 4.5 percent in
1965. We did considerably better in 1966, when
the unemployment rate dropped to 3.8 per-
cent— the first time it has averaged below 4
percent for a year since 1953. And we hope to
improve upon that in the future.
The efficiency of American labor and industry
showed vip closer to home, also. Productivity
improvements in the 1960-65 period permitted
U.S. workers to realize most of their increased
earnings in increased real income, since price
levels remained relatively stable while gross
weekly earnings increased considerably.
The efficiency of American labor and industry
shows up in another critical measure, particu-
larly in reference to our ability to benefit from
the reciprocal elimination of trade barriers. Be-
tween 1960 and 1965, unit labor costs in manu-
facturing declined by about 2 percent in the
United States. Only Canada showed signs of
matching that performance. For our other ma-
jor trading partners, we note that unit labor
cost increased about 16 percent for the United
Kingdom, about 8 percent for Sweden, 20 per-
cent for Japan, and between 25 and 37 percent
for France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
But the considerable economic gi-owth and in-
tegration achieved by the countries of the
European Economic Community and the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association suggest that they
will also achieve the ability to improve their
cost perfonnance in the future.
We are confident, however, that we can con-
tinue to improve our relative competitive posi-
tion in world markets under our free economic
and political institutions.
Developments in the Common Market and
the European Free Trade Association made it
increasingly imperative to successfully conclude
the Kennedy Round negotiations. Both trading
blocs have made considerable progress in the
elimination of internal barriers to trade. EFTA
has no tariffs between member countries, and
the Common Market is scheduled to eliminate
all internal tariff barriers on July 1, 1968. In
1966, the combined GNP of both of these re-
gional trading blocs exceeded $500 billion.
Their internal markets are expanding and, like
the United States market, offer tremendous op-
portunities for manufacturers to increase out-
put at lower costs.
Both of the trading blocs maintain tariff and
nontariff barriers against U.S. exports which,
in conjunction with productivity impovements
to be expected from economic development and
integration, could have serious implications for
the expansion of U.S. exports and the degree
and nature of import competition in U.S.
markets.
It seems reasonable to assume that the tariff
and nontariff barrier reductions negotiated in
the Kennedy Round, and the dynamic impetus
created for the elimination of remaining tariff
JULY 31, 1967
137
and nontariff barriers in the future, will prevent
both export restriction and trade diversion fi'oin
occurring.
We are trying here to identify labor's stake
in the Kennedy Round witliin a dynamic world
of changing political and economic conditions.
We cannot afford to be complacent in such
a changing world. In fact, we stand to benefit
considerably by participating in and shaping
the changes that take place. I say again that
we expect the benefits of the Kennedy Eomid
to outweigh the cost of such temporary dis-
locations as may occur when competition
increases. Our present stake in foreign trade is
impressive.
Export-Related Employment in Manufacturing
In 1965, about 2.4 million jobs in manufac-
turing were attributable to U.S. exports of
merchandise and another half million at-
tributable to exports of services. Nearly 7
percent of total manufacturing employment
was related to the export of goods and services.
In the manufacturing sector, about 10 percent
of the machinery industries' employment is
export related — for the engine and turbine seg-
ment the ratio is 20 percent. About 10 percent
of industry employment was export related in
the lumber and paper industries; 9 percent for
scientific and measuring instrinnents industry;
10 percent for aircraft; and 14 and 16 percent,
respectively, for the chemical and synthetic
materials industries.
We emphasize manufacturing employment
because it is generally high-wage employ-
ment compared to other industry employment
and because it constitutes about 30 percent
of total nonagricultural employment.
In 1966, gross weekly earnings in manu-
facturing averaged about $112, compared to
an average of $61 and $79, respectively, for
employment in personal service occupations
and wholesale and retail trade, which together
constituted about 36 percent of total nonagri-
cultural employment.
Further, wages in our chief export indus-
tries, such as the chemicals, aircraft, and
machinery industries, are about 10 to 30 percent
higher than the average weekly earnings for
manufacturing as a whole.
So if the past and the present are any
guide to the future, the stake we have
in the Kennedy Round is high-wage and
high-quality employment opportunities and
everything that implies for a better standard
of life for all Americans.
The role of imports is another area which
we want to discuss frankly and constructively.
We sometimes hear the viewpoint expressed
that if we cut off or sharply reduce imports of
a competitive product, employment and output
in the domestic industry concerned would auto-
matically increase. By implication, this argu-
ment could be read to suggest an increase in
overall employment as well.
A complex and dynamic economy such as ours
does not operate quite that simply. There may
be particular cases where such a simple rela-
tionship might hold, but in an environment in
which national policies are geared to achieve
and maintain full employment and economic sta-
bility, such generalizations cannot be sustained.
Trade flows fi'om countiy to country in the
free world are reciprocal in nature. A restric-
tive act taken by one country tends to be
matched by a restrictive response by other coun-
tries. The net effect of such acts is most often
a contraction in world trade.
The economic effects of such a contraction
would ultimately be a reduction, relative or ac-
tual, in exports from the United States, the
country with the world's largest trade volume.
Foreign countries generally pay for goods in
dollars which they acquire directly or indirectly
from the United States as a result of foreign
goods being sold to the United States. By re-
stricting foreign access to U.S. markets, we
would limit the dollars that are available to
buyers who are potential customers of U.S. busi-
ness. The effects could also extend to the loss of
overseas markets where U.S. businessmen are
now facing more aggressive competition from
third countries and from domestic industry in
the countries involved.
In this era of close and complex interna-
tional trade and economic relationships, conse-
quences of measures which restrict imports are
most likely to have a detrimental impact on
U.S. exports and, by extension, on employment
in export industries, where wages tend to be
higher.
My point is that consideration of proposals
to restrict imports for the benefit of a single
industry must be examined in the perepective
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of the total national interest as it relates to
emploj'ment, prices, and output.
We must always be alert to situations which
migfht culminate in widespread and umnanage-
able unemployment. Fortunately, our experience
suggests that serious employment dislocation
which can be attributed to import competition
is relatively rare and can be accommodated by
the present national and international trade
policies.
Imports play a critical role in our complex
economy. Not long ago layoffs were reported
in the copper and brass products industry be-
cause of tight supplies of copper. Considerable
price pressures were reported to exist in the
stainless steel industry because of nickel short-
ages. We note also a tendency for imports to
increase when there is a possibility of an inter-
ruption to output arising from collective bar-
gaining negotiations or other causes.
Therefore, we find it difficult to accept the
simple relationship that is implied in a state-
ment tliat total employment can be increased
if we produce domestically what we now import
in considerable quantities, even if we do have
the capability of making the product.
Benefits to Labor and Nation as a Whole
Import competition, like any competition,
stimulates change. Such change may cause dis-
placement of labor which will vary in duration
depending on the speed of the change, the
adaptability of the displaced worker, and
the availability of alternative emisloyment
opportunities.
While we think it reasonable to assume that
imports, as a competitive factor, may contribute
toward displacements of labor and capital, the
analytical arts have not advanced sufficiently
to permit us to measure with any precision the
impact of imports. In a sense Congress recog-
nized this when it included the adjustment
assistance provisions in the Trade Expansion
Act. These provisions are based on the premise
that no single group should bear the burden
of injury that might result from an interna-
tional policy that benefits the nation as a whole
and that the determination of possible injury
due to imports can best be made after close
examination of particular cases.
Aside from the employment opportunities
which are related to the international exchange
of goods and services, there are the benefits that
accrue to consumers with respect to the variety
of products available in the marketplace and the
less obvious benefits which accrue f i-om the stim-
ulus of worldwide competition on the basis of
price, quality, and technology.
The conclusion we reach is that the benefits
which accrue to labor and the Nation as a whole
as a consequence of our foreign trade are such
that we look to future trade expansion resulting
from the Kennedy Round agreements with op-
timism that the net result will be more employ-
ment at higher wages than would otherwise have
been the case had the agreement been anything
less than it is.
Programs To Assist Vulnerable Industries
Before closing, I want to remind you of two
programs which we think equitably protect and
assist the legitimate interests of industries most
viilnerable to import competition and which fa-
cilitate the expansion of world trade.
The first and more active program is that
required as a result of our participation in
the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement
(LTA). A 3-year extension of the LTA was
negotiated within the framework of the Ken-
nedy Round. The Arrangement, over the years,
has permitted a limited and gradual growth of
imports in a mamier which avoided disruption
in the domestic market. The LTA has been an
important factor in stabilizing emplojanent
conditions in the industr}' and in encouraging
considerable imi^rovements in teclmology and
capital investment to be reflected in improved
productivity and wages of workers in the in-
dustry.
The second program I would note is the ad-
justment assistance program for firms and
groups of workers, one of the major innovations
of the Trade Expansion Act.
The adjustment assistance concept is that it
makes more sense to try to improve the pro-
ductivity of resources displaced or subject to
displacement as a consequence of import com-
petition than to restrict imports by means of
higher tariffs or quotas — since under the latter
there is no assurance that the necessary improve-
ments will be made to allow the firm or indus-
try and associated workers to compete with im-
ports or other domestic competition.
Adjustment assistance for woi'kers consists of
a combination of monetary payments called
JULY 31, 1967
139
trade readjustment allowances, which are based
on the worker's past earning experience and
limited to a maximum of 65 jjercent of tlie aver-
age weekly wage in manufacturing employ-
ment; training and retraining opportunities;
and relocation allowances to assist heads of
houseliolds to move to new locations where there
is certainty of employment.
Tlie desire to encourage improved produc-
tivity is illustrated by the emphasis Congress
placed on training. Under the act, if a worker
refuses to avail himself of suitable available
training opportmiities, he can be denied other
adjustment assistance. The emphasis on train-
ing is well placed. We all know from experience
that the worker who is able to adapt to, and
take advantage of, change has the best chance
to enjoy a lifetime of rising income and stable
employment. This program benefits all of us in
the long run since by improving skills and
worker productivity we increase our ability to
expand the national product and thus make pos-
sible liigher living standards for us all.
Under the Trade Expansion Act, the Tariff
Commission is responsible for making the in-
itial decisions which determine whether firms
or workers might be eligible to receive adjust-
ment assistance. Only five worker groups and
five firms attempted to obtain adjustment as-
sistance under the Trade Expansion Act, and
none of these groups or firms were found by
the Tariff Commission to meet the criteria for
eligibility for adjustment assistance presently
in the act. This experience has made both the
administration and the Congress aware of the
need to modify the criteria so that the objective
of the program relating to workers and firms
can be more fully achieved.
We have had experience with the adjustment
assistance program under the Automotive Prod-
ucts Trade Act which implements the U.S.-
Canadian auto agreement. In 18 months of op-
eration of the program, about 2,000 individual
workers filed for benefits, of whom about 1,100
were found to satisfy the eligibility require-
ments and subsequently received adjustment
assistance benefits.
The adjustment assistance benefits available
to workers under the auto act are identical to
those provided in the Trade Expansion Act,
although the procedures for gaining access to
the program and the criteria for determining
worker and firm eligibility are substantially dif-
ferent. Under the auto act, the Tariff' Commis-
sion conducts an investigation as to the facts of
the situation. The Automotive Adjustment As-
sistance Board, made up of the Secretaries of
Labor, Commerce, and Treasury, makes the de-
terminations of eligibility for groujas of work-
ers and firms.
We believe that adjustment assistance is an
effective way to assist workers and firms to
adapt to changing economic conditions. It is in
this spirit that the administration will be ask-
ing the Congress to amend the Trade Expan-
sion Act to insure that the intent and promise
of the adjustment assistance program can be
realized by workers and firms who have been
displaced because of import competition.
To conclude, I would like to leave you with
this brief summary of our stake in the Kennedy
Round : job opportunities ; higher wages ; stable
and rising incomes; and in the case of disloca-
tions resulting from import competition, the
opportunity to improve the skills and earnings
potential of displaced workers.
140
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
". . . NATO is not only moving, tag and haggage, from the
Porte Dauphine in Paris to the old Evere airfield in Brussels;
NATO is also moving from, peaceJeeeping to peacemaking, from
the mMnageTTient of a cold war to the management of detente!'''
The Golden Rule of Consultation
hy Ilarlan Cleveland
U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council'^
In the Paris suburb of Versailles a few
months ago, a touring company put on Peter
Ustinov's aging allegorical play The Love of
Four Colonels. You may recall that m this play
four officers — French, British, Ajnerican, and
Soviet colonels — vie for a lady's hand ; the lady
is perfection. Each fails, because perfection is
unattainable; and Dr. Diabolikov, who is
Ustinov's version of the Devil, offers them a
new proposition. They can, he says, go to sleep
for a hundred years and awaken with perfec-
tion in their grasp.
As they debate the issue, the Soviet officer
says he is a pragmatist; he is intei'ested not in
horizons but in breathing. The American is
attracted to oblivion; he is disgusted with his
wife and, anyway, he needs the rest. Yet as he
considers the choice, he thinks of one good rea-
son to stay alive in the world of today.
""V^Tierever you have a Russian," he says, "it's a
good idea to have an American."
In the Versailles production this line was
greeted with spontaneous and sustained ap-
plause. A member of the road-show company
said afterward that it invariably evokes a cheer
from French audiences, even in cities where the
Communist vote is strong.
There is a little mystery about this applause
line in the French version of The Love of Four
Colonels. It is not in the published play and was
apparently added somewhere along the line —
perhaps with the object of stirring up the audi-
' Made before the American Business Men's Club at
Bonn on June 20.
ence and making a political point. But what-
ever its origin, its anonymous a.uthor captured
in a short, simple sentence what most Euro-
peans and most Americans know has been the
practical basis for peace in our time : "Wherever
you have a Eussian, it's a good idea to have an
American."
This sure-fire applause line is still, regret-
tably, as relevant as ever. As long as the Rus-
sians continue to invest an impressive propor-
tion of their whole budget in the most modern
machinery of war, Americans are obliged to as-
sume that the only sure restraint on Soviet
leaders is their continuing to feel that recourse
to force or the threat of force risks setting in
motion an escalator beyond their control and
leading to military retaliation against the So-
viet Union itself.
Wliat makes it possible for Americans to stay
in Europe and work with Europeans for Euro-
pean security is a complex of transatlantic rela-
tionships called NATO. You all know about
NATO — or don't you ? I find that almost every-
body I know has touched NATO at one time or
another and come away with some image in his
mind about the Atlantic alliance.
But most of these images date from 5 or 10
or 15 years ago. There are "experts" who have
written sensibly about NATO but who are writ-
ing nonsense these days because they haven't
bothered to glance recently at the enormous
changes which time and circumstances and At-
lantic politics have wrought in the past 2 years.
How often have I read the words of a lazy com-
mentator, who has not been near the NATO
building for years, telling the alliance not to be
JTJLT 31, 1967
141
so lazy ? How often have we heard some critic,
cherishing his archaic notion of what NATO is,
filling his allotted space in the newspaper with
exhortations to bring the Atlantic alliance up
to date ?
Nobody seems to doubt that NATO has bril-
liantly succeeded in its tirst task, which was to
persuade the Soviets that military militancy
would not pay oif in Europe. Not long ago the
President of the United States called NATO the
world's greatest peacekeeping force. Yet now
some people of the Atlantic world, especially
yoimg people, it is said, are bored by the mili-
tary security of Europe; they don't remember
the last war, and they are repelled by the cold
war. What has this antique alliance done for
us lately? they ask. NATO is somehow con-
demned by the 18-year-olds because it is 18
years old.
Must NATO die so young in the hearts of the
young? Surely one should ask first what it is
about our Nortli Atlantic alliance that remains
relevant to this final third of the 20th century —
who would perform its peacekeeping function
if it were to disappear — and what new tasks this
group of European and North American allies
are already beginning to tackle in its new and
unfamiliar environment of cUtente.
For NATO is not only moving, bag and bag-
gage, fi-om the Porte Dauphine in Paris to the
old Evere airfield in Brassels; NATO is also
moving from peacekeeping to peacemaking,
from the management of a cold war to the
management of detente.
The Deterrent Force of NATO
To those who feel that peace is already as-
sured by Soviet statements and current Soviet
behavior, I can only recommend they lay off the
tranquilizers and take a wake-vip pill instead.
Once the eyes are fully opened, I suggest a close
look at the raw facts of Soviet military power
and the rising Soviet investments in the sophis-
ticated machinery of war. The U.S.S.R. today
has more strategic missiles, in better hardened
sites, than ever before. It has more firepower
in Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany,
than it has ever had there before. It has a bigger
naval presence in the Mediterranean this week
than it has e^er had there before. All in all, a
sober appraisal of what the Soviets could do to
us is quite enough to justify maintaining and
modernizing the deterrent that dissuades tliem i
from doing it.
NATO was built because the Soviet leaders of
two decades ago plainly respected nothing but
force in the realm of international affairs. The
story goes that Stalin, when he w.xs informed
of the interest of the Vatican in a certain matter,
abruptly stopped the conversation by posing a
question : How many divisions has the Pope ?
The story may be apocryphal, but it accurately
describes the reigning opinion in the ruling
circles of the Kremlin in quite recent times. This
illusory notion that force is everything was
tested, and found wanting, by a whole genera-
tion of Soviet leaders in a whole series of crises
from Berlin to Korea to Cuba to Berlin again.
Tlie critical reason these tests failed was
NATO. Allied policy and integrated readiness
proved several times over to Soviet leaders that
military militancy does not pay off in Europe.
They tested our force — three times in Berlin
alone — and found there was enough of it to
make armed adventure too dangerous a course
to suit men of power who are also men of pru-
dence. They tested our will, too — to see if we
could hold together under pressure — and found
that we could and would.
As a result of these cold-war experiences —
and in response to moderating trends witliin So-
viet society — the Russian leaders of today are
noticeably more restrained and less interested
in working themselves into dangerous con-
frontations. And so, without speculating on
what else the current Soviet leaders may have
come to respect, we can stress that the experience
of i-ecent years confirms that the Soviet Union
does, in fact, respect force and beliaves accord-
ingly.
As long as we maintain a credible peacekeep-
ing force, we may reasonably expect the Soviet
Union to maintain a policy of prudent restraint
in the conduct of its European policy. And with
a decent restraint prevailing on both sides, we
have reason to liope that agreements are possible
for making the present stalemate of forces in-
creasingly stable, more tightly controlled; in
time, perhaps, tlie stalemate can be maintained
by agreement or example at lower levels of
ready armed force, and thus at lower cost. And
as this goes on we may reach a state of political
detente in which, for the first time since before
those impatient 18-year-olds were born, we may
be able to tackle and resolve the fundamental
142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIiETIK
political issues which still divide Europe and
threaten the general peace.
Thus the respect which Soviet leaders accord
to the force represented by NATO becomes a
startinij point for defining the changing tasks of
the alliance in the years ahead.
From Military Deterrent to Political Detente
As we set about to parlay our credible military
deterrent to a credible political detente, the first
requirement is therefore to maintain the deter-
rent itself during the period of detente. We will
need our ready armed strength to persuade the
Soviets to talk sense. We will need it to keep
them talking when the going gets rough. And we
will need it to keep honest whatever bargains
can be struck for a durable peace in Europe.
The first signs of detente — brought about by
NATO and Conmiunist evolution — are welcome
indeed, if not yet very impressive. So far, the
change in East-AVest relations is mostly atmos-
pheric, compounded of one part Commiuiist cos-
metics and two parts Western wish-thinking.
In the North Atlantic Council the other day, we
took the pulse of this detente and concluded that
it is not a marriage nor an engagement, or even
a liaison, but a kind of flirtation, with the West
taking most of the initiative.
It is always dangerous, of course, to act in the
present as if the desired future had already
arrived. Our desire for permanent peace in
Europe is so strong in the West that we tend to
overreact to what our would-be Eastern friends
say and do from month to month. If they smile,
we are elated. If they frown, we are depressed.
A year ago, the prevailing opinion in Europe
was that instant detente was just aroiuid the
corner; nothing very exciting had happened
yet, but it did seem that the Soviets and Eastern
Europeans wei'e less belligerent and more ready
to talk sense than they had been at any time
since the Second World War.
But then the willingness in the West was
blunted by a series of Communist counter-
measures — the East German and Soviet re-
action to the resumption of relations Ijetween
Romania and the Federal Republic, the bog-
ging-down of proposals for a code of conduct on
East -West relations, the lack of Soviet response
so far to our efforts to engage them in talks on
antiballistic missiles, and the hard line of
Brezhnev's [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec-
retary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.]
speech at the Karlovy Vary Conference toward
the end of April.
It was in that speech, you recall, that Brezh-
nev asked us to dissolve NATO and said they
would in turn dissolve the Warsaw Pact. The
Soviets may well close down the Wai-saw Pact
anyway ; it has never been anything but a cover
for Soviet military domination of its neighbors,
and it has no political role. I can well under-
stand why Mr. Brezhnev would want us to
abolish NATO; it's the same reason that per-
suades us to maintain it: that in the face of
Soviet military power a durable East-West
detente can be built only on a durable Western
deterrent.
These disappointments in Europe are now
compounded by Soviet involvement in the Mid-
dle East crisis. While the two main subjects of
international attention were a limited war in
Viet-Nam and a limited peace in Europe, it was
just barely possible to believe in a Soviet Union
that relaxes tensions in Europe while helping
to maintain them in the Far East. But with
Soviet involvement in two crises outside the
NATO area, plus all the signs of a hardening
line on Europe and nuclear issues, the optimists
who heralded detente last year have become
the pessimists who now fear that detente is indi-
visible after all.
I suggest that the earlier elation and the cur-
rent depression are equally overdrawn. We
were not as close to enduring peace with the
Soviets as many people thought we were a year
ago. And we are not as far from peace with the
Soviets today as this season's events would make
it appear. It is futile to take the temperature of
Eastern intentions every hour on the hour and
keep adjusting our Western moods and actions
accoi'dingly. Onr problem is to move steadily
along the rough and erratic road toward East-
West conciliation and a lasting European set-
tlement. The zigzag course of Soviet behavior
is not all the Machiavellian tactics of leaders
who know exactly wha.t they are doing. Some of
it is sunply a reflection of how very hard it is for
totalitarian leaders to relax and normalize their
international relations. On the whole, friendly
relations with one's neighbors come more
naturally to us in the West ; but for the Com-
munists, friendly relations with the West re-
quire a radical wrench from the progrannnatic
JULY 31, 1967
143
hostility whicli has been for so long a way of
life in Eastern Europe.
In spite of zigs and zags, we all feel in our
bones that it makes sense to work toward a Euix)-
pean security system which rests on something
better than military standoff. And it is not too
soon to ask what NATO, while it maintains and
modernizes our military deterrent, can do about
Mtente. The answer is simple, and has already
been given in actions by the North Atlantic
Council during the past few months: for the
Atlantic alliance is the natural Western agency
for managing our side of the detente.
The Management of Detente
Hubert Humphrey, who visited Europe and
this city just 2 months ago, has been talking
about substituting an Open Door for the Iron
Curtain in Europe. The North Atlantic Council
is already deep in the business of directing
traffic through the rusty, creaky, slowly opening
door of East-West relations.
It is none to soon.
For each ally has its own ideas about how to
relax with the Soviets. The British have been
talking in Moscow about a friendship treaty;
the Germans are trying to arrange diplomatic
relations with the Eastern Europeans; the
French are negotiating scientific and military
cooperation with the Soviets ; the Poles are woo-
ing the Belgians; the Yugoslavs are promoting
East-West relations in their own specialized
way; the Romanians are reminding the Italians
of their common Latin culture. And the Amer-
icans are talking directly with the Soviets about
antiballistic missiles and the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons — among other things.
These various, mostly bilateral, discussions
do not have to be contradictory or at cross-
purposes. Detente managers can do several
things at once ; indeed, we shall have to work for
a better climate of relations through cultural,
technical, commercial, and economic arrange-
ments even as we begin to talk seriously about
the underlying political and secui-ity issues.
But each of these new East-West relation-
ships soon touches the vital interests not only of
the two nations doing the talking but of their
allies as well. We should certainly try to get to
each stage of agreement together. That is why
each of these relationships needs to be — and
most of them have been — discussed in the North
Atlantic Council.
The management of detente will test the ca-
pacity of the best minds and the largest spirits
in all the Allied nations. Already this year the
North Atlantic Council has recruited a number
of scholars and statesmen to make a wholesale
review of the future tasks of the alliance. They
are finding it not easy to mold a common policy
out of elements which until now have been con-
sidered as almost unrelated to each other: the
unity of Western Europe and the reunification
of Gei-many, the relationship of Europe to
America and the relationship of Europe with
Russia, the impact of massive and dramatic
events outside the NATO defense perimeter on
relationships within the NATO circle. To bring
into a single framework all the different kinds
of peace and relaxation we have all been saying
we favor is as challenging a political puzzle as
any of us could want to tackle.
It was quite to be expected that the first re-
sults of detente should have been a rise in ten-
sions among allies. As long as the nonprolifera-
tion treaty seemed an academic matter, because
the Soviets were not really interested in it, we
could all afford to be loudly in favor of it. As
soon as the Soviets showed signs of interest,
every political leader in the West had to ask
himself hard questions about his real attitude
toward a real treaty banning the further spread
of nuclear weapons. There were 3 years of
desultory NATO consultation before the treaty
looked real ; but starting last winter, 3 months
of very intensive consultation were required to
make sure that the treaty would appeal to each
ally as protecting its vital interests. This com-
plex and interesting negotiation in the North
Atlantic Council and with the Soviets still
goes on.
NATO consultation on the nonproliferation
treaty, which has given rise to so much comment
in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, is a good
example of the organization's role and of its
enhanced value in a period of xa'A.'^h^-dHente.
The fact that the United States has signed the
North Atlantic Treaty and sits on the North
Atlantic Council is our guarantee, aaid Europe's
assurance, that we are not going to make deals
with the Soviet Union behind the backs or
against the interests of our allies. And the con-
verse is a.lso true : That is why the German For-
eign Minister explained at the NATO meeting
in Luxembourg last week just what the Federal
Republic is trying to do to increase contacts be-
144
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
tween both parts of Germany — and drew a
unanimous endorsement from his 14 colleagues
tha.t "this internal German process was to be
considered an important contribution to the
search for a detente in Europe." ^ And it was in
this spirit of moving together toward detente^
and not letting the Soviets use steps toward
detente as another way of discriminating
against the Federal Eepublic, that the North
Atlantic Council last week "recorded its view
that tlie detente should be extended for the ben-
efit of all members of the Alliance."
In short, membership in the North Atlantic
Council is every ally's assurance that he will not
have to deal with the Soviet Union aJone. If
NATO did not exist, there would indeed be
danger of separate negotiations enabling the
Soviets to play one Western ally off against the
others — to use detente as a device for discrimi-
nation. If NATO did not exist, Europeans
might have some reason to be alarmed by the
prospect that the two superpowers might some-
how divide the world between them. But NATO
does exist and is available to manage the detente
as it has so successfully managed the deterrent
for all these years.
The political phase of NATO has thus begim.
We are ready to consult intimately with our
partners at every stage of this new and fascinat-
ing game. We ask in return only a reasonably
strict application of the Golden Rule — that our
NATO partners consult us as early, as frankly,
and as often as they would themselves wish to
be consulted. In this respect detente, like deter-
rence, is indivisible.
NATO's Global Agenda of Consultation
What about NATO consultation outside the
so-called "NATO area"? The crisis in the Mid-
dle East has brought the question sharply to
center stage.
NATO's integrated defense sj^stem, of course,
is limited by its political geography ; the Allies
have accepted the common obligation to defend
together a perimeter that includes the territory
of every NATO member and necessarily the
Mediterranean and Baltic seas and the North
Atlantic Ocean as well. But when it comes to
political consultation, the agenda of the North
' For text of a communique issued at the close of the
North Atlantic Coiuicil meeting on June 14, see Bul-
letin of July 3, 1967, p. 14.
Atlantic Council is global — which is just an-
other way of saying that the world is round.
Thus at the NATO ministerial meeting in
Luxembourg last week, a prime topic of consul-
tation was, of course, the breakdown of the
always precarious peace in the Middle East.
That did not mean the alliance itself can or
should operate in the Middle East; but it did
reflect the reality that turbulence next door to
NATO afi'ects the interests and could affect the
treaty obligations of every member of the alli-
ance. The distinction is between the arena for
international action, which is the United Na-
tions, and the place where allies consult about
their broadest interests among themselves,
which is the North Atlantic Council.
Americans' Stake in NATO Endeavors
As we measure the fluctuating chances of de-
tente against the risks of Western disarray, I
think we have to say that this past year has been
good for the alliance.
— We have stopped asking ourselves whether
we need a NATO defense system and have set
about to modernize it.
This spring we approved the first new agreed
NATO strategy in 11 years; and this month we
are starting to send messages through the new
NATO communications satellite system.
— We have stopped talking about 1969 and are
planning actively for the 1970's.
We have begun in earnest this year to share
among NATO govermnents the responsibility
for the nuclear portion of our common deter-
rent. The force plans we are now working on
this summer extend to 1973 ; and the studies of
political settlement in Europe may extend even
farther into the future.
— We have stopped wishing for detente and
have set about to seek it actively. Our problem
is to stay steady on our peacemaking course,
keeping everlastingly at it desipte the tactical
zigs and zags of Soviet diplomacy.
In all these endeavors we Americans have a
stake ; and so we have a contribution to make, a
voice to raise, a lead to take.
To those who doubt that we will stay the
course, I can only cite our record for fidelity to
what we have said we would do — which leads
us, indeed, to make good on our commitments
farther from home, for a longer time, at a
JTJLT 31. 196';
145
greater cost, tlian some of our friends think
wise.
To those who thinli that because of these far-
away commitments we have lost interest in the
future of Europe, I suggest the simplest pos-
sible test: Ask yourself whether there is any
matter of vital interest to Europeans in which
Americans and their Government are not deeply
enough involved.
And to tliose — back home as well as in
Europe — who find the frustrations of peace-
making too uncertain and the burdens of peace-
keeping too great, I can only prescribe a daily
reading of one short passage from the philo-
sophical memoirs of Dag Hammarskjold:
''You have not done enough, you have never
done enough, so long as it is still possible that
you have something of value to contribute. This
is the answer when you are groaning under what
you consider a burden and an uncertainty. . . ."
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds Second Meeting
Following is the text of a joint com/munique
rohicli was released at Buenos Aires on. July 5
at the close of a 3-day meeting of the Joint U.S.-
Argentine Trade and Economic Coinmittee.
The Joint Argentine-United States Trade
and Economic Committee held its second meet-
ing in Buenos Aires from July 3 to July 5, 1967.
The first meeting was held in Washington in
May 1966.1
The Delegation of Argentina was headed by
Sr. Enrique Gaston Valente, Undersecretary of
Foreign Commerce, and the American Delega-
tion by Mr. Edward E. Fried, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State for International Re-
sources and Food Policy.
The meeting was opened by the Minister of
Foreign Aifairs and Worship, Dr. Nicanor
Costa Mendez and was conducted in an atmos-
phere of complete cordiality. The two Delega-
tions noted that these talks reflected the spirit
of Chapter III of the Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America signed in Punta del Este in
April 1967.= The Delegations agreed that every
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 944.
' For text, see ihid., May 8, 1967, p. 712.
opportunity should be taken to increase mutu-
ally beneficial trade in both directions.
The Argentine Delegation expressed concern
over legislation pending in the United States
Congress which, if enacted, could provide for
certain restrictions on meat imports into the
United States. It was pointed out that the Ar-
gentine packing industry has made substantial
investments with a view to developing export
markets for prepared meats such as cooked and
frozen. The United States Delegation expressed
its understanding of the importance of the meat
trade to the Argentine economy and gave assur-
ances tliat the views expressed by the Argentine
Delegation would be given full consideration.
It was noted with satisfaction that market con-
ditions for beef were improving.
In response to the concern ex])ressed by the
Argentine Delegation about additional restric-
tions on dairy imports into the United States,
the United States Delegation noted that the
Presidential Proclamation concerning imports
of dairy products, issued on June 30,=* did not
affect United States imports of Argentine
cheese.
The Argentine Delegation was pleased to
note that the United States had recently sus-
pended its export subsidies on flaxseed and lin-
seed oil. The Delegations exchanged views on
current problems confronting the tung oil
market and explored possible ways of improv-
ing the situation.
The Argentine Delegation advised that the
Argentine Government had accepted the invita-
tion of the United States Government to send a
delegation to Washington to discuss an agree-
ment for the avoidance of double taxation.
The Argentine Delegation informed the
United States Delegation of its interest in ex-
panding cotton textile exports to the United
States. The United States Delegation explained
the provisions of the Intergovernmental Long-
Term Cotton Textile Arrangement,^ which aims
at providing growth for the cotton textile ex-
ports of developing countries so long as such
exports do not disrupt the markets of the im-
porting countries. This matter will be explored
further before the next meeting of the Joint
Committee.
The Argentine Delegation offered to consider
the possibilities of simplifying the consular
' Proclamation 3790 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 9803.
* For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
146
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTIXiETIN'
legalization procedure applicable to commer-
cial invoices covering United States exports to
Argentina, The discussions also covered some
aspects of import regulations of Argentina,
such as the system of prior deposits and the
customs clearance procedure.
Argentina's interest in improving the possi-
bilities of diversifying its exports to the United
States was also discussed. The Delegations con-
sidered various ways in which the United States
might assist toward this end. The discussions
a,lso covered problems relating to the Argentine
motion picture and television industries. It was
agreed to facilitate Argentine contacts with the
appropriate United States industries.
The two Delegations reviewed the continuing
cooperation of both coimtries toward the nego-
tiating of an International Grains Agreement.
They noted with satisfaction the agreement on
wheat prices and food aid reached in Geneva in
the context of the Kennedy Eound and dis-
cussed some of the problems before the negoti-
ating conference called by the International
Wlieat Council for July 12 of tliis year.
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement
on Flood Control Project
Statement hy President Johnson
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated July 6
The Governments of the United States and
Mexico have concluded an agreement for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of an
international flood control project for the Ti-
juana River in California and in Baja Califor-
nia, Alexico. Agreement was reached through
the International Boundary and "Water Com-
mission, United States and Mexico, which will
now proceed to supervise joint design and con-
struction of the project.
Once again we join with our sister Republic
of Mexico for the solution of a border problem.
The normally small Tijuana River, flowing
through the Mexican city of Tijuana and the
cities of San Diego and Imperial Beach to the
Pacific Ocean, is subject to severe floods. By
channelizing the river, the two countries can
confine its floodwaters in those cities to a nar-
row, concrete-lined waterway. These cities will
be able to develop the river's flood plains with-
out a continual threat to lives, homes, and busi-
nesses. Since tlie new river channel in the United
States will be moved southward to a location
just north and generally parallel to the interna-
tional boundary, the United States cities will
not have to contend with this river running
through their developed areas.
Each counti-y will pay for that part of the
project within its own territory, thus sharing
costs proportionally in accordance with the
benefits received. It is estimated that the United
States portion will cost $15,400,000 on the basis
of current prices. Of this amount, the local bene-
ficiaries w^ould pay $4,500,000 and the Federal
Government would pay $10,900,000. This ar-
rangement for local participation is the same
as though the project were domestic instead of
international.
I want to thank the many Members of Con-
gress who supported the legislation last year to
authorize this project, and particularly Senator
[Thomas H.] Kucliel and Representative
[Lionel] Van Deerlin for their valuable
leadership.
At three widely separated points along our
almost 2,000-mile boundary with Mexico, in the
lower Rio Grande Valley, at El Paso, and now
in California, we have new projects underway
designed to improve the border region where so
many of the citizens of both countries live and
share common aspirations.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Special Report of the National Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Financial Policies. Let-
ter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of
the Council, transmitting the Council's Special Re-
port on U.S. Participation in a Proposed Increase in
the Resources of the Fund for Special Operations
of the Inter-American Development Bank, and on a
Proposed Modification of Provisions for the Election
of the Bank's Executive Directors. H. Doc. 117.
May 3, 196T. 67 pp.
The Techniques of Soviet Propaganda. A study pre-
sented by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Revised
1967. S. Doc. 34. June 12, 1967. 63 pp.
Seventeenth Annual Report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, together with minority
views. S. Rept. 345. June 14. 1967. 51 pp.
JULY 31. 1967
147
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem; Urges
Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near East
Following is a sfateinent made on July I4 iy
U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldherg in the
fifth emergency special session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly., together with the text of a reso-
lution adopted hy the Assembly that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S./tJ.N. press release 124
Mr. President, the goal of the United States
in the Middle East, one we believe shared by
the great preponderance of the world commu-
nity, is a durable peace and enduring settle-
ment. We conceive of this goal as requiring
throughout the area far more than a return to
the temporary and fragile truce which erupted
into tragic conflict on June 5.
We are convinced, both by logic and the un-
forgettable experience of a tragic history, that
there can be progress toward the durable peace
in the entire area only if certain essential steps
are taken. One immediate, obvious, and impera-
tive step is the disengagement of all forces and
the withdrawal of Israeli forces to their own
territory. A second and equally immediate, ob-
vious, and imperative step is the termination
of any claims to a state of war or belligerency
on the part of Arab states in the area.
These two steps are essential to progress to-
ward a durable peace. They are equally essential
if there is to be substance and concrete mean-
ing to the basic charter right of every state in
the area, a right to which the United States re-
mains firmly committed: the right to have its
territorial integrity and political independence
respected by all and free from the threat or use
of force by all.
The United States stands ready to give its
full support to practical measures to help bring
about these steps — withdrawal of forces and
the termination of belligerent acts or claims as
soon as possible.
But if our goal is a durable peace, it is imper-
ative that there be greater vision both from this
organization and from the parties themselves.
It is imperative that all look beyond the imme-
diate causes and effects of the recent conflict.
Attention must also be focused, and urgently :
— on reaching a just and permanent settle-
ment of the refugee problem, which has been
accentuated by recent events;
• — on means to insure respect for the right of
every member of the United Nations in the area
to live in peace and security as an independent
national state;
- — on arrangements so that respect for the ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence of
all states in the area is assured ;
— on measures to insure respect for the rights
of all nations to freedom of navigation and
of innocent passage through international
waterways ;
— on reaching agreement, both among those
in the area and tliose outside, that economic de-
velopment and the improvement of living stand-
ards should be given precedence over a wasteful
arms race in the area.
In each and every one of the separate but re-
lated imperatives of peace, we recognize fully
that agreement cannot be imposed upon the
parties from outside. At the same time, we also
believe that the machinery, experience, and re-
sources of the United Nations can be of im-
measurable help in implementing agreements
acceptable to the parties.
The offer of such assistance by this organiza-
tion is dictated not only by the roots of United
Nations responsibility and involvement in the
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Middle East, which have grown deep and strong
over two decades; it is also dictated by our com-
mon determination, even dnty, under the charter
to save succeeding generations in tlie Middle
East from the scourge of another war.
It is against the background of this overall
I)olicy that my Government has developed its
attitudes toward the question of Jerusalem, and
I wish to mal%:e that attitude very explicit. The
views of my Government on Jerusalem have
been expressed by the President of the United
States and other high-level officials.
On June 28, the White House released the fol-
lowing statement : ^
The President said on June 19 tliat in our view "tliere
. . . must be adequate recognition of the special interest
of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^
On this principle he assumes that before any unilateral
action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be
appropriate consultation with religious leaders and
others who are deeply concerned. Jerusalem is holy to
Christians, to Jews, and to Moslems. It is one of the
great continuing tragedies of history that a city which
is so much the center of man's highest values has also
been, over and over, a center of conflict. Repeatedly
the passionate beliefs of one element have led to ex-
clusion or unfairness for others. It has been so, un-
fortunately, in the last 20 years. Men of all religions
will agree that we must now do better. The world must
find an answer that is fair and recognized to be
fair. . . .
The second statement, released on the same
day by the Department of State, read : ^
The hasty administrative action taken today can-
not be regarded as determining the future of the holy
places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.
The United States has never recognized such uni-
lateral actions by any of the states in the area as
governing the international status of Jerusalem. . . .
During my own statement to the General
Assembly on July 3,* I said that the "safe-
guarding of the holy places, and freedom of
access to them for all, should be internation-
ally guaranteed; and the status of Jerusalem
in relation to them should be decided not uni-
laterally but in consultation with all concerned."
These statements represent the considered and
continuing policy of the United States Govern-
ment.
With regard to the specific measures taken
by the Government of Israel on June 28, 1 wish
United States Repeats Concern
for Future of Jerusalem
statement by Secretary Rusk
Press release 163 dated July 14
The United States has abstained today on a
General Assembly resolution concerning Jeru-
salem. As Ambassador Goldberg indicated in
his statement earlier today, this abstention was
necessary because in our view the resolution as
presented did not fully reflect either the existing
situation or the best means of dealing with it.
But it would be wrong for any people or gov-
ernment to assume that this abstention indicates
that the United States is indifferent to the fu-
ture of Jerusalem.
The United States deeply regrets the adminis-
trative actions on Jeru.salem which have been
taken by the Government of Israel in recent
weeks. As we said on June 28' these adminis-
trative decisions cannot be regarded as deter-
mining the future of the holy places or the status
of Jerusalem in relation to them. We have made
this position clear to the Government of Israel
both before and after these decisions were taken.
We understand the deep emotional concerns
which move the people and Government of Israel
on this matter, but we are bound to point out
the need for understanding of the equal con-
cerns of others.
As we have observed before, Jerusalem is holy
to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and it is gen-
uinely tragic that this city of the highest spirit-
ual meaning has so often been a cause of conflict
in the past. Surely the lesson from this experi-
ence is that we must all do better now.
The United States Government continues to
hope that a generous and fair-sighted view will
prevail among all concerned, and its own influ-
ence will be directed to that end. It is our belief
that means of reason and of persuasion are most
likely to be successful in this purpose.
' For a Department statement of June 28, see
Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60.
' For text, see Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60.
" Ibid.. July 10, 1967, p. 31.
' For text, see iWd., July 17, 1967, p. 60.
• For text, see Hid., July 24, 1967, p. 108.
to make it clear that the United States does not
accept or recognize these measures as altering
the status of Jerusalem. My Government does
not recognize that the administrative measures
taken by the Government of Israel on June 28
can be regarded as the last word on the matter,
and we regret that they were taken. We in-
sist that the measures "taken cannot be con-
sidered other than interim and provisional, and
not prejudging the final and permanent status
of Jerusalem. Unfortunately and regrettably,
JTJLT 31, 1967
149
the statements of the Government of Israel on
this matter have thus far, in our view, not ade-
quately dealt with this situation.
Many delegations are aware that we were
prepared to vote for a separate resolution on
Jerusalem which would declare that the Assem-
bly would not accept any unilateral action as
determining the status of Jerusalem and calling
on the Govenmient of Israel to desist from any
action purporting to define permanently the
status of Jei'usalem. However, the sponsors
made clear then, as was their right, that they
preferred to proceed with their own text in
document A/2253,= and now with their resolu-
tion in A/L. 528/Rev. 2.
The latter draft does include changes which
we consider represent a marked improvement
over the original version, particularly in that
it no longer tends to prejudge action in the
Security Council. Nevertheless, since the resolu-
tion just adopted ex])ressly builds on Resolution
2253 on whicli we abstained for reasons which
we stated publicly, consistent with that vote
we also abstained today.
Even as revised, the resolution does not fully
correspond to our views, particularly since it
appears to accept by its call for recision of
measures that the administrative measures
which were taken constitute annexation of Jer-
usalem by Israel, and because we do not believe
the problem of Jerusalem can realistically be
solved apart from the other related aspects of
Jerusalem and of the Middle Eastern situa-
tion. Therefore, the United States abstained.
We have, of course, recMitly expressed our-
selves in a more formal sense by voting for a
resolution dealing with the question of Jeru-
salem. This was the Latin American resolution
contained in document A/L. 523/Rev. l,'^ which
dealt with Jerusalem as one of the elements
involved in a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East.
It is in the treatmeiit of one aspect of the
jiroblem of Jerusalem as an isolated issixe, sep-
arate from the other elements of Jerusalem and
of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,
that we were unable to support Resolution 2253.
Certainly, Jerusalem, as has been pointed out
^ For a .statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
on .Tilly 4 in explanation of the U.S. abstention on
A/RES/225.'?(ES-V) and text of the resolution, see
f6!rf..pp. 112andll3.
° For background, see i1)id., p. 108.
miiversally, I think, by every speaker, is an
important issue and, in our opinion, one which '
must necessarily be considered in the context
of a settlement of all problems arising out of
the recent conflict. In Jerusalem there are tran-
scendent spiritual interests. But there are also
other important issues. And we believe that the
most fruitful approach to a discussion of tlie
future of Jerusalem lies in dealing with the en-
tire problem as one aspect of the broader ar-
rangements that must be made to restore a just
and durable peace in the area. And we believe,
consistent with the resolution we were ready to
sponsor, that this Assembly should have dealt
with the problem by declaring itself against
any imilateral change in the status of Jerusalem.
Mr. President, since we are approaching the
end of this session on this important subject,
in which remarks were made not relating spe-
cifically to Jerusalem but ranging very broadly
on other subjects, I cannot let this occasion pass
without reference to some of tlie allegations
made regarding my Government's role in the
recent conflict in the INIiddle East. The charges
that the United States instigated, encouraged,
or in any way participated in this tragic strug-
gle are too unfoundecl to dignify by individual
comment. I dealt with many of these falsehoods
explicitly in the Security Council and will not
take the time of the Assembly to go over the
same ground here. I reaffirm what I said to the
Security Council with respect to each and every
one of these charges.'
I will merely say that one positive note in
this session has been the abandonment of the
most vicious falsehood of all — which could have
been productive of the most disastrous conse-
quences— that United States planes and mili-
tary personnel participated in the war on the
side of Israel. Before the war broke out, we
sought to prevent it by all means at our com-
mand. And once it began, we did everything in
our power to bring it to an early end. The rec-
ord of our diplomacy is very clear in this mat-
ter, despite comments which have been read
from newspapers which scarcely characterize
that diplomacy. And the record of the Security
Council is plain and clear for everyone to read
as to the actions we took, supported, and initi-
ated in the Security Council to bring the con-
flict to an end.
' For background, see ibid.. June 19, 19fi7, p. 920 ;
June 26, 1967, p. 934; and July 3, 1967, p. 3.
150
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
There is one charge about our position to
which I believe no nation in tlus liall faithful
to the charter would feel any necessity to plead.
That is the charge that we support the right
of every sovereign state member of the United
Nations to an independent national existence,
its right to live in a spirit of peaceful coexist-
ence and good neighborliness with all in the
area. That is a charge which the Charter of the
United Xations places on us all and which we
should all readily accept and acknowledge.
Our view has remained steadfast — before,
during, and now after the conflict. We extend
the hand of friendship to all states in the I\Iid-
dle East and express the fervent hope that as
time heals the scars of war, we can soon again
join our common efforts in helping build a bet-
ter, more enduring order in every state and
throughout the area, with peace, justice, secu-
rity, and liberty for all.
Mr. President, so much vituperation has
taken place in tliis Assembly, so unseemly in a
world forum, that I could not help recalling
today a statement made by my distinguished
predecessor, who died 2 years ago today in the
cause of peace. Adlai Stevenson. Adlai Steven-
son, talking about our bolo\'ed Eleanor Roose-
velt, said, ''She would rather light candles than
curse the darkness.'' And I share that spirit. I
do not see that anything is gained in the cause
of peace in the Middle East by the ^atuperation
which has taken place, vituperation not only
against my country but against other, small
countries, vituperation which has no place in
this foinun.
The time has come — indeed, the time is long
overdue — for \dtuperation and bitterness to be
tempered by sober realization of the difficulties
ahead and the willingiiess to face them squarely
and to do something about them.
"Wliat is needed is the wisdom and statesman-
ship of all those directly concerned and the
members of the United Nations so that condi-
tions of hate, too much ventilated in this hall,
can be eventually replaced by conditions of good
neighborliness.
'\Aniat is needed, above all, in the area is a
spirit of reconciliation which will someday
hopefully make possible a peace of reconcilia-
tion. I fervently hope that all in the area and
all in this hall wiD approach the days ahead
in this spirit.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION*
Measures taken by Israel to chaitgc the status of the
City of Jerusalem
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 22.53 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
Having received the report submitted by the Sec-
retary-General,"
Taking note icith the deepest regret and concern of
the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253
(ES-V),
1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) ;
2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to
rescind all measures already taken and to desist
forthwith from taking any action which would alter
the status of Jerusalem ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the
situation and on the implementation of the present
resolution.
U.N. Security Council Condemns
Recruitment of Mercenaries
The V.N. Security Council met on July 6 and
10 to con-^ider a complaint ^ from, the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. FoUoioing are
statements made in the Council on July 6 and
10 hy UjS. Deputy Representative William B.
Buffum, together with the text of a resolution
adopted iy Council on July 10.
STATEMENT OF JULY 6
U.S. /U.N. press release 119
We readily agreed this afternoon to an urgent
meeting of the Security Council to consider the
complaint from the Government of the Demo-
cratic Rejiublic of the Congo charging that
forces from outside its own country have fo-
mented disturbances in the eastern jaortion of
the Congo and, with the cooperation of dis-
sident local military elements, apparently
gained control of several important cities. The
charges are indeed serious ones, and they deserve
*A/RES/22.>i (ES-V) (A/L. 52S/Rev. 2) : adopted
by the Assembly on July 14 by a vote of 100 to 0, with
18 abstentions (U.S.).
' U.X. docs. A/67o3 and S/8052.
' U.N. doc. S/8031.
JULY 31, 1967
151
our most careful consideration. Certainly the
type of action that has been alleged would con-
travene not only the spirit but also the letter of
the United Nations Charter.
The strong opposition of the United States
Government to intervention by one state in the
internal affairs of another has been demon-
strated repeatedly. Such interference, whether
it be with armed forces or throvigh subversion or
other less obvious means, cannot be counte-
nanced. If any foreign government is in fact
aiding and abetting those in the Congo who are
seeking by force to wrest control of certain areas
from the legitimate authorities, such action
would violate the charter and accepted princi-
ples of internntional law. All U.X. member
states, in our judgment, should refrain from any
such activities and should take appropriate
measures to discourage their nationals from par-
ticipation in them.
Inasmuch as these charges are serious ones,
the Council will naturally wish to be fully in-
formed of the facts of the situation. We trust
that the Government of the Congo will make
every effort to ascertain the full facts and keep
us informed of developments as they occur. In
the meantime the United States believes it is
incumbent on all of us to do nothing that will
further exacerbate the situation there.
Since the day when the Congo became inde-
pendent the United States has been prominent
among those that have supported and assisted
the government of that nation to develop
strength and stability in order to insure the se-
curity and well-being of the Congolese people.
We have made these efforts both through the
United Nations and through mutually agreed
bilateral arrangements. This record, if I may
say in all humility, Mr. President, is one of
which my Government is proud.
And it is for this reason, as well, that we are
deeply disturbed over any threats to the steady
progress which has been made in the Congo and
we firmly support the efforts of the Central Gov-
ernment in the Congo to restore order and to
exercise its legitimate authority throughout the
country. We deplore any attempts by outside
forces to interfere with those efforts. I am sure
that this will also prove to be the attitude
of other members of this Council and feel con-
fident that within a short time it will again be
possible for all of the people in the Congo to live
in peace and free from fear, as they so richly
deserve.
STATEMENT OF JULY 10
U.S. /U.N. press release 122
Mr. President, although the drnft resolution ^
which has just been introduced by the distin-
guished representative of Nigeria does not co-
incide with our preferences in every respect, the
United States will vote affirmatively. We will
do so because we fully support the efforts of the
Democratic Kepublic of the Congo to exercise
its legitimate authority throughout the country
and to restore order wherever order is disrupted.
Mr. President, in our view, if any foreign gov-
ernment aids or abets any elements in the
Congo, whether these be mercenaries or irregu-
lar forces seeking to overthrow the Government
or to gain control of any part of the country,
such action would be in clear violation of the
United Nations Charter and deserving of our
condemnation. This was our policy, sir, 3 years
ago when secessionist elements in the eastern
Congo were engaged in large-scale conflict, with
substantial support from the Chinese Com-
munists, to wrest control from the Central Gov-
ernment ; and this remains our policy today.
We will vote for the resolution this evening
because we support the principle of noninter-
ference in the internal affairs of the Congo. In
doing so, we do not consider that by this reso-
lution the Council is making any specific finding
with regard to any specific government.
Mr. President, the United States has not been
content to give merely moral support to the
principles endorsed in this resolution this
evening. On the contrary, we have sought to
provide the Government of the Congo with some
of the tools which it needs to do the job in
protecting its integrity and its political
independence.
It was in this connection that over the past
weekend the United States, in response to a
request from President Mobutu and consistent
with previous United Nations resolutions deal-
ing with the Congo problem and calling foi'
assistance in helping that government to main-
tain its independence and territorial integrity,
dispatched three C-130 transport aircraft and
crews to Kinshasa. These are aircraft, I should
like to make clear to the Council, which are
designed to provide long-range logistic support
for the Congolese Government in meeting the
' U.N. doc. S/8050.
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mercenarj'-led rebellion. They will be there in
a noncombatant status.
This action reflects our longstanding policy
of supporting the Central Government and the
unity of the Congo, and it is in this spirit that
we will support the resolution sponsored by
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, and India.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
TEXT OF RESOLUTION'
The Security Council,
Saving taken cognizance of the mefsage of the
Congolese Government contained in document S/S031,
Eaving discusxed the serious developments in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Concerned by the threat posed by foreign interfer-
ence to the independence and territorial integrity of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1. Reaffirms in particular paragraph 2 of Security
Council resolution 226 (1960) of 14 October 1966;'
2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting
or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the
provision of facilities to them, with the objective of
overthrowing the Governments of States Members of
the United Nations ;
3. Calls upon Governments to ensure that their ter-
ritory and other territories under their control, as
well as their nationals, are not used for the planning
of subversion, and the recruitment, training and
transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ;
4. Decides that the Security Council shall remain
seized of the question ;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely
the implementation of the present resolution.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed helow) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus for the period December 6,
1966, to June 12, 1967. S/7969. June 13, 1967. 74 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Coun-
cil in pursuance of operative paragraph 3 of the
Council's resolution of June 14 (S/RES/237 (1967) )
concerning the civil population and prisoners of war
in the area of conflict in the Middle East. S/8021.
June 29, 1967. 6 pp.
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at New York
October 20, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957.
Notification of icithdrawal: Honduras, effective June
19, 1967.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December
13, 1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: July 12, 1967.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered Into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 10, 1967.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes, as amended (TIAS
4900, 6109). Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered
into force for the United States December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, May 31, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow January
27, 1967.1
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 12, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement. 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June
1, 1967, inclusive.'
Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 12, 1967;
Canada, July 14, 1967.
Accessions deposited: Japan, July 10, 1967; Saudi
Arabia, July 13, 1967 ; Austria, July 14, 1967.
Notification of undertaking to seek approval de-
posited: Switzerland, July 6. 1967.
Notifications of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Federal Republic of Germany, July 12,
1967; Guatemala, July 7, 1967; Israel, July 13,
1967.
Notifications of undertaking to seek accession de-
posited: Italy, July 14, 1967; Libya, July 10, 1967.
'S/RES/239 (1967) (S/8050) ; adopted unanimously
on July 10.
* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 760.
' Not in force.
JTJLT 31, 1967
153
BILATERAL
Dahomey
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Dahomey. Effected by exchange
of notes at Cotonou June 30 and July 3, 1907. En-
tered into force July 3, 1967.
Israel
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton July 13, 1967. Entered into force July 13, 1967.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6052, 6074, 612.5, 6194). Effected by an exchange of
notes at Rawalpindi and Islamabad June 28, 1967.
Entered into force June 28, 1967.
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 3, 1967. Entered into force July 3, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hj/ the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium,
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27,
1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Brussels February
2 and 22, 1967. Entered into force February 22, 1967.
TIAS 6229. 3 pp. 5(S.
Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement
with Japan, amending the agreement of September 12
and 19, 1966. Exchange of notes — Dated at Tokyo
February 21 and March 14, 1967. Entered into force
March 14, 1967. TIAS 6230. 4 pp. 5«i.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Cameroon.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 7,
1967. Entered into force March 7, 1967. TIAS 6231. 5
pp. 5<f.
Educational Commission. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
amending the agreement of May 10, 1965. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London February 16, 1967. Entered
into force February 16, 1967. TIAS 6232. 2 pp. 5<f.
Cultural Relations. Agreement with Romania. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Bucharest February 18,
1967. Entered into force February 18, 1967. TIAS 6233.
8 pp. 10<S.
Education — Commission for Educational and Cultural
Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs.
Agreement with the United Arab Republic. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Cairo January 5 and February 21,
1967. Entered into force February 21, 1967. TIAS 6234.
11 pp. io«;.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem-
bourg, amending Annex B to the agreement of Janu-
ary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Luxem-
bourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into force March
14, 1967. TIAS 6235. 3 pp. 5<#.
Saint Lawrence Seaway — Tolls for the Montreal/Lake
Ontario Section Lockage Fee on the Welland Canal.
Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of
March 9, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ottawa March 31, 1967. Entered into force March 31,
1967. TIAS 6236. 3 pp. 54.
Defense — C-47 Aircraft. Agreement with Mali. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Bamako January 5, 1967.
Entered into force January 5, 1967. TIAS 6238. 4 pp.
5^.
Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Israel, amending
the agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21
and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967. TIAS
6240. 4 pp. 5(f.
Extradition — Correction of Text of the Convention of
December 10, 1962. Agreement with Israel. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Jeru.salem and Tel Aviv April 4 and
11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967. TIAS 6246.
2 pp. 54.
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX 'luMl 31, 1967 Vol. LVH, No. U66
Agriculture. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chap-
ter in the History of International Commerce
(Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) . . 123
Argentina. U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds iiecond Meeting (communique) . . . 146
Congo (Kinshasa). U.N. Security Council Con-
demns Recruitment of Mercenaries (BufEum,
text of resolution) 1-51
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 147
Developing Countries. The Kennedy Round :
Proud Chapter in the History of International
Commerce (Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trow-
bridge) 12.3
Economic Affairs
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting (communique) 146
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con-
trol Project (Johnson) 147
Europe. The Golden Rule of Consultation (Cleve-
land) 141
Labor. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in
the History of International Commerce ( Free-
man, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) .... 123
Mexico. U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on
Flood Control Project (Johnson) 147
Near East
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem ;
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near
East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148
United States Repeats Concern for Future of
Jerusalem (Rusk) 149
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Golden
Rule of Consultation (Cleveland) .... 141
Presidential Documents. U.S., Mexico Conclude
Agreement on Flood Control Project . . . 147
Publications. Recent Releases 154
Trade
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting (communique) 146
Treaty Information
Current Actions 153
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con-
trol Project (Johnson) 147
U.S.S.R. The Golden Rule of Consultation
(Cleveland) 141
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 153
U.N. Security Council Condemns Recruitment of
Mercenaries (BufCum, text of resolution) . 151
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolutions on Jerusalem ;
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near
East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148
Name Index
BufEuni, William B 1.51
Cleveland, Harlan 141
Freeman, Orville L 123
Goldberg, Arthur J 148
Johnson, President 147
Reynolds, James J 123
Roth. William M 123
Rusk, Secretary 149
Trowbridge, Alexander B 123
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 10-16
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
No. Date Subject
tl56 7/10 Restrictions on travel to Lebanon
lifted.
*157 7/11 Hernandez sworn in as Ambassador
to Paraguay (biographic details).
tl58 7/13 U.S.-Israel Cotton Textile Agree-
ment.
tl59 7/i:;! U.S.- Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Committee.
*160 7/14 Pollack appointed Director of Inter-
national Scientific and Techno-
logical Affairs; Joyce, Deputy
Director (biographic details).
*161 7/14 Program for visit of President
Asgeir Asgeirsson of Iceland
tl62 7/15 U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning
incident in the port of Haiphong
on June 29.
163 7/14 Rusk : U.N. resolution on Jerusalem.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bdli.etin.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1467
August 7, 1967
SECRETAEY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 19 169
ISSUES IN FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
Statement hy William M. Roth 173
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Statement 1>y Assistant Secretary Solomon 180
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1467 Publication 8273
August 7, 1967
Fot sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Oovemment Printing Office
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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STATE BULLETIN es the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
tbe Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
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tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
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States is or may become a parly
and treaties of general interruitional
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Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19
Press release 164 dated July 19
I'd like to welcome to the conference today
a group of college interns who are working with
us in the Department this summer. We always
greatly value the contribution which they make,
and we hope that their experience here will in-
fect some of them with the desire to take on
careers in the field of foreign affairs.
I would like to express our very great dis-
tress at the death of former President Castello
Branco of Brazil in an airplane accident. I
think when the history of Brazil is written for
this period, historians will find that he made
a very substantial contribution to his country
and to the hemisphere, not only in pulling
Brazil away from the slippery slope into un-
controlled and disastrous inflation but also in
maintaining the options for Brazil in moving
toward a sound constitutional system. We very
greatly regret his death in an airplane accident
yesterday.
Also, I've sent condolences to the Govern-
ment of the Malagasy Republic because of the
death of my distinguished colleague the For-
eign Minister, Mr. Albert Sjdla who has been
Foreign Minister since 1960, who also was lost
in an airplane accident yesterday.
And I'm ready for your questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary^! how do you assess the state
of U.S. -Soviet relations in the light of the
Glassioro conference ^ and Soviet arvfis ship-
ments to the Aral) states in the continuing
Middle East crisis?
A. There's been no dramatic change in our
relations with the Soviet Union in recent weeks.
I think the Glassboro talks were highly useful.
They were hard-working talks. The President
and Chairman Kosygin had a chance, over a
' For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 35.
period of 9 or 10 hours, to go over the world
situation in considerable detail.
I think that the fact that they did meet was
a plus. There would have been general dis-
aiDpointment throughout the world and in this
country had they not found it possible to meet.
The fact that they were able to expose to each
other their points of view in considerable de-
tail at least made it possible for each side to
understand somewhat more clearly the respec-
tive views of the two Governments.
We did not expect miracles to emerge from
the Glassboro talks. The net effect of those talks
will be manifested in the weeks and months to
come as we try to find agreement on particular
points.
As far as we're concerned, we are prepared
to try to find points of agreement with the
Soviet Union — on small points such as cultural
exchanges and on large points such as Viet-Nam
or the Middle East.
But there are obvious differences which are
far reaching between our two countries. The
basic objectives of the Soviet Union continue
to be to support the world revolution. The ques-
tion of means is important. We hope that the
Soviet Union will understand the importance
of prudence in a world situation in which frail
human beings have weapons of mass destruc-
tion at their disposal. So we do not approach
our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis
of total hostility on the one side or any illusions
about the depth and the importance of the ques-
tions which separate us.
Now, this is a matter which requires continual
work day after day, week after week 
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